with which of those powers with whom we are now combined against France should we be at peace? We, proud of our own freedom, have long been accustomed to treat despotic governments with contempt, and to mark the vices of despots with vigilant sensibility. Of late, however, our resentment has been most readily excited by the abuses of liberty; and our hatred of vice is very different on different sides. In France an old despotism is overturned, and an attempt made to introduce a free government in its room. In that attempt great crimes are committed, and language is ransacked, and declamation exhausted, to rouse our indignation, and excite us to war against the whole people. In Poland liberty is subverted, that fair portion of the creation scized by the relentless fangs of despotism; the wretched inhabitants reduced to the same situation with the other slaves of their new masters, and in order to add insult to cruelty, enjoined to sing Te Deum for the blessings thus conferred upon them;-and what does all this produce? Sometimes a well-turned sentence to express our sorrow, or mark our disapprobation. But hatred of vice is no just cause of war, or ever was among nations; and when I hear men declaim on the crimes of France, who know how to reason like statesmen, I cannot but suspect that they mean to deceive and not to convince. But, it is next said, can a secure peace be made? The question is, I confess, difficult of solution. On the one hand, abstract consideration must be avoided; on the other, experience' and precedent attended to as much as possible. Do I think that a peace, concluded with such a government, would be secure? Perhaps I do not think it would be as secure as I could wish for the permanent interest of this country; but I desire the House to recollect what has been the nature of almost every peace that has been made in Europe. From a retrospect of the circumstances under which former treaties were ratified, it will, in all probability, be as secure as any peace that has been made with France at any other time, and more so than any that they, who would make no peace without the restoration of the monarchy, can ever expect to make. The present rulers of France, it is said, have declared themselves our natural enemies; and have contrived schemes, and sent emissaries to overturn our constitution. Was not all this con

stantly done by Louis 14th? Was he not the declared enemy of our glorious Revolution? Did he not keep up a correspondence with the jacobite party among us; and endeavour, by force and artifice, to overturn our establishment in church and state? Had our new-fangled politicians lived in those times, they would have said, before the peace of Ryswick, "What! treat with Louis 14th who has made war upon you unjustly, who has fomented treason and rebellion, who has attempted to destroy all that you hold sacred, and instead of a limited monarchy, and the protestant religion, to impose upon you the fetters of despotism and popery Such must then have been their language; but king William and his ministers would have thought those who held it fitter for bedlam than a cabinet. But, it is said, the Jacobins have threatened to over-run Holland, and extend their conquests to the Rhine. And did not Louis 14th invade Holland? Were his projects of conquest so moderate as to be confined within the Rhine?

The whole argument then comes to this, that you must be satisfied with the best security you can get, taking care that the power with whom you make a peace, shall have no temptation to break it, either from your misconduct or want of vigilance. The best security for Holland is, the emperor's possession of the Netherlands, and repairing the fortifications of the barrier towns, which he is bound by treaty to maintain. Whether the emperor shall be obliged to do this at his own expense or whether Holland and Great Britain shall assist him, is matter of future discussion; certain it is, however, that it will cost us much less than another campaign. If we look at the declaration to the people of France, the first idea presented by it, although afterwards somewhat modified, but again confirmed by the declaration at Toulon, is, that the restoration of monarchy must be the preliminary to peace. Now suppose that instead of the Jacobin Republic, some stable form of government, but not a monarchy, should be established, with which we might think it safe or necessary to treat, what would become of our promises to Louis 17th and the people of Toulon? Then, as to our security, according to the declaration, as soon as the French have a king we will cease to make war upon them, and then they may set about modifications of their monarchy. But how are these to

be made? Not, certainly, with a guard | of German troops surrounding the hall where those who are to make them are assembled. France will then be left in precisely the same situation as she was in 1789, from which flowed all the mischiefs that are now said to render it impossible for us to treat with them. Such is the notable security which the minister proposes to obtain!

The minister also promised at Toulon, or those whom he employed promised for him, to restore the constitution of 1789, and it was in fact, restored there. Louis 17th was not styled king of France and Navarre, &c. but king of the French, and all the authorities appointed by the constitution of 1789 were re-established. How did this agree with the conduct of our allies? While we were in possession of Toulon, general Wurmser entered Alsace, where he issued a proclamation, dismissing all persons appointed to offices under the Constitution of 1789, and restoring, till farther orders, the ancient system, which we are apt to call despotic. I will suppose a thing too absurd to be supposed but for the sake of argument, namely, that France is brought to submit to whatever we may choose to propose. Must she have a king? She consents. Must that king be Louis 17th? She consents. What in this case would be our security? Do ministers mean to restore to France all they may take from her in the course of reducing her to this submission? Do they mean to restore Valenciennes, Conde, Quesnoi, and St. Domingo? No: the secretary of state says not: He declares that you must have an indemnification for the expense of your services in the war. Admitting that Louis 17th will in that case have a proper sense of gratitude, and that gratitude in kings is stronger than in other men;-a position, however, rather doubted; for although" as rich as a king," "as happy as a king," and many expressions of the same sort, are common sayings, the breasts of kings have not always been considered as the depositories of gratitude. The phrase of "as grateful as a king," is not yet proverbial. Yet supposing that Louis 17th would be as grateful as this country could desire, as monarchs must be subject to the voice of their people, what would that voice be? That France was deprived of her former possessions, that she was shorn of her ancient lustre, and that no fair occasion

should be lost of regaining what had been ravished from her. And thus France would seize the first opportunity of attacking us, when we might possibly have no ally but Holland, and when Prussia or Austria might be leagued with France.

Sir, will any man say that this is not the probable course of events? Unless indeed it can be shown, that princes are more honest and true to their engagements than other men; but from what history this observation is to be collected, I am yet to learn. I know, indeed, that there are certain high stoical sentiments, such as "We know what becomes us to do; and in that line of conduct which, duty prescribes, we are determined to persevere, be the consequences what they may." On such sentiments men may act, if they please, for themselves, but this House can have no right to act so for their constituents, whose interests they are always bound in the first instance to consult. Are gentlemen ready to say that, sensible of all the calamities which must result from their adherence to their present line of conduct, they are nevertheless determined to persist, and to brave those calamities with their eyes open? There are causes, indeed, which dignify suffering; there are some occasions on which, though it is impossible to succeed, it is glorious even to fail; but, shall we expose that country, with whose welfare we are entrusted, to certain calamity and repulse; and all for a ridiculous crusade against the Jacobins!

When I heard that the success of the campaign was to be made matter of boast in the king's speech, I thought it the highest pitch of effrontery to be found in the annals of any nation. Little did I imagine, that his majesty would conceive it necessary to recapitulate from the throne all the successes obtained before the rising of the last session of parliament; successes of which we had been told over and over. If, however, these successes were estimated from June, when his majesty last addressed the parliament, to what do they amount? Or if, which is indeed the only rational mode of forming a judgment of the future, the situation of France, when first attacked by Austria and Prussia, is compared with her present situation, what is the prospect of final success? Far from imagining that I should have to contend, that the campaign has been neither successful nor

glorious, I expected to be asked, when I came to talk of peace, "What! are you so pusillanimous as to suffer your spirits to be depressed by a few untoward events? Would you so far degrade your country as to offer terms of peace now, which we disdained to offer in June, when our good fortune was at its height? When we have been repulsed at Dunkirk; when the prince of Saxe-Cobourg has been repulsed at Maubeuge; when we have been driven from Toulon in a manner so afflicting, if not disgraceful; when general Wurmser has been routed in Alsace; the siege of Landau raised; and the duke of Brunswick can scarcely protect the German cities on the Rhineto offer terms of peace would be to supplicate, not to negociate.

Such an appeal to my feelings, I must have endeavoured to answer as well as I could; but from that task I am completely relieved, by the boast made by ministers of their victories. If the advantages we obtained were such as they represent them to be, we can negociate without dishonour; we can assume the dignified character of being in a condition to dictate the terms of peace, and of forbearing to insist on all that our superiority entitles us to demand. Here then is an additional reason for pursuing the course which I recommend. The right hon. secretary (Mr. Dundas) has said, that our object in the West Indies was, to gain some solid advantage for ourselves, as an indemnification for the expenses of the war. This, however, is a perfectly distinct object from that of giving such a government to France as ministers might think it safe to treat with; and in many respects contradictory to the other. In pursuance of the object of solid advantage to ourselves, whatever islands we took for Louis 17th, we must wish to keep; and as we wished to keep the islands, must wish that Louis 17th, who would have a right to demand them of us, should not be restored; and thus our two objects would run counter to each other. The right hon. secretary has also said, that if we were to make peace with France on the principle of uti possidetis, the campaign would be the most advantageous and the most glorious in the records of history. Advantageous in that point of view, it certainly might be; but glorious it can hardly be called, when it is considered, that we are leagued in it with so many other powers, against a

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single nation whose force we had formerly met, not only without allies, but with those who ought to have been our allies marshalled under the standard of our enemy.

But the real object of the war is the destruction of the Jacobin power in France. Have we succeeded in that object? Is it not clear to the apprehension of every man, who possesses the smallest degree of information, that we are now more distant from it than ever? The right hon. secretary has informed us, that ministers have been greatly embarrassed, whether they should send the forces at their disposal with sir Charles Grey to the West Indies, or with the earl of Moira to co-operate with the Royalists in France. The answer is easy. If the war with the persons who now govern France is as the friends of ministers state it to be, bellum internecinum, they ought not to have hesitated a moment. All expeditions ought to give way to that which alone could most materially promote their object; namely, the aid afforded to the Royalists, for the purpose of marching directly to Paris, and exterminating that party, which is the object of such detestation, that ministers can alone be satisfied with its utter extirpation. I hope that they have not, in the present instance, as sometimes happens to men fluctuating between two purposes, so divided their attention as to have allotted for neither a sufficient force, and thus contrived to render both ineffectual.

My honourable friend (Mr. Windham) has stated, that an idea was last session held out to the country, that the war would be concluded in one campaign, and that this unreasonable expectation, artfully instilled into the minds of the public, is the chief, if not the sole source of any disappointment, which may be felt in the present moment. It is true, that I, and those who then thought as I did, represented the dangers to be apprehended from the war; but I appeal to the recollection of every man who heard us, whether we ever said that the war was likely to be terminated in one campaign. On the other hand, was it not insinuated, if not expressly stated, in the speeches of those who advised going to war, that one campaign would be sufficient to bring it to a conclusion? Do not ministers know that the same idea has been circulated by every ministerial scribbler in every

ministerial newspaper? And is it not notorious, that this delusion has induced many persons to approve of the war, who would otherwise have opposed it? My hon. friend has ridiculed the idea of the war having united the French among themselves. He has asked, whether, instead of union, there has not taken place a contest of two parties, which has led to a series of murders? All this I grant to be true; we have, indeed, beheld the most sanguinary scenes in France, in consequence of the contests of jarring parties; the complete triumph of the present Jacobin party has lately been sealed by the blood of their opponents. But, whatever may have been the contests of parties in France, or whatever the consequences to which they have led, I af firm, that the war has produced in that country not only union, but, what is still worse for the allies, a degree of energy, which it is impossible to withstand.

Let us look, Sir, to the real state of the case. When the session closed in June, there were parties existing in France of equal strength. The Girondists occupied Lyons, Bourdeaux, and other places the royalists possessed La Vendee; and the convention had to contend with Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, the Holy Roman empire, Sardinia, Tuscany, and Naples. (Tuscany, by the way, did not come under the British wing so willingly as the right hon. secretary asserted.) Yet, with these powers against them, the convention not only quelled all internal insurrections, but defeated their foreign enemies. Toulon was taken by the British, in consequence of certain conditions stipulated by the inhabitants. And yet even with the certainty of the guillotine before them, these inhabitants were so unwilling to assist the British, that no other than an ignominious evacuation could be effected. As far as can be collected from information, there is not now an insurrection from one end of France to the other. What, then, is the inference? That there is no probability, nor even possibility, of overturning the Jacobin government of France in another campaign, nor in another after that. The French are now inspired with such an enthusiasm for what they call liberty, that nothing but absolute conquest can induce them to listen to any plan of government proposed by a foreign power. Considering the spirit of the French in this point of view, I am not much com[VOL. XXX. ]

forted by any thing that the noble lord has said of their finances. I remember to have heard much the same arguments delivered from the same side of the House during the American war. The noble lord will find, in the debates of those days, much talk of a "vagrant congress" which was no where to be found, of their miserable resources, and their wretched papermoney, at 300 per cent. discount, of which with the few halfpence you might happen to have in your pocket, you might purchase to the amount of a hundred dollars. The Americans were represented as exercising against the royalists the most unheard-of cruelties; and then came what was now the master argument, that if such principles of resistance were suffered to exist, if the cause of the Americans was ultimately to be successful, there must be an end of all civilized government, and the monarchy of England must be trodden in the dust. At the time when such arguments were made, we were in possession not only of one port like Toulon, but of almost all their principal ports. Yet, I was not then deterred from recommending what I now recommend-negociation, while negociation is practicable. I lived to see Great Britain treat with that very congress so often vilified and abused, and the monarchy subsist in full vigour, certainly fuller than it had ever before subsisted since the Revolution. And if it were not presumptuous for a man to reckon on his own life, I might say, that I expect to live to see Great Britain treat with that very Jacobin government with which you now refuse to treat; and God grant that it may not be under circumstances less favourable for making peace than the present!

Having shown, that as much security might be obtained by treating now with France as in any case that comes within our experience, it remains only to prove, that even if negociation should fail, we have still much to gain, and nothing to lose. We shall thereby demonstrate to the world, that the war, on our part, is strictly defensive; and convince the people of England, that their money is expended not to gratify the caprice of an individual, but to protect the honour and interests of the country. In France the advantage will be still greater; for there, where enthusiasm supplies the place of military discipline and military skill, where it makes the people submit to tyranny almost beyond human patience, we shall di[4 M]

minish that enthusiasm, by showing them that they are not engaged in a war of defence, but of conquest. The country will no longer be governed by declamations against the allies, and exhortations to fight upon the frontiers: the refusal of the Jacobins to treat will ruin them in the opinion of the French people; and thus we shall at once secure the great ends of policy and justice. We shall show to the people of England, that we do not wantonly lavish their blood and treasure; we shall reconcile them to the war, if its continuance should be found necessary; and we shall disarm the enthusiasm of the people of France, by proving to them our own moderation, and our disposition to make peace upon equitable terms.

Whatever Frenchmen can do, I am told that Englishmen can do also. I have no doubt but they can; and that under the same circumstances, the efforts of the people of England would equal or exceed the efforts which are at present made by the people of France. Frenchmen, as they conceive, are contending for their independence as a nation, and their liberties as individuals. Some, indeed, say, that we are engaged in a similar contest, but few or none believe this to be actually the case. We make fine speeches, in order to show how much we are alarmed, and to communicate the alarm to others. But what effect do they produce? They are the result of cold declamation and artificial eloquence; they are the speeches of orators, not the effusions of manly feeling: nobody is persuaded of the facts which they assert, or impressed with the sentiments which they convey. The success of this or that campaign will make little or no difference with respect to the security of our religion and liberty, so often brought into the question. The French, on the other hand, dread equally the despotism of Austria and of Prussia. I wish they may not add, the despotism of Great Britain. In France they have ceased to make speeches on this subject, because every man feels it unnecessary to declaim on that which he is convinced every other man feels equally with himself.

On the conduct of the war, and the mismanagement of the force, with the direction of which ministers were entrusted the lateness of the hour would induce me to postpone any remark, did not the boastful manner in which they have talked of their own exertions render it impossible for me to be silent. The right hon. secre

tary has expatiated on the protection af forded to commerce. Has he forgot the situation in which commerce was left in the West-Indies? Has he forgot how long the whole Jamaica fleet waited for convoy, and under what convoy it was at last obliged to sail? Does he not know that at the very moment he was speaking the French had blocked up the harbour of Cork, and with a few frigates parading the British channel, are making prizes of our merchantmen, and chasing our cruizers into our own ports? Sure I am, that if such unexampled protection has been afforded to our commerce as the right hon. gentleman boasts of, our merchants are the most unreasonable and ungrateful people in the world, On this subject they hold a language very different; their complaints of want of protection are loud and general. When the right hon. gentleman was taking a review of the campaign, and representing it as so highly creditable and satisfactory to himself and his colleagues, I am surprised he forgot to mention Dunkirk. Of the expedition against Dunkirk, by what strange omission I know not, the right hon. gentleman did not say a single word. I should be glad to know, Sir, the wise man who planned that expedition, and advised the division of the combined forces in Flanders. If I may trust to information, which I see no reason to doubt, such advice was never given by the duke of York, and was directly contrary to the sentiments of that experienced general the prince of Saxe Cobourg. If the plan was reprehensible, let us look to the man. ner in which it was carried into execution. What exertions were made by ministers after the siege was undertaken to ensure success? What must have been the feellings of a gallant British prince, who, through dangers and difficulties, had approached the sea, the natural dominion of his country, and expected to find the whole coast a fortress for him, at beholding his troops destroyed by the gun-boats of the enemy commanding the shore, and impeding all his operations! Of that expedition, so full of imbecility and blunders, on the part of those who directed, and who were bound to co-operate in the undertaking, not of those to whom was left the task of execution, without being furnished with the necessary means, some account must be given. This failure ministers are bound to explain. To the conduct and skill of the duke of York I have every reason to believe that the subsequent