public signboards were covered with notices from military and civil authorities. These notices dealt with a great variety of subjects. There were schedules of military trains; announcements of places for the assembling of horses; requests to the public to be on the lookout for spies, and to protect bridges, tunnels, and railways; announcements that the Imperial bank notes are legal tender and must be accepted at face value (gold having disappeared from circulation immediately upon the outbreak of the war); decrees limiting the prices which could be put upon certain necessities of life, etc. In fact, these notices pictured to a considerable extent the conditions caused by a state of war.

In all probability most Germans realized that if war with Russia began, this would also mean war with France. This they seemed to regard as a natural thing because of the relations of the two countries ever since the Franco-Prussian War, and because of France's membership first in the Dual Alliance and then in the Triple Entente. This probably explains why the demonstrations before the war were directed against Russia much more than against France. "Nieder Russland!" was heard much more frequently than "Nieder Frankreich!" The Germans seemed to feel that the Russians had deceived them, and that in return for a long-continued friendship they were receiving an unmerited return. It is true that in the cries which accompanied the departure of troops during the following week" Nach Paris!" was heard much more frequently than "Nach Petersburg!" However, this was probably due, in the first place, to the fact that in the first part of the war the German military operations have been directed against France much more than against Russia, and, in the second place, to a reminiscence of the Franco-Prussian War.

Reports of fighting along the French border came about as soon as the beginning of the war with Russia. According to the German newspapers, the French were the aggressors in these conflicts.

It is as yet impossible to know with certainty who were the first aggressors, since the other side publish contradictory reports. It is, however, certain that the Germans made the first important aggressive move by going into Belgium. At any rate, diplomatic relations with France were broken very soon, and the war was on with France as well as Russia.

The temper of the people now seemed to

As

In

become more serious and more united. has been indicated, a few days earlier there had been many hostile demonstrations towards Russia and France, probably carried on principally by more or less irresponsible persons. These now ceased in the main. Furthermore, there had been considerable opposition to the war. This disappeared entirely, at least so far as public expression was concerned. The press was immediately put under a rigorous censorship, which doubtless put a stop to any attempted criticism of the war. All the parties soon expressed their support of the Government in the war. the vast majority of Germans, doubtless, a strong patriotic feeling was aroused by the belief that their country had been unjustly attacked, and that in any case it must be defended. Their interest was manifested by the huge crowds which thronged the streets especially in the evening in search of news. The leading papers issued numerous special editions, many of which were distributed free, and whenever an automobile bearing one of these editions appeared, there was a mad rush which resulted in the street becoming littered with paper.

A very important question still remained to be answered, and that was as to what England would do. It was known that as a member of the Triple Entente England might enter the war. At the same time there was a good deal of speculation as to whether the English love of peace would not keep her out of the war. On the afternoon of Monday, August 3, Sir Edward Grey made a speech [already commented upon in The Outlook] in the House of Commons, which was reported in Germany the following day and was read with great interest. This speech was received in Germany with many denunciations of Grey in particular and England in general. This is to be explained in the main probably by the excited condition of the German public. It was also encouraged by reports which had already been published the day before to the effect that French military air-ships had flown over Belgium and Holland, thus violating the neutrality of these countries. (So far as I know, these reports have never been confirmed, and are denied in Belgium and Holland.) During the evening of Tuesday an extra appeared, announcing that at about seven in the evening the English Ambassador had gone to the Foreign Office and had asked for his passports. This statement made war with England almost certain. Soon

1914

after a mob gathered in front of the English Embassy and smashed the windows. About midnight appeared an extra announcing that England had declared war against Germany.

For several days thereafter it was dangerous to speak English on the streets. Most of the Americans appeared with American flags in their buttonholes in order to avoid being taken for English. The Spionenjagd, or hunt for spies, which had been carried on eagerly and enthusiastically against the Russians and French, was now turned against the English as well. Russian and French names and signs had been disappearing for some days, and now the English also began to go. Numerous storekeepers were to be seen scraping Russian, French, and English signs from their windows. The Café Boncourt became the Kurfürstendam Kaffeehaus. The Piccadilly Café became the Vaterland Kaffeehaus. In the window of a clothing store which I passed every day there appeared a sign from the proprietor stating that, even though he had sold English clothing for twenty-four years, he was a patriotic German and had two sons in the army and would sell no more English clothing. In the window of a store in which American typewriters were sold appeared a sign that only machines of American make were sold, and only Germans were in the employ of the firm. Even the menu began to change its appearance, and purely German expressions took the place of the foreign.

On Wednesday, August 5, not only the English Ambassador but the Belgian diplomatic representative as well left Berlin, and on Thursday it was announced that Belgium had declared war against Germany. This was, of course, due to the German invasion of Belgium which had now taken place. It seemed to be fully expected and therefore was apparently little noticed by the public.

On the evening of Friday came the report, officially confirmed, that the city and forts of Liège were taken. This report caused great jubilation and gave rise to the feeling that there was little in the way of the march to Paris. It was not until after I left Germany that I learned the truth about Liège. very doubtful if the General Staff made any statements with regard to the fighting at Liège which were not strictly accurate. But the reports which reached the public were of such a nature as to rouse a degree of confidence which must have led to much disappointment later on when the march to

41

Paris did not progress as rapidly as was expected. One German gentleman of very highstrung temperament told me that he could not sleep from the time the war began until after the so-called victory of Liège, when he slept peacefully in the assurance that the German soldiers would win.

One indication of the Germans' hostility to foreigners growing out of their feeling that Germany was attacked unjustly by other countries was seen in the Spionenjagd, which would have been ridiculous if it had not been so serious. The military authorities and the press asked the people to be on the lookout for spies. This request had its effect far beyond all expectations. For some days every German in Berlin seemed on the hunt for spies. Numerous Russians, French, and English who were so unfortunate as to be in Berlin and unable to leave were seized by mobs, and would in many cases have been seriously injured if it had not been for the quick action of the police. Also many other foreigners as well, among them a number of Americans, had similar experiences. And even quite a number of Germans, among them officers and soldiers, were suspected. One day on the Jägerstrasse I saw an enormous crowd containing thousands of persons gather around some soldiers whom somebody had suspected. It was not until the police could make their way through the crowd and rescue the soldiers that the excitement subsided. On another occasion I was passing by a railway station late in the evening when some one raised the cry that spies were to be found in a certain house. A large crowd gathered immediately, and it was not until a visit was made to a neighboring police station, where apparently the police officers succeeded in persuading the crowd to desist from the hunt, that the crowd dispersed. I heard one German in this crowd, more selfcontrolled than the rest, urging those around him to quiet themselves, and saying that it was not like the Germans to act in this way. And it was indeed true that on many occasions during these days the traditional phlegmatic Teutonic temperament seemed to disappear and to be replaced temporarily by the more excitable Latin temperament.

However, the police seemed to do their duty well, and prevented serious injury on most if not all occasions. The military authorities, and the press also, probably realizing that their request to the people had had too great an effect, issued warnings that the hunt for spies

be not carried on so ardently and that order in general be kept more carefully. Furthermore, the orderliness which is drilled into the Germans doubtless asserted itself and assisted greatly in quelling the excitement.

Within a day or two after the mobilization began many soldiers were marching through the streets on their way to the war. There were regiments of infantry, troops of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and long lines of forage, ammunition, and hospital wagons. At first these soldiers were greeted with loud cheers, and both soldiers and spectators joined in singing "Die Wacht am Rhein," ""Deutschland über Alles," and "Unser Kaiser," and in crying out Auf wiedersehen!" "Nach Paris" and "Nach Petersburg!" the days passed the troops were watched more and more in silence. This was doubtless due in part to the fact that the sight had become a wonted one. But it was probably also due in part to the fact that the war was becoming a very grave and living reality which

But as

was touching the life of the people very seriously.

The mobilization of the German army was indeed a remarkable sight. The General Staff, for obvious reasons, gave out no figures with regard to the number of men in the field. But it was said that by the end of the six days of mobilizing there were over three million men along the French and Belgian borders and a lesser number along the Russian border. And yet these millions of men were equipped and moved to the front with an orderliness and precision which indicated long and careful preparation.

The days of mobilizing ended on Friday, August 7, though troops will, of course, continue to move until the end of the war. On Saturday a few passenger trains began to run on a more or less regular but very slow schedule. This was a great relief to many Americans and other foreigners who were anxious to leave Germany. Berlin, August 11.

W

E have seen nowhere a better statement of Great Britain's attitude in the European crisis than that made in the following editorial from the London Spectator " of August 8. It may well be

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that what our fellow-citizens of German ancestry call America's lack of sympathy with Germany is due to a subconscious fear of the world danger which would result from the supremacy of Germany's view of war as defined by the "Spectator:"

The great war has come. "Why has it come?" is the bewildered question of all English men and women. How does it happen that within a week Germany and Austria-Hungary are at war with France, with Russia, with Britain, with Servia, with Belgium, and that it is exceedingly likely that to the list will have to be added Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark, and, later, Italy, Rumania, and Greece? People have begun to realize pretty generally that Germany brought on the war, or, at any rate, when Austria-Hungary had brought it on by what appeared to be her rash act, did not stop it, as undoubtedly she could have stopped it had she chosen. Why, instead of calming down the Austrians, and claiming our aid, which we

were only too eager to give, in calming down Russia and France, did Germany never once show any real anxiety to get Europe out of so bad a business? Putting the most favorable construction that we possibly can upon the behavior of the German Government, that Government showed from the beginning a complete cynicism as to the result. The very most that can be said in Germany's favor is that she exhibited at first a certain diplomatic respectability in regard to the stages by which the world slid into war. "But," it will be said, "your suggestion that Germany made the war is incomprehensible, and must remain so unless you can also suggest some explanation for her action. What was her object? Why did she play the part she has played ?"

Our answer is one which we feel bound to give because we believe it, even though it may seem to a section of our readers unjust to Germany. We believe Germany made the war, and made it because she feared that unless war came now she might have to give up her strongest national aspiration-the aspiration to be a great world Power, dominant in Europe, with vast dependencies abroad, and able to command the sea, or at any rate to be possessed of naval strength

43

never!"-impulses which are the most frequent cause of war. War is so terrible a thing, the risks are so awful, and so pessimistic are most statesmen as to the possibilities of maintaining peace, that those of them who have been trained in the school of Realpolitik would hold it a crime not to strike whenever they were convinced that their nation had a preponderance of power. To lose the golden opportunity seems in their eyes as wrong as suicide seems to the individual.

If that is the true view, Germany could easily find an excuse for war, much as she found it in 1866 and in 1870, by making use of Austria-Hungary's perennial quarrel with Servia. What seems to encourage the view that the attack upon Servia was intended to produce a world-wide rather than a local effect is, we think, the curious fact that Austria-Hungary has made so little progress in the Servian war. Considering her great military strength at the locus in quo, and the fact that the best part of her army is always ready for instant action in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the Danubian frontier, it is almost incredible that Austria-Hungary should not yet have got into Servian territory. If, however, her object as the ally of Germany was to bring on a European war rather than to punish Servia, she would very naturally not wish to commit her troops to any big adventure in Servia. Having lighted the torch there, they would be wanted for far more serious work elsewhere. All, then, that would be required in Servia would be just the frontier guards necessary to prevent serious Servian raiding in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We fully admit that, put out in cold blood, the view we have given of the origin of the war sounds incredible. Our defense of it is that at least it does supply the only explanation that has yet been suggested, except that of pure panic, which will meet the facts. Indeed, the panic suggestion is really the same as our suggestion, only expressed in somewhat different terms, and not carried so far. The German Government is not a

true sense. It acts from calculation, though, of course, in that calculation the dread of consequences plays its part. And here let us say that in writing as we have done about Germany we do not wish to make any sanctimonious accusations of diabolical wickedness

or special criminality. In such matters,

though it is, we confess, very difficult to judge justly, we must judge people by their own standard and not by ours; and we are bound to admit that Germany can stand that test. We do not believe that the great bulk of the German people-we are not now speaking of Germans affected by English thought, or anxious to assume a position which will find sympathizers in Englandwould really regard our view as unfair.

Germany thinks that she has got a great mission. She does not think war a crime, though of course she thinks it a misfortune, and, still further, she thinks of it as an instrument of policy, and not merely as the last resort in a conflict of wills. Therefore it does not seem to her unnatural, or mad, or wicked to make war on the lines we have described. We are not going to be judges in our own cause by talking about special acts of wickedness. We do, however, say that a Power which holds the views of war which we have ascribed, and as we believe quite properly ascribed, to Germany, is a terrible danger to the world. It may be that

Providence intends the German idea of war to prevail and German aspirations to be fulfilled. We do not think it is so, but if it is then so it will be. Meanwhile it is our duty to use every effort and every weapon at our disposal to confute the German view and save the freedom of Europe and of the world. We are not going to become a vassal State of Germany, even if that position might still secure for a generation or so our wealth and nominal independence, without a hard struggle. We may warn the Germans that we shall fight as we have never fought before in our history, and that if they think, as there seem some indications that they do, that when we are tired of the war we may be induced to abandon our allies and make peace for ourselves, they are utterly mistaken. Whatever happens, we shall not act thus. Having begun the war, we shall fight it through till we are either victors or else have been destroyed as a nation. If we perish, it will be with the feeling that we have fallen with our honor and our good faith intact.

Do you suppose for one moment that a Government like that of Germany, having built up a strong and prosperous nation, would not know better than attempt to make Belgium and Holland Germanic provinces and reduce Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, and England to subordinate positions? How long could such an experiment last? Please also note that the German Emperor and his Government have a united Germany following them into this including the four million Socialists, which is a sure sign of the general belief that the war from the German point of view is a just HERMAN P. ROEPER.

war.