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am influenced largely by the history of the decisions of State judges in denying the people their rights, on the ground, not that the exercise of these rights is forbidden by the State Constitution, but that it is forbidden under the National Constitution, although the Supreme Court of the Nation has never so decided. Again and again (as in the workmen's compensation decisions, where the courts of New York, and of Connecticut under Chief Justice Baldwin, decided against the people, and the courts of Iowa and Washington in favor of the people) one State court has decided that a given statute to secure working men or women their rights is in conflict with the National Constitution, while the court of another State has taken the exactly opposite position on a practically identical statute. The courts of Massachusetts and New York have flatly contradicted one another in just such cases. Now, all I ask is that, where equally competent courts thus flatly contradict one another as to the rights of the people, the benefit of the doubt be given to the people. When the Supreme Court of the Nation has decided a question concerning the interpretation of the National Constitution, that decision is of course binding on both the judges and the people of the several States. But prior to this decision as regards Federal constitutional questions, and at all times as regards State constitutional questions, the people of each State should have the right to determine for themselves, after due deliberation, what the definite position of their governmental representatives is to be on any given Constitutional question. Let the State court first decide such question. Unquestionably such decision will carry great weight with the people; normally they will not overturn it, or even question it; and certainly in no case will they lightly or wantonly overturn it. But secure to them the right if they so desire, in any given case, to vote finally as to whether or not the decision is to be accepted as binding, in order to secure ample additional time for debate, provision could be made that such vote should not be taken within, say, six months of the decision. Then, if the people vote to sustain the decision, well and good; if they vote against it, then their action shall be accepted as that of the ultimate court of appeal, and shall be binding on all the State judges (until, or unless, of course, the Supreme Court of the Nation acts in the case if it be one affecting the National Constitution).

Remember that I am not now discussing what is known as the "recall" of the judges. Remember, also, that I am not now discussing decisions by judges in suits affecting merely private individuals, or cases between man and man; decisions which should, of course, be rendered wholly without heed to popular feeling and with inflexible regard to the eternal principles of justice. I am discussing a wholly different proposition, namely, that the people must have the right ultimately to determine for themselves what great lines of governmental policy are to be followed by the State, that they have never surrendered this ultimate right to the judges or any one else, and that it is our duty to see that it is not kept merely as a nominal and unreal right, a sham right, but that machinery shall be devised to make it a real, working right, which can be invoked and put into effect, after due deliberation, but without too much difficulty.

Mr. Thayer quotes the opinion of judge after judge in proof of his position that the courts should declare a law unconstitutional only when there can be no doubt in the minds of men of ordinary intelligence and good faith that their contention is just. The Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, speaking for the Court, said: "An Act of the Legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the Constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt." Chancellor Waties, of South Carolina, said, using language which it would be well indeed for the judges of to-day to ponder: "The interference of the judiciary with legislative acts, if frequent or on dubious grounds, might occasion so great a jealousy of this power and so general a prejudice against it as to lead to measures ending in the total overthrow of the independence of the judges, and so of the best preservative of the Constitution. The validity of the law ought not, then, to be questioned unless it is so obviously repugnant to the Constitution that when pointed out by the Court all men of sense and reflection in the community may perceive the repugnancy. By such a cautious exercise of this judicial check, no jealousy of it will be excited, the public confidence in it will be promoted, and its salutary effects be justly and fully appreciated." And, yet again, the Georgia Court said: "No nice doubts, no critical exposition of words, no abstract rules of interpretation suitable in a contest between individuals, ought to be resorted to in deciding on the constitutional

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forth in this opinion, and in Justice Holmes's opinion in the Oklahoma bank cases, could become welded into all our law, there would be no need of changing this law so as to preserve popular rights. This is what I would infinitely prefer to see done. But if this cannot be done, then I unhesitatingly champion such change of the formal expression of the fundamental law as will render it immensely easier than at present for the people to pass finally on any constitutional interpretation by the judiciary.

I am sure that ultimately our people must, and will, come to the view that the Nation and the States within their several spheresspheres which must cover every particle of the ground where it is possible for Government to act at all-have not only the right but the duty to decide as wisdom and experience shall dictate as to all the conditions which shall obtain in tenement-houses, in factories, in mines, on railways, for preserving men, women, and children in health, life, and limb. If they so decide, and are really bent upon having the decision reduced to practice, the courts will sooner or later, in one way or another, be forced to give it effect. It is idle to say that the people as a whole have not the right to decide for themselves on such a matter of governmental policy. It is in no shape or way one of the few questions where the public servants of the people have the right, and where it is their duty, to go counter to the wishes of the people. I do not mean that there are no such cases; on the contrary, I hold that not only the judge, but the legislator or executive, may at times find that his highest duty to the people is to resist the will of the people if some question of real and vital principle, of right or wrong, is at stake. But his usefulness in standing ruggedly for his own convictions in such cases where the moral law is at stake will largely depend upon his not having refused to represent the popular will when the people had a right to have their will respected. It is one of the highest duties of a judge to decide an issue of justice wholly without regard to popular feeling; but he can best perform this high duty if he also performs the high duty of trying to carry out in good faith a policy of law as to which the people have soberly and formally declared their intentions. All good citizens must uphold the judge who fearlessly does justice without regard to popular clamor or private intrigue. It was as much the duty of the people to uphold the judge who sentenced

the Chicago bomb-throwing Anarchists as to uphold the other Chicago judges who sentenced offending corporations and individuals of wealth. Recently, in New York, certain official leaders of the miscalled Socialist party, in addresses which were in no proper sense Socialistic, but simply appeals for murderous anarchy, undertook to bring the most infamous kind of pressure on the courts and officers of justice in connection with the McNamara trial for murder.1

It was as foul a crime against justice thus to try to bully the court and jury into acquitting the men if guilty as it would have been to try to influence the court and jury to convict them if innocent.

It is pre

cisely because it is so vitally important that our people should uphold the courts when threatened in such fashion that I feel it to be so important that the courts should not give the people cause to feel that they, the courts, are wantonly ready to thwart the people's will when that will, duly expressed through the forms of law, should be respected.

I hold most strongly that the people of New York State and of the United States have the power and the duty, acting in their collective capacity through the National and State Governments, to do whatever is necessary to guard the welfare, not only of women and children, but of men, where they are required to live or to labor under conditions that are destructive of decency and good citizenship. I hold that public servants are in very truth the servants and not the masters of the people, and that this is true not only of executive and legislative officers but of judicial officers as well. The judge should be independent, but so should every

I Honest and sincere Socialists can have little or nothing in common with the men who make Anarchistic appeals of this kind; and I need hardly say that condemnation of such appeals, of such incitements to anarchy, should be strongest on the part of the very people who are entirely willing to apply any principle of Socialism if in actual practice that principle be found to work well.

proper executive or legislative officer. No public servant who is worth his salt should hesitate to stand by his conscience, and, if necessary, to surrender his office rather than to yield his conscientious convictions in a case of genuine importance. But while that is his right and his duty, our right and our duty is to see that he is responsible to us, to the people; and I hold with Abraham Lincoln that we are unfit to be called a free people if we permanently surrender the right to shape our destinies and place this right in the hands of any men not responsible to us. I do not believe that it is wise or safe to pretend that we have self-government and yet by indirect methods to try to rob ourselves of self-government. I believe that the only ultimate safety for our people is in self-control ; not in control from the outside. I do not believe in snap judgments, I do not believe in permitting the determination of a moment to be transmuted into a permanent policy; but I do believe that the serious, sober, wellthought-out judgment of the people must be given effect; I do believe that this people must ultimately control its own destinies, and cannot surrender the right of ultimate control to a judge any more than to a legislator or an executive. As a matter of expediency it may be, and in my opinion it is, desirable that the control by the people over the judge shall be exercised more cautiously and in different fashion than the control by the people over the legislator and the executive; but the control must be there, the power must exist in the people to see to it that the judge, like the legislator and the executive, becomes in the long run representative of and answerable to the well-thought-out judgment of the people as a whole.

One word in closing. cated is not revolution.

What I have advoIt is not wild radicalism. It is the highest and wisest kind of conservatism.

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road native women with their bright-colored clothes clinging to them, bearing fruits to market and flowers to sell and sticks to burn, and still others carrying babies, whose bright little eyes look out on a world they try to understand as they pass along tied to the mother. The Spectator also sees on this trail little piles of whitewashed stones, the shrines of saints, and he sees saint-houses, and many flocks of sheep and goats, and droves of cattle being gathered in at the foot of the hill below the native towns for protection against the weather and the bandits, just as they were gathered in during the life of Abraham. And the shepherd is as sylvan, and plays a native lute. And a donkey with a cross every now and then stands grazing on the mountain, marked forever, according to tradition, as one of the especial family that Christ rode on earth, and therefore still held somewhat sacred. From every high point on the hills is seen Tangier, ancient and Biblical in appearance, like a picture of Damascus from a Bible of our childhood.

The Spectator feels that he has years and years ago dreamed this picture view out of a story-book. The city is tinged in the sunset with a glory almost sacred, as its burnt-out blue walls and red-tile roofs melt into the sea at its feet. Ages and ages have rolled away since it was first built. There is a legend among the Moors that the dove found the sprig of olive on Tangier's highest hill, and carried it to the ark as the first joyful sign of land. And as the sun sinks lower and lower into the sea, and splashes the city and the heavens with a final blaze of Oriental color, like the stained-glass windows of a great cathedral, the Spectator reluctantly turns his horse homeward, and as he rides the night settles and the cool evening mists begin to rise, and the gentle tinkle of the bells of the flocks is heard below each hill; and as his horse gallops on he thinks about the Moorish story of Tangier and the dove.

India under Curzon and After. By Lovat Fraser. Henry Holt & Co., New York. $4. The present strained situation in Persia, and the announcement at the recent Durbar in India that the two provinces of Bengal are to be reunited under a single governor, give peculiar timeliness to Mr. Fraser's book. It is a historical narrative, not only descriptive, but, in a broad sense, critical, of Indian affairs-political, military, economic, educational, governmental, and international-during the past dozen years,

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with especial reference to the achievements of Lord Curzon as Viceroy. The greatest of these achievements Mr. Fraser believes to be the partition of Bengal (which has apparently now been undone, though on what grounds the world has not yet been informed), the solution of the problem of the Northwest Frontier, the reform of the system of education, and the formulation of a clear, consistent, and considerate land revenue policy. Mr. Fraser was for some years editor of "The Times of India," and has

had unusual opportunities for understanding Indian conditions, for observing the events of which he writes, and for knowing the principal actors in those events. He is an enthusiastic admirer of Lord Curzon, and, without being betrayed into partiality, he has written with fine sympathy, warmth, and understanding of what can fairly be called the great services rendered by a man who had a great career-for the work of the Viceroy of India, when the Viceroy is a man of Lord Curzon's power and ability, legitimately comes under the heading that includes great careers. It is of especial interest to Americans in view of our own Philippine problems. Mr. Fraser's book is as delightful in manner as it is informing in matter. Not only is his style simple, lucid, and readable, but it has charm as well.

Arctic Prairies (The). By Ernest Thompson Seton. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. $2.50. Mr. Seton, in his usual lively and colloquial way of writing, describes a canoe journey of two thousand miles in search of caribou. His own drawings and photographs bring out the salient points and enforce the descriptions. In the region of Aylmer Lake, in Canada, he found conditions as to game and wildness of country which resembled the long-past days of our own Far West. Here, as he tells us, the locomotive and telegraph are unknown; the uncivilized Indian roams the forest and the prairie; the buffalo, the wolf, and all kinds of game abound, and the hunter and student of nature alike find in abundance what they most enjoy.

France and the French. By Charles Dawbarn. The Macmillan Company, New York. $2.50. We can hardly have too many descriptions of the actual life of the always interesting French people. To gain information not contained in other books, Mr. Charles Dawbarn's "France and the French" is worth reading. It gives the impressions derived from his ten years' residence in France. It is specially worth while as a setting forth of the fact that the unfrivolous French constitute most of the people. The book dips beneath the surface, and with regard to politics is quite as interesting as it is with regard to social relations. For instance, take the Presidency-the French President plays a politically colorless rôle, says Mr. Dawbarn; there was an evident intention to give to him the character of an uncrowned constitutional king. Thiers, when he founded the Third Republic, the author even asserts, clearly had in mind the return of a limited monarchy, and the second President, MacMahon, was really elected by the National Assembly as a sort of Monk, preparing the way for a Restoration." This may explain why a brilliant man, likely to be possessed of a Cæsar's ambition, is generally rejected in favor of Presidents of the type of Loubet and Fallières, who only wish to carry

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out their duties with simple and unostentatious dignity. As to present-day discontent, Mr. Dawbarn rejects the idea that a reconstitution of the monarchy would be any solution. He would sensibly find the solution rather in new electoral methods. These are coming. The elections of 1910 were the last to be held under the old system of the scrutin d'arrondissement, with its " narrow appeal to local prejudices." Plain-Towns of Italy. By Egerton R. Williams, Jr. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. $4. When one speaks of the little towns of Italy, one is apt to think immediately of the Umbrian towns-of Perugia, Assisi, and the rest; one is much less apt to think of the little towns of the Veneto. And yet those little towns of the Veneto have a charm all their own. They are not to be seen by the rapid tourist. They reveal themselves only to him who journeys leisurely on foot or by cycle or by carriage. Who can visit Castelfranco, for instance, and go away uncharmed? The noble roads leading thither, the splendid trees, the distant mountains, the town walls and palaces, and, finally, Giorgione's glowing masterpiece-all these things make a sum of satisfaction which the traveler will not get from every town in Italy. Mr. Williams has understood how to treat these towns of northern Italy with sympathy and understanding. His present volume is particularly valuable because, so far as we know, it is the only comprehensive book in English on the sub

ject.

Truth about Chickamauga (The). By Arcnibald Gracie. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. $4. This is an elaborate and detailed description of the actual facts and opposing views about Chickamauga. It will therefore interest the military man rather than the general reader. The author believes that history has been falsified about this battle. He has made an exhaustive study of the records and has carried on a voluminous correspondence with survivors of both armies. He holds that General Rosecrans did not really win a victory over his Confederate opponent, General Bragg, but that the latter made a pretended retreat as a feat of masterly strategy. He accords General Thomas high credit for a display of "leonine strength and tenacity of purpose;" and he thinks that General Sheridan did the best he could under the circumstances.

Blue Bird (The). By Maurice Maeterlinck. With twenty-five Illustrations in Color by F. Cayley Robinson. Dodd, Mead & Co., New York. $1.25. The American publishers of Maeterlinck's plays and essays and of a recent biography of the dramatist and poet have supplemented their various contributions to the knowledge of this very interesting and individual writer by the publication of "The Blue Bird" in a small quarto, charmingly made. The play, as every

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