the difficulty, and can at most but obfcure its by THE Divines and Moraliits of later Ages feerh perfectly fatisfied that they have loofed this Gordian knot, by imputing the fource of all Evil to the abuse of Free-will in Created Beings. God, they fay, never defigned any fuch thing fhould exift as Evil, moral or natural; but that giving to fome Beings, for good and wife purposes, a power of Free-agency, they perverted this power to bad ends, contrary to his intentions and commands; and thus their accidental wickedness produced confequential Mifery. But to fuppofe in this manner, that God intended all things to be goods and happy, and at the fame time gave being to creatures able and willing to obftruct his benevo lent defigns, is a notion fo inconfiftent with his? wisdom, goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence, that it seems equally unphilofophical, and more evidently abfurd, than the other. They have been led into this error by ridiculously judging of the difpenfations of a Creator to his Creatures, by the fame rules which they apply to the dealings? of Men towards each other; between which there is not the leaft proportion or fimilitude. A Man who endeavours, to the utmost of his power, to make others virtuous and happy, however unfuecessful, is fufficiently juftified; but in a Being omnipotent and omniscient, the Cause of all causes, the Origin of all thought, will, and action; who fees all things past, prefent, and to come, in one instantaneous view, the cafe is widely different; his active and permiffive will must be exactly the fame; and, in regard to him, all confequential and future Evils, thro' every moment of time, are actually prefent. SINCE therefore none of thefe pretended folutions can, I am certain, give fatisfaction to your comprehenfive understanding, let us now try to find out one more rational, and more confiftent with the analogy of every thing around us. 5 THAT there is a Supreme Being infinitely powerful, wife, and benevolent, the great Creator and Preferver of all things, is a truth fo clearly demonftrated, that it fhall here be taken for granted. That there is alfo in the univerfal fyftem of Things, the works of his almighty hand, much mifery and wickedness, that is, much natural and moral Evil, is another. truth, of which every hour's fatal experience cannot fail to convince us How these two undoubted, yet feeming contradictory truths can be reconciled, that is, how Evils of any fort could have place in the works of an omnipotent and good Being, is very difficult to account for. If we affert that he could not prevent them, we deftroy his power; if that he would not, we arraign his goodness; and therefore his power and goodnefs cannot both be innite. BUT however conclufive this argument may féem, there is fomewhere or other an error in it; and this error I take to arife from our wrong notions of omnipotence, Omnipotence cannot work contradictions, it can only effect all poffible things, But fo little are we acquainted with the whole fyftem of Nature, that we know not what are poffible, and what are not: but if we may judge from that conftant mixture of pain with pleasure, and of inconvenience with advantage, which we muft observe in every thing around us, we have reafon to conclude, that to endue created Beings with perfection, that is, to produce Good exclufive of Evil, is one of thofe impoffibilities which even infinite Power cannot accomplish. AT THE true folution then of this incomprehenfible paradox must be this, that all Evils owe their existence folely to the neceffity of their own natures; by which I mean, they could not poffibly have been prevented, without the loss of fome fuperior Good, or the permiffion of some greater Evil than themselves; or that many Evils wil unavoidably infinuate themselves by the natural relations and circumftances of things, into the moft perfect system of Created Beings, even in opposition to the will of an almighty Creator, by reason they cannot be excluded without working contradictions; which not being proper objects of power, it is no diminution of omnipotence to affirm that it cannot effect them. AND here it will be proper to make a previous apology for an expreffion, which will frequently occur in the following pages, which is, that God cannot do fuch and fuch things; by which is always to be understood not any retrenchment of the divine omnipotence, but only that fuch things are in their own natures impracticable, and im poffible to be performed. MALM.S THAT the Almighty should be thus limited, and circumfcribed by the nature of things, of which he himself is the Author, may to fome feem not very intelligible: but furely it is not at all diffi cult to conceive, that in every poffible method of ordering, difpofing, and framing the univerfal fyftem of things, fuch numberlefs inconveniences might neceffarily arife, that all that infinite Power and Wifdom could do, was to make choice of that method, which was attended with the leaft and fewest, and this not proceeding from any defect defect of power in the Creator,but from that imperfection which is inherent in the nature of all YOTHIS neceffity, I imagine, is what the Ancients meant by Fate, to which they fancied that Jupi ter, and all the Gods, were obliged to submit, and which was to be controuled by no Power whatever. The Stoicks feem to have had fome dark and unintelligible notions of this kind, which they neither understood themselves, nor knew how to explain to others; that the untractableness of Matter was the cause of Evil; that God would have made all things perfect, but that there was in Matter an evil bias repugnant to his benevolence, which drew another way, whence arofe all manner of Evils. Of the like kind is. a Maxim of the fame Philofophers, That Pain is no Evil; which, if afferted with regard to the individuals who suffer it, is downright nonsense; but if confidered as it affects the universal System, undoubted truth, and means only that there is no more pain in it than what is neceffary to the production of happiness. How many foever of thefe Evils then force themselves into the Creation, fo long as the Good preponderates, it is a work well worthy of infinite Wisdom and Benevolence; and notwithstanding the imperfections of its parts, the whole is moft undoubtedly perfect.. HENCE |