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never again appeared against the Romans with their keeping at a distance from their main body, and rewhole force.

These severe contests had not brought Cæsar far into the interior of the island; but now he followed up Cassivellaunus, who retired, for the defence of his own kingdom, beyond the Thames. Marching through Kent and a part of Surrey, or the beautiful country which now bears those names, the Romans reached the right bank of the Thames, at Cowaystakes, near Chertsey' in Surrey, where the river was considered fordable. The passage, however, was not undisputed: Cassivellaunus had drawn up his troops in great numbers on the opposite bank; he had likewise fortified that bank with sharp stakes, and driven similar stakes into the bed of the river, yet so as to be concealed or covered by the water. Of these things Cæsar says he was informed by prisoners and deserters. It should appear that he overcame the obstacles raised at the ford with great ease; he sent the horse into the river before, ordering the foot to follow close behind them, which they did with such rapidity that, though nothing but their heads appeared above water, they were presently on the opposite bank, where the enemy could not stand their charge, but fled.

The rest of his army having disbanded, Cassivellaunus now retained no other force than 4000 warchariots, with which he harassed the Romans, always This point, like most of the other localities mentioned by Caesar, has been the subject of dispute. We venture to fix it where we do, on the authority of Camden, and Mr. Gale, a writer in the Archæologia, vol 1. p. 183.

tiring, when attacked, to woods and inaccessible places; whither also he caused such of the inhabitants as lay on Cæsar's line of march, to withdraw with their cattle and provisions. Being perfectly acquainted with the country, and all the roads and defiles, he continued to fall upon detached parties; and the Romans were never safe, or masters of any ground, except in the space covered by their entrenched camp or their legions. On account of these frequent surprises, Cæsar would not permit his horse to forage at any distance from the legions, or to pillage and destroy the country, unless where the foot was close at hand to support them.

The fatal want of union among the petty states into which the island was frittered, and the hatred some of them entertained against their former enemy Cassivellaunus, now, however, began to appear and to disconcert all that chief's measures for resistance. The Trinobantes, who dwelt in Essex and Middlesex, and who formed one of the most powerful states in those parts, sent ambassadors to Cæsar. Of this state was Mandubratius, who had fled to Cæsar into Gaul, in order to avoid the fate of his father, Imanuentius, who had held the sovereignty of the state, and whom Cassivellaunus had defeated and put to death. The ambassadors entreated Cæsar to restore their prince, who was then a guest in the Roman camp, to defend him and them against the fury of Cassivellaunus, promising, on these conditions, obedience and entire submission in the name of all the Trinobantes.

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HUTS IN A CINGALESE VILLAGE.

Cæsar demanded forty hostages, and that they should supply his army with corn. The general does not confess it, but it is very probable that, through the wise measures of Cassivellaunus, the Romans were at this time sorely distressed by want of provisions. The Trinobantes delivered both the corn and the hostages, and Cæsar restored to them their prince. Immediately upon this, other tribes, whom Cæsar designates the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Cassi, also sent in their submission. Some of these people informed Cæsar that he was not far from the capital of Cassivellaunus, which was situated amidst woods and marshes, and whither multitudes of the British had retired with their cattle, as to a place of safety. This town is supposed to have been near to the site of St. Alban's, and on the spot where the flourishing Roman colony of Verulamium arose many years after. Though called a town, and a capital, it appears from Cæsar to have been nothing but a thick wood or labyrinth, with clusters of houses or villages scattered about it, the whole being surrounded by a ditch and a rampart, the latter made of mud or felled trees, or probably of both materials mixed. In many respects the towns of the Cingalese in the interior of Ceylon, and the mode of fighting against the English practised by that people, at the beginning of the present century, resemble the British towns and the British warfare of nineteen centuries ago.

Cæsar soon appeared with his legions before the capital of Cassivellaunus; and he says, that though the place seemed very strong both by art and nature,

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he resolved to attack it in two several points. He was once more successful: the Britons fled to another wood, after a short stand, and the Romans took many prisoners and vast numbers of cattle. Though thus defeated in the inland districts, Cassivellaunus still hoped to redeem the fortunes of his country by a bold and well-conceived blow, to be struck on the sea-coast. While the events related were passing beyond the Thames, he dispatched messengers to the four princes or kings of Cantium (Kent), to instruct them to draw all their forces together, and attack the camp and ships of the Romans by surprise. Kentish Britons obeyed their instructions, but, according to Cæsar, the Romans, sallying from their entrenchments, made a great slaughter of their troops, took one of the princes prisoner, and returned in safety to the camp. At the news of this reverse, the brave Cassivellaunus lost heart; he sent ambassadors to sue for peace, and availed himself of the mediation with Cæsar of Comius, the king of the Atrebatians, with whom, at one time or other, he appears to have had friendly relations. The Roman general, as we have noticed, states that the authority or influence of Comius in the island was very considerable. It would be curious to see how he exercised it in favor of his Roman patron; but here we are left in the dark. Cæsar turned a ready ear to the overtures of Cassivellaunus, and granted him peace on such easy conditions, that some writers have been induced to believe that he was heartily tired of the harassing war. For himself he only says that he was in a hurry to return to Gaul, on account of the

and sizes, some being rude, and others of curious and even elegant workmanship. Those most commonly in use, and called Esseda, or Esseda, by the Romans, were made to contain each a charioteer for driving, and one, two, or more warriors for fighting. They were at once strong and light; the extremity of their axles and other salient points were armed with scythes and hooks for cutting and tearing whatever fell in their way, as they were driven rapidly along. The

frequent insurrections in that country. He merely demanded hostages, appointed a yearly tribute (the amount of which is nowhere named, and which was probably never paid), and charged Cassivellaunus to respect Mandubratius and the Trinobantes. Having received the hostages, he led his troops back to the Kentish coast, and crowding them into his ships as closely and quickly as he could, he set sail by night for Gaul, fearing, he says, the equinoctial storms which were now at hand. He tells us he had many prison-horses attached to them were perfect in training, and ers; but he certainly did not erect a fort, or leave a single cohort behind him, to secure the ground he had gained in the island.1

Tacitus, writing 150 years later, says distinctly, that even Julius Cæsar, the first who entered Britain with an army, although he struck terror into the islanders by a successful battle, could only maintain himself on the sea-coast;—that he was a discoverer rather than a conqueror. He only saw a small portion of the island; but the farther he got from the coast and the Belgic colonies, the more fierce and barbarous he found the natives.

We have dwelt more particularly on these campaigns, as we have the accomplished general's own account to guide us, and as many of his details may be applied to explain the other Roman wars which followed, when there was no Cæsar to describe in the closet his exploits in the field. The sequel, indeed, when we must follow professional historians, who were never even in Britain, is comparatively uninteresting and monotonous. We shall, therefore, set down the great results, without embarrassing the reader with unnecessary details; but at this point it will be well to pause, in order to offer a few general remarks, which will equally elucidate the past and future campaigns of the Romans in our island.

The contest which had thus taken place between the British bands and the famed Roman legions at a period when the discipline of those corps was most perfect, and when they were commanded by the greatest of their generals, was certainly very unequal; but less so (even without taking into account the superiority of numbers and other advantages, all on the side of the invaded) than is generally imagined and represented. A brief examination of the arts and practices of war of the two contending parties may serve to explain, in a great measure, what is past, and render more intelligible the events which are to ensue. The first striking result of such an examination is a suspicion, and indeed a proof, that the Britons were much farther advanced in civilization than the savage tribes to which it has been the fashion to compare them. Were this not the case, the somewhat unsuccessful employment against them of so large an army as that of Cæsar, would be disgraceful to the Roman name. Their war-chariots, which several times produced tremendous effects on the Romans, and the use of which seems at that time to have been peculiar to the Britons, would of themselves prove a high degree of mechanical skill, and an acquaintance with several arts. These cars were of various forms 1 For the preceding part of our narrative, see Cæsar de Bello Gallico,

from book iv. ch. 18, to book v. ch. 19 (inclusive).

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so well in hand, that they could be driven at speed over the roughest country, and even through the woods, which then abounded in all directions. The Romans were no less astonished at this dexterity than at the number of the chariots. The way in which the Britons brought the chariots into action, was this: at the beginning of a battle they drove about the flanks of the enemy, throwing darts from the cars; and, according to Cæsar, the very dread of the horses, and the noise of the rapid wheels, often broke the ranks of his legions. When they had succeeded in making an impression, and had winded in among the Roman cavalry, the warriors leaped from their chariots, and fought on foot. In the meantime, the drivers retired with the chariots a little from the combat, taking up such a position as to favor the retreat of the warriors in case of their being overmatched. "In this manner," says Cæsar, "they perform the part both of rapid cavalry and of steady infantry; and, by constant exercise and use, they have arrived at such expertness, that they can stop their horses when at full speed, in the most steep and difficult places, turn them which way they please, run along the carriage-pole, rest on the harness, and throw themselves back into their chariots with incredible dexterity."

For a long time the veteran legions of Rome could not look on the clouds of dust that announced the approach of these war-chariots without trepidation. The Gauls had once the same mode of fighting, and equally distressed the Romans with their war-chariots. Nearly 300 years before the invasion of Britain, when the Gauls were established in parts of Italy, and in close alliance with the Samnites, a successful charge of the Roman cavalry was repulsed, and the whole army thrown into dismay, by a mode of fighting to which they were utter strangers: "A number of the enemy," says Livy, "mounted on chariots and cars, made towards them with such a terrible noise, from the trampling of the horses and the rolling of the wheels, as affrighted the horses of the Romans, unaccustomed to such operations. By this means, the victorious cavalry were dispersed, and men and horses, in their headlong flight, were thrown in heaps to the ground. The same cause produced disorder even in the ranks of the legions: through the impetuosity of the horses, and the carriages they dragged through the ranks, many of the Roman soldiers in the van were trodden or bruised to death; and the Gauls, as soon as they saw the enemy in confusion, followed up the advantage, nor allowed them breathing-time." The use of war-chariots, however, seems to have

Tit Liv., 1. x. c. 28.

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fallen out of fashion among the Gauls, during the long | Their cavalry were armed with shields, broad-swords, period that had intervened; for Cæsar never makes mention of them, in describing his many battles with that people on the continent.

The existence of the accessories-the hooks and scythes attached to the wheels or axles-has been questioned, as neither Cæsar, nor Tacitus, nor any early writer, with the exception of the geographer Pomponius Mela (who wrote, however, in the first century), expressly mentions them in describing the war-chariots. Weapons, answering to the description, have, however, been found, on the field of some of the most ancient battles. Between the Roman invasion under Cæsar, and that ordered by the Emperor Claudius, the cars or chariots of the British attracted notice, and were exhibited in Italy. They were seen in the splendid pageantry with which Caligula passed over the sea from Puteoli to Baiæ, on his mole and bridge of boats. The emperor, Suetonius tells us, rode in a chariot drawn by two famous horses, and a party of his friends followed, mounted in British chariots. Probably Cæsar had carried some of the native war-cars to Rome, as curiosities, just as our navigators bring the canoes of the Indians and South-Sea Islanders to England. At subsequent periods, the war-chariots of the Britons were frequently alluded to by the poets as well as historians of Rome.

The ancient Britons were well provided with horses, of a small breed, but hardy, spirited, and yet docile.

and lances. They were accustomed, like the Gauls, and their own chariot-men, to dismount, at fitting seasons, and fight on foot; and their horses are said to have been so well trained, as to stand firm at the places where they were left, till their masters returned to them. Another common practice among them was, to mix an equal number of their swiftest foot with their cavalry, each of these foot-soldiers holding by a horse's mane, and keeping pace with him in all his motions. Some remains of this last custom were observed among the Highland clans in the last century, in the civil wars for the Pretender; and in more modern, and regular, and scientific warfare, an advantage has often been found in mounting infantry behind cavalry, and in teaching cavalry to dismount, and do the duty of foot-soldiers. A great fondness for horses, and a skill in riding them, and breaking them in for cars and chariots, were observable in all the nations of the Celtic race. The scythe-armed cars of the Britons may be assumed as one of the many links in that chain which seems to connect them with Persia and the east, where similar vehicles were in use for many ages.

The infantry of the Britons was the most numerous body, and, according to Tacitus, the main strength of their armies. They were very swift of foot, and expert in swimming over rivers and crossing fens and marshes, by which means they were enabled to make sudden attacks and safe retreats. They were slightly

pal occupations in their brief periods of peace. Even in tactics and stratagetics, the more difficult parts of war, they displayed very considerable talent and skill. They drew up their troops in regular order; and if the form of a wedge was not the very best for infantry, it has been found, by the Turks and other eastern nations, most effective for cavalry appointed to charge. They knew the importance of keeping a body in reserve; and in several of their battles they showed skill and prompitude in outflanking the enemy, and turning him by the wings. Their infantry generally occupied the centre, being disposed in sev

elad; throwing off in battle the whole, or at least the greater part, of whatever clothing they usually wore, according to a custom which appears to have been common to all the Celtic nations. They were not encumbered with defensive armor, carrying nothing of that sort but a small light shield; and this, added to their swiftness, gave them, in some respects, a great advantage over the heavily-armed Romans, whose foot could never keep pace with them. This, indeed, was so much the case in the ensuing wars, that the turn of a battle was often left to depend, not on the legions, but on their barbarian auxiliaries, some of whom were as lightly equipped as the Britons them-eral lines, and in distinct bodies. These corps conselves. In coming to their offensive arms, we reach a point where they were decidedly inferior to the Romans; and a cause, perhaps, as principal as any other, of their invariable defeat when they came to close combat. Their swords were long and unwieldy, without points, and only meant for cutting-awkward and offenceless weapons compared to the compact, manageable, cut-and-thrust swords of their enemies, which could be used in the closed mélée. But an important circumstance, which throws the advantage still more on the side of the Romans, is, that while their weapons were made of well-tempered steel, the swords and dirks of the Britons were, in all probability, only made of copper, or of copper mixed with a little tin. We are told that the swords of their neighbors, the Gauls, were made of copper, and bent after the first blow, which gave the Romans a great advantage over them.

A prodigious number of warlike implements, as axes, swords, spear-heads, all made of copper, or of copper mixed with tin, and known among antiquaries by the general name of "Celts," have been dug up in different parts of our island; but we are not aware of the discovery of any things of the sort made of iron, that can safely be referred to the manufacture of the ancient Britons. In the absence of metals, they used bones and flints to tip their arrows, their spears, and lances. Heavy black stones, perforated to receive a wooden handle, served them as maces or battle-axes. These are the very weapons of savages; and perhaps those which have been found in such abundance buried in the earth, are much more ancient than the period of Cæsar's invasion, or were only used at that and later periods in the interior and northern parts of the country.

In addition to their clumsy sword, the British infantry carried a short dirk and a spear. The spear was sometimes used as a missile weapon, having a leather thong fixed to it, and retained in the hand when thrown, in order that it might be recovered again at the butt-end of this spear was sometimes a round hollow ball of copper, or mixed copper and tin, with pieces of metal inside, and, shaking this, they inade a noise to frighten the horses when they engaged with cavalry.

With the exception of the Druids, all the young men among the Britons and other Celtic nations were trained to the use of arms. Frequent hostilities among themselves kept them in practice, and hunting and martial sports were among their princiVOL. 1.-3

sisted of the warriors of one clan, commanded each by its own chieftain; they were commonly formed in the shape of a wedge, presenting its sharp point to the enemy; and they were so disposed, that they could readily support and relieve each other. The cavalry and chariots were placed on the wings, but small flying parties of both manœuvred along the front. In the rear and on their flanks they fixed their travelling chariots and their wagons, with their respective families in them, in order that those vehicles might serve as barriers to prevent attack in those directions, and that their courage might be inflamed by the presence of all who were most dear to them.

Some of the native princes displayed eminent abilities in the conduct of war. According to the Roman writers, Cassivellaunus, Caractacus, and Galgacus all formed combined movements and enlarged plans of operation, and contrived stratagems and surprises which would have done honor to the greatest captains of Greece and Rome. Their choice of ground for fighting upon was almost invariably judicious, and they availed themselves of their superior knowledge of the country on all occasions. In the laborious arts of fortifying, defending, or attacking camps, castles, and towns, they were, however, deficient. Their strongest places were surrounded only by a shallow ditch and a mud wall, while some of their towns had nothing but a parapet of felled trees placed lengthwise. While the Roman camps, though occupied only for a night, were strongly fortified, their own camps were merely surrounded by their cars and wagons, a mode of defence still common among the Tartar and other nomadic tribes in Asia. But, as the Roman war proceeded, we frequently find them giving more attention to the defence of their night camps; and some of the more permanent positions they took up were strengthened with deep ditches and stone walls.

The armies of the ancient Britons were not divided into bodies, mixed, but distinct as a whole, consisting each of a determinate number of men recruited from different families and in different places, and commanded by appointed officers of various ranks, like the Roman legions and our modern regiments; but all the fighting-men of each particular clan or great family formed a separate band, commanded by the chieftain or head of that family. By this system, which had other disadvantages, the command was frittered away into minute fractions. All the several

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