pulsion; i. e. such compulsion to which the will is, or may be entirely opposed. As to liberty of self-determination, or the causation of volition, by ourselves, if this were possible, and were decreed by God, or by any means were rendered previously certain, there would be no more liberty in it than if we did not cause our own volitions; because we should still be tied down to cause those particular volitions, and no others. So that this mighty question which has agitated the christian world for ages, is easily answered, if we only explain what we mean by liberty.

[One or two queries were made on the above article by a writer in a subsequent part of the volume, to which the following is an answer.]

The author of the piece inserted in this Magazine, vol. ii. page 151, requests either the author of a former piece on the subjects of free agency and decrees, or some other writer, to solve "the knot," which he proposes. Therefore I shall attempt the solution. The knot is thus stated by the author himself. "The free actions of men, according to our author's (a former writer's) theory, are effects, and must be produced, either mediately or immediately by divine power. They are, therefore, in this respect, as passive as the earth was in creation. Now is there no difficulty in conceiving how actions, which, though free with respect to their nature, are passive with respect to their cause, should constitute the agent, the proper object of praise or blame?" On this statement of the difficulty I remark,

That the principal ground of difficulty with our author is, that "the free actions of men are supposed to be effects, and produced either mediately or immediately by divine power." But does our author suppose, that the free actions of men are not effects? If so, they are either self-existent and eternal, or come into existence without cause, and by mere chance; neither of which will be pretended. Therefore, our author himself must allow, that the free actions of moral agents are effects of some cause or other. Whatever that cause be, whether it be the divine power, or any other power extrinsic to the subject of the actions, is immaterial as to the freedom of those actions. Is it not immaterial as to their freedom, whether my actions be the effects of the wind, the rays of the sun, the power of an angel, or the power of God? If in any one of these cases they be "as passive as the the earth was in creation," they are equally passive in all the rest. If, therefore, there be a difficulty in the theory opposed by our author, it is a difficulty which attends the theory of our author himself; unless

he deny the free actions of moral agents to be effects. For if he should hold, that they are effects, not of any extrinsic cause, but of the person himself, who is the subject of them, still those actions are equally effects, and equally passive with respect to their cause, as if they be the effects of any extrinsic cause. Suppose a man cut off his own hand, the effect is equally passive, as if it were cut off by any other man; it is as passive as the earth is in its creation. And if that act of the will, by which he determines and wills to cut off his hand, be the effect of the man himself, still this effect, in its production, is as passive as the effect of any other cause. Therefore, our author's words may be retorted: "Now is there no difficulty in conceiving how actions, which, though free with respect to their nature, are passive with respect to their cause, should constitute the agent, a proper object of praise or blame?" These words imply, that an action, which is the proper object of praise or blame, must not be passive with respect to its cause; i. e. it must not be produced by its cause. But how this is possible, our author must inform us.

Our author proceeds to illustrate his objection: "Let it be supposed, that my neighbor possesses, and unawares, and without my previous consent, exerts a power to change my disposition, from benevolence to malice, by striking me with a magic wand, or some other way; should I be blamable for exercising a malicious disposition? Would not all reasonable men exculpate and pity me? Would they not say, he was benevolent, and would have continued so if it had not been for his wicked neighbor. It is therefore not his fault, but his neighbor's. This supposition may, perhaps, in some measure, serve to illustrate the real difficulty, which lies in the minds of those who object to the doctrine of the divine decrees." If this illustrate the real difficulty, it deserves our particular attention. The argument here urged is, that if a malicious disposition be produced in me, without my previous consent, I am not blamable for exercising it. This implies, that if it be produced with my previous consent, I am blamable for the exercise of it. If so, then our author gives up his former argument, and rests his cause on a new one. His former argument was, that we are not blamable for acts in the production of which we are passive. But in the case now proposed, I am entirely passive in the production of a malicious disposition; it is produced in me by another, only I consent to its production, and therefore am blamable for the exercise of malice.

Or, perhaps, to avoid this inconsistence, our author may explain himself to mean, not that I am blamable for the exercise of malice produced in me by another, but merely for my consent to its pro

I

duction. Be it so; then the question will arise, how came this consent into existence? Did it come into existence without cause? This will not be pretended. Did I cause it myself? Then doubtless I caused it by a causing or efficient act, and this efficient act is as distinct from the consent produced, which is the effect, as any cause is from its effect. Again; this causing act is also an effect, and requires a cause. This cause must, for the same reason as before, be myself, and myself must cause it by an efficient act; and thus we must run into an infinite series of acts causing one another, which is absurd and impossible. The same absurdity will attend the supposition, that the consent now in question, was caused in me by some extrinsic cause, but with my previous consent. That previous consent requires a cause, and for the same reason my previous consent must concur to the causation of that, and so on to infinity; so that there is no other possible supposition, than that the consent, that my neighbor should produce malice in me, was caused by some extrinsic cause without my previous consent. And if I be blamable for this consent, thus brought into existence without my consent, why may I not be equally blamable for a malicious disposition brought into existence in the same manner?

The truth is, that if malice, however caused, be not blamable, it is not blamable in any case. And if malice, produced in me by my neighbor's magic wand, be not blamable, it never can be blamable. For whenever it does exist, it is produced by some cause extrinsic to him, who is the subject of it; and if our author will show, that he himself, or any other man, can efficiently produce an exercise of malice in himself, and avoid the absurdity of an infinite series of acts in the same man, begetting one another, he will do more than has ever been done by any opposer of the doctrine of decrees, from Pelagius down to the present time. The true solution of our author's difficulty is this, that the essence of the virtue and vice of benevolence and malice lies in the nature of those affections, and not in their cause.

THE PROOF OF GOD'S MORAL PERFECTIONS FROM
SCRIPTURE.

Question. Can the moral perfections of God be proved from the scriptures alone, without any argument from the light of nature? Answer. It is agreed, that unless we previously know the moral perfections of God, we know not, when we read the scrip

tures, that he speaks the truth; and therefore that he has drawn a true character of himself in the scriptures. It is, in this question, taken for granted, that we have evidence that the scriptures are a revelation from God. Therefore I say, that from the scriptures themselves we have the same evidence, that those scriptures are a revelation from a God of benevolence, as that they are a revelation from a God of wisdom. The whole scheme of redemption is evidently a benevolent scheme, as evidently benevolent as it is wise. To say that it is a malevolent scheme, would as manifestly be contrary to the import and tendency of it, as to say that it is foolish, and betrays a want of skill in the author. Now, if the scheme of the gospel be entirely and perfectly benevolent, suited to promote the glory of God and the happiness of the created system, to the highest degree, it argues, that the author of it is an entirely benevolent being. The argument is the very same that we might draw from the visible works of creation and providence, if they were manifestly in like manner conducive to the glory of God and the general good. Every part of scripture is full of holiness and benevolence; e. g. the divine law. Will it be pretended, that an unholy being is the author of the law? We might as well say, that an unskilful being is the author of the planetary system.

If the divine law be a proof of the divine holiness and goodness, the gospel is a still stronger proof of it; because it exceeds in glory, or in the display of holiness and goodness. The evidence of the holiness of God, in that case, is the same with the internal evidence, that the scriptures are a revelation from God. We argue, that the scriptures are a revelation from God, because of the transcendent wisdom and holiness which appear in them. So, I argue, that the author of the gospel scheme is a good being, because of the transcendent goodness and holiness which appear in it.

Objection. But how do we know that the gospel is true; or that God has taken, and will in future pursue those measures which are mentioned in the gospel, to exercise and display holiness and goodness? If we know not the divine veracity by other evidence, how shall we know that he has spoken the truth in the gospel? I answer, the gospel consists of two parts, which may be called, one the moral, and the other the historical part. By the moral part I mean all the duties prescribed in the gospel, as supreme love to God, benevolence to our neighbor, repentance, faith, humility, forgiveness of enemies, and love to them, prayer, divine worship in general, and the whole of new obedience, the examples of the gospel, particularly that of our Lord Jesus Christ,

the holiness of heaven, the nature of the rewards of virtue, as tending to promote virtue, the nature and tendency of the punishments of sin, to discountenance it.

By the historical part of the gospel I mean the declarations of facts, whether past or future; or history in the proper sense, and predictions, including promises and threatenings, as declarations of future facts. Now, from this last part of the gospel I do not at present argue the divine holiness and goodness; but from the former part I do, and may argue these divine attributes as properly as from the divine law. Surely none but a holy being would first give a character of God perfect in greatness, holiness and goodness, and then require us to love him supremely, to be followers of him as dear children, to be holy as he is holy, and perfect as he is perfect. No other being would require us to follow the perfect example of Christ; to love one another with a pure heart fervently; to do good to all, especially to the household of faith; to be meek and lowly of heart; to forgive and love our enemies; to repent of all our sins of heart and life, and to forsake them in future; and all this on the pain of the most dreadful but just punishment on the one hand; with the prospect of infinite and holy rewards on the other. In short, as the moral part of the gospel is manifestly conducive, in the highest degree, to the glory of God and good of the intellectual system, the author of it must be a holy and benevolent being.

In proportion as the holiness and goodness of God are displayed more clearly and uniformly in the law and gospel of God, than in the works of creation and providence; so much the stronger is the proof from them, of the divine moral perfection, than that which is drawn from creation and providence.

As to the objection arising from the evil in the world, this is expressly solved in scripture, in that it informs us, that it shall be overruled for good; which is not made known in any other way.

In addition to this, from the invariable fulfilment of the divine promises and threatening, so far as there has been time for it, and from the exact conformity of all divine declarations with truth, I may argue the divine veracity.

We all argue, that any person is a person of veracity, with whom we have had long intercourse, and have always found an exact conformity of all his words and declarations with truth. Now, mankind have had intercourse with the Deity for nearly six thousand years; in that time they have received from him. many declarations, promises and threatenings; and in no one of them has there been found any deviation from truth or fact.