repeat any one of those opinions to whatever part of the subject it might relate. The present crisis was awful. He had done every thing in his power to avert the calamity of war; and he did intend to have made one more attempt, if he had not been most unaccountably prevented by the failure of public business for a whole week. That opportunity was unfortunately lost. We were now actually engaged in war; and being so engaged, there could be no difference of opinion on the necessity of supporting it with vigour. No want of disposition to support it could be imputed to him; for in the debate on his majesty's message, announcing that we were at war, he had moved an amendment to the address, as much pledging the House to a vigorous support of it, as the address proposed by his majesty's ministers, and better calculated to ensure unanimity. But the more he felt himself bound to support the war, the more he felt himself bound to object to the measures which, as far as yet appeared, had unnecessarily led to it. -contemptible trifling about ceremonies. | been accused in the last debate with reThey had committed us, and their con- peating the same things over and over, he duct was now before the tribunal of God, should now content himself with referring of the public, and of posterity. Who to the opinions he had formerly delivered are the aggressors, they who kept a mi- and hoped that he should not be again renister, or they who dismissed him-they proached, in the same breath that rewho offered to explain, or they who re-minded him of repetition, with failing to fused to hear-they who offered to go on and trade in amity, or they who prohibited the export of grain to them, while open to all the rest of the world? It was well known that Dumourier was anxious to come to England to negociate, not to fight; and nothing but the dismission of M. Chauvelin, in the harsh way in which it was done, put an end to a mission that would have secured us the continuance of peace. The noble marquis made a forcible appeal on the state of the country, on the discontents of Ireland, and the indisposition of Scotland. What would be the consequence when the real public of England also should be raised, and the false public, the associations, be laid asleep? The state of Holland was not a subject of confidence to those who knew it best. If its Bank, its East-India, and West India companies, should be affected the whole fabric of Holland would give way. The great question to resolve was, what this war was for, what it was to effect, and how it was to end? It was not a war of anger, nor of vengeance. What was it?-He was afraid it was a war of aggrandizement on our part; a war to prosecute which, we were negociating with the other powers for treaties now understood-now every thing but signed and which, as soon as we were fairly involved, we should, upon some twentyfour hours notice, be called upon, as we were on this message, to approve. The Duke of Leeds warmly approved of the address, and of the war, which he thought was unavoidable on the part of ministers, and in which they should have his hearty support. Earl Stanhope's amendment first, and next the earl of Lauderdale's were put, and negatived. The address was then agreed to. Debate on Mr. Fox's Resolutions against the War with France.] Feb. 18. In pursuance of the notice he had given, Mr. For rose. He said that he had delivered his sentiments so frequently on the several points included in his intended motion, that the House could not expect him to add much that was new. Having The necessity of the war might be defended on two principles; first, the malus animus, or general bad disposition of the French towards this country; the crimes they have committed among themselves; the systems they have endeavoured to establish, if systems they might be called; in short, the internal government of their country. On this principle, there were few indeed that would venture to defend it; and this being disavowed as the cause of war by his majesty's ministers, it was unnecessary for him to dwell upon it. Se. condly, that various things have been done by the French, manifestly extending beyond their own country, and affecting the interests of us and our allies; for which, unless satisfaction was given, we must enforce satisfaction by arms. This he considered as the only principle on which the necessity of the war could be truly defended, and in this he was sure the great majority of the House and of the country were of the same opinion. His object was, to record this in an address; and whatever objection there might be as to time or circum who in first attempting to invade France, and some of them in since invading Poland, had violated all the rights of nations, all the principles of justice and of honour. On the first principle he had already stated, as one of two on which it might be attempted to justify the necessity of the present war, as it was most studiously disclaimed by ministers, and all but a very few members of that House, it was unnecessary for him to say any thing. On the second he had said, that the alleged causes of complaint were not causes of war previous to negociation, and on this point his opinions were not new, as they had formerly been called, but such as he had always entertained, from the first moment of his forming opinions upon such subjects; neither were they singular. He had since looked into the writers on the law of nations, and by all the most approved it was laid down as an axiom, that injuries, be they what they may, are not the just cause of war, till reparation and satisfaction have been fairly and openly demanded and evaded, or refused. Some of them even went so far as to say, that reparation and satisfaction ought to be demanded, both previous and subsequent to the declaration of war in order to make that war just. stances, could he obtain the sense of the House purely upon the principle, he should be very sanguine in his hopes of success. Such a record would be a guide to their conduct in the war, and a landmark on which to fix their attention for the attainment of peace. In examining the alleged cases of provocation, he had maintained that they were all objects of negociation, and such as, till satisfaction was explicitly demanded and refused, did not justify resorting to the last extremity. He had perhaps also said, that ministers did not appear to have pursued the course which was naturally to be expected from their professions. He did not mean to charge them with adopting one principle for debate and another for action; but he thought they had suffered themselves to be imposed upon, and misled by those who wished to go to war with France on account of her internal government, and and therefore took all occasions of representing the French as utterly and irre concileably hostile to this country. It was always fair to compare the conduct of men in any particular instance with their conduct on other occasions. If the rights of neutral nations were now loudly held forth; if the danger to be apprebended from the aggrandizement of any power was magnified as the just cause of the present war; and if, on looking_to another quarter, we saw the rights of Poland, of a neutral and independent nation, openly trampled upon, its territory invaded, and all this for the manifest aggrandizement of other powers, and no war declared or menaced, not even a remonstrance interposed-for if any had been interposed, it was yet a secret could we be blamed for suspecting that the pretended was not the real object of the present war-that what we were not told, was in fact the object, and what we were told, only the colour and pretext? Our causes of complaint against France were, first, the attempt to open the navigation of the Scheldt; second, the decree of the 19th of November, supposed to be directed against the peace of other nations; third, the extension of their territory by conquest. The first of these was obviously and confessedly an object of negociation. The second was also to be accommodated by negociation; because an explanation that they did not mean what we understood by it, and a stipulation that it should not be acted upon in the sense in which we understood it, was all that could be obtained even by war. The third was somewhat more difficult, for it involved in it the evacuation of the countries conquered, and security that they should in no sense be annexed to France; and no such se The war, however, be the real cause what it might, would be much less calamitous to this country, if, in the prosecution of it, we could do without allying ourselves with those who had made war on France, for the avowed purpose of in-curity could, perhaps, at present be deterfering in her internal government; if we could avoid entering into engagements that might fetter us in our negociations for peace; since negociation must be the issue of every war that was not a war of absolute conquest, if we should shun the disgrace of becoming parties with those vised. But if we were aware of this; if we saw that during the war the French are engaged in with other powers, they had no such security to offer; if we knew that we were asking what could not be given, the whole of our pretended negociation, such as it had been, was a farce and a delusion: not an honest endeavour to preserve the blessings of peace, but a fraudulent expedient to throw dust in the eyes of the people of this country, in order that they might be hurried blindly into a war. The more he attended to the printed correspondence, the oftener he read lord Grenville's letter to M. Chauvelin, so repeatedly alluded to, the more convinced he was how extremely deficient we had been in communicating the terms on which we thought peace might be maintained. We told them they must keep within their own territory; but how were they to do this when attacked by two armies, that retired out of their territory only to repair the losses of their first miscarriage, and prepare for a fresh irruption? When to this studied concealment of terms were added the haughty language of all our communications, and the difficulties thrown in the way of all negociation, we must surely admit, that it was not easy for the French to know with what we would be satisfied, nor to discover on what terms our amity (not our alliance, for that he had never suggested, though the imputation had been boldly made,)-could be conciliated. When to all these he added the language held in that House by ministers, although he by no means admitted that speeches in that House were to be sifted for causes of war by foreign powers, any more than speeches in the French Convention by us; and last of all, the paper transmitted by lord Auckland at the Hague, to the states general-a paper which, for the contempt and ridicule it expressed of the French, stood unparalleled in diplomatic history-a paper, in which the whole of them, without distinction, who had been in the exercise of power since the commencement of the revolution, were styled " a set of wretches investing themselves with the title of philosophers, and presuming in the dream of their vanity to think themselves capable of establishing a new order of society, &c."-how could we hope the French, who were thus wantonly insulted, to expect that any thing would be considered as satisfactory, or any pledge a sufficient security? Let the House compare lord Auckland's language at the Hague with the pacific conduct of ministers at home, as represented by themselves. While they were trying every means to conciliate; while with moderation to an excess, which they could not help thinking culpable, they were publicly ordering M. Chauvelin to quit the kingdom within eight days, but privately telling him that he might stay and negociate; while they were waiting for propositions from M. Maret, which M. Maret did not make ; while they were sending instructions to lord Auckland to negociate with general Dumourier, lord Auckland was writing that silly and insulting paper by their instructions; for if he had written such a paper without instructions he was very unfit for his situation, and must have been instantly recalled. Thus, while, as they pretended, they were courting peace, they were using every manoeuvre to provoke war. For these reasons, he should move, that ministers had not employed proper means for preserving peace, without sacrificing the honour or the safety of this country. He came next to consider their conduct with respect to Poland. He had formerly said, that he wished not to speak harshly of foreign princes in that House, although the period had not long since passed, when it was thought perfectly allowable to talk of the empress of Russia as a princess of insatiable ambition, and of the late emperor, as a prince too faithless to be relied upon. But when he spoke of the king of Prussia, he desired to be understood as speaking of the cabinet of the court of Berlin, whose conduct he was as free to criticise, as other gentlemen the conduct of the Executive Council of France. In May 1791, a revolution took place in Poland, on the suggestion, certainly with the concurrence, of the king of Prussia; and, as was pretty generally imagined, although not authentically known, with the court of London. By a dispatch to his minister at Warsaw, the king of Prussia expressed the lively interest which he had always taken in the happiness of Poland, a confirmation of her new constitution, and his approbation of the choice of the elector of Saxony, and his descendants, to fill the throne of Poland, made hereditary by the new order of things, after the death of the reigning king. In 1792, the empress of Russia, without the least plausible pretext, but this change in the internal government of the country, invaded Poland. Poland called upon the king of Prussia, with whose express approbation this change had been effected, for the stipulated succours of an existing treaty of alliance. He replied, that the state of things being entirely changed since that alliance, and the present con- principles of the Poles were unexceptionjuncture brought on by the revolution of able; when they were attempting a brave May 1791, posterior to his treaty, it did but unsuccessful resistance to a more not become him to give Poland any as- powerful adversary, their principles were sistance, unless, indeed, she chose to re- not dangerous; but when they were overtrace all the steps of that revolution, and powered by superior force, when they had then he would interpose his good offices laid down their arms and submitted to both with Russia and the emperor to re- their conqueror, when their whole counconcile the different interests. The dif- try was possessed by a foreign army, then ferent interests of foreign powers in the he discovered that they had French prininternal government of a free and inde- ciples among them, subversive of all gopendent nation! It was singular that mi- vernment, and destructive of all society. nisters should be so keen to mark and And how did he cure them of these abostigmatise all the inconsistencies of the minable principles? Oh! by an admirable French with their former declarations, remedy!-invading their country, and which had been too great and too many, taking possession of their towns. Are and yet could see without emotion such they tainted with jacobinism? Hew down inconsistency, not to say perfidy, as this the gates of Thorn, and march in the Prusconduct exhibited. He was not the de- sian troops. Do they deny that they enfender of the gross departures which tertain such principles? Seize upon Danthad been made by the French from their zick and annex it to the dominions of own principles; but if we thought it un- Prussia. Now, did not this seizure and safe to treat with them, because of their spoil of Poland tend to the aggrandizeperfidy, we had little inducement to unite ment of the powers by whom it was perwith the king of Prussia, who had vio-petrated? Was it not a greater and more lated not only principles, but an express treaty, in a more particular and pointed manner, than they had yet had an opportunity of doing. Among the powers at war, or likely to be at war with France, there was no great option of good faith. But the French, it was said, violated their principles, for the sake of robbery and rapine, to seize on territory, and plunder property. Let us look again for a moment to the king of Prussia. contemptuous violation of the law of nations than the French had yet been guilty of? Most undoubtedly it was. Had we opposed it? Had we remonstrated against it? If ministers had any such remon. strances to show, they would produce them in due time, and the House would judge of them; but while none were produced, or even mentioned, he must presume that none had been made. The invasion of Poland had this material aggraIn 1792 he limited the cause of war vation, that the powers who invaded were against Poland by Russia to the new con- not themselves attacked at the time. stitution which he himself had approved They had not the excuse of the French to and promised to defend. But if once this plead, that they did it in a paroxysm of obnoxious constitution was completely fear and danger, circumstances that prompt subverted, and that excellent old republic nations as well as individuals to many acts (for these crowned heads were great re- of impolicy and injustice. The king of publicans when it suited their convenience) Prussia first connives at or consents to the which had for ages constituted the happi-invasion of Poland. Next, he attempts ness of Poland, re-established on its an- an unprovoked invasion of France, and is cient basis, he would interpose his good foiled. How does he revenge the disgrace offices to conciliate the different interests of his repulse? By increasing his army and restore peace. What, then, prevented on the Rhine, by concentrating his forces him from interposing his good offices? for a fresh attack? No: he more gallantly Was not the new constitution completely turns round on defenceless Poland, and subverted? Did not the Russian troops indemnifies himself for his losses by seiz. succeed in overrunning Poland? Were ing on towns where he can meet with no they not in possession of the whole coun-resistance. It was not, therefore, on any try? And had not the empress of Russia been able to restore the excellent old republic? But if she was satisfied with her success in this respect, not so the king of Prussia. He was a critic in principles. When he approved of their revolution, the general system of attention to the balance of Europe that ministers were acting, since while they pretended to consider it as of the utmost importance in one case, they had suffered it to be most flagrantly infringed upon in another. Having dwelt very copiously on the impolicy of viewing, without emotion, the dismemberment of Poland, by three mighty powers, and considering the balance of power engaged only when France had gained the advantage, Mr. Fox deprecated of all things, any thing so infamous as our being supposed to be a party to this abominable confederacy of kings. In speaking thus freely, he hoped he should not be again accused of treating these monarchs with unnecessary severity. When public transactions were in question, it was the right of every one, under whose observation they came, to treat them in the manner precisely that they appeared to him. He did so in treating of our own domestic concerns, and he would take the liberty of doing so, whenever foreign politics were in any ways connected with them. He had but little means of knowing the private characters, habits, or dispositions of kings; and if he had, still, in discussions in that House, he could not fairly be represented as alluding to any other than the public proceedings that were conducted in their name; so that when he spoke of the measures of the cabinet of Berlin, and censured them in the manner which he conceived them to deserve, the personal character of the king of Prussia was by no means implicated in that censure. He therefore lamented openly, that England could be supposed to be in the least involved in that detested league. He could wish, that if we had quarrels, we should fight them by ourselves; or if we were to have allies, that we should keep our cause of quarrel completely separated from theirs and, without intermeddling with the internal concerns of the French republic, not burthen ourselves with any stipulations which should prevent us at any time from making a separate peace, without the concurrence or approbation of those sovereigns. Mr. Fox concluded with moving the following Resolutions : stance, without having attempted to obtain redress by negociation. 3. That it appears to this House, that in the late negociation between his majesty's ministers and the agents of the French government, the said ministers did not take such measures as were likely to procure redress, without a rupture, for the grievances of which they complained; and particularly that they never stated distinctly to the French government any terms and conditions, the accession to which, on the part of France, would induce his majesty to persevere in a system of neutrality. 4. "That it does not appear that the security of Europe, and the rights of independent nations, which had been stated as grounds of war against France, have been attended to by his majesty's ministers in the case of Poland, in the invasion of which unhappy country, both in the last year, and more recently, the most open contempt of the law of nations, and the most unjustifiable spirit of aggrandizement has been manifested, without having produced, as far as appears to this House, any remonstrance from his majesty's ministers. 5. "That it is the duty of his majesty's ministers, in the present crisis, to advise his majesty against entering into engage. ments which may prevent Great Britain from making a separate peace, whenever the interests of his majesty and his people may render such a measure advisable, or which may countenance an opinion in Europe, that his majesty is acting in concert with other powers for the unjustifiable purpose of compelling the people of France to submit to a form of government not approved by that nation." The first resolution being put, Mr. Burke rose. He said that he thought no apology was due by the right hon. gentleman who preceded him, either to the House or to him, for fatiguing 1. "That it is not for the honour or in- them. For himself, he never was one of terest of Great Britain to make war upon those who felt pain in hearing the right France on account of the internal circum- hon. gentleman upon any subject but one, stances of that country, for the purpose and that was, the business now before the either of suppressing or punishing any opi- House - French politics and French prinnions and principles, however pernicious ciples. Upon any other topic, however in their tendency, which may prevail disposed the right hon. gentleman might there, or of establishing among the French be to repeat what he had said before, bepeople any particular form of government. ing a repetition of such excellent matter as 2. "That the particular complaints always fell from the right hon. gentleman, which have been stated against the con- he should be delighted to hear it -decies duct of the French government are not repetita placebit. The copy of such an exof a nature to justify war in the first in-cellent original, though made for the hun |