tiago province in general is good farming land and offers magnificent agricultural opportunities to settlers. It cannot be said that any part of Cuba has been thoroughly developed; indeed, the island may be called a brand-new country. Of all the provinces Santiago probably holds the most of this undeveloped wealth, its greatest resources being mineral.

"Puerto Principe is a good cattle country. There is also much fine timber standing in its southern part, and much entirely undeveloped wealth in the way of copper and iron ores. Asphalt is another source of riches in this province. Much of this asphalt is so fine that it is used not for paving but for the manufacture of varnishes. The asphalt has not yet been tried for paving, but will be in Havana. Tremendous deposits of asphalt, indeed, exist in many parts of the island, and there are probably many which have not been discovered. There are parts of Cuba, small as the island is, which have not even been prospected. As a matter of fact there is actually room on this island for the explorer, and many surprises lie in wait for coming generations.

"The eastern end of Santa Clara province is made up of rich tobacco, coffee, and grazing country. The middle of the province and its western end consist of fine sugar-lands. Much of this province is entirely undeveloped.

"Matanzas and Havana provinces are sugarlands with splendid tobacco-plantations in western Havana. I need make no comment on the quality of these tobacco lands. Havana cigars and Cuban tobacco are known and worshiped from one end of the smoking world to the other. Havana comes nearer to being fully developed than any other province.

"The province of Pinar del Rio is very largely undeveloped. Its riches consist principally at present of fine tobacco land, and probably much of the undeveloped country may in the future be successfully used for sugar culture.

"Even the little Isle of Pines holds millions of dollars of undeveloped wealth in the way of marble and iron. Its timber has been pretty well cut, merely because its small size and the fact that vessels could easily reach it made transportation comparatively easy. Between the Isle of Pines and the mainland are famous sponge fisheries, and on the island in many places are fine mineral springs, which, when investigated, will doubtless prove to be of great medicinal value. This makes it possible that the island will some day become an important health resort, although that of course is still a long way off.

"Where else in so comparatively small an area within such easy access of the markets of the

The Revision of Porto Rico Laws

world can any such range of undeveloped wealth be found. I have the most unbounded faith in Cuba. If I were a millionaire looking for investment I certainly should bring my money here, knowing what I know of Cuba's 'dormant wealth.'" The problem of government for Porto Rico is unique. The treatment thus far accorded that island, both in the law devised by the last Congress for the administration of its affairs and the adjudications placed upon the question of its relation to the home government, have not argued the happiest, nor does the resignation and return of the first Governor-General indicate much progress as yet toward settled affairs. If, however, the Com-. mission appointed to revise and compile the laws. of Porto Rico is as wise as the expressed ideas of Mr. L. S. Rowe, one of its members, lead one to hope, what is perhaps the most delicate phase of the problem will be happily solved. In the Forum, Mr. Rowe says:

The Spanish civilization, with its highly organized political and administrative system, and its carefully developed and complex codes, was, in form at least. extended to the West Indian possessions. We therefore meet a population accustomed to a system of law quite as carefully worked out as our own, although in parts constructed on a different basis. As far as the private law is concerned, the traditions have been formed and are as definite as those of Spain itself. It is out of the question, therefore, to sweep away at one fell blow the entire structure. Such a policy would throw the institutional life of the people into a state of confusion, and inevitably lead to anarchy and disintegration. We must not make an Alsace-Lorraine of Porto Rico. Americanization must take place gradually, and foster rather than destroy the spirit of legality, guiding it into new channels and developing it in directions neglected by the Spanish system. The first step necessary to bring the island closer to us in political thought and feeling is the thorough revision of the public law. This can be done all the more readily because of the policy, consistently pursued by Spain, of discouraging active participation in public affairs by the native population. Throughout the history of Spanish domination, the Porto Rican element was classed as "second class Spaniards." The highly centralized form of government which prevailed enabled the Spanish government to place its own agents in every position of importance, whether in the provinces or in the municipalities. For the American government this is at once an advantage and a drawback. It is an advantage, because it clears the way for new institutions, more distinctly American

in character. It is a drawback, because of the resulting lack of political training.

A large body of jurists, who had received their training in foreign countries-namely, in Germany and France-began the revision of the antiquated system which was based on the "Siete Partidos." The series of complications, of which the civil and commercial codes and the mortgage law are the most important, gave a new basis to the legal system of the mother country. Both Cuba and Porto Rico received the benefit of these changes, and we thus find a body of civil law which, in some respects, is superior to both the French and German systems. The most important problem which the revision of the civil and commercial codes presents is to simplify the system in certain parts, and to eliminate those institutions which have been imported from France and Germany, but which have failed to take

root.

On the other hand, the existing criminal code requires the most thorough revision. Its more primitive character is explained by the fact that it was never subjected to the tests of the more modern penal codes, as is shown in the failure adequately to protect personal rights and in the tendency to punish offenses against property with undue severity. It fails, furthermore, to make proper use of a system of fines, confining itself almost exclusively to the penalty of imprisonment. The grading of punishment is, furthermore, far removed from our modern standards of right and wrong, and will have to undergo thorough revision.

The codes of civil and criminal procedure will require simplification, in order to make their operation less cumbersome and more rapid. Here the simplicity of procedure which characterizes some of our Western States' codes can readily be introduced without violating any settled traditions. In fact, the adaptation of the Spanish to the American system of private law can be best begun through the codes of procedure.

While, at first glance, the possibility of reconciling the American and Spanish systems seems remote, a close study of both will show that such a blending is by no means impossible. In fact, it is a combination which must be made, if we are to meet the obligations forced upon us by the administration of our new possessions. It is true that the questions presented are new to us and, in the form they have taken, find no parallel in the history of modern Europe. American rule means orderly development rather than oppression, and must, therefore, effect a gradual combination of the two systems of law rather than a violent substitution of one for the other. The latter policy would arouse a form of opposition which would thwart every

effort to Americanize the island. We must gradually accustom ourselves to the thought that the "American system" does not necessarily mean either the English common law or the extreme form of decentralized government to which we have hitherto been accustomed. In fact, the lessons which our new possessions are teaching us will broaden our view of political and legal systems, and prepare us for the larger obligations which our position in the Western Hemisphere has forced upon us. The more thorough comprehension of the strength and weakness of Spanish-American institutions, which must come in the close contact with the practical questions of law and government in Porto Rico, may prepare the way for that closer relationship with the South American republics which the logic of our present situation demands. The feeling of distrust which has existed will disappear, when it is clearly seen that there is nothing in the two civilizations to prevent the fullest cooperation. If, on the other hand, we deal harshly with Porto Rico, the feeling of distrust, of which there were symptoms during and after the recent war, will turn into fear and hatred; and the Monroe Doctrine, instead of being a permanent basis for the maintenance of friendly relations with all nations, will become a byword for aggression and misrule.

land

The French Navy and Eng- Typical of more conservative French opinion-which since the Fashoda incident has concerned itself as much with the relations between the Republic and England as with those between France and Germany, and which has lately been agitated over English naval operations in the Channel-is an article by André Méril in L'Eclair.

Dispatches of recent date stated a surprising fact concerning French submarine boats. The Morse, a vessel of that class, was ordered, according to said dispatches, to leave Cherbourg, the only French military post on the English Channel, proceed to Havre and plant a torpedo on the Cocyte, a cruiser entrusted with the defense of the "Estuaire" or entrance of the river Seine. It was said that the Morse, built like the Gustave Zédé, another submarine boat, accomplished this mission without trouble. A report which reaches L'Eclair is to the effect that the Morse could not accomplish this mission. It reached Havre, but no torpedoing was done. The report referred to was written by French Admiral Fournier, who issued the order to torpedo the Cocyte. The facts are these: The Morse (an American name, by the way) left Cherbourg at 3 p. m., traveling on the surface and protected as usual by a cruiser, the Buffle. The speed never exceeded seven knots (12

kilometers). The distance from Cherbourg to Havre is 72 marine miles. Within eight miles from Havre, as soon as the presence of the Buffle was discovered through the searchlights of the Cocyte, the Morse dived and made the attempt to plant the torpedo. It did not succeed.

Yet England is anxiously watching the progress of submarine boats in France and the tension between the two countries is quite great, although there is some tendency of late toward relaxation. There is an amelioration of dealings between London and Paris. All told, the causes of this amelioration are very numerous. In the first place the British have understood that it would be bad taste to prolong their crisis of jingoism. If we had severely dealt with them when they were defeated in the Transvaal they could have retaliated during the Dreyfus case. Therefore it was tit for tat. Besides it would have been foolish to keep the two countries at daggers' points, at the risk of ruining immense commercial transactions between ourselves. It would have proven disastrous for France as well as for England. Therefore it was urgent to react, and I am glad to state that this reaction has taken place.

So far our political relations are satisfactory. The British have seen that in China the French were not trying to deceive anyone, but at the same time that we were determined to protect our interests.

In regard to Morocco they have admitted our rights; they understand that the "statu quo" gives us the privilege of controlling this part of the North African dominion, consequently we cannot stand conspiracies against our legitimate claims near the Sultan.

All told, the Morocco mission in London, notwithstanding what has been printed by the British press, has conclusively declared that it has signed no treaty with Great Britain. The cabinet of St. James has wisely seen that it would be dangerous to antagonize us under the guise of the Morocco interests.

"En résumé," the political situation between England and France is rather satisfactory, and, unless something happens, cordial or at least pacific relations between the two countries will be concluded.

They are talking a good deal in London about our submarine boats. Notwithstanding what the British say, these boats are their nightmare. A Frenchman who understands the English people pretty well, told me: To comprehend to what extent our submarine boats bother and disturb the equanimity of the British, you must know that the opera glass of every Englishman is always

focused on our navy. It is our navy that he fears. Sincerely it is my opinion that England believes that the seas belong to her and that all the coaling stations of the world are her own property. Imagine then how obnoxious to the British is the idea of a nation like France using new weapons like submarine boats, destroying at the same time all conceptions of actual warfare on the high seas. Besides, they know in England what our navy officers will do with these pigmies of the ocean which require so much skill, audacity, bravery, and even heroism.

An English History of the In a way reciprocal of this French Presidency French view of English affairs a late article in the (London) Spectator on the history of the French Presidency, may be read with interest. It is history, fast enough, succinct and well-told, and by the way affords a curious commentary on the last exclamations of the late Prince Imperial as these are now reported by Quentin-Bauchard. (See page 275.)

The French Presidency has had a very curious and unexpected development which is well worth the attention of Constitution-mongers. It was fully intended when the office was originally established in 1871 that the President of the Republic should have the powers of a Continental Monarch, should possess a general initiative, and should act upon the two Chambers as a guiding and restraining influence. He chooses the Ministers, and they are responsible to him; he is supreme head of the Army, and though he has no veto, and no power of dissolving without the consent of the Senate, he can remonstrate with the Chambers in a Message, which, if he possessed the ear of the electors, would be more effective than any Premier's speech. The world, mindful of the history of France and of the instinct of Frenchmen for believing in persons rather than institutions, thought that the President would be, if not the real ruler, at least the most important person in the Republic. It turned out otherwise. M. Thiers, it is true, supported as he was by the confidence of Europe, as well as by his own genius, was nearly a Monarch; and had Marshal MacMahon been a sincere Republican, or even a little more confident in his own capacity for statesmanship, he might have consolidated the Presidency, and left it as strong as the rival institution in the United States. M. Grévy, however, who succeeded him, was only a selfish lawyer who thought that men could be "managed" but not controlled, and that the first condition of popularity in a President was self-effacement. When it became necessary to remove him, he being too like a mean kind of Eli, the Chamber discovered that

although removal was not contemplated by the Constitution, that document gave them one irresistible weapon. The majority of Deputies could compel the Ministry to resign, and repeat the process until the machine being brought to a deadlock, the President must either depart or strike a "coup d'état." They used this power, M. Grévy resigned, and from that moment the President became a constitutional Monarch, who could indeed choose Ministers, but could choose only such Ministers as the Chamber was ready to support. It was impossible to maintain them against the Chamber, and the Chamber, inclined like all Continental Chambers to make its power felt, dismissed Ministers on the smallest provocation, until a Cabinet which has lived two years is considered to have displayed unaccountable and unprecedented vitality.

After the fall of M. Grévy the degradation of the Presidency (or should we rather say the imprisonment of the Presidency in political etiquettes?) went on apace. M. Carnot, from whom great things were expected, chiefly because of his name, took a strictly constitutional view-in the English sense of his position, and when, in June, 1894, he was assassinated, he was succeeded by a man with a weakness which, we would fain believe, is in England rather uncommon. Upright, thoughtful, and patriotic, M. Casimir-Périer was still possessed by a certain form of egoism. His preoccupation under all circumstances was his personal dignity. He would have faced bullets without trembling, but slights, not to say insults, made his life a burden to him. His Ministers, says the correspondent of the Times who also reported the facts at the time, detected his weakness of temperament, and as each of them hoped for the succession they strove by studied slights, all of the same kind, to drive him to resignation. It took them six months to succeed, but they succeeded. M. Hanotaux concealed important telegrams from the President, and when interrogated replied that they were confidential; while General Mercier, when asked why he had moved eighty thousand troops nearer to the frontier, answered, with exquisite insolence, "These are Army affairs, not civilian matters." M. Périer could have sent both their dismissals, and would have been supported, but he saw further possibility of injury to his "amour propre," and at once retreated into the shelter of private life. 'His successor was a stronger and a more vulgar man. Good-tempered, thick-skinned, and utterly unscrupulous, M. Félix Faure, who had won his election by the arts of Sixtus Quintus, concealing always such ability as he had under a mask of "bonhomie," endeavored

to restore the power of the Presidency by endless conciliations. He mixed with the people, he affected in the Dreyfus case to share all their prejudices, he flattered the Army, and he intrigued with the Nationalists, always with the hope that some crisis would arrive in which he could demand for the Presidency more power, and, above all, more deference and dignity. Had he been an able man he might have succeeded, for Frenchmen who are not Royalists still think a dignified Executive indispensable to France; but he was essentially only a Lord Mayor as satirists represent that personage; he was secretly disturbed by all parties; and when, in February, 1899, he died in a way still considered inexplicable, the Presidency was so discredited that it seemed as if the Republic could hardly last. The Nationalists, who intended to set up either a throne or a dictatorship, looked much the strongest party; and diplomatists in particular expected either a revolution or a military régime. M. Loubet, who succeeded, and who goes straight, has lifted the Presidency out of that slough, steadily supporting a strong and really Republican Ministry; but even he has not raised the great post to the height which its builders intended it should attain. His character rather than his intellect attracts the confidence of the people, and he is the referee rather than the ruler or the guide of France. He has shown much capacity in choosing able men; but nobody expects from his initiative a great foreign policy, or a solution of the social difficulties which so alarm the statesmen of to-day.

Italy and

the Papal Princedom

The eventuality of the Thirteenth Leo's demise keeps prominently in discussion the irrepressible subject of the temporal princedom. The Italian journals, never very impressive, record now only. partisan arguments and ex-parte reviews of the situation. For "foreign" understanding the declaration of Archbishop Ireland made in the North American Review is the most forceful recent deliverance on the subject.

The situation is to-day no less intolerable for Italy than it is for the papacy. The court of the king is obscured by that of the pope. Rome persists in being papal, in deriving its life and grandeur from the papacy. Throughout the kingdom, Italians are divided. The adherents of the pope's temporal power are legion. They are, too, the most conservative elements of the population, and as they refrain, in obedience to the pope's order, from active participation in national politics, the peril daily grows that the socialistic and revolutionary elements in the country may obtain control of public affairs. Through fear of papal claims,

the government is compelled to impose on the country, much against the country's deepest wishes, the burden of an oppressive militarism, and of an unnatural and unhistoric alliance with Austria and Prussia. No country could hope for permanent peace and prosperity under conditions of this nature. All Italians realize this, all clamor for deliverance of one kind or another. Meanwhile the papal cause will necessarily be gaining ground for this reason, if for no other, that the Italian people are profoundly Catholic, and will remain Catholic in every fibre of their souls, as long as they are Italians. And once the heat of political passion is cooled, and it is more plainly seen that papal independence is a religious, not a political matter, the proper solution to the Roman question will be given by Italy itself. Time may be required; but the papacy has the patience of an eternal institution. On higher grounds, however, than a consideration of the conditions of Italy do Catholics rest their hope of a restoration of papal independence. Were the conditions of Italy ever so adverse, Catholics are calm and strong in their expectations. They have the enduring confidence that, whatever the conditions in Italy are to-day, or may be to-morrow, those conditions will, in Providence's own good time, be so altered as to allow the papacy to regain its rights. Since the church is from Christ, and one of its requirements for the proper fulfillment of its spiritual mission is the civil independence of its head, the present "Captivity of Babylon" will not continue; the pope will regain his civil princedom.

From the Vatican

Although reports from Rome continue to speak of the Pope's excellent health, the feeling undoubtedly prevails at the Vatican, that a Conclave of the College of Cardinals cannot be far off, and it is no secret that candidates for the throne of St. Peter are preparing for the election. The New York Press has dispatches which affirm that on account of the large number of aspirants those who are well informed anticipate a dead-lock, and the ultimate selection of an outsider who has not yet been mentioned.

Sig. Salvatore Cortesi is of a different opinion. While the "foreign"-i. e., the extra-Italian— cardinals will probably control the situation, it is likely, writes this authority in the International, that they will only decide between the various Italian aspirants.

Even with such high ecclesiastical dignitaries as the cardinals and in such a body as the Sacred College, though generally considered beyond the reach of base and mundane passions, political con

siderations and likes and dislikes among nations have their influences; and it may be taken for granted that the cardinals will group themselves according to the relations that exist between their respective countries. Notwithstanding the present perfect health and strong constitution of Leo XIII., a Conclave cannot now be far off; and as the international situation cannot then be much changed from what it now is, it is supposed that the foreign cardinals will divide themselves into two groups, one of which will comprise the seven French, five Spanish, the Irish, Portuguese, and Belgian, and the other the four Austrian, three German, and the one English, American, and Australian. It is not difficult to understand that the first group of fifteen, headed by the French, will support the election of an intransigeant candidate, hostile to Italy, and ready to continue the francophile policy that was inaugurated and followed, with a constancy worthy of a better return, by Cardinal Rampolla, Papal Secretary of State. The other group, the Anglo-German-American, will give its votes, it is supposed, to a candidate who would inaugurate an attitude of moderation towards Italy, and would put religion high above politics. After the death of Pius IX., the party favorable to conciliation with the Peninsula had their candidate in the person of Cardinal Canossa, who belonged to one of the most aristocratic families of Italy, and was Archbishop of Verona. He refused to leave for Rome for the Conclave until he had celebrated a solemn funeral mass for the repose of the soul of King Victor Emanuel II., who had died one month previously. However, when the time of voting came, he was left almost without supporters, and in the three ballots which took place before the choice fell on Cardinal Pecci (Leo XIII.), he received only one vote, that of Cardinal Amat, who remained faithful to him until his death one month later.

Although Leo XIII., as I said before, more than any other pontiff since the fourteenth century, when the papal court had its seat at Avignon, has done his best to balance more evenly the number of foreign and Italian cardinals, there seems to be no chance for the elevation of any other than an Italian to the supreme dignity. This is due to the conviction, so deeply rooted in the majority of Catholics, that, given the everlasting conflict between church and state in the Peninsula over the loss of the temporal power by the Papacy, an Italian pope is better fitted to represent and uphold the rights of the Holy See. Besides, as appears evident from the above mentioned division among the foreign cardinals, the other countries could never agree on a candidate not Italian; so diverse and conflicting are the interests involved.