Redondo Beach

it defends that by saying that the German General Staff was obliged to force this passage in order to avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most unfavorable ground, and that in the midst of arms the laws are silent. As a consequence, these defenders of Germany have no word for the advocacy of the keeping of treaties except "hypocrisy." Thus, Professor Münsterberg says that a neutrality treaty is not regarded as a contract, and that "it is nothing but sheer hypocrisy if the enemies of Germany, including the Anglophile portion of the American press, behave as if this had not been common knowledge the world over." It ought not, in view of this, to be surprising to find that in the letter "To the Evangelical Christians Abroad" religious leaders of Germany do not even consider the possibility of referring the charges against Servia to an international tribunal to ascertain whether they were true or not, but defend the action of Austria as "the justifiable vengeance for an abominable royal murder." It ought not even to be surprising to find that the non-military German is willing to say, as Professor Münsterberg says of atrocities, that everything that is not specifically forbidden in war is to be regarded as allowed.

This view of non-military Germany sets forth the substance of militarism; for militarism does not consist in the existence of a large army or a large navy, but in a system based upon faith in the military power as supreme over all other forms of power and military considerations as more weighty than all other considerations. If these five sources of information correctly interpret the view of the Kaiser's people, then the Pan-Germanism of Bernhardi is not the fantastic dream of a small group who have happened to get control, but a belief that has been wrought into the substance of the German masses. There is reason why this should be so. The man who has newly come into great wealth finds it difficult not to be governed by his desire to emulate his wealthy neighbors and by his fear for the safety of his possessions. Germany as a nation is young, and it has grown rich quickly. Its desire for a "place in the sun " and its suspicions of its neighbors are perhaps a natural product of its youth and its rapid rise. Moreover, Germany as an Empire was founded in aggressive warfare. It owes much of its material prosperity to its We do not condemn the Germans for holding these views; but, though it still may

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remain true that the diplomatists who carried on the negotiations and the military who put their weight of influence on the side of war were short-sighted when they should have been wise, it is not fair to say of German leaders and princes who are, like the common soldiers, risking their lives at the front, that they are solely responsible for the attitude of mind that brought on the war if it is really an inheritance of the whole nation.

A German victory, therefore, would mean a victory for this idea of national conduct : that the self-interest of every nation is and ought to be supreme, that the clash of interests can be settled only by war, that in such a clash of interests treaties are of no account, and that the endeavor to regard such treaties as binding is hypocrisy. On the other hand, a victory for the Allies would mean the victory of the opposite idea: that in national matters, as in individual matters, not selfinterest but duty is supreme, that the clash of interests between nations is therefore capable of submission to the reason of the nations, that the treaties should be regarded as enforceable, and that nations shall hereafter find the repudiation of such treaties costly.

THE PHILIPPINE BILL

The Philippine Bill now before Congress may be profitably compared with the previous effort of Representative Jones to settle (or unsettle) the policy of the United States on the Philippine question.

Two years ago Mr. Jones, who is still Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, reported to Congress a bill the object of which was "to establish a qualified independent government for the Philippine Islands, and to fix the date when such qualified independence shall become absolute and complete." According to the terms of that bill, the probationary period after which the "Republic of the Philippines" was to be finally cut loose from American control was eight years. In that bill, even during the proposed probationary period, power was granted to the nascent republic to make treaties with foreign nations, subject to the approval of the United States, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, coin money, to make tariffs, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations.

As the minority report on the new Jones Bill,

which has just been submitted to Congress, points out, Mr. Jones and his supporters now declare that during the two years that have elapsed since their first drastic bill was introduced "increasing evidence of the capacity of the Filipinos to manage their own affairs has been afforded." It is surprising, therefore, to find the present Jones Bill comparatively conservative both as regards its declaration of purpose and its provisions for governmental control of the Philippine Islands. The most radical feature of the new bill is the abolition of the Philippine Commission, which has (until the recent appointment of Governor-General Harrison) been under the direct control of an American majority, but which is now composed of five Filipinos and four Americans. The Philippine Commission, it will be remembered, holds the position of an upper house in the Philippine Government.

Not only does this new Jones Bill propose to substitute for the present Philippine Commission an elective native Senate, but it also proposes to grant to that Senate, in concert with the Philippine Assembly, control over all the expenses contracted by the Philippine Government, authority to reorganize the executive departments of the Philippine Government in any way it sees fit, and power to regulate (subject to the final veto of the American President) the whole of the public domain acquired by the United States from the Kingdom of Spain by the Treaty of Paris. These extensive powers, however, are granted to the Filipinos with a very definite string attached, for Congress reserves to itself the right to annul any law passed by the Philippine Legislature. The Governor-General, still to be appointed by the President, also possesses a limited veto power that can be overruled by a three-fourths vote of the two Filipino houses. The powers of the Governor-General are much like those possessed by the Governors of our own States or of the President himself in relation to the Nation. It can be seen from this brief summary of the changes which it is proposed to make in the present government of the Philippine Islands that responsibility has somewhat sobered the Congressmen who have been such bitter opponents of the Republican administration in the Philippines.

Apparently they, too, have seen something of the unwisdom of promising definite independence to the Philippines on any specified

date-independence, the success or failure of which would be so vital both to the islands and to the United States. It may be asked, however, Is the independence they do indefinitely promise founded upon a just conception of the facts or of American ideals?

In the preamble to the present Jones Bill are the following clauses:

Whereas, it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established

therein; and

Whereas, for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them, without in the meantime impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence; therefore [Here follows the body of the bill.]

In this preamble there are two statements which can be used as illustrations of the dif

ference of opinion which exists between the followers of Mr. Jones and those who, like ex-Governor Forbes, Mr. Dean C. Worcester, and ex-President Taft, are spokesmen for the Philippine policy with which The Outlook has always been in sympathy.

The statements to which we refer are the promise to recognize Philippine independence as soon as a stable government can be established in the islands, and the promise inferentially contained in the final clause of the preamble regarding the method by which the Filipino people shall be prepared for independence.

Mr. Jones's definition of what a stable government is differs widely from The Outlook's understanding of the situation. Perhaps The Outlook's position can be best stated by a quotation from a report made by Mr. Taft when Secretary of War to President Roosevelt in 1907:

What should be emphasized in the statement of our National policy is that we wish to prepare the Filipinos for popular self-government. This is plain from Mr. McKinley's letter of instructions and all of his utterances. It was not at all within his purpose or that of the Congress which made his letter part of the law of the land that we were merely to await the organization

1914

of a Philippine oligarchy or aristocracy com-. petent to administer government and then turn the islands over to it. On the contrary, it is plain, from all of Mr. McKinley's utterances and your own, in interpretation of our National purpose, that we are the trustees and guardians of the whole Filipino people, and peculiarly of the ignorant masses, and that our trust is not discharged until those masses are given education sufficient to know their civil rights and maintain them against a more powerful class and safely to exercise the political franchise.

Secretary Taft's opinion in 1907 is the opinion of The Outlook in 1914. It is not so much a "stable" government that it has been the object of the United States to create, as a genuine popular government. The Outlook does not believe that the Filipino people can be helped or served in any way by the general terms of such preamble as Mr. Jones has written into the present Philippine Bill. The promise, indefinite as it is, of independence upon the creation of a "stable" native government furnishes fitter material for agitation than legislation. Moreover, when there is established in the Philippines a government that is popular as well as stable there is no certainty that the Filipinos will wish the sovereignty of the United States withdrawn and independence forced upon them. Why, then, pledge the United States to such a course now? In reference to the final clause of this preamble, there is, too, grave doubt-doubt which direct information from the Philippines does not dissipatewhether the rapid transference of the Philippine government from American to native control, in the way which Representative Jones believes eminently desirable, will not in itself do much to defeat the purpose of such an action. It is not so much the intelligence of the few Filipino leaders that requires stimulation to make popular government in the Philippine Islands successful, as the education of the masses of Filipinos in those principles of self-government which, after several centuries of effort, our own race has not too completely mastered. A too rapid transference of governmental functions from American to Filipino control may possibly make for the speedy creation of a "stable" native government, but it may also serve to rivet upon the islands an aristocracy of wealth and privilege destined ultimately to defeat the idealistic purpose to which the United States has given such thought and sacrifice.

It is also a very pertinent question to

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ask whether at this time, when international relations are so strained and difficult, there is any wisdom to be found in unsettling the status of the United States in the Far East.

HOW TO DEVELOP TRADE WITH SOUTH AMERICA

In The Outlook for this week there appears an interesting and informing paper by Mr. Robert Bacon upon the people of South America and the social and economic conditions under which they live. Mr. Bacon's impressions are the result of personal observation, and his article is timely because of the widespread discussion of America's present commercial opportunities in Latin America.

It is also timely to point out that these opportunities are not to be profitably grasped in unpreparedness, or without careful study and patient adaptability.

The tread of the vehicles used in the Southern and Southwestern States of our own country is four inches wider than that of similar vehicles used in the Northern States. The Southern theory is that a buggy or carriage with a wide tread rides more easily on a rough road than one with a narrow tread. This is true; but throughout the country the roads are so much better than they were fifty years ago that there is no longer any perceptible difference between the comfort of a vehicle with a broad tread and one with a narrow tread. Nevertheless the buggy manufacturer who attempted to sell narrow-tread buggies in the South would be unsuccessful, because the ruts in the road have been worn to fit the broad tread and the people will not change their habits.

This is the nub of the whole matter. Our American manufacturers have learned the prejudices and habits of the people in the different parts of the Union and give them what they want. Most of the sombreros worn on the plains of Texas are made in Philadelphia, and the felt-lined "arctics" of the Northwestern lumbermen are made in Providence, Rhode Island. The manufacturers of both these articles have become rich because they supplied what the people wanted, and did not attempt to give them something just as good or better which was not wanted. They saw the ruts, and made the goods to fit. In dealing with South America the same policy is necessary. The goods offered must

be adapted to the tastes, habits, and prejudices of people who for centuries have had standards of living, eating, and dressing that are different from our own. It is both useless and impertinent to attempt to impose other standards upon them. It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to change the habits of a people, and if we are to supply the needs of South America we must give the people there what they want, and not what we think is best suited to their needs. We must learn to speak their language. Our salesmen must be in sympathy with their mental processes and institutions. They must adjust themselves to the siesta and the deliberateness with which business is I conducted south of the Rio Grande and on the other side of the equator.

Then, too, there must be less American bumptiousness and condescension-only those who have traveled widely can realize how extremely offensive American boastfulness and self-sufficiency are to the Latin races, whose courtesy and culture have a genealogy much older than our own.

It is trite to say that if we are to build up an extensive trade with South America we must have the co-operation of North American banks and bankers, and persuade the people of South America to think financially in terms of the dollar rather than of the pound sterling. New York must become an international as well as a National clearing-house, and a market must be made in the United States for the obligations of South American governments as well as for the securities of South American corporations.

The Scripture might be paraphrased to fit

the commercial exigencies of the twentieth century by saying that "where the credit is, there the heart is also." It is certain that people are going to buy their goods where they are trusted, and we cannot get the trade of South America unless we show our confidence in the future of that continent by a willingness to finance its development.

We can do all this without waiting for an American mercantile marine, desirable as that ultimately may be. With centuries of maritime experience behind them, the English people can provide ocean transportation more cheaply than we can. It may be economically expedient to let them do it until we can learn to do it at least as well. It is an age of specialization. Each nation should do the things that it can do most efficiently. If we can manufacture the goods, sell them, and provide the credit necessary to retain the trade, we may well be content for the present and let the English collect the freight. Moreover, in these days ships follow trade; trade does not necessarily follow artificially established ships. Perhaps one of the best ways to establish a merchant marine is to create trade with South America.

Finally, we must recollect that trade is essentially barter. We cannot sell to those from whom we do not buy, and if we are to deal largely with South America there must be reciprocal effort toward the removal of any tariff barriers that may exist between us and the people with whom we would trade. But, above all, we must not forget the ruts of national habits and customs, and we must build our vehicles of commerce to fit those ruts.

see that Oxford is peculiarly the place for the acquirement, not only of privates, but of officers, for the British army.

Indeed, as fine work has been done here in strengthening the army as anywhere. There has been a realization that the univer.sities may be expected to produce officers rather than privates. Now the need of officers is especially great, and it will continue to be great as long as the war lasts. Hence a University Board was organized to deal actively with the situation. The Board is composed of the Vice-Chancellor (Dr. T. B. Strong, of Christ Church) and four other members. Three of these are also members of the Oxford University Officers' Training Corps a permanent institution. The members have been sitting every day to interview and report upon any candidates for a commission, and have been in daily communication with the War Office in London. The Oxford University Officers' Training Corps has already done good work under peace conditions; and now, under war conditions, it is, with the Vice-Chancellor's approval, urging every able-bodied undergraduate to join it. Thus from time to time relays of men will be produced, qualified to receive a commission and to take part in the training of Lord Kitchener's successive new armies. Since the beginning of the war the Board has already nominated about twelve hundred men. Some thirty of them are destined for the Military School at Sandhurst, about fifty for commissions in the regular army, over two hundred for the special reserve, over four hundred for the Territorial forces, and between four and five hundred for Lord Kitchener's new army.

This number does not, of course, exhaust the number of university men who have now joined the army; some have enlisted, and some were already holding commissions in the Territorials when the war began.

Suggestions have been made to the ViceChancellor to close the University of Oxford entirely, and so turn all the men into the ranks of the new army now being enrolled. But the Vice-Chancellor contends that this would make an unappreciable difference to the recruiting now; and also that it would extinguish for good all hope of a succession of officers.

To show the enthusiasm among Oxford men, I would add the report of a special inquiry I made at Oriel College. Of one hundred and twenty-nine men in residence there

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last term, nearly one hundred have volunteered in some form or other; and of those who have not so volunteered, some are Rhodes Scholars who have already gone home, some are on the sick list, and some are in holy orders.

The scene in Balliol "quad" reminded me of a similar one the other day in Lincoln's Inn, London, that quiet oasis between Holborn and the Strand. Lincoln's Inn has always been associated in my mind only with young men quietly studying law and with older men as quietly administering it. But the splendid library and the long rows of chambers now look down on squads of lads drilling in the open.. Some of them are already in khaki; others only in their shirtsleeves.

In many other places in London drilling is in progress on Somerset House Terrace, at the Horse Guards Parade, at the Knightsbridge, and at the Albany Barracks. In Tottenham Court Road, too—that symbol of the purely commercial and the non-militarythere is one great mark of the uncommercial and the military, and, strange as it may seem, it is found in and about the massive and imposing Young Men's Christian Association Building. That building has become a great center for the Territorials-those volunteers who, in any event, go into camp every year. But especially this year!

In

You pass through Tottenham Court Road into Oxford Street and Regent Street. many of the shop windows are such printed appeals as these, in large letters:

TO ARMS FOR KING AND COUNTRY! YOUR COUNTRY NEEDS YOU! LORD KITCHENER WANTS 100,000 MORE VOLUNTEERS.

JOIN THE ARMY TILL THE WAR IS OVER

And then, more rarely, such a pithy, ap pealing notice as this to any Britisher of backbone:

UP TILL NOW YOU HAVE LOOKED ON AT THE GAME. WE CALL UPON YOU TO PLAY IT NOW. FORWARDS WANTED! NO BACKS! PLAY UP!

And then, above all, this one:

COME NOW, DON'T HAVE TO BE FETCHED! THE PEOPLE WILL LOOK AFTER YOUR HOMES.

Just how any Englishman who believes in his country's cause can withstand this last appeal is beyond me.

Then there are other and rather more