His argument might have force if he had shown how, on any supposition advanced, a mere suspension of Divine agency would render a less complicated apparatus sufficient for the purpose. No liquid having qualities common with any known liquid could consistently be left on the eye. We hold there is no conceivable mode of attaining the desired end more simple or natural than the one devised. The Creator acts by general, simple laws, and the uniformity, harmony, and simplicity manifest in all his works are seen in this instance.

The liability of the organization of animals to injury and disarrangement from various causes, furnishes another illustration of the author's argument. Bones are broken; limbs are severed; the teeth decay; the lungs inflame; the heart enlarges, or its valves ossify. There are ten thousand other accidents and disorders incident to our constitution, and the circumstances in which we are placed. From these causes much privation and suffering result. Remedial provisions are, moreover, found incorporated, to a greater or less extent, in the structure of all animals; provisions for the reparation of injuries, and the reproduction of those parts which have been lost by accident or disease. The author not only thinks these facts more consistent with his theory than any other, but says,―

"If we suppose the phenomena connected with matter to be immediately dependent upon the power of God, we must then refer these evils directly to his will, and suppose them to be as really and as fully intended by him as any of the most obvious ends of our creation; an idea not only contradicted by everything which we behold around us, but one from which our whole moral nature revolts; for it makes God responsible for the evil in the world, not inseparably connected with the means employed for the production of a greater amount of good, but as existing by itself and for its own sake." -P. 355.

In reply to this, we assert that the theory of direct Divine agency no more makes God responsible for evil than the other. If at first he gave matter laws and properties producing action, he foresaw their effects, and designed them. The difficulty, if any exist, is as great on one supposition as the other. The same remark applies to the alleged complexity of the animal organization. If it results from the properties of matter, God so constituted them as to produce it. Nearly all the difficulties suggested by Mr. Chace may be urged as strongly against his theory as the other. It is an error to represent that, according to our theory, the disarrangement and suffering in nature are "objects of Divine intention;" "as fully intended by Him as any of the most obvious ends of our creation." A few principles, marked by simplicity and uniformity in given

circumstances, characterize the manifestations of Divine power. The greater part of human suffering results from ignorance or wickedness. If, through other agencies, the plans of Deity are interrupted, if the animal system is deranged, we cannot expect him to produce the results of a healthy organization by departing from the fixed principles of his government. It may not be conceivable, on any system, how this uniformity could be secured without some apparent evil.

The author's last argument is founded on simplicity, which he alleges is found in his system; while he says of the opposite, “it is wholly wanting in that beautiful simplicity which, as we have said, characterizes all the operations of nature. It cannot therefore be true." Apply this test in the strictest sense, and we think but a casual investigation will be required to determine which system is sustained by it. In the theory of direct Divine agency, we see the same Being who created all things, upholding them, and causing all the varied phenomena of nature, in accordance with a few fixed general principles. We see a cause adequate to produce all the results we witness. "We look through nature up to nature's God." In the opposite hypothesis matter is presented as inert, powerless, yet endowed with certain indefinite, indefinable properties, acting with power scarcely less than omnipotent, and intelligence more than human. One theory presents us one cause whose existence is clearly proved, whose action is harmonious; the other presents us with several, whose existence is at best but conjectural, and whose action is involved and discordant.

Mr. Chace thinks it a disparagement of the Deity to suppose his power

"To be exerted every moment about each one of all the innumerable atoms contained in the universe .. following them through all their combinations and changes, varying its manifestation with every new condition under which they are placed."-P. 355.·

We have already remarked on the harmony in the opinions of Mr. Chace and the author of the "Vestiges." They differ only in this, that one pushes their common principles further than the other. The author of the "Vestiges" thinks it

"The narrowest of all views of the Deity, and characteristic of an humble class of intellects, to suppose him constantly acting in particular ways for particular occasions."-P. 119.

Indeed, in his estimation, it is "a very mean view of the creative Power," which considers it as immediately exerted,

"At one time to produce zoophytes; another time to add a few marine mollusks; another, to bring in one or two conchifers; again, to produce crustaceous fishes; again, perfect fishes; and so on to the end."-P. Î17.

He thinks more than a sufficient condemnation of the doctrine of original and separate creations is found

"In the single fact that it necessitates a special fiat of the inconceivable Author of this sand-cloud of worlds to produce the flora of St. Helena." Explanations, p. 108.

Thus one thinks it unreasonable and absurd to suppose Deity would stoop to direct the atoms of matter, to uphold the universe directly by his power; and the other, that it is a supposition disparaging to the dignity of his character to suppose he would immediately create the various orders of beings whose existence is revealed to us. One view is as reasonable as the other; for if God could create the myriads of animalculæ that float on a sunbeam, or swarm in a drop of water, we surely may consider it no degradation to suppose him constantly employed in originating the magnificent operations his universe presents. This view, as maintained by both these authors, is but a revival of the old infidel argument against the doctrines of a special Providence and man's accountability, founded on the insignificance of the Creator's own works when compared with himself. It is a suspicious circumstance against any theory, that it is made in any way to depend upon it. Christian men in the present age surely cannot need its formal refutation. The Scriptures represent our heavenly Father as exercising a constant superintendence over his works, and giving them the most minute attention. He feeds the ravens; he hears the young lions when they roar, and seek their meat from him; he sees the sparrows when they fall; he feeds the fowls of the air; he gives beauty to the lily, and clothes the grass of the field. By him even the hairs of our heads are all numbered. It is the most unnatural and unreasonable view of God, that represents him as neglecting any of his works on account of their comparative insig nificance. Though the Lord be high, yet hath he respect unto the lowly." Though he warms the breast of the highest angel in heaven, yet he breathes life into the meanest insect on earth. He shines in the verdure that clothes the plains, in the lily that delights the vale, and in the forest that waves on the mountain. He supports the slender reed that trembles in the breeze, and the sturdy oak that defies the tempest."

The system that excludes the immediate Divine agency from nature, denies, of course, the doctrine of special Providence, and makes prayer, at least so far as relates to temporal blessings,

absurd. If the properties of matter produce all its changes, it is vain to pray to God for deliverance from the pressure of calamity in the day of evil. When the heavens are brass, the showers fail, the herbage is withered, the barren fields elude the tiller's toil, and the hopes of the husbandman perish; no fasting, fervent prayer of perishing thousands, no deep humility, can move God to change nature's dreary aspect. When the howling of the midnight tempest brings fearful agitation to a mother's heart, as she thinks of her sailor boy exposed to its fury on the ocean, we cannot tell her to have faith in God, and pray trustingly for the safety of her child, for such prayers are impotent and vain.

Scripture, indeed, assures us that God has not left himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons. "Whatsoever the Lord pleaseth, that did he in heaven and in earth, in the seas and all deep places. He causeth the vapours to ascend from the ends of the earth; he maketh lightnings for the rain; he bringeth the wind out of the treasuries.' Fire and hail, snow and vapour, stormy wind fulfil his word. He commandeth and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves of the sea. He maketh the storm a calm, so that the waves thereof are still. We might suppose that He who has promised to deliver all who in trouble call upon him, having such control over nature, might interpose his Almighty arm to save; but men considered wise tell us this is vain; that God rules not in the domain of nature.

From their theory it follows, that we might as well pray to the north wind, to the driving sleet, or the raging tempest, as to ask God for deliverance.

The views of Mr. Chace would seem to sanction those infidel, though beautiful lines of Pope:

"Shall burning Etna, if a sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires?

On air or sea new motions be impress'd,

O blameless Bethel! to relieve thy breast!

When the loose mountain trembles from on high,

Shall gravitation cease if you go by?

Or some old temple, nodding to its fall,

For Chartres' head reserve the hanging wall ?”

With reference to the objection founded on prayer, it may be said that God, foreseeing all things, had reference to prayer in the original direction given to the properties of matter, and ordered events accordingly. From this it would follow that prayer is a part of the universal scheme of things, and is as directly governed

by the law of necessity as matter. When the Almighty created matter, and gave it those laws which make its phenomena fixed and sure, he made provision for a certain number of effectual prayers, neither more nor less, and these prayers must be offered: the stability of the universe depends on it. Of course, all anxiety relative to prayer may cease. If we were selected in the beginning to utter a part of these prayers, we must present them; if not, we cannot pray acceptably.

We are thus led into the wildest system of predestination and fatalism. We consider the objection to the views we oppose founded on the doctrine of a special Providence, and the duty of prayer, as conclusive.

Before leaving the article of Mr. Chace, we wish simply to notice a singular statement near its close. He propounds the question relative to the origin of matter, and states that it lies wholly beyond the reach of our faculties-reason does not take hold of it— aside from revelation, we have no means of forming an opinion upon the question whether matter is eternal and self-existent, or whether it had a beginning, and derived its existence from a power without itself.

This conclusion follows naturally from his theory. But if this be true, of course the existence of God cannot be proved from the existence and phenomena of the material universe, and reason has no argument from nature against Atheism. It tells us of matter as having real existence, possessing inherent and underived qualities, and, by virtue of these, capable of producing all the phenomena of the material universe; but surely it points not to God, but strengthens rather the hands of infidels. Such are the conclusions to which we must be led when we deny the immediate agency of God in his works.

We think it is time that more definiteness relative to the causes of natural phenomena should be exhibited in the works on natural science put into the hands of the young. It would seem as though many of their authors did not "like to retain God in their knowledge." Seldom do they make any attempt to lead the young mind "through nature up to nature's God." In many of these works the Deity is not named. The great First Cause, ever present and ever acting, is excluded, and we are told of nature, of inherent properties, of essential properties, and these are set forth as the causes of all events transpiring in the material world. This is the language of infidels. Meeting with these terms used as causes in their writings, the young mind is easily led to receive their speculations. Thus the teaching of philosophy in Christian