But we have in Latin an idiom by no means rare, which when it occurs in Greek, has been always explained as dependent on this use of the infinitive for the imperative. We read: & deiλoí, móσ' iμev; tí κακῶν ἱμείρετε τούτων; (Od. 10. 431), where the person of ἱμείρετε forbids our taking ἴμεν as the first plural, and : ὦ βασιλεῦ, κότερον λέγειν πρὸς σὲ τὰ νοέων τυγχάνω, ἢ σιγᾶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ (Herod. 1. 88), where Aéyev or tuev seems a repetition of the infinitive by the speaker in reluctant response to a command usually implied. It is much more common in Latin, where in: mene incepto desistere victam (Aen. 1. 37) it is evidently an indignant protest by Juno against the command imposed on her by fate. In her anger she repeats incredulously the command conveyed to her, as though she had not heard aright, just as does Croesus in the example cited from Herodotus; and so the idiom indicates plainly that the command was conveyed by the infinitive, not the imperative. So, too, in: servom antestari? vide (Pl. Curc. 623), tantum laborem capere ob talem filium (Ter. And. 870), quid enim sedere totos dies in villa ista? (Cic. Att. 12. 44. 2). We find the idiom in the second part of: Mene salis placidi voltum fluctusque quietos (Aen. 5. 848-9), where Virgil explains it in the sense I have indicated by supplying iubes with it in the first part. But in the great majority of examples of the idiom it passes to the expression of an exclamation at a shocking misfortune, as in: mene Iliacis occumbere campis non potuisse! (Aen. 1. 97-8) or: huncine solem tam nigrum surrexe mihi! (Sat. 1. 9. 72-3). That the interrogation and not the exclamation is the older force here seems plain when we have this form transferred to indirect, as we find it in: existimabant . . . postremo quid esse levius aut turpius quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium? (B. G. 5. 28, fin.), or: sententia quae censebat reddenda bona... nam aliter qui credituros eos, non vana ab legatis super rebus tantis adferri? (Liv. 2. 4. 3-4). For plainly esse or credituros here has been transferred from such uses of the infinitive indirect as we have just given. Naturally the subjunctive is also used in such cases, as in docebat etiam . . . id eis eripi quis pati posset? (B. G. I. 43), or legati . . . rogaverunt . . . eane meritos crederet quisquam, &c. (Liv. 7. 20. 3-5). In poscere fata tempus (Aen. 6. 45-6) have we a complex or a simple sentence? Those who regard Skt. davane, or Greek Sovvai as the primary and typical form of the infinitive, and treat it as the dative of a noun, 'for the giving', will regard it as a simple sentence. But we have also the Skt. kartum, the Latin creatum, apparently an old accusative, for the making', and this gives what is termed the infinitive proper in both Sanskrit and Umbro-Oscan. We have, thirdly, a form without any case-ending, and showing the infinitive stem only, as in dóμev, or the Ionic idéev (probably old idéfev), giving us the usual Greek infinitive ideîv; and this may well be the oldest of the three. It is true that, if we except first supines, Latin infinitives seem all of the first class, the datives. But in Greek active forms like ἀγέμεν οι μένειν seem most usual when used as imperatives; in Homer they are in ending the same as the German forms schreiten, fahren; and gerade stehen is closely parallel to avoi μένειν. To return to our question: Is not: melius non tangere (Hor. Sat. 2. 1. 45) a complex sentence, being composed of two: non tangere. Melius erit? And so with: poscere fata. Tempus est. There cannot be much doubt that: me licet unda ferat (Prop. 2. 26. 44) is a complex sentence; what of: me licet undam ferre? Is it not for: me undam ferre. Licet? We compare with: me undam ferre 'let the wave bear me' the Homeric: Alavra daɣeîv 'let Ajax win', or Hesiod's γυμνὸν σπείρειν. When we compare these with: σὺ δ ̓ ἐν κpívaolaι, it is evident that the accusative with the infinitive is not primary, but a later development to be paralleled with that in: volo te venire, which again is complex for: te venire, volo 'do thou come, it is my wish'. And so: quid vis faciam? (Ter. Eun. 1054) seems complex for: quid faciam? Quid vis? a use of three for four. We have the two constructions confused in: mene vis dem ipse in pedes? (Pl. Capt. 121), showing how lightly the Roman passed from one to the other. Of course this shows us the real nature of our modal infinitive, if it is true; and to me all seems to point in this direction. Monro (Hom. Gram. 241) thinks we may connect the use of the infinitive for the imperative with the use of the infinitive to imply fitness or obligation. This, pointing to such uses as we have in: čσri pèv evdel (Od. 15. 392), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥρη εὕδειν (Od. I I. 330-1), οὐ γὰρ ἔοικ ̓ ὀτρυνέμεν (ΙΙ. 4. 286), ἔμε δὲ χρὴ γήραϊ . . . πείθεσθαι (ΙΙ. 23. 644-5), modal infinitives all, is plainly parallel with the course we are following. But Monro thinks of explaining the use for the imperative from such constructions by the ellipse of eσrɩ or xpý, which is explaining the simple from the complex. He is embarrassed, because he sees this mode of explanation does not help with the German use in Schritt fahren. Is it not more reasonable to try to explain the complex from the simple sentence? When we turn to Apollonius Dyscolus (Synt. III. 14), we read: 'I believe that Homer, following his custom of avoiding imperative modes of expression, introduces the infinitive for the imperative, as a general form of the verb, into which, as I have just shown, all special moods can be converted'. In III. 13 he had shown that the infinitive is a general form lying at the base of all moods; so that in περιπατῶ we have ὡρισάμην περιπατεῖν, in περιπατοῖμι, ηὐξάμην περιπατεῖν, in περιπάτει, προσέταξα περιπατεῖν. His general form of the verb ' corresponds closely with our usual definition of the infinitive as the form of the verb which gives its simple meaning, without reference to number or person. This form, called in Latin infinitivum, in Greek ἀπαρέμφατον “with no παρεμφάσεις or accessory meanings', would naturally be, not the case form dófevat, which is a dative, but the simple stem form δόμεν or ἔμμεν or ἰδεῖν; which may approximate very closely in meaning to the root form da, or voca, or fer, that we found to be the old universal forms for command, out of which dato, or vocate, or ferunto developed. Just what additional meaning the stem-forming suffixes -μev or -Fev bring to the root, I do not know; and until we know this, we cannot accurately determine the relation of da or dós to dóμev; but they seem to have been very much alike. Brugmann (Gr. Synt. 170) thinks that a satisfactory explanation of the union of pív with the infinitive, already fully developed in Homer, has not yet been found. Monro's (Hom. Gram. 236) difficulty with πρìv dóμevaɩ (Il. 1. 98) before the giving' seems to be his feeling that pív should take an ablative, not a dative. But in piv ¿λ0eîv υίας Αχαιών (Ι. 9. 403) ἐλθεῖν is neither a dative nor an ablative ; Apollonius felt it to be, not a noun, but the general form of the verb, and we know that in Greek, even in Attic Greek, what the Greek grammarian called the póleos, the Latin grammarian the praepositio, was not a preposition in our sense of the word. Dionysius Thrax finds the πρόθεσις . . . ἔν τε συνθέσει καὶ συντάξει (18) ; i. e. he feels that σύν is as much a preposition in συντίθημι as in σὺν θεῷ. Far less can we treat pív as a preposition in our sense of the word in considering the early union of sentences which joined πpív with the infinitive. Perhaps Sóμeval is properly regarded as a noun; but is Sóμev a noun or a verb? Certainly aye and fer, which seem its nearest parallels in syntax, can hardly be regarded as nouns. I suppose that roots, as such, belong to a time in the history of language when the distinction between the noun and the verb was not yet developed. Let us take first the easier construction of πpív with the negative, as in: τὴν δ ̓ ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν 'her I will not release; sooner shall old age come upon her in our (II. 9. 386-7), 'but not even so shall Agamemnon any longer persuade my mind. Sooner let him pay me back all the bitter despite ', where by taking Sóμevaι as equivalent to an imperative in parataxis, we get exactly the sense we want, leading us to 'till he have paid back', the usual translation. So in : οὐδ ̓ ὅ γε πρὶν Δαναοῖσιν ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀπώσει, (II. 1. 97-8), 'nor will he before remove the loathly pestilence from the Danaans. Let Agamemnon first give back to her father the bright-eyed maid'. And in : ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γάρ κεν ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐναίσιμος εἴη, (Od. 10. 383-5), 'O Circe, what man, who would be righteous, would endure first to take meat and drink? Sooner let him view his companions face to face, and set them free'. In all four examples cited the principal clause has a negative expressed or implied, and has either a future verb, or a verb in the optative used as a future. The indicative used in the dependent clause of the first is clearly a voluntative future, coming very close to the meaning of the imperatives for which infinitives are used in the remaining three. But for this imperative force we have subjunctives substituted in: μήτηρ δ ̓ οὔ με φίλη πρίν γ' εἴα θωρήσσεσθαι, Sooner πρίν γ' αὐτὴν ἐλθοῦσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι ἴδωμαι (ΙΙ. 18. 189-90), 'and my mother does not permit me to arm myself sooner. must I see her plainly coming'. Monro sees this parataxis in: οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις, πρὶν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθῃσθα (Ιl. 24. 551), 'you will not raise him. Sooner shall you suffer some new evil'. He thinks that 'the subjunctive was directly modelled on the existing use with the infinitive, that πρὶν πάθησθα simply took the place of πρὶν παθεῖν, when a more definite conditional force was wanted. It is quite simple to substitute the subjunctive for the imperative, and for the infinitive used as an imperative; we have here a parallel to the Latin licet venire and licet venias. The 'simple' substitution of a subjunctive for an infinitive not so used might call for further explanation. But we can understand the transference of this subjunctive to the optative after a past tense, as in: οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν, πρὶν πειρήσαιτ' ̓Αχιλῆος (Ιl. 21. 58ο). We find the infinitive used for the imperative with pív in both the principal and dependent clauses in: μὴ πρὶν ἐπ' ἠέλιον δῦναι καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἐλθεῖν, πρίν με κατὰ πρηνὲς βαλέειν Πριάμοιο μέλαθρον (ΙΙ. 2. 412-4). Ο Zeus most glorious, most great . . . let not the sun go down thereon, nor darkness come on. Sooner let me have cast to ground Priam's palace'. So, too, in: μή μοι πρὶν ἰέναι, Πατρόκλεες ἱπποκέλευθε, νῆας ἔπι γλαφυράς, πρὶν Εκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο αἱματόεντα χιτῶνα περὶ στήθεσσι δαΐξαι (11. 16. 839-41), 'come not sooner to me, Patroclus driver of steeds, to the hollow ships. Sooner shalt thou have rent about his breast the gory tunic of man-slaying Hector'. We have, to parallel this, a voluntative future in the principal, and an infinitive in the dependent clause in: οὐ γὰρ πρὶν πολέμοιο μεδήσομαι αἱματόεντος, πρίν γ' υἱὸν Πριάμοιο δαίφρονος, Εκτορα δίον, Μυρμιδόνων ἐπί τε κλισίας καὶ νῆας ικέσθαι (Ιl. 9. 650-2), 'for not sooner will I take thought of bloody war. Sooner let noble Hector, wise Priam's son, come to the huts and ships of the Myrmidons'. And so, too, in: οὗ σε πρὶν κτεριῶ, πρίν γ' Εκτορος ἐνθάδ' ἐνεῖκαι τεύχεα καὶ κεφαλήν, μεγαθύμου σοῖο φονῆος (II. 18. 334-5), |