through an opinion which is the exact opposite of that held by the political parties. He fears that intervention will lead to some national calamity, and thus weaken, instead of strengthen, his position. The Japanese public has been excited by false or exaggerated reports of events in Russia, including the alleged massacres of Japanese by Germans and Bolsheviki; but, on the whole, the Japanese public has been about equally divided. There is no real public opinion in Japan.

The most marked clash on this issue has been that between Premier Terauchi and Home Minister Goto on one side, and the Foreign Minister and War Office on the other. The army has been tugging at its leash like a starved bulldog scenting meat. And Viscount Motono has been almost equally eager for seizing what seems to him a golden opportunity for Japan.

The long and short of it is that there are two Governments in Japan-one composed of the Premier and the Home Minister, the other composed of the Foreign Minister and the War Office. On the issue of Russian intervention the first has had the backing of the United States, and the second has been supported by France, while England and Italy have been hesitating, though apparently slightly in favor of intervention. The influence of Viscount Ishii, the new Ambassador to America, has strengthened the stand of the Premier and Home Minsister. It is now quite apparent which of Japan's two Governments is the stronger, and there have lately been rumors that Viscount Motono is contemplating resignation.

Such are some of the stronger cross-currents through which Japan has had to steer her way during the past two or three months. To complicate matters, the question has been, not simply whether to intervene in Russia or not, but how to intervene if intervention is agreed upon. A good deal of the British sentiment for intervention has apparently been based on the assumption that British or American troops would co-operate in the expedition with the soldiers of Japan. American and French opinion has been more inclined to prefer having Japan go it alone, so far as active military operations are concerned, 1 but with the Allies helping financially. After talking with many prominent Japanese, including several members of the Government, I have come to the conclusion that with the Japanese it is a question of intervening in Siberia alone or not intervening at all. Their pride is injured by the suggestion that Allied troops be sent to co-operate with them, and justifiably so, it seems to

Count Terauchi does not speak English, and Mr. Yusuke Tsurumi, the son-in-law of Baron Goto, had kindly volunteered to act as interpreter. Mr. Tsurumi not only speaks excellent English but writes it. He was the editor in charge of producing the authoritative "Official Guide to Eastern Asia," published by the Imperial Government Railways of Japan. Mr. Tsurumi understands the American point of view; he is an ardent friend of America and an admirer of President Wilson, whose election he urged in America during the last Presidential campaign. Through Mr. Tsurumi Count Terauchi replied:

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ut "I have not as yet formed a definite opinion about this problem. Nor would it be of any practical use if I had made my mind, because intervention cannot at once be put into practice. The opinions of the Allied nations must first be heard. esides, we can hardly form an unerring estimate of the real situation in Russia. Though a treaty of peace has been signed between Germany and Russia, what concrete result may it bring? Will the Russian people continue to submit to the guidance of is the Bolshevik Government? Even if the Bolshevik Government succeeds in getting rid of Russia's obligations toward her i allies, how do we know that the Russian people's will is represented by that Government's conduct? Japan once waged war with Russia, but to-day there is between the two countries absolutely no ill feeling. At the outset of the present war, when Russia proposed to send her Siberian troops to the western

front, our Government gladly consented to safeguard the peace of the Far East so as to enable Russia to deliver her utmost power on the western front, with no apprehension about the East. Thus the Japanese Government has good will for Russia and entertains deep sympathy for her in the deplorable complications which have arisen in Russia's internal administration since last year. So we by no means desire to make an enemy of Russia, even if Russia's condition should get from bad to worse. Though the Bolshevik Government should shake hands with Germany, yet there would be many Russians whose views are sound and reasonable and who regard us as their friend and ally, so that we should be loth to despatch troops thoughtlessly, and thereby make an enemy of the Russian people.

"What we fear deeply is the possible advent of the German influence in the East, and we will have to be prepared against possible emergencies, for Germany may push her influence too far eastward. But if Japan be obliged to take military action in Siberia, such action will be taken simply because of the necessity of maintaining the peace of the Orient, and will never mean aggression or territorial ambition on the part of Japan.

"As regards your second question, namely, as to whether Japan wants to act singly or in concert with other allies, I would say that Japan would want a co-operative action. If any of our allies should desire to participate in Japan's military expedition, Japan would be only too pleased to welcome such participation and assistance, but we fear that such participation would be impossible now. Great Britain and France are concentrating all their power on the western fronts, so that they will have no surplus strength to spare for an expedition to the Far East. As to the United States, she is also doing her best in lending her man power to France and in otherwise working for victory, and we fear it will not be very easy for her to send very many troops to Siberia.'

“Then in what manner would you have the United States help you?" I asked.

In case Japan is to make a co-operative move into Siberia," said the Premier, "she will desire every possible assistance you can render. The material and financial help which the United States can afford us is precisely what Japan will need."

Count Terauchi surprised me by the considerable amount of animation he put into his discourse. His usual expression is a cold inscrutability which a professional gambler might envy. He seldom betrays emotion in his face, and behind that mask he makes his plans and maps his courses, unmoved by praise or hostile criticism. Yet, despite his stony exterior, he is deeply emotional, and weeps easily. He is very sincere and loyal and patriotic and kind. His bad points are said to be narrow-mindedness and a lack of ideals. He is a frank materialist. And he is reputed to be very much afraid of Socialism. Co-operation between such a man and a man like Trotsky is hard to conceive. So I asked him: "Supposing that Japan intervenes in Siberia and that the Bolshevik Government, if still in power, should show a willingness to accept Japanese co-operation in restoring order, would Japan help the Bolsheviki to re-establish a strong state?"

He did not answer directly, but said:

"As I have already said, Japan bears every good will toward Russia, and in this war has been supplying her with arms and munitions to help her win victory. We had hoped with all our · heart for Russian victory. But, unfortunately, in March of last year Russia was plunged into the vortex of revolution, and from it resulted the unexpected Kerensky Cabinet, which has since been replaced by the Lenine Ministry, which we see now signing peace with Germany. For all that, we still believe that a great many Russians are influenced by a rational faith in the recuperation of their country and in the principles of humanity, and therefore our sympathy for Russia remains unchanged. It is our belief that Russia will regain her national footing, which she seems to have lost for the time being. And when she does, it is necessary, in the interest of Japan, and Japan's allies too, that Russia should be protected to the best of our ability. For Japan, in particular, it is very desirable that Russia should lie between Japan and Germany; so we will not stint our aid to her, but will give her all possible help. We feel sincerely sorry for Russia-sorry that so great and powerful a nation as she

should have come to such an indescribable predicament in consequence of revolution.'

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Well, suppose the war should end with Germany in possession of the Russian Baltic provinces," I asked, "and with Japan occupying eastern Siberia as a result of Japanese intervention. What, Count Terauchi, would Japan think of the constitution of a new and smaller Russia, established on the territory lying mainly between Moscow and Irkutsk ?"

"It is Japan's sincere hope," replied the Premier, "that Russia should be reborn into a strong, well-ordered state. We believe that the existence of Russia as an independent nation will constitute an effective barrier against the encroachment of German influence toward the East, and therefore will be a great factor toward promoting the peace of the Orient and of the whole world. That is why we strongly desire that Russia should continue her national life forever, even though she were to become in territory a smaller country."

The Premier touched a button and a "boy" brought in tea. I recognized the "boy" (he has six children) as one who had worked for me and who had been discharged. His glance at me was full of dignified scorn, as if to say: Ah, you see how the gods have regarded your injustice to me. I have exchanged a plebeian for a Prime Minister."

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As Count Terauchi sipped tea and smoked he asked how I thought the Allies would regard such a buffer Russian state between Germany and Japan. He seemed much interested in this. As the tea warmed him he nodded his head and smiled. Then, with his high cheek-bones, narrow eyes, arched eyebrows, and high bald head, he looked like a fine old Mongolian monarch, some chieftain of ancient China. His high-pointed crown is his most noticeable physical characteristic, and is accentuated by hostile cartoonists till it looks like the head of Fukurokusin, one of the Seven Gods of Good Luck worshiped in Japan, whose “dome" is a yard high. This tall cranium and his masklike countenance give Terauchi an appearance of dignity and shrewdness which is indicative of his real character. I have seldom seen such a high head, unless it be that of Francisco Villa. [Mr. Mason made two visits to Mexico for The Outlook in 1914 and 1916, and personally interviewed both Villa and Carranza. --THE EDITORS.]

Terauchi's friends call him the " Kitchener of Japan." He is like the late "K. of K." in that he combines great military ability with high administrative genius; he is like Kitchener in his solemnity of face and in his reputed dislike for women. Also like Kitchener, Terauchi began at the bottom of the ladder and has been a War Minister and a great colonial administrator. Terauchi's work as Governor-General of Korea is compared to that of Kitchener in Africa and India.

Terauchi is a stickler for discipline. All this time that we had been talking poor Mr. Tsurumi had been standing, and he remained standing throughout the interview, which lasted an hour and a quarter. He told me afterwards that he had expected Count Terauchi would ask him to sit down, but the stern old soldier did not do it. However, as Count Terauchi considers attention to discipline the highest trait in a man, Mr. Tsurumi's suffering may be rewarded.

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I asked the Premier how far into Siberia Japan would in case she intervened, and whether she would be prepared to penetrate European Russia if strong German resistance should be encountered. He said: "Your question touches a strategic problem. You must understand that you cannot extend the theaters of war to indefinite lengths. There is a limit to Japan's military power, and, besides, Japanese military strength is established on purely defensive principles, so that it is impossible for us to undertake responsibility for such extensive fronts. As we know it to be impossible to get reinforcements of half a million or one million troops from America, Great Britain, and France to fight in Russia, we could not hope to advance so far as European Russia. The best policy in war is to fight nearer home, dealing with an enemy who has come a long way into unfamiliar places. It would be difficult to predetermine how far we should go." "Count Terauchi, you may permit me to ask a very bold, straightforward question," I said, “for I should like to dispel the misunderstanding that is prevailing among certain sections of Americans. Now that the Berlin-Bagdad dream has been shattered, certain German newspapers have begun to talk of a

Berlin-Tokyo connection through Russia. Some Americans are possessed of the opinion that there is a possibility of Japan's forming an alliance with Germany after the war, if the conclusion of the present war should favor such possibility. What is your Excellency's opinion about this?"

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"That will depend entirely on how the present war may end," said General Terauchi. "It is impossible to predict the changes which the conclusion of this war may bring. If the exigencies of the international relationships demand it, Japan, being unable to maintain a position of total isolation, may be induced to seek an ally in Germany; but, as far as I can judge from the existing condition of affairs, I see no such danger. In other words, I be lieve that Japan's relations with the Entente Allies will continue unaltered after the present war. Last winter I was asked by a certain American gentleman whether there was any danger for the future of American-Japanese friendship, when I did my best to explain the situation. If the United States should take such a step as would endanger the independence of China, Japan could not of course look on idly; but it is clear that the United States will never do anything of the kind. Therefore there is no fear of the American-Japanese friendship being in any way threatened. I was born in the year following the arrival of Commodore Perry in Japan; the memorable event was soon followed by the Harris Treaty, which opened Japan to the intercourse of the world. Had Commodore Perry then fired guns on Japan, there might long have remained feelings of enmity in the bosoms of the Japanese; but from beginning to end he adhered to the principles of justice and humanity in his advice as to the opening of Japan. There were some far-sighted men in Japan who saw real advantage in following his advice, and the result was as fortunate as could be desired. Thus from the very beginning of Japan's intercourse with America she was our benefactor, not our enemy. Years have passed since then, but there is no reason to suspect any change in the cordiality of the neighborly relations. It is true that Japan has a little military strength, but that she should send her army across the Pacific and land it in America is quite impossible; and I presume it would be very difficult for the United States to do the same against Japan. I believe there is no reason to anticipate war between the two countries. What possible harm can there be to have Japan developing on this side of the Pacific and the United States growing on the other side? The possibility of Japan and America breaking off into war has never for a moment entered my mind. And if you ask what is the best way to maintain in perpetuity this cordial American-Japanese friendship, I would say, let us go on in the same manner as we have been doing during the past sixty years."

"I would like to ask a question bearing on Japan's future, your Excellency," I said, taking up the thread of conversation. The Anglo-Saxon peoples are to-day feeling a strong liberal idealism. Perhaps there are a good many Anglo-Saxons now who feel that their race has already got about all the territory it needs for the development of its interests, particularly on the Pacific, where the Anglo-Saxons have most of the Pacific coast of North America, Hawaii, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and footholds in China. On the other hand, intelligent Americans and Britons are beginning to realize that a country which is growing as rapidly as Japan, and which has proved its right to be ranked as a civilized nation, ought not to be denied the privilege of normal expansion. Japan's population is outgrowing her territory. Where will she find an outlet? A Japanese magazine writer has recently suggested that Japan might make an arrangement with France by which Japan would take over part or all of French Indo-China. Other Japanese have mentioned the possibility of extending Japan's territory northward. Now, America desires the preservation of the territorial integrity of China, but intelligent Americans would not be grudge Japan an accession of territory somewhere else if it could be arranged justly. It has been suggested that the war might end with Germany holding the Baltic provinces of Russia, France regaining Alsace-Lorraine, and France making an arrangement with Japan by which Japan would get French Indo-China. Quite apart from any allusion to the present crisis in Siberia, toward which the world knows Japan is disinterested, which would Japan prefer as a colony to absorb some of her growing population-a piece of land in such a northern region

as Siberia or a colony in the south, such as French IndoChina ?"

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Japan is increasing in her population at the rate of about half a million a year," replied the Premier," and it is indeed a problem that we should well consider; but it is not likely that we shall be pressed for the lack of land to live in during ten or fifteen years to come. For there is still much room in Chosen and also in Hokkaido which can be used for our colonization. Manchuria, though it is not part of Japan's territory, can relieve much of our surplus population. The Japanese people do not take kindly to the idea of emigration, because they have long been used to the mild climate at home, and dislike both the torrid and arctic regions. Neither freezing Siberia nor the scorching south is very tempting to the Japanese. As to any questions depending on the disposal of Alsace-Lorraine, they must await the decision of military power.

Here Count Terauchi brought the interview to an end, remarking that he was overdue at the Diet. He shook hands with his left hand, for his right has been of little use since his right arm was wounded in the Saigon Rebellion forty years ago. At the beginning of our conversation the Premier had remarked that he was not speaking for publication. When asked to relent, he said that he would get Mr. Tsurumi to write out his recollection of what had been said and submit it to him in Japanese. Then, if it met with his approval, it would be given to me and translated. This was done. Mr. Tsurumi's remembrance of the conversation proved almost dictographic. He wrote it out in question and answer form like a catechism and submitted it to the Premier. After reading it Count Terauchi submitted it for the consideration of the Foreign Minister and of the Minister for Home Affairs. When they had approved it,

The report of the interview was then translated by a gentleman approved by Mr. Tsurumi. All the remarks of the Premier quoted above are in the exact phrasing of this authoritative transcribing. Thus they are as "official" as they could be.

As I understand them, the salient points brought out in my interview with Premier Terauchi are these:

First, unless the German menace to the Far East through Russia grows considerably stronger than it is at this writing, Japan will not intervene in Siberia except with the warm approval and with the assurance of the economic support of all her allies. The advice of caution given by the Japanese Ambassador to Petrograd, who has just come out of Russia, strengthens the party which is for extreme prudence in the question of intervention.

Second, if Japan does intervene, she would prefer to have no foreign troops co-operating, except, perhaps, small detachments of Chinese, although she would consent to Allied co-operation if the Allies insist. But she would want, and would need, generous assistance in the form of munitions and money from Great Britain and America.

Third, if Japan does intervene, she will have no intention of going beyond a limited objective, probably Irkutsk, which she would approach over both the Siberian and Amur Railways. Japan, in short, has no desire to meet the organized armed forces of Germany, for which she has a most wholesome respect. Despite the possible wording of her explanations, her intervention would be undertaken almost solely to stop the spread of anarchy and German intrigue toward the Far East; that is, it would be purely a measure of national self-defense for Japan. Thus it would probably have very little effect toward relieving the pressure of German arms on the west front.

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Fourth, Japan is much exercised over the definition of her future relations with Russia and Germany. Her present relations with Russia are handicapped by great lack of understanding on the part of Japan. The interviews just now being given out by the Japanese Ambassador to Russia on his return home are almost the first public utterances made by a Japanese public man indicating any understanding of the fact that the radicalism and liberalism of Russia are genuine, widespread, and ineradicable, and that they are not merely the effusions of a few professional agitators." Japan's misunderstanding of Russia has been aided by the fact that Reuter, the British news service, has fed the Japanese public with cabled_excerpts of the Russian views of the Tory newspapers of England like the London "Times" and the London "Observer," and has noticeably not given the Japanese a fair glimpse of the opinion on this issue held by British labor and British liberalism, the elements which are really running the war in England. More than once the doubtless well-intended work of the Reuter service has actually tended to hinder the winning of the war for democracy.

America, on the other hand, has helped to give Japan a better understanding of Russia than Japan was apparently able to get for herself. Unquestionably, the United States, for all the misconceptions nursed by its tories, has understood radical Russia better than any other ally of Russia. Moreover, America's views are having great weight with Japan. There is an unmistakable and highly interesting drift in Japanese official opinion to-day. This is an inclination toward the view that the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance has been nearly exhausted by Japan, and that a more valuable ally for the Island Empire will be Germany or America. In other words, for her own peculiar purposes Japan is inclining to consider both Germany and America greater Powers than Great Britain. The Japanese seem to feel that England will be so exhausted by the war and so engrossed with making good the economic drain on her own resources that she will have little support to lend Japan's programme in the Far East. There is also an opinion that the British Empire will break into a flexible group of nations after

the war.

On the other hand, Japan is impressed by the growing military and economic power of the United States, although she does make a proper discount for the usual American boasting.

As for Germany, Japan is feeling that the war will probably leave the Germans in a position of great strength, and that this strength will seek development either through central

Asia toward India or through Siberia toward the Far East. Japan fears Germany, and this means that she would be inclined to make an arrangement with Germany for her own protection unless she believed that it would benefit her more to ally herself with another Power.

Well, America is the most formidable rival of Germany for Japan's hand. It will do no good, however, for Americans to scold Japan for tendencies toward Prussianism such as undoubtedly exist in these islands Americans will have to show Japan that Prussianism doesn't pay by helping to beat Germany; and by the efficiency of their own conduct of the war, as well as by helping to secure a workable democratic régime in Russia, Americans can prove to Japan that democracy is not to be dreaded as a sort of national tuberculosis.

The forbearance toward the question of mobilization in Siberia shown by the Government, headed by the professional soldier Terauchi, is a great testimonial to the extent of America's influence with Japan. America is vastly indebted to

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Japan for this. Incidentally, by this forbearance Japan has augmented her stock of good will among the other nations. Good will is just as important to a nation as to a corporation, and Japan's supply of it has been rather thin, owing to a few historic blunders, such as the presentation of the famous Twenty-one Demands on China.

In return for Japan's consideration of the American view about Russia the United States must scrupulously recognize the special position and interests of Japan in the Far East, and must actively aid the proper and orderly development of Japan. America has a great opportunity to guard real democracy in Russia and to encourage it in Japan, to help Japan and Russia understand each other, and to help them both check the menace of Prussia. To accomplish these ends the United States must be in performance as well as in after-dinner promises a true friend of both Japan and Russia. That is the unmistakable way to end the Kaiser's dream of "Berlin-Petrograd-Tokyo." Tokyo, March 22.

STRANGER in Geneva, New York, notices first the massive gray-stone Methodist church, which dominates the main street and throws its English Gothic tower skyward with a valiant air. It was built by working people, and so recklessly built that the congregation found itself saddled with a building debt of $82,000, a weekly budget of $230, and an income of less than one hundred dollars. In two years the debt has been cut to $49,000, and the weekly income is nearly $300. The church has more than a thousand members, of whom 350 are tithers." A tither is a person who sets aside one-tenth of his income for Christian activities. These Geneva Methodist tithers are doing more than pay for their church; they are pioneers in a financial policy which bids fair to spread through Methodism.

Nevertheless I was curious to talk to these people who found it possible to give so much in the face of rising prices, war charities, and added taxes. How did they do it?

My directions led me first to the town's principal shoe store, where I asked for Mr. Cassatt.

"We tithers," he said, proudly, turning to me after waiting on a customer, "don't feel that we begin to give until after we have returned our tenth to the storehouse. I've already paid in $700 on the church debt, and have pledged a thousand more in ten years. By that time I hope to wipe off the $2,500 mortgage on my own home."

I tried him with a mean attack. "Doesn't wife ever your tell you that you could own your own house sooner if you didn't pay so much on the church?" No, she doesn't. She's not that kind," he answered, promptly. Humiliated, I went elsewhere to seek understanding.

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Mrs. Silver, a young and pretty widow, lives with her four children in a shabby little house overlooking the big frozen lake. She was introduced to me as one who had just joined the Tithers' Association and wanted to give one-tenth of the dollar a day she earned by sewing bags for the near-by flour-mill. "I guess I can give one bag and trust Him to stretch the other nine," she explained. When I spoke of fuel and food and clothes, she agreed, smilingly, but said:

"There's always money spent foolishly which could be better spent by the Lord, and it ain't right to rob him of what's his."

I went on down the frosty lake road to the home of Mrs. Silver's neighbor, Mrs. Hardy.

"What do I think of tithing?" she repeated, as she brought me into the neat, warm kitchen. " Why, if I didn't tithe I'd be picked as clean as a bird. I've got to tithe to keep goin'." "But what does your husband say about it?"

'My husband is a drinkin' man, as I guess you've heard. He says I sha'n't touch a cent of his money, so I take a tenth of what is left after I've paid for food and rent; sometimes it's only five cents, sometimes it's ten, but whatever it is it don't belong to me."

When I returned to the church, I found a meeting of a group of ministers from near-by parishes, gathered to learn the technique of putting tithing before their congregations. There were sixteen, most of them young fellows with bluff ways and honest faces. They came from farming communities and had the hard task of persuading the New York farmer that a tenth of his produce did not belong to him. I was amused at the naïve way they ran business and religion together, and at first I was genuinely shocked at the familiar way in which they addressed the Deity. Their homely speech seemed blasphemous until I grasped the fact that no disrespect was intended and that they but put into practical expression the philosophy of pantheism.

"A man looks up into Jesus' face and says, 'Lord, I surrender; all to thee I owe.' And the Lord says, 'If you mean business, what are you going to give?':

"The Lord's no fool. We get our business sense from him, along with every other good thing.'

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Why wouldn't the Lord take care of the tither? He knows he gets his money that way to carry on his work. If he owns a tenth of a business, he'll see that it don't suffer."

When they knelt for prayer, I found I liked their "Amens and "Yes, Lords," and "Hallelujahs" chiming across the speaker's invocation. It all had a lively sense of intercession and emotional validity.

Later, some of them told of their experiences, especially of the rewards reserved for those who clung to their stewardship. "You'll never find a tither in the poorhouse," one said, and another, "I'm a parson on six hundred a year; and I found I had to tithe to get out of debt."

One told of a man in Syracuse who tithed regularly when the tenth was only ten dollars a month; he prospered until it grew to a hundred dollars. This looked too big to relinquish, so he gave up the practice. Disaster followed, until he was brought to poverty and humility. He began tithing again, and now he is on his feet financially and spiritually.

"I want you to hear the story of Mrs. Gordan," said one young minister. "She has a masterful, loud-spoken way about her, which made some of us in the church think she ruled the house. I guess this story shows who is master. She told it to me last night after prayer-meeting.

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Gordan," I says to my husband," this week you'll have to