sults. This we shall endeavour to lay before our

readers as concisely

as we can, yet so as not to injure the narrative. They will thus be enabled still better to appreciate the able and striking argument of the pamphlet, when we next return to it.

This second treatise is, as we have said, very curious and interesting in its way. The circumstance that it should have appeared at all, gives occasion for much important reflection. Who or what the Colonial Society was, beyond any other club of this metropolis, very few, we imagine, knew, or cared to know, at the beginning of the last session. Least of all could it have entered into any man's imagination that, before that session was out, the Colonial Society would supersede Parliament itself in the defence of the outraged interests of India,—would be found at the head of the movement which, having overspread the provinces, made an effectual lodgment at the India House, and troubled the slumbers of both Houses of Parliament. We have been greatly struck with the style of the petitions, which the East India Committee of this Society addressed to both the Houses, soliciting information as to the causes of the Affghan war. They are very unlike any petitions we have ever seen from private and self-constituted societies. We do not refer to the circumstance that, on one occasion a secretary, and on another a chairman, signed the petitions, after the style of officers of bodies corporate; and that, in spite of the disapprobation of watchful Parliamentmen, the petitions were even so suffered to lie upon the table. There is something remarkable in the petitions themselves. They bespeak consciousness of the right to interfere in these and in even greater matters, when colonial interests are affected, and when their cause is abandoned or mismanaged by Parliament. In stating that they have “applied themselves to the examination of the causes and origin of the war," the petitioners consider that they have said quite enough to support their prayer" for the production of such public documents as may enable them to understand by what authority the war was proclaimed, and for what object it was undertaken."* There is no excuse whatever for their having so come forward, uninvited, to the examination. They are the East India Committee of the Colonial Society, and that is enough. And, as we have said, the Court of Directors, the Houses of Parliament, and sundry personages of circumstance and repute in the politics of our Eastern Empire, have so dealt with this section of the Colonial Society, as to warrant us in inferring that they too are pretty

* Report of the E. I. Committee of the Colonial Society, p. 33, Appendix A.

much of that opinion. We must say that we look upon this with a certain satisfaction. The neglected colonies have long been in want of a Parliament of their own in the metropolis of the Empire. Once possessed of such, they would be neglected colonies no longer. If the Colonial Society is destined to become to them such a Parliament, or the precursor of such, we must think it a matter of much gratulation, both for the colonies and ourselves. It is at any rate certain that the new institute has made a good commencement. The Report before us, (the first that as yet has emanated, in an authoritative shape, from either of the sectional committees of this Society), is a most creditable performance in itself, and full of promise for the future. If every section of our Colonial Empire is as well cared for in the bureaux of the Colonial Society, as the East Indian section appears to be, it is not too much to assert, that the institute in question has already shown itself well qualified, and entitled, to speak as one having authority directly from the colonies themselves; and, in short, to step at once into the character of their metropolitan representative.

The fruit of their labours is here before us. It consists of a general Report on the causes and consequences of the Affghan war, and of three collateral Reports on the following subjects: 1st. International law, respecting declaration of war, and the conformity thereto of English practice. 2nd. The English law of regal prerogative in war and peace, and the constitutional barriers to the exercise of the same.-3rd. The Anglo-Indian law and practice upon the same subjects. Besides these, there is a tolerably copious appendix of extracts of the documentary and oral evidence taken by the sub-committee; and very useful notes are interspersed generally throughout the work.

There is to be

The result of their deliberation, (evidently a long and patient one), is to show, that the Affghan war is one so utterly irregular and unjust, as not to deserve to be accounted a war, but rather a piratical enterprise; and that the unhappy soldiers engaged in it have no claim whatever on the laws of just and legitimate warfare. found neither declaration of war against the Affghans, it tells us; nor proclamation of it to the British nation, nor publication of it to the world. No exposition had been vouchsafed in Parliament,-no vote had been taken, no debate had, no protest recorded, in either House. The ground assigned for the rejection of the petition of the Colonial Society for the production of the usual documents, without which the war could not be legal, was the now habitual one, that the production would be injurious to the public service. On the same ground was similar information

refused by the Ministers to the Court of Directors, when that body, upon whom it is resolved to lay the cost of the enterprise, by unanimous vote applied to have their ignorance enlightened, by the production of the despatches at least that commanded the war. These circumstances afford a complete justification of the Colonial Society, for embarking as they have done in this investigation, apparently of their own choosing, really one into which they have been forced. But these circumstances have another and a more important consequence. They stamp with irrefragable disgrace our boasted proceedings across the Indus. They establish the utter illegality of those proceedings. They show that not only has the law of nations been most grossly violated, a matter about which statesmen now-a-days seem little solicitous, the law of England, a matter that has still its importance, has been violated no less.

"The law of nations is admitted as portion of the British constitution. It is of higher authority than any statute; and courts of justice have set statutes aside, when interfering with the law of nations. To violate these forms is to violate the laws of Great Britain. We must, then, refer to the law of nations to ascertain what the laws of England, are in respect to the declaration of war. According to the law of nations,* two things are requisite to constitute a solemn and formal war: first, that it be on both sides made by the sovereign authority; secondly, that it be accompanied by certain formalities. These formalities consist in the demand of a just satisfaction, and in the declaration of war. In effect, these two conditions are necessarily required in every war which shall be, according to the laws of nations, a legitimate one, that is to say, such a war as nations have a right to wage. The right of making war belongs only to the sovereign: and it is only after satisfaction has been refused to him, and even after a declaration of war, that he has a right to take up arms.' 'A declaration of war being necessary as a further effort to terminate the difference without the effusion of blood, it ought, at the same time that it announces our settled resolution of making war, to set forth the reasons which have induced us to take up arms. A sovereign is to make the declaration of war public within his dominions. He is also to make known his declaration of war to the neutral powers. To march an army into a neighbouring country by which we are not threatened, and without having endeavoured to obtain, by reason and justice, an equitable reparation for the wrongs of which we complain, would be introducing a mode pregnant with evils to mankind, and sapping the foundation of the safety and tranquillity of states.' 'War void of form, and undertaken without right, and without so much as apparent cause,

*Grot. de Jur. Bell. et Pac. lib. i. cap. iii. § 4. † Vattel, b. iii. c. iv. p. 315. Report of the E. I. Committee, &c. pp. 2-4.

is more properly called robbery. A nation attacked, by such sorts of enemies, is not under any obligation to observe towards them the rules of war in form: it may treat them as robbers.'"*

This clear exposition of the legitimate method of making war, leaves us only one remark to add ;—and it is, that while the authorities collected together in the first of the collateral Reports above noticed, abundantly establish that such is indeed the law of nations, the second of those Reports demonstrates, out of a similar mass of authorities, that it was ever the law of England, and is so still. The third Report, and in the most convincing manner, demonstrates that, down to this unfortunate enterprise of ours against the Affghans, our Indian practice was conformable to international and British law; and the first of these collateral Reports had already as convincingly demonstrated that, down to the peace of Vienna, such in general was our practice in Europe.

Now, if we examine the uncontradicted narrative of these hostilities, we shall find that they present none of the above characteristics of solemn and lawful warfare. 1. It is not alleged that we had suffered injury from the Affghans. It is admitted by Sir John Cam Hobhouse, that the lamented Burnes did accurately represent them to have availed themselves of all public and private occasions of showing kindness to our government and subjects. Where then is the "right" of the war, or "the apparent cause" of it? 2. It is a secret war,-a monster hitherto unparalleled in our annals;—it has been kept secret from the people that were made to wage it against a people that had not injured them. The Court of Directors is supposed to be the power that governs India. The Parliament is supposed, by the theory of 1688, no longer to control, but to govern the Queen and her whole Empire. But the English minister kept secret his measures from the inferior governing body, as well as from the supreme one, evading at the same time the constitutional checks upon the regal prerogative, by waging these hostilities under cover of the local Indian government. On our side, therefore, they have not been "made by the sovereign authority." 3. No declaration of war was emitted to the intended enemy; no proclamation of war to our subjects or to neutrals. The only paper bearing even the name of Declaration, was that of Simla; and that was a mere order of the day for the passage of the Indus by our troops already assembled

* Ibid. p. 6.

"In 1602, Geneva was attacked by the Savoyese, without a declaration of war. The Genevese hung upon the walls their prisoners, and the act was sanctioned by all nations."

on its banks. It wanted every ingredient of a declaration, but the name. It did not "demand a just satisfaction,"-" an equitable reparation for wrongs." It did not even complain of anything which, if substantiated, could be said to amount to a wrong. It did not attempt to "set forth the reasons which have induced us to take up arms." To use the language of the third collateral Report, it is a paper without any form of public, legal, or diplomatic character,-a jumble of false and irrelevant propositions. It requires no redress whatever of the Affghans; the word War is not so much as mentioned. In fact, as we have said already, it was merely the order of the day for crossing the Indus into the neutral territories between them and the object of attack. Therefore, the Affghans, finding themselves attacked, not only "without right," but even without the formalities of warfare, were not "under any obligation to observe the rules of war in form" towards us. They were fully authorised to deal with us as robbers."

66

The partisans of Sir John C. Hobhouse and Lord Auckland, with a view to meet this difficulty, have urged the extremity of the case. It was to counteract Russian aggression that the war was begun; and the emergency left no time for formalities. Russia had practised upon Persia, once England's ally, and had made her England's foe. Persia, under Russia's influence, next practised upon Cabul; and, after establishing among the Affghans friendly relations with herself, persuaded them to become unfriendly to England, and to promote Russian interests towards the Indian frontier. To secure the advance she had made, Russia then sent one Captain Vicovitch, as her diplomatic agent to Dost Mahomed, who received him as such. But, assuming that these errors are real, which they most undubitably are not, what should have been the conduct of our government? Russia was weak in Europe and upon the ocean; England strong on both. Moreover, we were then united closely to France and Austria, her historic foes. But Russia's land forces and strong military position made her invulnerable in Asia. Our course then was clear. We had: First, to call her to account, and cease to cooperate with her. Secondly, to declare war against herself, not the barbarians whom we suspected of being her instruments. Thirdly, to make the Black Sea and the Baltic the theatre of war, where England was irresistible. In each of these particulars, except in calling Russia to an account, the course has been most decidedly the opposite. Without declaring war, either against her or her supposed instruments, we made war upon the latter alone; we chose for the scene of war the territory where we were weakest, and where