property, and that only. But a debt being paid, by whomsoever it be paid, the creditor has recovered his property, and therefore has a right to nothing further. If he extort, or attempt to extort, anything further, he proceeds beyond his right and is guilty of injustice. So that if Christ had paid the debt for the believer, he would be discharged, not on the footing of grace, but of strict justice.

With respect to distributive justice the discharge of the sinner is wholly an act of grace. This kind of justice has respect solely to the personal character and conduct of its object. And then is a man treated justly, when he is treated according to his personal moral character. If he be treated more favorably than is correspondent to his personal character, he is the object of grace. I say personal character; for distributive justice has no respect to the character of a third person, or to anything which may be done or suffered by another person, than by him, who is the object of this justice, or who is on trial, to be rewarded or punished. And with regard to the case now before us, what if Christ has made atonement for sin? This atonement constitutes no part of the personal character of the sinner; but his personal character is essentially the same, as it would have been, if Christ had made no atonement. As the sinner, in pardon, is treated, not only more favorably, but infinitely more favorably, than is correspondent to his personal character, his pardon is wholly an act of infinite grace. If it were, in the sense of distributive justice, an act of justice, he would be injured, if a pardon were refused him. But as the case is, he would not be injured, though a pardon were refused him; because he would not be treated more unfavorably than is correspondent to his personal character.

Therefore, though it be true, that if a third person pay a debt, there would be no grace exercised by the creditor, in discharging the debtor, yet when a third person atones for a crime, by suffering in the stead of a criminal, there is an entire grace in the discharge of the criminal, and distributive justice still allows him to be punished in his own person. The reason is, what I have mentioned already, that justice in punishing crimes, respects the personal character only of the criminal; but in the payment of debts, it respects the recovery of property only. In the former case, it admits of any treatment which is according to his personal character; in the latter it admits of nothing beyond the recovery of property.

So that though Christ has made complete atonement for the sins of all his disciples, and they are justified wholly through his

redemption; yet they are justified wholly by grace. Because they personally have not made atonement for their sins, or suffered the curse of the law. Therefore they have no claim to a discharge on account of their own personal conduct and suffering. And if it is objected, that neither is a debtor discharged on account of anything which he hath done personally, when he is discharged on the payment of his debt by a third person; yet justice does not admit, that the creditor recover the debt again from the debtor himself; why then does it admit, that a magistrate inflict the punishment of a crime on the criminal himself, when atonement has been made by a substitute? The answer is, that justice in the these two cases, is very different, and respects very different objects. In criminal causes, it respects the personal conduct or character of the criminal, and admits of any treatment which is correspondent to that conduct. In civil causes, or matters of debt, it respects the restitution of property only, and this being made, it admits of no further demand.

In the third sense of justice before explained, according to which anything is just, which is right and best to be done; the pardon of the sinner is entirely an act of justice. It is undoubtedly most conducive to the divine glory, and general good of the created system, that every believer should be pardoned, and therefore, in the present sense of the word, it is an act of justice. The pardon of the sinner is equally an act of justice, if, as some suppose, he be pardoned not on account of the death of Christ, considered as an equivalent to the curse of the law denounced against the sinner; but merely on account of the positive obedience of Christ. If this be the mode and the condition of pardon established by God, doubtless pardon granted in this mode and on this condition, is most conducive to the divine glory and the general good. Therefore it is, in the sense of justice now under consideration, an act of justice; insomuch that if pardon were not granted in this mode, the divine glory would be tarnished, and the general good diminished, or the universe would suffer an injury. The same would be true, if God had in fact granted pardon, without any atonement, whether by suffering or obedience. We might have argued from that fact, that infinite wisdom saw it to be most conducive to the divine glory and the general good, to pardon without an atonement; and of course that if pardon had not been granted in this way, both the divine glory and general good, would have been diminished, and injustice would have been done to the universe. In the same sense the gift of Christ, to be our savior, his undertaking to save us, and every other gift of God to his creatures, are acts of justice.

But it must be remembered, that this is an improper sense of the word justice, and is not at all opposed to grace, but implies it. For all those divine acts and gifts just mentioned, though in this sense they are acts of justice, yet are at the same time, acts of pure grace.

In this sense of justice, the word seems to be used by the apostle Paul, Rom. 3: 26, "To declare his righteousness, (or justice,) that he might be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." That God might be just to himself and to the universe. Again in Psalm 85: 10, "Mercy and truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other." Righteousness, in the distributive sense, hath not kissed peace with respect to the sinner; so far as it speaks anything, it calls for his punishment. But the public good, and the divine glory admit of peace with the sinner. In the same sense the word occurs in the version of the Psalms in common use among us, where it is said "justice is pleased and peace is given.' Again in the catechism of the assembly of divines, where they say, "Christ offered up himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice."

Thus it appears, that the pardon of the sinner, in reference to distributive justice, which is the only proper sense of the word, with respect to this matter, is entirely an act of grace, and that, although he is pardoned wholly through the redemption of Jesus Christ.

It is in the same sense an act of grace, as the gift of Christ, or any other most gracious act of God. Though the sinner is pardoned wholly through the redemption of Christ, yet his pardon is an act of pure grace, because in it he is treated inconceivably more favorably than is correspondent to his personal character.

The pardon of the sinner, on this plan of the redemption or the atonement of Christ, is as entirely an act of grace, as if it had been granted on an atonement made, not by the sufferings of Christ, but merely by his active obedience. For if we suppose, that the atonement of Christ consists wholly in the obedience of Christ, not in his sufferings, in what sense would the pardon of the sinner be an act of grace, in which it is not an act of grace on the hypothesis concerning the atonement which hath been now stated? Pardon is no more procured by the payment of the sinner's debt, in the one case, than in the other. If it be said that Christ's suffering the curse of the law is the payment of the debt; I answer, this is no more a payment of the debt, than the obedience of Christ. If it be said that Christ's obedience only honors and magnifies the law; I answer, No more is done by the sufferings of Christ. It is true, that if the sinner be pardoned VOL. H. 4

on account of Christ's obedience, he is treated more favorably than is correspondent to his personal character. But the same is true, if he be pardoned on account of Christ's sufferings. If it be said, that in the one case, Christ suffers, as the substitute of the sinner; I answer, in the other case he obeys as the substitute of the sinner. In the one case, Christ has by his sufferings made it consistent with the general good, to pardon the sinner; in the other case, he has made the same thing consistent with the general good, by his obedience. And if this circumstance, that the pardon of the sinner is consistent with the general good, abolishes grace from his pardon in the one case, the same circumstance is productive of the same effect, in the other. The truth is, that in both cases, the whole grace of pardon consists in this, and this only, that the sinner is treated infinitely more favorably, than is correspondent to his personal character.

Again; according to this scheme of the atonement, the pardon of the sinner, is as wholly an act of grace, as if he had been pardoned without any atonement at all. If the sinner had been pardoned without any atonement, he would have been treated more favorably than is correspondent to his own character; and so he is, when pardoned through the atonement of Christ. In the former case, he would be pardoned, without a payment of his debt; so he is in the latter. If the measures taken by God, to secure the public good, those measures consisting neither in any personal doing or suffering of the sinner, nor in the payment of debt, be inconsistent with grace in the pardon of the sinner, in the one case; doubtless whatever measures are taken by God, to secure the public good in the other case, are equally inconsistent with grace in pardon. And no man will pretend, that if God do pardon the sinner without an atonement, he will pardon him in a way which is inconsistent with the public good. In this view of the objection, either the bare circumstance that the pardon of the sinner is consistent with the public good, is that which abolishes the grace of pardon; or it is the particular mode, in which the consistence of pardon and the public good, is brought about. If the bare circumstance of the consistence of pardon and the public good, be that which abolishes the grace of pardon; then it seems, that in order that any pardon may be gracious, it must be inconsistent with the public good; and therefore the pardon of the sinner without any atonement, being by the concession of the objector a gracious act, is inconsistent with the general good of the universe, and with the glory and perfections of God, and therefore can never be granted by God, as long as he is possessed of infinite perfection and goodness, whereby he is necessarily disposed to seek the good of the universal system, or of his own kingdom.

Or if it be said, that it is the particular mode, in which the consistence between pardon and the public good is brought about, which abolishes the grace of pardon; in this case it is incumbent on the objector, to point out what there is in the mode, which is opposed to grace in pardon. He cannot pretend, that in this mode, the debt of the sinner is paid, or that in repentance the sinner's personal character is so altered, that he now deserves no punishment. If this were the case, there would certainly be no grace in his pardon. It is no grace, and no pardon, not to punish a man who deserves no punishment. If the objector were to hold, that the personal character of the sinner is so altered by repentance, that he no longer deserves punishment, he would at once confute his own scheme of gracious pardon.

Neither can it be pretended, by the advocates for pardon without atonement, that there is any grace in pardon, in any other view than this, that the sinner is treated more favorably, than is correspondent to his personal character. And pardon on such an atonement as Christ hath made, is, in the same view, an act of grace. So that if the true idea of grace, with respect to this subject be, a treatment of a sinner more favorable than is correspondent to his personal character; the pardon of the sinner through the atonement of Christ, is an act of pure grace. If this be not the true idea of grace, let a better be given, and I am willing to examine it; and I presume that on the most thorough examination of the matter, it will be found, that there is as much grace in the pardon of the sinner, through the atonement of Christ, as without any atonement at all. Surely it will not be pleaded, that it is no act of grace to treat a sinner more favorably than is correspondent to his own personal character; if such treatment be not more favorable than is correspondent to the personal character of some other man, or some other being; and that it is no act of grace in a prince to pardon a criminal, from respect to the merits of the criminal's father; or that if one nobleman had been the murderer of another, there would have been no grace exercised in the pardon of the former, from respect to the intercession of some powerful court.

On every other hypothesis concerning the mode or condition of pardon, it must be allowed, that God dispenses pardon, from regard to some circumstance, or juncture of circumstances, which renders the pardon both consistent with the general good, and subservient to it; and whatever this be, whether the death of Christ, or anything else, provided it be not the payment of money, and provided the personal character of the sinner be the same, it is equally consistent or inconsistent with grace in pardon.