or vicious in it, in the least degree diminishes the worth of my virtue in doing kind offices to him?

The Remarker will, probably, be sensible, upon a review of the subject, that there is not the least ground for such an inference. According to his own statement, there is a good, in fact, done by A; and B receives and enjoys it, and that whether he be virtuous or vicious. The merit of the virtue of A, in doing this good, must therefore belong to him. If C, by the exercise of a virtuous disposition, enjoys it, the praise-worthiness of this virtuous disposition is certainly his; while a mere sensibility of pleasure and pain has nothing of a moral nature in it.

But in this writer's critical definition of the terms merit and demerit, it is apprehended there are some defects, and some of his observations are hardly capable of defence. He says, that merit involves a right to demand a reward; but, demerit, no right to demand punishment;-that justice turns over the sinner to the sovereign disposal of him whom he has offended, and that a less punishment than is deserved may be inflicted. These are not exactly his words; but, if I understand him, this is the import of what he says. This would imply, that justice does not so much require vice to be punished, as virtue to be rewarded. If sin against God merely exposes to punishment, and less than is deserved may be inflicted, why will it not follow, that justice doth not demand that any punishment at all shall be inflicted? And if it do not demand it, what evidence is there that it will ever be inflicted? If justice demand that any punishment whatever should be inflicted, it demands the whole which is deserved, as much as any part. If justice, and the good of the universe, do not as much demand that the Deity express his displeasure against the sinner, by inflicting natural evil upon him, and that too equal to his desert, as much as it is possible that equity should give a right, in any case whatever, to demand a reward; why is it necessary that the displeasure of the Deity should ever be expressed in any natural evil? Why might not sin have been forgiven without an atonement?

Where a reward is due, the right of demand lies in him to whom it is due. But, where punishment is deserved, the right of demand that it should be inflicted lies in the party injured; and, in case of sin against God, the right of demand lies in him, in the whole universe which is injured by the sinner. And that justice which guards the interest of the universe, and seeks the general good, as really demands punishment, as a meritorious action can, in any case whatever, demand a reward.

A sinner, when possesed of a properly penitent disposition,

sees the beauty, and feels the importance of justice. Justice appears to him to have real demands; and he views it as of infinite importance to the good of the universe, that these demands should be satisfied. And though the demands of justice be against himself, his benevolence to the universe still as really calls for their being satisfied, as true virtue ever calls for a reward.

Further observations upon the subject would, perhaps, be neither instructive nor entertaining to your readers.

MODERN LIBERALITY.

Now,

The liberality of the present age is so extravagant that it runs into many absurdities; one of which is, that we are to teach no particular system of religion, but either teach no system at all, or every system alike. This is plainly implied in the common doctrine so much insisted on by many, that nothing ought to be done to bias the minds of men in religion, but that they ought to be entirely free from every bias or influence in favor of any one particular doctrine or system of religion rather than another. all teaching of any doctrine or system of religion, is an attempt to persuade and incline those who are taught, to receive that doctrine or system. Of course, if nothing is to be done to bias the mind of any man in favor of any doctrine, no doctrine is to be taught. But that this is both contradictory to the express commands of scripture, and absurd in the eye of reason, I presume every man will grant who gives himself the trouble to think. It is as absurd to imagine that the most likely way for a man to become truly religious, is to be taught nothing concerning religion, as it is to imagine that the most likely way for a man to become a great mathematician or philosopher, is to be taught nothing concerning mathematics or philosophy; or that a man who is taught nothing concerning a particular mechanic business, is the most likely to become an accomplished artist in that business.

Or if it be said, that we ought to teach religion indeed, but should teach every kind or system of religion alike, and then leave men to judge for themselves; I observe, that this seems to be as absurd, as to teach a man every kind of mechanic art equally, as the most direct way to make him a good shoe-maker.

Corollary. Hence we see the impropriety of putting books on every subject, and containing arguments equally for and against

the truth, into the hands of people in general. What is this but teaching them every doctrine of truth and falsehood equally, in order to lead them into the truth? And this is as absurd, as to teach a man the trade of a blacksmith or a carpenter, in order to make him a tailor.

THE DIVINE VENGEANCE.

God in scripture tells us, "Vengeance is mine, I will repay;" "I will avenge me of mine adversaries;" "I will recompense fury to mine enemies," etc. Now, many are strongly prejudiced against these expressions, and grievously offended at them. The reason doubtless is, that they misapprehend their meaning. They conceive that they mean the same which is commonly meant by the same words among men; viz. a selfish, malicious and furious passion. But, in truth, those scriptural expressions mean no more than that God, as a righteous governor and judge, will, according to strict justice, punish all rebels against his government, so far as the general good of his kingdom, which is the intellectual universe, requires. If a wise, just and good judge punish a criminal according to justice and the requirements of the state, he may be said to avenge the state, or himself as the head and representative of the state on those criminals, and to repay or recompense them for the injury they have done the state. And surely such vengeance is nothing inconsistent with the most perfect moral goodness.

THE SALVATION OF THE HEATHEN.

In favor of the salvation of the heathen, it is sometimes said, if a heathen be truly virtuous and holy, what will become of him? Will he be cast off merely because he is ignorant of Christ; though if he had known him, he would most cheerfully have received him as his Savior? On this I observe, no doubt if any heathen be truly virtuous and holy; if he love God supremely, as an infinitely great, wise, holy and good God, and his neighbor as himself, he will be saved. But the question is, whether any such persons can be found among the heathen. Of the heathen philosophers Socrates is commonly selected as the best and most likely to be a saint. But it is generally granted, that he allowed VOL. II.

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of unnatural lust, and lived in it himself. Plato was a mere temporiser in religion; Cicero was a most vain-glorious creature; and not one of all the ancient philosophers appears by his writings or otherwise, to have possessed that sense of sin, that spirit of humility and repentance, which, according to the scriptures, is so essential to the character of a good man. Therefore we have no evidence that any one of them was possessed of true virtue or holiness, and on that ground there is no reason to believe, that any of them are saved.

Nor does it appear, that ever any of the heathen had just ideas of virtue or true moral goodness, as existing in men. Humility, repentance, forgiveness of injuries, loving our enemies, etc. appear not to have entered into their ideas of a good man. And if they had not just ideas of moral goodness in men, we may be sure that they had not just ideas of it in God, and of those perfections which constitute the glory of his character. And until we find a heathen, who has just ideas of true virtue in men, it is an idle and groundless conjecture, that any heathen ever ascribed to the material sun, "the power, wisdom, goodness, holiness, justice and grace of the true God," and loved and worshipped it in this view. A person who should ascribe such attributes to the sun, and should love and worship it on account of those attributes, would be a friend to true virtue and holiness, would himself practise true virtue, and lead a life of holiness, would therefore be a humble penitent, as well as a moral man, and in his account of true virtue or moral goodness would express his ideas correspondently to the forementioned moral attributes, which he ascribes to the sun. But such a heathen has not yet appeared. Let him be pointed out, and it will be of more weight in the argument, than a thousand conjectures.

BENEVOLENCE OF GOD IN INFLICTING PUNISHMENT.

It is often mentioned as a self-evident proposition, as an axiom of great importance, and a fundamental truth, that God has made no man to be damned. But the truth or falsehood of this proposition depends entirely on the sense of it. Doubtless God made every man with some definite design, and for some determinate end. And if he did not make any man with a design that he should be damned, he made him with a design that he should not be damned. Therefore, either all men are finally saved, or else the design of God in the creation of some men is frustrated,

and he fails of the end at which he aimed, and which he intended to accomplish. None, it is presumed, will assert the latter, and none but universalists the former. Yet it is frequently maintained by those who are not universalists, that God has made no man to be damned.

Will it not be allowed, that God has made some men to have the tooth-ache, others to have the small-pox, others to have the yellow fever, and others to have the plague? Will it be denied, that God made all men to die; some to die in battle, others to be drowned, others to be consumed in their own houses, others to be tortured to death by savages? If these things will not be denied, where is the absurdity of supposing that God has made some to suffer the pains of hell? If, indeed, the pains of hell be not deserved by any man, we may boldly assert, that God, who is perfectly just, has made no man to suffer these pains. But allowing that any do deserve them, by what argument shall we prove, that God has not made some men to suffer them in the same sense that he has made some to die with the yellow fever, to be drowned, or to be burnt to death?

It is granted, that to have the yellow fever, to be drowned, and to be consumed, is not the ultimate end of any man's creation. Nor is damnation the ultimate end of any man's creation. The yellow fever, and all diseases and deaths, are designed ultimately to subserve the divine glory and the good of the creation. Just so with regard to damnation; it will never be inflicted on any man, but with an ultimate design to subserve the same important ends.

If, therefore, when it is asserted that God never made any man to be damned, the meaning be, that God never made any man with an ultimate view to his damnation, this is granted; but if the meaning be, that God never made any man with a design that, in consequence of his own sin and desert of damnation, he should suffer it, and thereby promote the general good and the divine glory; this is as false as to assert that God never made any man with a design that he should have the yellow fever, and thereby promote the general good and the divine glory.

Some seem to imagine that if God damn any man, he does it from a malicious disposition, such a disposition as men are apt to indulge in revenging the injuries which they have received. And on this ground they argue in favor of universal salvation. They say that God is good, and it is absurd to suppose that he is malicious, and disposed to revenge himself on his creatures; and therefore it is absurd to suppose that he damns them.

That it is absurd to suppose that God is in the least degree