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Annual Sale of
As usual during January we shall offer a very attractive collection of Table Cloths and Napkins at reduced prices. These are goods of our regular standard quality, consisting of broken lots and patterns we are discontinuing. Many of the designs are as good as anything in our stock to-day and are exceptionally good value at the prices offered.
Napkins (per dozen)
Breakfast size, at $2.25, 2.50, 2.75, 3.00, 3.50, 4.00, 4.75, 5.50.
Dinner size, at $3.00, 3.50, 3.75, 4.50, 5.25, 6.00, 6.25, 6.50, 7.25, 8.00, 10.00, 12.75.
2 x 2 yds., $2.25, 2.50, 2.75, 3.00, 3.50, 3.75, 4.25, 5.00, 6.00, 9.50.
2 x 22 yds., $2.75, 3.00, 3.25, 3.75, 4.00, 4.75, 5.75, 6.25, 7.50, 8.50.
2 x 3 yds., $3.75, 4.00, 4.50, 5.50, 6.25, 7.00, 8.50, 9.50, 10.00, 14.50.
2 x 4 yds., $6.50, 7.25, 7.50, 8.00, 9.50, 12.75.
24 x 24 yds., $3.50, 3.75, 4.25, 4.75, 5.00, 6.00, 6.50, 8.25, 9.25, 10.00, 11.50.
Reg. Trade Mark
We also offer at this sale a very attractive collection of Towels and
MAIL ORDERs receive OUR PROMPT ATTENTION
James McCutcheon & Co.
5th Avenue & 34th St., N. Y.
Short Term Investments
Investment bonds and notes issued to mature in from one to five years are favored by many investors as yielding a somewhat better income than long time obligations. In addition, such securities, particularly of the larger issues, usually command a ready market and are less subject to wide fluctuations in price.
We have prepared a booklet giving brief descriptions of the principal issues of such securities, which we will be pleased to furnish on request.
Ask for booklet S-617
Guaranty Trust Company
28 Nassau Street
How About Your Savings?
Are they absolutely safe? Can you get them quickly in case of need?
Are They Earning 5%?
If you can answer these four questions
Our assets are over $2,500,000; our sur-
We have paid 5% every
Industrial Savings and Loan Co.
JANUARY 6, 1912
HAMILTON W. MABIE, Associate Editor ROOSEVELT
ing comparative order within their jurisdictions than because of any strong leanings toward republican principles. In the second place, outside of the eighteen provinces which constitute China proper, there are the provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan, and Tibet, constituting two-thirds of the Empire's area, and the opinion in those great outlying dependencies is, in general, monarchical.
CHINA AND RUSSIA
Indeed, in Mongolia the monarchical opinion is so strong that its princes have refused to recognize China's sovereignty over their country if the future Chinese Government is to be republican in form. A month ago they decided that if the Manchu dynasty were overthrown, there being no other to take its place, they would declare their independence. This suited Russia exactly. It has long been evident that one of the first advantages to be sought by Russians from any Chinese unrest would be in Mongolia. Not only is Mongolia Siberia's next-door neighbor, but Russia has also an immediate pretext in her desire to hasten the construction of a railway from Siberia across Mongolia to Peking, thus bringing Europe by three or four days nearer to the Chinese capital than at present. Accordingly, following the expulsion by the Mongols of Chinese officials from the province, the Russian representative at Peking requested that China should promptly reassume control of Mongolia. He received the rather pathetic reply that at present China was unable to comply. Thus this inability opens the way for a distinct extension of Russian influence in that dependency, and also for the possibility of the ultimate annexation of a sparsely settled province, with a population of several million, very nomadic in character. Should Russia prevail in Mongolia, it is expected that a like fate would befall Eastern Turkestan, which adjoins Mongolia to the west, and with regard to which
Russian covetousness has been quite as evident. The difficulty with all this is that when, as now, partition was threatened a dozen years ago, Secretary Hay put Russia and the rest of the Powers on record as maintaining the integrity of the Chinese Empire. If Russia disregards this, will not the Powers protest? Will not our own Government, having obtained the consent of the Powers to the preservation of China, be the first to protest? As to any effect, however, verbal protests, unsupported by something more forcible, hardly count for much among the Orientals-and in this case, as in some others, Russia may be regarded as a semi-Oriental Power.
PERSIA AND RUSSIA
Much of the news from Persia is confused and obscure, but its general tenor is not reassuring to those who are concerned for Persia's future as an independent and self-governing nation. Mr. Shuster, the American Treasurer-General, some of whose acts afforded Russia the pretext for active interference in Persian affairs, has been dismissed. He is only awaiting the appointment of his successor to leave the country. There have apparently been bloody conflicts between Persians and Russians in the northern part of the country, but it is not easy at this distance to determine on which side the fault lies. Russia, however, asserts that the aggression was all on the Persian side, and, having the power, will doubtless be able to make good that point of view by force of arms. Despatches from St. Petersburg indicate that punishment is to be inflicted in northern Persia relentlessly and cruelly. Meanwhile, in spite of the complete submission of the Persian Government to Russian demands, no Russian troops have been withdrawn from Persian territory. Whether they will ever be withdrawn will remain for the course of future events to show. There is nothing in the history of Russian foreign policy to indicate that the Russian hand which now presses heavily upon Persia will be lifted from any altruistic or humanitarian motive, or because of any consideration for the rights of the Persian people.
British Foreign Office has aroused widespread criticism in England. This criticism has come largely from Liberals, but it has also been given expression to by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords. Lord Curzon is a long-time student of Eastern affairs, an authority on Persia, and a former Viceroy of India. He is naturally deeply interested in anything which concerns Great Britain's position in India and the Near East. Criticism is directed against the Persian policy of Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on two grounds-the one altruistic, the other selfish. It is declared that for Great Britain to remain inactive while Russia oppresses Persia is for Great Britain to be false to its traditional attitude toward weaker peoples—an attitude of sympathy and helpfulness and not of aggression--and false to its specific responsibility to the Persian people. In the AngloRussian Convention of 1907 both Russia and Great Britain agreed to respect the independence and integrity of Persia; and shortly thereafter the British Government gave an even more explicit pledge to Persia that nothing would be done to violate her integrity and independence. A leading organ of Liberal opinion in England declares that one of the conditions which Persia has been obliged to accept from Russia without protest from Great Britain is "a gross infringement of Persian sovereignty." second ground of criticism of the policy is that it is bad from the point of view of British interests. Lord Curzon has pointed out the movement which is unconsciously taking place toward the partition of Persia. Anglo-Russian Convention provided for economic partition; the present events are leading directly to administrative partition, from which the steps to political partition and thence to geographical partition are well-nigh inevitable. Such a division of Persia would, in Lord Curzon's opinion, have serious dangers by bringing the Russian frontier into close contact with the British frontier. The whole policy of buffer states would be done away with, and the defense of India from possible Russian aggression would be rendered infinitely more difficult. It is also argued that it is foolish for Great Britain to pay for the support and friendship of Russia in European affairs the price involved in tacit consent to Russian aggression in Persia. And this not because the price is so high, but because there is the
gravest danger that the thing bought would not be delivered if it should ever become to Russia's advantage to repudiate the bargain.
But in estimating the weight of these criticisms several things should be remembered. First, Foreign Offices generally know considerably more about the internal conditions of a country like Persia, and generally have a much keener appreciation of the difficulties of preserving each his own country's interests there, than their critics can have. Second, the first duty of the British Government is to the British Empire; and the British Foreign Minister who should fail to keep as the first and most sacred article of his creed the preservation of the integrity, prosperity, and prestige of the British Empire would be false to his trust. The British Empire has been, and is, a tremendous force for the advancement of civilization throughout the world. Anything which should endanger the British Empire would be a greater blow to civilization than even the oppression by an unscrupulous Power of a weaker people.
THE FAMINE IN RUSSIA
The existing famine in Russia is a striking proof of the fact that in a despotically governed country the national revenue may be large and the national credit good while the economic status of the people who furnish the revenue and maintain the credit is extremely low. According to the latest report of the Russian Minister of Finance, the revenues of the Empire are so largely in excess of the estimates that it is possible not only to make a considerable reduction in the national debt, but to set aside, as a "free cash balance," a surplus of more than $200,000,000. At the same time, the taxpayers whose earnings go to make up this superabundant revenue are so poor and have so little reserve capital that they are reduced by a single bad harvest to a condition that may fairly be described as desperate. On account chiefly of unfavorable climatic and meteorological conditions, there was a complete or partial failure of the crops this year in twenty Russian provinces, and the result is a widespread famine which affects the health and well-being of twenty million people, and which has already reduced more than eight million of them to a state of actual starvation. Hundreds of thousands of peasants in the provinces that border the Volga or lie on the eastern and western slopes of the Urals are suffering for food, and tens of thousands of them have been able to keep themselves alive only by eating weeds, acorns, or the bark of trees. Epidemics of scurvy and "hunger-typhus" are reported from scores of villages in the eastern part of European Russia, as well as from many provinces in Siberia and the Caucasus, while the state of affairs in Orenburg, Samara, and Saratof is said to be as bad as it was in the great famine of 1891, when hundreds of millions of rubles were spent in the work of famine relief, and when a ship-load of food was bought and sent to Russia by citizens of the United States. In a communication recently sent to the Duma, Dionysius, Bishop
Third, behind the dealings of diplomacy still looms, even in this age of the world, the possibility of war. The nation which would interfere with the activities of one of its colleagues must always be prepared to face the contingency of war. So long as there are bandits in the world, those who would interfere with their depredations and would make them give up their booty must be prepared to make good their interference by force of arms. If Great Britain is to rely, for the maintenance of her position in Europe, not upon the potentiality of her armed strength, but upon her friendships among the nations of Europe, the British people must be ready to pay the price of those friendships, even if the price involves a loss of national selfrespect. In plain words, if Great Britain is to reckon the friendship of Russia among the essential elements of her defense against Germany, she cannot be too critical of her ally's activities in other directions. when her naval strength is sufficient so that she is indifferent to any threat from Germany will England be safe in running the risk of sacrificing the friendship of Russia in the cause of justice to a weaker people. And yet some of those who are most severe in criticising the present British policy in Persia are most strongly opposed to the adequate up