Although there may be many other circumstances connected with an act of memory, yet these three which we have mentioned-the simple phantasm, the recognition, and the reference to a past time-appear to be all the elements which are essential to memory. § 100. Memory, as a form of representation, we have seen to be essentially an integrating process. Some image presents itself before the mind, and we recognise it—that is, we believe that we have known it before in connection with a number of other mental objects. The act of memory is not complete until we are able to recall the other circumstances with which the recognised phantasm was originally connected in our knowledge. To remember a thing, in short, is to posit the image of the thing in the midst of a greater or less number and variety of other images in connection with which we have already known it. We must be able to posit it in time, but as time is known to us only by a succession of events or images, the giving of a position in time to the object of memory implies an ability to say what events preceded, co-existed with, and succeeded it. Hence, when we try to remember an event, we are satisfied when we are able to say that it occurred about the same time as, or soon after, another event with which we are more familiar. And the greater the number of the circumstances or events in the midst of which we are able to posit the object of memory, the more complete is the act of memory. These accompanying circumstances may be of any kind; may be sensations of our own minds, actions performed by us or others,

CHAP. IV.

SECT. III.

Memory of

events in

time.

CHAP. IV.
SECT. III.

Scientific

memory without time.

objects existing in space, even arbitrary artificial signs indicating time, place, or circumstance.

§ 101. There are, however, forms of memory in which the reference to time does not appear to be essential. A student wishes to demonstrate the fortyseventh proposition of the first book of Euclid; but he has partially forgotten it. He does not attempt to connect his partial knowledge with anything past. He looks at the figure and endeavours to recall the relations which exist between the different parts of which it is composed. And a perfect memory of this proposition has probably no reference to past time at all, but is simply a representation of the lines and angles of the figure before the mind, with a clear perception of the relations existing between them, and of the conclusion which follows from the comparison of these relations. Similar remarks might be made with reference to our memory of other systems of knowledge.

There is also a form of memory which is involved in the acquisition of practical habits, from which the element of time appears to be eliminated. When a musician remembers a piece of music, it is not meant merely that the musical notes are represented before the mind's eye in their proper order, but also that he can, without hesitation or difficulty, strike with his fingers upon the proper keys, and produce in quick succession the sounds indicated by the musical characters. And, in this case, the want of memory consists in an inability to think of the particular series of musical notes which should follow

or precede some other remembered parts of the piece.

Thus, perhaps, it would be more accurate to consider recognition as the one essential characteristic of memory by which it is distinguished from simple representation; and to add that, when the object of memory is a past event in our own lives, the act of memory involves also the positing of its object amongst a greater or less number of other objects or events related to one another in a past time.

CHAP. IV.

SECT. III.

tion.

§ 102. There is another mode of representation Expectadiffering from simple phantasy in having a reference to time, and differing from memory in referring to future instead of to past time. This we call expectation or prevision. In the process of perception this plays a very important part. The different qualities of which an object of perception is composed have been so constantly found in our experience united together, that when we perceive any one of them we expect to find the others. We have always found that the coloured globular body which we call an orange contains within it a pleasant acid juice and several seeds. Whenever we see an orange, we expect to find within it what our past experience tells us is likely to be there. Thus, expectation is founded upon memory; and upon the constancy and invariability of the experience with which memory furnishes us will depend the confidence of our expectation. The perfection of expectation is prevision. The astronomer can predict with certainty when an eclipse of the moon will take place, because

CHAP. IV.
SECT. III.

his calculations are founded upon a long series of
accurately observed and constantly and invariably
recurring phenomena. The weather-casts of the
meteorologist do not give rise to the confident ex-
pectation produced by scientific prevision, because
the phenomena observed are exceedingly variable
and inconstant, and it is known that there may be
innumerable disturbing causes at work. In daily life
the principle of expectation is of the greatest practi-
cal importance in guiding our conduct. One of the
forms of superstition consists simply in founding an
expectation upon some sign or omen which is con-
nected by tradition with the event expected. The
slightest reflection might show the utter want of
connection between the sign and the object of expec-
tation; but the association has been formed in child-
hood through the instructions of parents or relatives,
and even after reflection has shown that it does not
conform to truth or reality, its power can scarcely
ever be completely overcome.
A reasonable expec-
tation is founded upon the remembered or well-
attested experience of ourselves or others. We be-
come acquainted, for example, with persons, and have
opportunities of observing how they speak or act in
particular circumstances. We form an estimate of
their character-that is, we construct in our minds a
certain kind or class of ideal actions which we expect
them to perform in certain circumstances. The
better we know them, the greater confidence have we
in our expectations. Thus, in all the circumstances
of life, expectation, reasonable or unreasonable, is an

important guide of our actions; and our success in life to a great extent depends upon the carefulness and ability with which our expectations are formed.*

CHAP. IV.
SECT. IV.

SECTION IV.

KINDS OF REPRESENTATION-CONTINUED.

IMAGINATION.

§ 103. The power of representation possessed by the human mind is exhibited in a still more important form than any which we have yet considered. Hitherto we have studied the representing power in its simpler operations, in merely recalling in their natural order the objects of our previous knowledge. We have now to study the power of representation as combined with various other powers and exerted in various interests. And in this form of the operation of the representing power, we shall see that the objects represented are modified and re-arranged in various ways to suit the design of the individual. This form of representation is usually called the constructive or plastic imagination, to distinguish it from the simple representation of objects in phantasy and memory. Before proceeding to consider the most important special applications of the imagination, we may refer to certain general principles of its operation.

* Although the most essential element of expectation is a mental representation referred to a future time, yet it is in reality founded upon inference, or a kind of implicit inference.

Represenbined with

tation com

other

powers.