NOTES.

Note [A] referred to in page 9

These may perhaps be justified, even supposing us to form an unfavourable opinion of this mode of writing in general. The works, against which they are directed, were written with great ability, and were addressed to a class of readers, who would not have attended to any other mode of refutation. It became necessary, therefore, to combat them with their own weapons, without inquiring very minutely how far those weapons were lawful.

Note [B] referred to in page 20.

I am happy to observe, that the opinion here advanced, appears to coincide nearly with that of the three most distinguished critics of the laft age. Of this the reader may become sensible by perusing the following quotations. In producing them, my intention, certainly, is not to rest its proof upon any authority, however eminent. But they

I

may be of use in obviating any prejudices that exist against it; and the bringing together the opinions of three such distinguifhed writers on the same subject, cannot fail to assist the reader in forming a correct judgment with regard to it.

The first, which is from Lord Kaimes, gives a very profound and philosophical view of the manner in which example operates in forming the character.

'One feeling there is that merits a deliberate view, for its singularity as well as utility. Whether to call it an emotion or a passion, seems uncertain: the former it can scarce be, because it involves desire: the latter it can scarce be, because it has no object. But this feeling, and its nature, will be best understood from examples. À single act of gratitude produceth in the spectator, or reader, not only love or esteem for the author, but also a separate feeling, being a vague feeling of gratitude without an object; a feeling, however, that disposes the spectator or reader to acts of gratitude, more than upon an ordinary occasion. This feeling is overlooked by writers upon ethics; but a man may be convinced of its reality, by attentively watching his own heart when he thinks warmly of any signal act of gratitude: he will be conscious of the feeling, as distinct from the esteem or admir. ation he has for the grateful person. The feeling is singular in the following respect, that it is accompanied with a desire to perform acts of gratitude, without having any object; though in that state, the mind, wonderfully bent on an object, neglects no opportunity to vent it elf

any act of kindness or good-will that would pass unregarded upon another occasion, is greedily seized; and the vague feeling is converted into a real passion of gratitude: in such a state, favours are returned double.

In like manner, a courageous action produceth in a spectator the passion of admiration directed to the author: and beside this well-known passion, a separate feeling is raised in the spectator, which may be called an emotion of courage; because, while under its influence, he is conscious of a boldness and intrepidity beyond what is usual, and longs for proper objects upon which to exert this emotion.

Spumantemque dari, pecora inter inertia, votis
Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem.

Non altramente il tauro, oue l'irriti
Geloso amor con stimoli pungenti,
Horribilmente mugge, e co' muggiti
Gli spirti in se risueglia, e l'ire ardenti.

Eneid. iv. 158.

E'l corno aguzza a i tronchi, e par chinuiti
Con vani colpi á la battaglia i venti.

Tasso, canto st. 55€

So full of valour that they smote the air

For breathing in their faces.

Tempest, act 4. sc. 4.

The emotions raised by music, independent of word, must be all of this nature: courage roused by martial

music performed upon instruments without a voice, cannot be directed to any object; nor can grief or pity, raised by melancholy music of the same kind, have an object.

For another example, let us figure some grand and heroic action, highly agreeable to the spectator; be.ide veneration for the author, the spectator feels in himself an unusual dignity of character, which disposeth him to great and noble actions: and herein chiefly consists the extreme delight every one hath in the histories of conquerors and heroes.

This singular feeling, which may be termed the sympa thetic emotion of virtue, resembles, in one respect, the well. known appetites that lead to the propagation and preservation of the species. The appetites of hunger, thirst, and. animal love, arise in the mind before they are directed to any object; and in no case whatever is the mind more solicitous for a proper object, than when under the influence of any of these appetites.

"The feeling I have endeavoured to unfold, may well betermed the sympathetic emotion of virtue; for it is raised in a spectator, or in a reader, by virtuous actions of every kind, and by no other sort. When we contemplate a virtuous action, which fails not to prompt our love for the author, our propensity at the same time, to such actions, is so much. enlivened, as to become, for a time, an actual emotion. But no man hath a propensity to vice as such on the contrary, a wicked deed disgusts him, and makes him ab. hor the author; and this abhorrence is a strong antidote