to prove that every Englishman, whether he has a right to vote for a reprefentative, or not, is ftill represented in the British parliament; in which opinion they all agree: on what principle of common fenfe this opinion is founded I comprehend not, but on the authority of fuch refpectable names I fhall acknowledge its truth; but then h will afk one queftion, and on that I will reft the whole merits of the caufe: Why does not this imaginary reprefentation extend to America, as well as over the whole island of Great-Britain? If it can travel three hundred miles, why not three thoufand? if it can jump over rivers and mountains, why cannot it fail over the ocean? If the towns of Manchefter and Birmingham fending no reprefentatives to parliament, are notwithstanding there reprefented, why are not the cities of Albany and Boston equally reprefented in that affembly ? Are they not alike British fubjects? are they not Englishmen or are they only Englishmen, when they follicit for protection, but not Englishmen, when taxes are required to enable this country to protect them?

-But it is urged, that the Colonies are by their charters placed under diftin&t Governments, each of which has a legiflative power within itself, by which alone it ought to be taxed; that if this privilege is once given up, that liberty which every Englishman has a right to, is torn from them, they are all flaves, and all is loft.

THE

THE liberty of an Englishman, vis a phrase of fo various a fignification, having within thefe few years been used as a fynonymous term for blaf phemy, bawdy, treason, libels, ftrong beer, and cyder, that I shall not here prefume to define its meaning; but I fhall venture to affert what it cannot mean; that is, an exemption from taxes impofed by the authority of the Parliament of Great-Britain; nor is there any charter, that ever pretended to grant fuch a privilege to any colony in America; and had they granted it, it could have had no force; their charters being derived from the crown, and no charter from the Crown can poffibly supersede the right of the whole Legislature: their charters are undoubtedly no more than those of all corporations, which empower them to make bye laws, and raise duties for the purposes of their own police, for ever subject to the fuperior authority of parliament; and in fome of their charters, the manner of exercifing thefe powers is specified in these express words, "according to the course of other corporations "in Great-Britain:" and therefore they can have no more pretence to plead an exemption from this parliamentary authority, than any other corporation in England.

IT has been moreover alledged, that, though Parliament may have power to impose taxes on the Colonies, they have no right to use it,

becaufe

because it would be an unjust tax; and no fu preme or legislative power can have a right to enact any law in its nature unjuft: to this, I fhall only make this short reply, that if Parliament can impose no taxes but what are equitable, and the perfons taxed are to be the judges of that equity, they will in effect have no power to lay any tax at all. No tax can be impofed exactly equal on all; and if it is not equal, it cannot be juft; and if it is not juft, no power whatever can impose it; by which fhort fyllogifm, all taxation is at an end; but why it should not be used by Englishmen on this fide the Atlantic, as well as by those on the other, I do not comprehend.

THUS much for the right. Let us now a little inquire into the expediency of this measure; to which two objections have been made; that the time is improper, and the manner wrong.

As to the first, can any time be more proper to require fome affistance from our Colonies, to preserve to themselves their prefent fafety, than when this Country is almoft undone by procuring it? Can any time be more proper to impose some tax upon their trade, than when they are enabled to rival us in our manufactures, by the encouragement and protection which we have given them? Can any time be more proper to oblige them to fettle handfome incomes on their governors, than'

when

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when we find them unable to procure a fubfiftence on any other terms than thofe of breaking all their instructions, and betraying the rights of their fovereign? Can there be a more proper time to compel them to fix certain falaries on their judges, than when we see them fo dependent on the humours of their affemblies, that they can obtain a livelihood no longer than quam diu fe male gefferint? Can there be a more proper time to force them to maintain an army at their expence, than when that army is neceffary for their own protection, and, we are utterly unable to fupport it? Laftly, can there be a more proper time for this mother country to leave off feeding out of her own vitals, these children whom she has nurfed up, than when they are arrived at such strength and maturity as to be well able to provide for themselves, and ought rather with filial.duty to give some affiftance to her diftreffes.

As to the manner; that is, the impofing taxes on the Colonies by the authority of Parliament, it is fald to be harsh and arbitrary; and that it. would have been more confiftent with justice, at least with maternal tenderness, for Administration here: to have fettled quotas on each of the colonies, and have then transmitted them with injunctions, that: the fums allotted fhould be immediately raised by their respective legislatures, on the penalty of theit being impofed by Parliament, in cafe of their.

non

non-compliance? But was this to be done, what would be the confequence? Have their affemblies fhewn fo much obedience to the orders of the Crown, that we could reasonably expect, that they would immediately tax themselves on the arbitrary command of a minifter? Would it be poffible here to fettle those quotas with justice, or would any one of the colonies fubmit to them, were they ever for juft? Should we not be compared to thofe Roman tyrants, who used to fend orders to their fubjects to murder themselves within fo many hours, most ob ligingly leaving the method to their own choice, but on their disobedience threatening a more fevere fate from the hands of an executioner? And! fhould we not receive votes, fpeeches, refolutions, petitions, and remonstrances in abundance, instead i of taxes? In short, we either have a right to taxiz the Colonies, or we have not: if Parliament is poffeffed of this right, why fhould it be exercifed with more delicacy in America, than it has ever. been even in Great-Britain itself? If on the other hand, they have no fuch right, fure it is below the dignity as well as juftice of the Legislature, to intimidate the Colonies with vain threats, which they have really no right to put in execution.

ONE method indeed has been hinted at, and but one, that might render the exercise of this power in a British Parliament juft and legal, which is the introduction of reprefentatives from the feveral