admirer of fincerity and fimple manners, every heart that warms at the recollection of diftinguished virtue, must confider Mr LOCKE as one of the most amiable, and moft illuftrious men, that ever our nation produced. Such he is, fuch he will ever be, in my eftimation. The parts of his philofophy to which truth obliges me to object, are but few, and, compared with the extent and importance of his other writings, extremely inconfiderable. I object to them, because I think them erroneous and dangerous; and I am convinced, that their author, if he had lived to fee the inferences that have been drawn from them, would have been the first to declare them abfurd, and would have expunged them from his works with indignation. Dr BERKELEY was equally amiable in his life, and equally a friend to truth and virtue. In elegance of compofition he was perhaps fuperior. I admire his virtues: I can never fufficiently applaud his zeal in the caufe of religion: but fome of his reafonings on the fubject of human nature I cannot admit, without renouncing my claim to rationality. There is a Writer now alive, of whofe philofophy : I have much to fay. By his philofophy, I mean the fentiments he hath published in a book called, A Treatife of Human Nature, in three volumes, printed in the year 1739; the principal doctrines of which he hath fince republifhed again and again, under the title of, Effays Moral and Political, &c. Of his other works I fay nothing; nor have I at prefent any concern with them. Virgil is faid to have been a bad profe-writer *; Cicero was certainly a bad poet and this author, though not much acquainted with human nature, and therefore not well qualified to write a treatife upon it, may yet be an excellent politician, financier, and hiftorian. His high merit in these three refpects is indeed univerfally allowed: and if my fuffrage could add any thing to the luftre of fuch distinguished reputation, I fhould here, with great fincerity and pleasure, join my voice to that of the public, and make such an encomium on the author of the Hiftory of England as would not offend any of his rational admirers. But why is this author's character fo replete with inconfift Seneca, Controv. lib. 3. ency! ency! why should his principles and his talents extort at once our esteem and de-· testation, our applaufe and contempt ! That he, whofe manners in private life are faid to be fo agreeable to many of his acquaintance, fhould yet, in the public capacity of an author, have given fo much. cause of just offence to all the friends of virtue and mankind, is to me matter of aftonishment and forrow, as well as of indignation. That he, who fucceeds fo well in defcribing the fates of nations, fhould yet have failed fo egregiously in explaining the operations of the mind, is one of thofe incongruities in human genius, for which perhaps philofophy will never be able fully to account. That he, who hath fo impartially ftated the oppofite pleas and principles of our political factions, fhould yet have adopted the most illiberal prejudices against natural and revealed religion; that he, who on fome occafions hath difplayed even a profound erudition, fhould at other times, when intoxicated with a favourite theory, have fuffered affirmations to escape him, which would have fixed the opprobious name of Sciolift on a lefs celebrated author; and, finally, B 2 His finally, that a moral philofopher; who feems to have exerted his utmost ingenuity in fearching after paradoxes, fhould yet happen to light on none, but fuch as are all, without exception, on the side of licentioufnefs and fcepticifin: these are inconfiftencies perhaps equally inexplicable; at leaft they are fuch as I do not at prefent chufe to explain. And yet, that this author is chargeable with all thefe inconfiftencies, will not, I think, be denied by any perfon of fenfe and candour, who hath read his works with attention. philofophy hath done great harm. Its admirers, I know, are very numerous; but I have not as yet met with one perfon, who both admired and understood it. We are prone to believe what we wish to be true and moft of this author's philofophical tenets are fo well adapted to what I fear I may call the fashionable notions of the times, that thofe who are ambitious to conform themfelves to the latter, will hardly be difpofed to examine fcrupuloufly the evidence of the former. ving made this declaration, which I do in the spirit of an honeft man, I must take the liberty to treat this author with that plainnefs, Ha plainnefs, which the caufe of truth, the interests of fociety, and my own confcience, require. The fame candour that prompts me to praife, will alfo oblige me to blame. The inconfistency is not in me, but in him. Had I done but half as much as he, in labouring to fubvert principles which ought ever to be held facred, I know not whether the friends of truth would have granted me any indulgence; I am fure they ought not. Let me be treated with the lenity due to a good citizen, no longer than I act as becomes one. If it fhall be acknowledged by the candid and intelligent reader, that I have in this book contributed fomething to the establishment of old truths, I fhall not be much offended, though others fhould pretend to difcover, that I have advanced nothing new. Indeed I would not wish to fay any thing on thefe fubjects, that hath not often occurred to the common fenfe of mankind. In Logic and Morals, we have new treatifes, and new theories; but we are not now to expect new difcoveries. The principles of moral duty may |