cient and extensive Tradition: For all those Things which seem to us to be destroyed, are either destroyed by the Opposition of something more powerful than themselves, as Cold is destroyed by the greater Force of Heat; or by taking away the Sub

were deprived of the Use of all its Faculties; thus material Things are said to be destroyed, if either their Substance ceases to be, or if their Form be so altered, that they are no longer of the same Species; as when Plants are burnt or putrefied; the like to which befals Brute Creatures. II. It cannot be proved that the Substance of the Soul perishes: For Bodies are not entirely destroyed, but only divided, and their Parts separated from each other. Neither can any Man prove, that the Soul ceases to think, which is the Life of the Soul, after the Death of the Man; for it does not follow, that when the Body is destroyed, the Mind is destroyed too, it having never yet been proved, that it is a material Substance. III. Nor has the contrary yet been made appear, by certain philosophic Arguments, drawn from the Nature of the Soul; because we are ignorant of it. It is true indeed, that the Soul is not, by its own Nature, reduced to nothing; neither is the Body; this must be done by the particular Act of their Creator. But it may possibly be without any Thought or Memory; which State, as I before said, may be called the Death of it. But, IV. If the Soul, after the Dissolution of the Body, should remain for ever in that State, and never return to its Thought or Memory again, then there can be no Account given of Divine Providence, which has been proved to be by the foregoing Arguments. God's Goodness and Justice, the Love of Virtue, and Hatred to Vice, which every one acknowledges in him, would be only empty Names; if he should confine his Benefits to the short and fading good Things of this Life, and make no Distinction betwixt Virtue and Vice; both good and bad Men equally perishing for ever, without seeing in this Life any Rewards or Punishments dispensed to those who have done well or ill: And hereby God will cease to be God, that is the most perfect Being; which, if we take away, we cannot give any Account of almost any other Thing, as Grotius has sufficiently shewn, by those Arguments, whereby he has demonstrated, that all Things were created by God. Since therefore there is a God, who loves Virtue and abhors Vice; the Souls of Men must be immortal, and reserved for Rewards or Punishments in another Life. But this requires further Enlargement. Le Clerc. The Proof of the Soul's Immortality, drawn from the Consideration of the Nature of it, may be seen in its full Force in Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell and the Defences of it.

ject

ject upon which they depend, as the Magnitude of a Glass, by breaking it; or by the Defect of the efficient Cause, as Light by the Absence of the Sun. But none of these can be applied to the Mind; not the first, because nothing can be conceived contrary to the Mind; nay, such is the peculiar Nature of it, that it is capable equally, and at the same Time, of contrary Things in its own, that is, in an intellectual Manner. Not the second, because there is no Subject upon which the Nature of the Soul depends; (a) for if there were any, it would be a human Body; and that it is not so, appears from hence, that when the Strength of the body Jaffer Body fails by Action, the Mind only does not con-hom tract any Weariness by acting. (b) Also the Powersom of the Body suffer, by the too great Power of thepot Things which are the Objects of them, as Sight

by the Light of the Sun. (c) But the Mind is sight of the Sun affelt A mosy saying, that the Mind was simple and unmixt, that it might not the mine

(a) For if there were any, &c.] That there is none, Aristotle' proves very well from Old Men, Book I. Ch. 4. concerning the Soul. Also Book III. Ch. 4. he commends Anaxagoras, for

distinguish other Things.

tr

(b) Also the Powers of the Body, &c.] Aristotle, Book III. of the Soul, says: "That there is not the like Weakness in the "intellectual Part, that there is in the sensitive, is evident from "the Organs of Sense, and from Sensation itself; for there can be no Sensation, where the Object of such Sensation is "too strong; that is, where the Sound is too loud, there is "no Sound; and where the Smell is too strong, or the "Colours too bright, they cannot be smelt nor seen. But the Mind, when it considers Things most excellent to the Understanding, is not hindered by them from thinking, any more "than it is by meaner Things, but rather excited by them; "because the sensitive Part cannot be separated from the Body, "but the Mind may." Add to this, the famous Place of Plotinus, quoted by Eusebius, in his Preparat. Book XV. Chap. 22. Add also, that the Mind can overcome those Passions which arise from the Body, by its own Power; and can choose the greatest Pains, and even the Death of it.

(c) But the Mind is rendered, &c.] And those are the most excellent Actions of the Mind, which call it off most from the Body.

rendered the more perfect, by how much the more excellent the Things are, about which it is conversant ; as about Figures abstracted from Matter, and about universal Propositions. The Powers of the Body are exercised about those Things which are limited by Time and Place, but the Mind, about that which is Infinite and Eternal. Therefore, since the Mind, in its Operations, does not depend upon the Body, so neither does its Existence depend upon it; for we cannot judge of the Nature of those Things which we do not see, but from their Operations. Neither has the third Method of being destroyed any Place here: For there is no efficient Cause, from which the Mind continually flows: Not the Parents, because the Children live after they are dead. If we allow any Cause at all, from whence the Mind flows, it can be no other than the first and universal Cause, which, as to its Power, can never fail; and as to its Will, that That should fail, that is, that God should will the Soul to be destroyed, this can never be proved by any Argument.

the mind is Engandulour thing infinite. the bod

SECT. XXIV,

But many Things favour it.

Nay, there are many not inconsiderable Arguhow thingments, for the contrary; such as (a) the absolute hat are limited time flace &c.) And over all other living Creatures. To which may be

(a) The absolute Power every Man has over his own Actions,

added, the Knowledge of God, and of Immortal Beings. An "Immortal Creature is not understood by any mortal one," says Sallust the Philosopher. One remarkable Token of his Knowledge is, that there is nothing so grievous, which the Mind will not despise, for the Sake of God. Besides, the Power of understanding and acting is not limited, as it is in other Creatures, but unwearied, and extends itself infinitely, and is by this Means like unto God; which Difference of Men from other Creatures, was taken Notice of by Galen.

Power

Power every Man has over his own Actions; a natural Desire of Immortality; the Power of Conscience, which comforts him when he has performed any good Actions, though never so difficult; and, on the contrary, (a) torments him, when he has done any bad Thing; especially at the Approach of Death, as it were, with a Sense of impending Judgment; (b) the Force of which, many Times could not be extinguished by the worst of Tyrants, though they have endeavoured it ever so much; as appears by many Examples.

(a) Torments him when he has done, &c.]

the power a Man has of was

See Plato's Firsting.

4. leads Book of bis Commonwealth: "When Death seems to approach to wish/0 any one, Fear and Solicitude come upon him, about those Things which before he did not think of."

Jommatality

(b) The Force of which, &c.] Witness that Epistle of Tiberius

to the Senate. "What I should write to you, O Senators, oh the Leath "how I should write, or what I should not write, at this Time,

"let the Gods and Goddesses destroy me, worse than I now Br

"feel myself to perish, if I know." Which Words, after Tacitus had recited in the VIth of his Annals, he adds, “So "far did his Crimes and Wickedness turn to his Punishment. "So true is that Assertion of the Wisest of Men, that if the "Breasts of Tyrants were laid open, we might behold the "Gnawings and Stingings of them; for as the Body is bruised "with Stripes, so the Mind is torn with Rage and Lust and "evil Designs." The Person which Tacitus here means, is Plato, who says of a Tyrant, in Book IX. of his Commonwealth: "He would appear to be in Reality a Beggar, if any

one could but see into his whole Soul; full of Fears all his "Life long, full of Uneasiness and Torment." The same Philosopher has something like this in his Gorgias. Suetonius, Ch. 67. being about to recite the forementioned Epistle of Tiberius, introduces it thus: "At last when he was quite wearied out, in the Beginning of such an Epistle as this, he confesses "almost all his Evils Claudian had an Eye to this Place of Plato, when he describes Rufinus in his Second Poem.

Stains within

Deform his Breast; which bears the Stamp of Vice.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

From whence it follows that the End of Man is Happiness after this Life.

IF then the Soul be of such a Nature as contains in it no principles of Corruption: and God has given us many Tokens, by which we ought to understand, that his Will is, it should remain after the Body; there can be no End of Man, proposed more worthy of Him, than the Happiness of that State; and this is what Plato and the Pythagoreans said, (a) that the End of Man was to be made most like God. Thus what Happiness is, and how to be secured, Men may make some Conjectures; but if there be any Thing concerning it revealed from God, that ought to be esteemed most true and most certain.

SECT. XXVI.

Which we must secure, by finding out the true
Religion.

NOW since the Christian Religion recommends itself above all others; whether we ought to give Credit to it or no, shall be the Business of the Second Part of this Work to examine.

(a) That the End of Man was, &c.] Which the Stoics had from Plato, as Clemens remarks, Strom. V.

BOOK