A C dent both of the Crown and the Commons, and a King whofe Power is restrained both by the Houfe of Peers and House of Commons; which it never can be as long as he has the Direction of either: And we may likewife fee, that the greateft Danger, to which our Conftitution can be expofed, is, that of the Crown's getting the intire Direction of both Houfes of Parliament, by Means of the Places and Penfions it has to beflow, and the Profecutions, Penalties, and Forfeitures, to which Men B may be exposed by a Multitude of penal, Laws. These laft, no Adminiftration will ever make use of, till they are drove to it by the Weaknefs of their own Measures: It is what no Roman Emperor ever made ufe of, till he was drove to it by fome very ridiculous Piece of Management. But the People of Rome feverely felt, that most of their Emperors did make use of it; and we may expect the fame Fate, if ever the Crown fhould, by Means of Places and Penfions, prevail upon the Parliament to grant fuch Powers, and to pafs fuch Laws, as may render it not only in vain, but unfafe for any Man in the Kingdom to oppofe the Minifters of the Crown, either at Elections, or in Parliament. If this fhould ever happen to be the E Cafe, I must tell the venal Electors of this Kingdom, if there are any fuch, that the wicked Profits they now make by Elections will foon be at an End, because there will be then no Oppofition to the Court Candidates in any County, City or Bo- F rough in the Kingdom; for as foon as Gentlemen find that it is unfafe, as well as in vain to oppose an Adminiftration, no wife Man will, and no vain Fool will dare to fet up for a Member, without a Recommendation from the prime Minifter. We may have Knights, Citizens and Burgeffes, regularly chofen by the People, as the Confuls, Pretors, and other Magiftrates were at Rome, even under their moft tyrannical Emperors; but that of being a Member of Parliament will become a Poft, which will be conferred by the King's Prime Minifter, as the Magiftracies were at Rome by the Em peror's favourite Slave, to cherish the Vanity of rich Fools, that he may have the greater Number of lucrative Pofts to bestow upon wife Sycophants. I Having now, Sir, fhewn the Danger to which our Conftitution is moft expofed, I must obferve, that tho' by the late happy Revolution; we got free of King James and his arbitrary Views, yet we were far from getting ourselves freed from this Danger: Nay, I'm afraid, it is fince become greater than ever it was in any former Period; and I must fay, it is a little furprizing, we did not upon that Occafion take Care, to make fome Regulations for fecuring our Rights and Liberties, inftead of contenting ourselves with D declaring them only. We made, indeed, a Declaration of our Rights and Liberties, and we got that Declaration made Part of an Act of Parliament; but we made no Regulations, for rendering that Declaration effectual, tho' the Meeting of the Convention was declared to be, In order to fuch an Establishment, as that cur Religion, Laws and Liberties. might not again be in Danger of being fubverted. We declared, that Parliaments ought to be held frequently; but we left it as much in the Power of the Crown to call Parliaments or no, as it was before that Period. We declared, that the Elections of Members ought to be free; but we left it as much in the Power of the Crown as it was before, to prevent that Freedom. We declared, that the Freedom of Speech and Debates in Parliament ought not to be questioned in any Place out of Parliament; but we took no G Care Care to prevent fuch questioning, by bis Vote for the Choice of any Perfon any new Regulation; fo that it may to be a Knight of the Shire, Citizen, truly be faid that, with regard to Burgess, or Baron of any City, Bothis Declaration, the Power of the rough or Cinque-Port, to ferve in Par Crown did not in the leaft fuffer, liament; under the Penalty of 100%. by our Crown's being fet on the and of being incapable of ever holding Heads of King William and Queen A any Office or Place of Truft under bis Mary. But what is most furprizing, Majefty. This, Sir, was a real Se we did not fo much as declare, that curity against a corrupt Influence of new Parliaments ought to be fre- the Crown, or rather of the Miquently chofen, or that the bribing nifters of the Crown, at Elections or corrupting of Members of Par and it fhews that the Opinion of liament was inconfiftent with the Parliament then was, that no OfLiberties of the People; tho' every B ficer of the Excife could be fupMan, that was a Friend to the Re- pofed to be abfolutely independent volution, was convinced, that the of thofe, by whofe Favour he held Nation had fuffered greatly by the his Commiffion; but why the Oflong Continuance of the first Parlia- ficers of Excife fhould have been ment, called by King Charles II. then, or fhould be now, thought and by the Endeavours then used less independent than other Officers, for corrupting the Members. Nor C who hold their Commiffions by the did we take Care to fecure the fame Tenure, is what I cannot acHouse of Lords against the Crown's count for. Perhaps the Friends of fending in to that House, a Dozen Liberty thought, that if they had or a Score of new Peers at a Time, at that Time afk'd too much, they in order to carry a favourite Point. would have got nothing; but this Nay, we did not fo much as deis a good Reafon for afking it upon clare, that fuch a Step was incon- D fome other Occafion. fiftent with our Conftitution, tho' every one might have then foreseen, that it would be done, if there fhould ever be Occafion for it. Accordingly, this Method of fecuring a Majority in that Houfe has been once practifed fince that Time, but whether there will ever again be Occafion for it, is what I much question. E It is therefore ridiculous, Sir, to fay, that our Conftitution was fully established and fecured by the Revolution; for the first real and effec- F tual Security we obtained, with Regard to our Civil Rights and Liberties, was in the Year 1694, when an Act of Parliament was paffed, by which 'twas enacted, That no Perfon concerned in the Excife, fhould by Word, Meffage, or Writing, or in any other Manner whatsoever, endeavour to Perfuade any Elector to give, or Diffuade any from giving G The next real and effectual Security we got for our Civil Rights and Liberties, and the only other I can think of, which we got in that Reign, befides fome Laws for regulating Elections, and for preventing Members of Parliament from being concerned in the Management or Collection of fome of the Branches of the Revenue, was the famous Law for Triennial Parliaments, which was obtained with great Difficulty; for King William, notwithstanding his natural Attachment to the Liberties of Mankind, was prevailed on to refuse it the Royal Affent the first Time it was offered, whereby he certainly rifk'd lofing the Affections of faithful Subjects, for the fake of protecting, very probably, treacherous Servants; a Dilemma he would not probably have been brought into, if the Minifters of the Crown had then had as much Money, and as many many Pofts and Offices, at their Difpofal, as they have now; and unless the Quantity of the former, and the Number and Value of the latter be very much diminished, I do not believe that ever any future King of Great Britain can be brought A into fuch a Dilemma. Thefe, Sir, were all the real Securities we got during the Reign of King William, at leaft all that were to take Effect in his Reign; and the many new Regulations that were made by the first Act for fet- B tling the Crown upon the prefent Illuftrious Family fhew, that the Parliament then thought our Conftitution was far from being fully reftored, or abfolutely fecured, by C E the Revolution. It is what no human Wisdom can pretend to do by any Regulation or Revolution; for as the Excellence and Security of our Conftitution depends upon an equal Diftribution of that which I have called the fupreme and abfolute Power of a Society, among the three feveral Branch- D es of our Legislature or Government, fo as that no one of them fhall ever come to be under the abfolute Direction of either or both of the other two; and as Power is in its own Nature fluctuating, and with refpect to each Branch muft always be either upon the Flux or Reflux, our Conftitution can never be abfolutely fecure, but muft always depend upon a mutual, a continual, and a laudable Jealoufy's being kept up, between the three feveral Branches of our Government. It is to this F Jealoufy we owe its having been fo long preferved, and fo often recovered from the Brink of Destruction; and as the Freedom of our Government, with regard to the People, depends upon the Houfe of Commons being independent, that is to G fay, not under the Direction either of the King or Houfe of Lords, or both, therefore our People ought always to be extremely jealous of any Thing, that may tend towards bringing that House under any fuch Dependency. This Danger, Sir, to which our Conftitution must be always exposed, is confirmed by the whole Tenor of our History: In every Age, almost in every Reign, fome new Power has been affumed, or fome old one made a bad Use of, by one or other of the Branches of our Legislature, by which our Conflitution has been endangered, and often for a Time, in fome Meafure, fufpended. By an A&t of the 16th of Charles II, which enacted, That the holding of Parlia ments fhould not be intermitted or dif continued above three Years, tho' it repealed a much better Law, yet we thought we provided against that Danger, which had been fo fenfibly felt in the two former Reigns; but in that Reign two new Dangers be gan to appear, which was that of continuing the fame Parliament for a great Number of Years, and that of the Crown's having a corrupt Influence both at Elections and in Parliament. Against the former we provided by the Triennial Act I have mentioned; and against the latter we in part provided in King William's Reign, by preventing Members of the Houfe of Commons from being concerned in the Manage ment or Collection of fome Branches of the Revenue, and by prohibiting Officers of Excife being Sollicitors at Elections; but thefe Provifions were by Experience found infuffi cient, therefore many Laws have fince been made, from Time to Time, for guarding against this Danger; and if the Danger is not yet fufficiently guarded againft, the fame Reafons, which juftified the paffing of thefe Laws, must hold good for paffing other Laws for the fame Purpose. The Queftion, Sir, whether or no it would be dangerous, or rather a total Overthrow of our Conftitution, to to have a Majority, or near a Majority, of Placemen and Penfioners in the Houfe of Commons, is a Question that cannot now admit of any Difpute; it is already determined by the Laws that have been made for preventing Penfioners A of all Sorts, and Placemen of feveral Sorts, from having Seats in the Houfe of Commons. Therefore, those ftupid Tools of Power who preténd to difpute this Queftion, do not know what they are about: They do not know that they ate difputing B against the standing Laws of their Country. The only Queftion that can now be brought into Difpute is, Whether this Danger be fufficiently guarded againft by the Laws now in being; and in order to anfwer this Question, I must beg Leave C to flate these three other Questions: Whether there be, in the Nomination of the Crown, fuch a Number of Placemen, not yet excluded from having Seats in the Houfe of Commons, as may make a Majority, or near a Majority, in that Houfe? Whether Penfions may be fo privately given, as not to be dif coverable by any of the Laws or Regulations now in being? Whether Men who have no Eftates, may not have Seats in Parliament, notwithstanding any Law or Regulation yet made for preventing it? If these three Questions are to be answered in the Affirmative, as they certainly muft, nay, if either of the first two must be answered in the Affirmative, every one muft allow, that the Danger we are in, of having the Houfe of Commons brought under the abfolute Direction of the Crown, by Means of the Number of Placemen and Penfioners in that Houfe, is not as yet fufficiently guarded againft; and that therefore fome new Law is abfolutely neceffary for that G Purpose. For as the Crown, in fome Meafure, may be faid to have already the abfolute Direction of the Houfe of Lords, by Means of that D unlimited Power it claims of fending whomfoever it pleafes, and as many as it pleases, into that Houfe, if it fhould get, by Means of Bribery and Corruption, and by Means of the Pofts and Preferments it has at its Difpofal, the abfolute Direction of the Houfe of Commons, our Government would that Moment cease to be a free Government, it would become an abfolute Monarchy, and one of the worst Sorts of abfolute Monarchies; for an abfolute Government, founded upon Corruption, muft neceffarily endeavour to debauch the Morals of the People; in order to widen and establish the Foundation of its Power. Virtue and publick Spirit would be its moft dangerous Enemies, and therefore, it would endeavour to deftroy every Man that fhould feem to be infected with either. As the House of Commons, Sir, is the Grand Inqueft of the Nation, as it is the Bufinefs of that Houfe to inquire into the Conduct of all Minifters, Magiftrates, and Officers appointed by the Crown, or rather the Minifters of the Crown, and of all those who are intrufted with the Fingering and Difpofing of publick Money, it is as ridiculous to have the Majority of that Houfe conE fifting of Placemen and Penfioners; as it would be in a Lord to give his Steward the Nomination of his under Servants, and then appoint thofe under Servants, to examine and controul his Steward's Accounts. It is by a strict and impartial Inquiry into the Conduct of our Minifters, Megiftrates and Officers, that they continue to be our Servants; if we ever appoint them to inquire into one another's Conduct, which will be the Cafe, if ever fuch a Number of them get them felves chofen Members of the Houfe of Commons, as to make a Majority of that Houfe, they will foon come to be our Mafters. This is felf-evident; and is declared to F ba be fo by the Laws that have been F In the virtuous Times of the Commonwealth of Rome, when the People had an unfeigned Regard for their Liberties, no foreign Danger could prevent their guarding against domeftick. When the Enemy was almost at the Gates of their City, it was then the People infifted most ftrenuously upon thofe Regulations they thought neceflary for prevent- G ing their being brought into Bondage by the Patricians. In this our brave Ancestors followed their Ex- When fome new Laws or Regulations appear to be abfolutely neceffary for fecuring the People's Liberties, or when fome Minifters, Magiftrates or Officers ought to be removed, or called to an Account, for their wicked or weak Conduct, or for the Mifapplication of publick Money, it is the Business, Sir, it is the Duty of thofe who are the Reprefentatives of the People in Parliament, to infift upon it, and to take the moit proper Method for obtaining it. This can create no Difcord or Divifion in the Nation, unless there be a fettled Defign to * Tit, Liv, Lib. II. Cap. 28. incroach |