CHAP. III.

SECT. VII.

Criticism.

constitution of our senses in general, then not only
the nature and relations of objects in space and time,
but even space and time themselves disappear; and
these, as phænomena, cannot exist in themselves, but
only in us. What may be the nature of objects.
considered as things-in-themselves, and without re-
ference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite
unknown to us. We know nothing more than our
mode of perceiving them; and with this alone we
have to do. Space and time are the pure forms
thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone
can we cognise à priori-that is, antecedent to all
actual perception; and for this reason such cognition
is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our
cognition which is called cognition à posteriori—that
is, empirical intuition. The former appertain abso-
lutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever
kind our sensations may be; the latter may be of
very
diversified character. Supposing that we should
carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest
degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance
one step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of
objects as things-in-themselves."

§ 77. One great merit which we must ascribe to Kant is the dismissal from his psychology of all accidental side questions, and the clear presentation of the fundamental problems which the psychologist endeavours to solve. The process of perception is reduced ultimately to a consciousness of sensations,

* These quotations from Kant's 'Kritik,' are from Mr. Meiklejohn's translation published in Bohn's series.

varied in character, but all agreeing in having, as a condition of their possibility, particular forms. Through these sensations there is made known the existence, although not the nature, of things-in-themselves. The essential problems of every system of psychology must have reference to (1) sensations, or what Kant calls the matter of sensations, (2) space and time, called the form of sensations, and (3) the thing-in-itself, or whatever it may be called, supposed to exist independently and as the cause of sensations. There is a fourth problem not so fundamental, regarding the process by which sensations form themselves or become transformed into distant objects of perception. Here we have presented in very small compass the subjects of all the disputed questions of psychology, and if psychologists only understood one another, the probability is that there would not appear so great a difference between their views as is now supposed.

CHAP. III.

SECT. VII.

Immediate objects of conscious

ness.

With regard to the first of these problems, the nature of the immediate objects of consciousness, Kant makes no distinction between the sensations and the mental acts which they constitute. But still they are mental, purely mental, and called by him representations of other and unknown objects of intuition. We shall have to notice, in a subsequent philosopher, an important difference regarding this question. The cardinal doctrine of Kant's psychology of perception is, however, the à priori and phænomenal character of space and time. Space Space and and time are subjective in their origin, and are

K

time.

CHAP. III.
SECT. VII.

conditions only of phænomena, not of things-inthemselves. This problem also, we shall find,* gives rise to a great deal of discussion. An investigation Things-inthemselves. into the nature of the so-called things-in-themselves is not properly a psychological one, although psychology has to do with the grounds of our belief in them. Kant considered them beyond the sphere of human knowledge, but Kant's German successors broke through the trammels which he had attempted to impose upon the human intellect, and speculated boldly regarding the nature and laws of what he pronounced unknown. Into these speculations it would be inconsistent with our subject to enter. But the psychological doctrines of Kant have been fruitful in stimulating and, to a certain extent, in guiding subsequent researches into the perennial problems of thought which he apprehended so clearly. Any criticism of Kant's doctrines, we shall not now attempt, but leave it to be done by those of the present generation to whom we must now devote some attention. Our historical review will, we trust, have produced two good effects; it will have enabled us to see the most important errors of the earlier psychologists; and will have given us a clear apprehension of what are the fundamental problems of the psychology of perception.

* §§ 82-81.

CHAP. III.

SECT. VIII

SECTION VIII.

MODERN ENGLISH PSYCHOLOGY.

§ 78. Was Kant successful in his refutation of Hume? By the principle which Kant endeavoured to establish, was philosophical skepticism rendered impossible or absurd? For an answer to these and similar questions we must look to the history of modern psychology. Hume and Kant are the representatives of the two great schools of modern English psychology, and it shall be our task in this closing section to refer, as briefly as possible, to the fundamental questions regarding which these schools are at issue. It would be impossible, within the space to which we propose to confine ourselves, to give anything like a fair account of even the most important of the psychological works of the present time; it would be equally impossible to do justice to the philosophical ability and learning with which the great problems of psychology have been treated. All that we propose to do is to introduce the student to a sphere of research of great interest and great extent, and to furnish, perhaps, some stimulus and some guidance in the pursuit of knowledge. We shall not, therefore, as heretofore, consider each psychological system by itself, but shall give an account of the manner in which psychological problems and difficulties have been treated by different writers. For the sake of brevity, we shall endeavour

Study of

modern psychology.

CHAP III.
SECT. VIII

Problems.

Objects of conscious

ness.

to avoid everything of secondary importance and of merely historical interest. We shall restrict ourselves to the consideration of the few essentially important problems which must be solved in one way or another by every psychological system; problems which have already been pointed out in connection with Kant. The attempt to ascertain, or accurately to state, what a philosopher really means is frequently attended with considerable difficulty; and we have prominent examples of the evils arising from a disingenuous or a prejudiced reading of the doctrines of another. This we shall endeavour to avoid, and give as briefly and accurately as possible the doctrines which we propose to discuss.

§ 79. Kant's general doctrine, that there are certain à priori truths or principles which could not originate in experience, may be better discussed at a future time. At present we are concerned chiefly with the modern doctrines concerning :

(1) Sensations, or the immediate objects of consciousness; (2) space and time, especially the former; (3) the object and the process of perception; and (4) the believed objective cause which may account for the existence and permanence of the objects we perceive.

The question as to the nature of the immediate objects of consciousness is one of great importance. It has been almost universally held that the objects of which we are immediately conscious are ideas purely mental, either identical with the act of consciousness, or numerically, but not in nature, different from it.