and as the acquired powers of both are obtained chiefly through the assistance of touch, there is an intimate connection between all the three. A sensation of sound having taken place, it is immediately transferred to a distance, and we attempt to conceive or perceive what the sounding object looks like. In other words, we attempt to explain to our minds the object of hearing by translating it, as it were, into an object of sight. In the same way, a sensation of colour having taken place, we at once project it to a distance, greater or less according to circumstances, and then connect it with sensations of touch and muscular sensations, or think what it would feel like if we were within reach of it. Thus we explain and enlarge the knowledge communicated to us by one sense, by connecting it with, or translating it into, the idealised sensations of the other senses. And the objects of the material world around us, as far as our knowledge of them is concerned, consists of various sensations projected to a distance without us, and united together in such a way that when one of them cccurs, the others are invariably believed to be possible. But this objective union is not of our creation; it is manifestly a condition of the non-ego which we become aware of by the process we have indicated, but which we did not produce and cannot change.

CHAP. II.

SECT. VI.

organic

§ 36. We are now led to a more careful considera- Extration of this distant non-ego. As far as our knowledge objects. of it is concerned, we have seen that it consists of sensations projected into space and combined variously into different unities called objects. These

CHAP. II.

SECT. VI.

Phenome

nal and noumenal elements.

projected sensations we call qualities, and thus objects are composed of a number of qualities. But objects thus composed are manifestly the creation, to a great extent, of our own minds. The sensations are mental phenomena; the act of projection, and the combination of sensations of touch with those of sight and others, are mental processes. The foreignness and independence of these objects to the mind are revealed only in the fact that the mind cannot create or annihilate its sensation at will, and that the laws of the combination of these sensations are evidently not mental laws, but laws of a non-ego. In the objectiveness of projected sensations and their laws there is believed to be involved the existence of some non-ego independent of our knowledge. A sensation-for example, a colour-is something of which we are conscious, and even after the process of projection has taken place, after the eye has been educated, and we perceive the colour as at a distance from us, it is still a thing known to us. But besides this colour as known, we think of some cause or power existing beyond or behind the projected sensation which, striking upon our eye, has produced the sensation. This cause or power cannot be a sensation; it is supposed to exist anterior to and independent of our sensation. It cannot be an object of knowledge, because it can be known only as a sensation, but, ex hypothesi, it has an existence anterior to sensation. Thus, the non-ego appears to consist of two elements; an element which is known, and an element which is unknown, but supposed to

exist. The known element, we have seen, consists simply of projected sensations; the unknown element is composed of something which, when brought into relation with our senses, helps to produce sensations. The term quality has unfortunately become ambiguous by being applied to both of these elements. When it is said that the quality of an object is one of its characters by which it is known to us, it is evidently a projected sensation, for all objects as known consist of such. When it is said that the quality of an object is that which produces a certain sensation in us, it is applied to something which, apart from the sensation, is unknown. The former of the two applications of the word quality appears to us the most natural, and by quality we shall, therefore, henceforth indicate those characteristics of objects which constitute our actual knowledge of them. There is, however, a still farther restriction to the term quality, or at least an important distinction between two kinds of qualities. The qualities of colour, smell, hardness, &c., are simply sensations of sight, smell, muscular effort, &c., ideally transferred or projected into external space. But the space into which these sensations are projected, or which they occupy, is not a sensation of any kind. Although in our knowledge it is inseparably connected with sensation, it is essentially different from sensation. To adopt scholastic distinctions, it is the form of which sensation is the matter, the quantity of which sensation is the quality. It is therefore perhaps improper to speak of extension, figure, and

F

CHAP. II. SECT. VI.

4

other forms of space as being qualities at all. They are rather the spatial relations of qualities, the objective form into which sensations, being projected, are known as qualities. This essential distinction between the form of sensation and sensation itself has given rise to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the former comprising different modes of space, and the latter qualities properly so called, that is projected sensations. Taking quality in the latter, that is, in its proper sense, there is another distinction, although not an essential one, which may be observed. The mode of operation of the different senses is somewhat different. In touch there is necessarily a contact between the external object and the organism; in sight, hearing, and smell, the necessity of similar contact is not so obvious. Consequently touch has been supposed by some to bring us into contact with objects as they really exist; other senses not. Hence the distinction of some qualities being supposed to be more essential to the idea of body than others, or of some being purely subjective, while others are partly or wholly objective. Perhaps such distinctions have arisen also from the fact that, in some of the senses for example, sight and hearing-there is obviously a perception of distance, or a projection of the sensation; while in others, as smell, there is not so much, or so clearly so. Whatever may have given rise to such distinctions, they are fallacious. All qualities properly so called are originally sensations and subjective. All sensations come to be objectified,

and involve elements belonging to the non-ego. All sensations, except purely organic ones, are projected ideally beyond the organism, and there known as qualities; while purely organic sensations, that is, sensations which are discovered not to depend upon extra-organic conditions, are not thought of as qualities at all. Consequently the only essential difference between qualities of objects arises from the difference between the kinds of sensations.* Other differences are either fallacious or accidental.

CHAP. II.

SECT. VI.

non-ego.

§ 37. Having considered the constituent elements Noumenal of objects as known to us, that is, as consisting of real or ideal sensations projected into space and forming there a unity, let us now give some attention to the supposed unknown non-ego. When we perceive a colour, we think of some unknown cause or power which, coming into contact with our eye, gives rise to the sensation. So every other quality of objects suggests to us the existence of something behind it and beyond it which, in relation to our organism, gives rise to different sensations. Whatever this is, it is and must be in itself unknown, because when it comes within the sphere of our knowledge it is already transformed into some sensation or other mode of consciousness, and when we attempt even to conceive it, it must be conceived under the form of some mode of consciousness. Let us, for clearness, call this unknown something a. There is then supposed to be an x corresponding to every different quality which we perceive. And we *For another distinction, see § 179.