108 Turkish Accusation against England.

them, and sometimes by separate action, coupled with an understanding with Russia as often as circumstances allowed it. That policy prevailed till 1867, when a contrary policy was for the first time adopted.*

I have referred to Midhat Pasha's article in the Nineteenth Century, in which he says that Turkey would not have engaged in war with Russia if the Porte had not been encouraged to rely on British aid. To this must be added the message dictated by Server Pasha, Foreign Minister of Turkey, for publication in England when Turkey lay prostrate at the feet of her conqueror. Server Pasha declared that England was entirely responsible for the war, and Turkey would now become an ally of Russia. And one of the Turkish Envoys with him added: We were encouraged to go to war by England, and even to continue the war when our better judgment told us we had better make peace on any terms. We would have made peace before the fall of Plevna that would have satisfied Russia but for the counsels of the English Government. I do not refer to the official notes of Lord Derby. If we believed them we had nothing to hope from England; but it is not official notes diplomatists believe in most. It is "officious" notes. It is words whispered in the ear. It was the private conversations of Lord Beaconsfield with Musurus Pasha, of Mr. Layard with Server Pasha and with the Sultan, that led us on and deceived us. Server Pasha has documents which will prove beyond doubt all I say.'

Sir H. Layard and Lord Beaconsfield contradicted this at the time; but Server Pasha chose to resign rather than withdraw a word; and now Mr. F. Greenwood's revelations in the Pall Mall Gazette and the Cornhill Magazine prove that Server Pasha was strictly accurate.-See Daily News of Feb. 7, 1877, and Thompson's Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, ii. p. 377.

CHAPTER X.

THE NEW POLICY AND ITS CAUSES.

I SAID in my last chapter that when Pitt found that not only the leading British statesmen of the day, but the entire British nation, condemned the anti-Russian attitude into which he had allowed himself to be momentarily betrayed under the influence of Prussia, 'he dropped it incontinently, and henceforth was an advocate of a friendly understanding with Russia.' As I have based my argument all through on authoritative proof, I had better fortify this statement also by unimpeachable evidence. In a subsequent debate in the House of Commons Mr. Pitt eulogised Alexander I. of Russia as the most magnanimous and powerful Prince' of his age, as shown by his sacrifices for the deliverance of Europe.' This eulogy was greeted by a solitary jeer from Mr. Tierney, upon whom Pitt immediately turned with the retort: Does it not promise the deliverance of Europe when we find the armies of our allies (the Russians) rapidly advancing in a career of victory, at once the most brilliant and auspicious that

ever signalised the exertions of any combination?'*

This policy continued down to the Crimean War-a war into which England was cleverly manœuvred by three men-the Emperor of the French, who had a special reason of his own to break the power of Russia, as I shall explain in my next chapter; Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who had a personal quarrel to avenge on the Emperor Nicholas; and Lord Palmerston, who appeared to have been mesmerised by the Emperor of the French. I have related elsewhere (and it is also alluded to in the Greville and Malmesbury Memoirs) a painful story told me in 1877 by the late Lord Bath, with permission to publish it; but it is worth repeating here. Lord Palmerston and the British Ambassador at the Porte succeeded, with the powerful aid of Louis Napoleon, in persuading the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen to agree to the despatch of the French and English fleets to Constantinople, Turkey having before then declared war against Russia-a challenge which Russia, on the advice of France and England, did not take up actively, as negotiations for peace were still going on. It was at this critical stage that the three conspirators, eager for war, managed to manoeuvre the allied fleets to Constantinople, in the hope of provoking Russia into some indiscretion which would give France and England a casus Hansard, vol. xxxiv. p. 1046.

Story of Sir Stratford Canning III

belli against her, or (still better) which might provoke Nicholas at last to declare war against the two Powers. While the allied fleets, many of which were sailing vessels, were waiting at the Dardanelles for a favourable wind to take them up to Constantinople, Lord Bath arrived in his yacht. Admiral Dundas, in command of the two fleets, visited him, and begged him on his arrival at Constantinople to call on the Ambassador and tell him that the allied fleets were at the Dardanelles, and would arrive at Constantinople as soon as the wind permitted. On delivering my message,' said Lord Bath to me, Sir Stratford Canning (as he then was) jumped up, and, apparently oblivious of my presence, stalked up and down the room muttering aloud to himself: "Ah! the fleets will soon be here. Once they are here there must be war. It cannot be avoided. I shall take care that it is not avoided. I vowed to have my revenge upon that man [Nicholas, who had refused to receive him as Ambassador at St. Petersburg], and now, by God, I've got it." Yes, indeed, he got it. Under his inspiration the Turks used all their ingenuity to provoke Russia to attack them. They employed their navy to carry Turkish Bashi-Bazouks to the coast of Circassia, from which they conducted a guerilla warfare against Russia, while the Turkish fleet manoeuvred in bravado before Sebastopol. After one of these piratical expeditions and challenges the Russian

I [2

took up to war.

fleet came out from Sebastopol to engage the Turkish fleet, which immediately took to flight. The Russian fleet pursued, and sank it in the harbour of Sinope-a legitimate and justifiable operation of war, if ever there was one. But it was immediately denounced by Sir Stratford Canning as 'the massacre of Sinope,' and the London Press the cry and hounded the Government on Lord Aberdeen and most of his Cabinet tried to stem the tide, while the Emperor of the French and Palmerston did their uttermost to swell the cry for war. The former proposed that France and England should order the Russian navy not to issue from their ports on pain of being driven back by the fleets of France and England. Palmerston urged this policy on the Cabinet in vain, whereupon he resigned on the pretext of disagreement with his colleagues on a domestic question. There was a popular clamour for his return to the Cabinet, and Lord Aberdeen, yielding to the storm, took Palmerston back on his own terms-namely, the acceptance of the French Emperor's proposed insult to Russia. The insulting order was issued, and Nicholas, seeing that France and England were bent on war, refused to accept any more humiliations, and broke off diplomatic inter

course.

Russia knew that the French Emperor was determined on war, and gave up all hope of conciliating him. But up to this last fatal affront