immutable glory of virtue, must tend to impair our respect for it, and thereby divert the mind from the highest and purest fountain of human happiness?

In the beginning of this article we made some allusion to the false method to which the theory under consideration. owes its existence. Hartley has informned us of the manner in which he was led to embrace and advocate this theory. He began, as he tells us, by trying the power of the principle of association; by trying whether it could not be made to account for all our intellectual pleasures and pains. He undertook to ascertain the origin of the various parts and operations of the mind, or rather to trace them all up to the same origin, before he had carefully observed their several characteristics. How many false theories have arisen from the same prolific, from the same inexhaustible source! One person adopts the principle of self-love, because he happens to see how it will serve to explain a few of our mental phenomena; and, for the sake of a grand simplification, it must be made to explain all the rest. Another seizes upon sympathy, a third upon association, and each proceeds to take such a view of facts as will enable him with the greater ease to reduce them all to his own favorite classification, or mode of explanation. By the aid of a lively fancy, a good deal of coloring, and, above all, the ambiguities of language, the true nature of things is most strangely disguised; and all, however unlike in themselves, are made to appear in one grand array with the same regimentals on; whilst the theoriser himself stands forth as the captain of the host!

And such will continue to be the course of men for centuries to come. Yet let us take encouragement, as well as warning. For order and light, real and not apparent only, will ultimately rise out of confusion and darkness. If the systems which spring from human ingenuity, may, at first sight, strike the mind with their regularity and beauty; yet, let us recollect that they are destined soon to pass away. The system which Descartes has given us of the material universe, for example, was adapted to captivate the mind; because its immense fabric, because its wide inductions, were based upon a few particulars within the reach of all. By recommending itself to the natural indolence of the human mind, as well as to its passionate love of general principles, it was calculated to make proselytes among the ignorant as well as among the learned. But it was com

pelled, in spite of all its captivating charms, to shrink into nothing before the irresistible manifestation of the truth. Newton unveiled the true system of the universe. His facts are as broad as his principles. His foundation is laid as deep as that of nature itself. And hence, although his system, as has been well said, does not give the mind so much pleasure in reading it; yet it will outlive ten thousand such fanciful hypotheses as that of the immortal French philosopher. If, from the causes above intimated, error has the advantage over truth in the rapidity of her marches; the latter possesses, in many cases, the inconceivable advantage that her conquests are everlasting.

But such views as those unfolded by Newton are not to be obtained, in any department of science, without much. toil and self-denial. To recur to our former example, the disciple of Descartes may see all the order and beauty of his master's system at once; and he may be charmed before its evanescent glories have time to fade from his eyes. But the disciple of Newton must hear much apparent discord before he can enjoy the high privilege of listening to the music of the spheres. Like the Christian, he must depend upon promises at first, and he must pass through the valley of self-denial and humility, in order to reach that loftiest eminence ever attained by man, from whence he may look abroad, not upon the production of hypothesis and fancy, but upon the unrivalled glory of God's own creation.

ART. II. THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF MAN'S DEPendence.

BY REV. ISAAC PARSONS, East Haddam, Conn.

THE Christian world is divided in opinion on many subjects, but on no one does this difference result in wider discrepancies than on that of human dependence. This may be regarded as one of the starting points of difference of opinion in the Theological discussions of this age. There are not a few, who take the side of Arminians and Pelagians in these discussions, who have formerly ranked with Calvinists, and who still claim to be Calvinists, while in their

views of man's dependence, they are in fact with Pelagians and Arminians, and are found carrying out their heretical views on other subjects in Theology. It is not my design to trace minutely the distinction between Calvinists on the one hand, and Arminians and Pelagians on the other, in regard to human dependence, nor to show the influence of this in determining their respective views of the doctrines and duties of religion, but my design is simply to present a few thoughts on the nature and extent of man's dependence.

It is admitted by all who are believers in revelation, that mankind are the creatures of God, that to him they owe both their creation and preservation, yet among believers in revelation there are diversities of opinion in regard to the nature of man's dependence on God. As mankind are free, moral, and accountable agents, it is contended by some that this dependence must differ in kind or degree from the dependence of material existence, and hence, they would restrict dependence to the existence of man at first, and to his general preservation. On the contrary, Calvinists hold to entire and absolute dependence in man on God. Yet they admit the freedom of the human will, and hold to human accountability as really and as fully as others, who limit man's dependence in accomodation to their preconceived views of free agency.

It is important for all, of every name and class, to be established in scriptural views on this subject, and also, that all should be ready to acknowledge and to feel their dependence in its full extent as taught in the Holy Scriptures. I shall, I. Inquire as to the nature of man's dependence on God. II. As to its extent.

I. The nature of man's dependence on God. Man is a complex being, uniting soul and body in his person, having an animal nature and a moral existence, yet man in both natures, in soul and in body, is the creation of God, the workmanship of his hands, as really so, as any portion of the inanimate creation. He was brought into existence without any will or agency of his own, and he is in his structure as to body and soul, such a creature, endowed with such powers. and capacities as God chose to see in him. The dependence of man on God for existence is as absolute as that of inanimate matter. And what is there in the nature of man's dependence, that should distinguish it from the dependence of other effects of creative power? It is true, that as a

moral agent, he is constituted with faculties which give him a higher rank in the scale of being than irrational creatures, but this higher rank does not prove that he is any the less dependent on God, or that dependence in his case differs in its nature from dependence in other creatures, unless it should appear from other sources of knowledge that man is less under the controul of God than other creatures. Irrational creatures have a distinct organization, and are distinct agents, yet absolutely under the controul of God and completely in his hands! And why should we infer any thing different from this in regard to the dependence of men as the creatures of God, though they are moral and accountable? God is the Father of their spirits and the former of their bodies, and as the offspring of God they belong to him, and are accountable to him: they are as really his as the earth on which they dwell, and they have nothing of privilege, nor of talent, nor of means of happiness and usefulness, which has not come to them from God. And as God is the giver of all, so he is able to take away all their blessings, and they cannot live, nor breathe, nor move any longer than it is his pleasure that they should. Dependence, for aught that appears, may be contemplated as extending to all creatures, still in point of dependence they are all alike. No creature is beyond the reach of God's power; none is beneath his care. He is Creator of all, he is over all, holds the power of life and death in respect to all, and all are dependent on him for their continued existence. God challenges this supremacy to himself in his word: "I am God and there is no God with me. I kill and I make alive. I wound and I heal, neither is there any that can deliver out of my hand." Though dependence may be of the same nature in all creatures, so far as to place them in the hands of God, still it may be a question how far men are dependent on God. This leads

II. To inquire as to the extent of man's dependence on God. Under this inquiry I shall contemplate man just in respect to his powers of moral agency, and-secondly, in his

character as a sinner.

Whenever doubt has arisen in the mind in regard to the extent of human dependence, it has respected man in the exercise of his powers of moral agency. It is admitted that these powers are from God, but in the exercise of them, it is said that man's freedom is such, as exempts him to a limited extent from dependence, and that God cannot controul man in

the exercise of his powers, as it would be his pleasure to. But what absurdity is there in admitting the idea of dependence in the soul of man on God? Can the human soul'exist independently of God? Does not its immortality depend on the will of God?-and is not the soul dependent on God for its natural powers, and also in the exercise of those powers as well as for their continued and regular state? The understanding is the leading faculty of the soul, yet what man is there who can say that he is not dependent on God in the exercise of this faculty? or what man can say this faculty shall never be deranged? Who has not seen the mind thrown off its balance, and the understanding deranged and for the time being the person's moral agency impaired? Is not the Father of our spirits conversant with them? and does he not control all the influences and causes, which affect any of our faculties ?-and shall we feel, that we are independent in the exercise of our powers? Saith the Psalmist, "O Lord thou understandest my thoughts afar off, for there is not a word on my tongue but O Lord thou knowest it altogether,-thou hast beset me behind and before and laid thine hand upon me! Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" I see no more absurdity in the entire dependence of man as a moral agent, than in the entire dependence of inanimate matter? And from man as a moral agent in the exercise of his faculties, I cannot detach the idea of dependence on God and yet retain him accountable to God! If man is capable of acting independently of God and beyond the power and influence of God to control and restrain him, I see not, why it does not follow, that he ceases to be accountable to God! Dependence and accountability in creatures who are moral agents, go hand in hand! Where dependence begins in a moral agent on God, accountability begins!-where dependence ends, accountability ends! On this principle, if men are supposed to act independently of God in the exercise of their powers of moral agency, we must suppose that they cease to be accountable to God in their conduct. But this conclusion is contrary to all that is taught us in the word of God on this subject. The law of God, the rule of duty to men as moral agents, requires obedience to God to the entire extent of their capacities, whether they choose to yield this obedience or not. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength VOL. V.

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