at all. It is, in a very literal sense, rather our living duration1 since these acts are ours: their intensity is a function of this duration, which is the only duration that we directly experience. In other words, it is here contended that what, as Locke said, we call an instant,...the time of only one idea in our minds without the succession of another," is psychologically not ‘a part in duration' in that other sense in which, as he says, "we cannot conceive any duration without succession?."

The Continuity of Time.

5. But, if our experience of time depends primarily upon acts of attention to a succession of distinct presentations, it would seem that time, subjectively regarded, must be discrete and not continuous. This, which is the view steadily maintained by the psychologists of Herbart's school, was implied if not stated by Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Locke hopelessly confuses time as perceived and time as conceived, and can only save himself from pressing objections by the retort, "It is very common to observe intelligible discourses spoiled by too much subtlety in nice divisions." But Berkeley and Hume, with the mathematical discoveries of Newton and Leibniz before them, could only protest that there was nothing answering to mathematical continuity in our experience. And, whereas Locke had tried to combine with his general psychological account the inconsistent position that "none of the distinct ideas we have of either [space or time] is without all manner of composition," Berkeley declares : "For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence....Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the

1 Cf. Bergson on la durée, Evolution créatrice, 1907, pp. 10 f.

2 Op. cit. 11. xiv. 10, XV. 12.

3 Op. cit. II. xv. 9. The 'retort' above quoted will be found in the note to this section in the French translation, reproduced in most English editions.

number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind'. Hume, again, is at still greater pains to shew that "the idea which we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible, but that by proper distinctions and separations we may run this idea up to inferior ones, which will be perfectly simple and indivisible...that, therefore, the imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea of which it cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation?."

At first blush we are perhaps disposed to accept this account of our time-perception, as Wundt, e.g. did, and to regard the attribution of continuity as wholly the result of after-reflexion'. But it may be doubted if this is really an exact analysis of the case. Granted that the impressions to which we chiefly attend are distinct and discontinuous in their occupation of the focus of consciousness, and that, so far, the most vivid element in our time-experience is discrete; granted further that in recollection and expectation such objects are still distinct-all which seems to imply that time is a mere plurality-yet there is more behind. The whole field of consciousness is not occupied by distinct objects, neither are the changes in this field discontinuous. Attention does not move by hops from one definite spot to another, but, as Wundt himself allows, by alternate diffusion and concentration, like the foot of a snail, which never leaves the surface it is traversing. We have a clear presentation discerned as A or B when attention is gathered up; and, when attention spreads out, we have only vague and more or less confused presentations. To some extent, such confused presentations are always present, and so serve to bridge over the comparatively empty interval during which attention is unfocused. Thus our perception of a period of time is not comparable to so many terms in a series of finite units any more than it is to a series of infinitesimals. When attention is concentrated in expectation of some single impression, then, no doubt, it is brought to a very fine point ('zugespitzt,' as Herbart would say); and a succession of such impressions would be represented as relatively discrete compared

1 Principles of Human Knowledge, pt. i. § 98.

• Treatise of Human Nature, pt. ii. § 1, Green's ed. pp. 334 f.

3 Logik, to Auf. 1880, i. p. 432. In his 2nd ed. (1893, i. p. 486) Wundt, more suo, silently swings round and accepts the position here maintained.

with the representation of the scenery of a day-dream. But absolutely discrete it is not and cannot be, for what account could we then give of the intervals1? In this respect the truth is rather with Herbert Spencer, who, treating of this subject from another point of view, remarks, "When the facts are contemplated objectively, it becomes manifest that, though the changes constituting intelligence approach to a single succession, they do not absolutely form one"."

On the whole, then, we may conclude that our concrete time-experiences are due to the simultaneous representation of a series of definite presentations that were both accompanied and separated by more or fewer indefinite presentations forming a more or less confused background; that, further, the representations have certain marks or temporal signs due to acts or movements of attention, whereby the memory-continuum is formed; that the rate of these movements or 'moments' is approximately constant; and that each moment itself is primarily experienced as part of a peculiar subjective intensity, one that differs from the intensity of feeling in being active,

1 To maintain such absolute discreteness is to make the common mistake of confusing time as directly experienced with the formal concept of time which ignores protensity, replacing it by infinite divisibility. Experimental psychology—without realising the primacy of this subjective factor-has nevertheless helped to bring it to light. It has shewn that our 'sense' of time-lapse is never determined by succession alone, though always dominated by this so long as it is clearly perceived; and also that our estimate alters with the frequency of this succession, so long as it is distinguishable, but not disappearing when this is replaced by some uniform impression or by what is called 'empty time.' It has shewn also that a comparison is always possible between two intervals, one that is empty and any other, however variously filled. Cf. Meumann, "Beiträge zur Psychologie des Zeitsinns," Philosophische Studien, ix. (1894), pp. 266 ff.; xii. (1896), pp. 129 ff. Cf. also above, ch. iii, § 3.

Principles of Psychology, vol. i. § 180.

CHAPTER IX

MEMORISING, RHYTHMIZING AND READING

Span of Prehension and Repetition.

§ I. The movements of attention concerned in the earliest formation of the memory-continuum are mainly non-voluntary, determined that is to say by sensory changes. But we are now in a position to study the further elaboration of this continuum at that higher level where the attention given is altogether voluntary. Such is the case in the process commonly called memorising or 'learning by heart,' and again in the process of reading-topics in which the experimental method of investigation has been especially fruitful and which, partly on this account, are here reserved for a chapter apart.

The learning and retaining of a stanza of poetry say, is obviously a function of many variables, such as the mode of presentation (whether the words are heard only, or heard and seen, or both heard, seen and spoken aloud), the length, the subject's familiarity with the words and ideas used, the number of repetitions, the attention given, etc. Familiarity of course implies previous learning and retaining; the first essential, therefore, in any attempt to study these processes from the beginning, is the exclusion of this factor. Accordingly Ebbinghaus, the pioneer in experiments of this kind', devised the new material, which is now regularly employed, namely, closed monosyllables, not themselves words, and strung together promiscuously into lines of fixed length so as never to form words: bam, rit, por, sig, nef, gud, etc., is an instance of such senseless verses'.' 1 H. Ebbinghaus, Ueber das Gedächtnis: Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie, 1885.

2 In fact, however, it is practically impossible altogether to exclude old associations. The syllables just given for example suggested to one person: Baboon laughs in

With very slight attention most persons would be able to reproduce three or four such syllables on a single reading or hearing; and by greater concentration six or seven might be so reproduced. This maximum, called sometimes the 'span of prehension,' has been repeatedly made the subject of special inquiry. In idiots it is found, as might be expected, to be in general remarkably low; in school children it increases rapidly between the ages of eight and fourteen, and then remains almost stationary. Individual differences are however small compared with the striking differences that in all cases appear when longer lines make repetitions necessary1.

The comparatively constant span of prehension is doubtless closely connected with certain other psychical constants, such as the range of the psychical present and of the primary memoryimage, the tempo of movements of attention, &c. There are isolated investigations of these several conditions, but the subject as a whole still awaits systematic treatment. That it is not wanting in interest is evident when we consider that if our span of prehension were enlarged, a corresponding increase in the variety and range of metre and rhyme in poetry, of 'phrase' in music, and of evolution in the dance would be possible. The limits at present imposed on these and like complexities find their ultimate explanation in the constants just mentioned.

With lines of greater length than seven syllables some repetition is requisite before they can be correctly reproduced. The number of such repetitions was found by Ebbinghaus to increase very rapidly with the number of syllables to be learnt. In his own case, for lines of 12, 16, 24, 36 syllables the repetitions necessary were on the average 166, 30, 44, 55 respectively. Thus for a line exceeding in length that of the span of prehension only about five times, he required fifty-five times as many repetitions-if we might regard the single reading of the syllables

order to signify 'good' and called up a picture of an ape eating a banana. Div, nur suggested 'divine nurture' to one, and 'diviner' to another.

1 Cf. J. Jacobs and F. Galton on the "Span of Prehension," Mind (1887), xii. 75 ff.; B. Bourdon, "Influence de l'âge sur la mémoire immédiate," Rev. phil. (1894) xxxviii. 148 ff.; W. H. Winch, Brit. Jl. of Psych. (1904), i. 127 ff.

2 Cf. Dietze, "Untersuchungen über den Umfang des Bewusstseins u.s. w.," Phil. Studien (1885), pp. 362 ff.; L. W. Stern, "Psychische Präsenzzeit," Ztschr. f. Psychologie (1897), xiii. 325 ff.; Daniels, "Memory After-image and Attention,” Am. Jour. of Psychology (1893), vi. 558 ff.