That power, though darkened and weakened by sin, remonstrated with them when they did wrong, and encouraged and approved of them when they did right. Their own conceptions of right and wrong, under its influence and authority, formed the rule of their conduct; and in proportion as they approached this standard or deviated from it, did they feel selfreproach or self-approbation; their thoughts accused or else excused one another. They thus had the witness in themselves, and gave evidence to others, that they were the subjects of moral law and government, and accountable for their conduct to the Supreme Lord and Ruler of all. The voice of conscience intimated the certainty of a judgment to come, and seconded, by its approval or its condemnation, the sentence of the Eternal Judge. In this they had an earnest of the final decision which shall be passed on the character and condition of all men, in the day when God will render to every one according to his works.

"The practical reason of insisting so much upon the natural authority of conscience is, that it seems in a great measure overlooked by many, who are by no means the worse sort of men. It is thought sufficient to abstain from gross wickedness, and to be humane and kind to such as happen to come in their way. Whereas, in reality, the very constitution of our nature requires, that we bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty; wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it. This is the

true meaning of that ancient precept, reverence thyself. The observation that man is thus, by his very nature, a law to himself, pursued to its just consequences, is of the utmost importance; because, from it will follow, that though men should, through stupidity, or speculative scepticism, be ignorant of, or disbelieve, any authority in the universe to punish the violation of this law; yet, if there should be such authority, they would be as really liable to punishment, as though they had been before-hand convinced, that such punishment would follow: Because it is not fore-knowledge of the punishment, which renders obnoxious to it; but merely violating a known obligation*."

That this capacity of moral perception, judgment, and feeling, is inherent in human nature, has been maintained, with very few exceptions, by philosophers and moralists of all ages and nations. Cicero defines it, Vera ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna. This language applies to the eternal law of right and wrong, as well as to the power by which we are capable of perceiving it. It is of this power viewed in connexion with this law, that the same distinguished philosopher says, Nec vero, aut per senatum aut per populum, solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est querendus explanator aut interpres ejus alius. Nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis—alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una lex et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi Magister, et Imperator omnium, Deus.

Butler's Preface to his Sermons on Hum. Nat.

439

CHAPTER X.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY :-PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

FEW subjects have been the occasion of so much discussion, and few are attended with such great difficulties, as the celebrated question of liberty and necessity. It is highly probable that a difference of opinion will always exist in regard to a point so abstruse, and which at the same time involves considerations which interest the feelings of all men. There are, on both sides, men of great talents, learning, and worth, a circumstance which admonishes us to exercise candour and humility in the discussion.

It was noticed in a former chapter, that the will is that faculty of the mind by which it chooses or refuses, and by which it exerts its active power. By the determinations of the will, we mean, the resolu tions of the mind to act in one way rather than in another. These determinations must be occasioned by some power in the mind itself, or by something external, since they cannot exist without a cause. It is maintained by some, on the one hand, that the power which produces and which controls the determinations of the mind is inherent in the mind itself; and that, therefore, in place of being subject to motives, the mind can yield to them, or resist them at pleasure. It is affirmed by others, on the contrary, that the motive which appears strongest in the view

of the mind, is that which invariably determines the will.

By motive is to be understood either the external object which is presented to the view of the mind, and which influences the mind to act, or the state of the mind in which the external object is contemplated. Properly speaking, the motive in every case arises from the mind itself, since the external object has power to excite the will, or otherwise, according to the light in which it is viewed by the mind.

The term liberty is used in different acceptations. That state of mind in which its volitions are not irresistibly determined by any foreign cause, constitutes what is called natural liberty, or liberty of choice. When a person is free from hinderance to do what he wills, he possesses freedom in the common acceptation of the word.

This expression is used in a sense different from this by certain writers. According to their views, liberty includes, first, a self-determining power in the will, by which its acts and volitions are controlled and governed: secondly, indifference, by which is meant, that the mind previous to the act of volition is in equilibrio: thirdly, contingence, by which they signify that which stands opposed to any fixed and certain connexion with a prior ground of its existence.

The term necessity is used in three different acceptations.

I. It stands opposed to ineffectual resistance, and has a reference to some imagined opposition. This is the common notion of necessity; and, accordingly,

when we speak of necessity in relation to ourselves, the fruitlessness of every voluntary exertion is sup posed. We say of things that they necessarily are, that it is impossible for them not to be, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavour the contrary. Hence the terms, necessity, possibility, impossibility, ability, inability, in their common acceptation, are expressive of a relation to a supposed will and endeavour of ours; and so firmly fixed is this association, that we never hear the words without having this idea suggested to our minds.

II. The terms necessary and impossible are used to denote the immutability of certain existences and relations. They are applied, in this signification, to God's existence; to some of his dispositions and acts, such as, his loving himself, his loving righteousness and hating iniquity, and his doing in all cases that which is best to be done.

III. Necessity is often used to denote the most perfect and absolute certainty. It is in this acceptation chiefly that the term is employed in the controversies concerning the freedom of the will. It is in this sense only, that all things which are yet future, or which will hereafter begin to be, can be said to be Had their existence been necessary in necessary. itself, they always would have existed.

The only

way, therefore, in which any thing that is to be hereafter, is, or can be necessary, is by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own nature, or with something that already is, or has been; so that the one thing being supposed, the other certainly follows. Natural or physical necessity denotes the restraints