Many of the historical facts related in scripture are confirmed by authentic profane history. Others are confirmed by effects now remaining, as the flood, the confusion of tongues, the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah, etc. Many of the traditions, and the fables among the ancient heathen, were manifestly founded on the facts recorded in scripture, and are a confirmation of them. Now, if all the prophecies, promises and threatenings of scripture are fulfilled, which ought to be fulfilled according to the time, may we not hence infer, that those which remain unaccomplished will be accomplished in their proper time? If all historical narrations of scripture are confirmed by profane history, so far as that history undertakes to relate the events of those times and nations; and if all the effects of the events recorded in scripture remain to this day, which might be expected to remain; may we not hence infer the truth of the other narrations of scripture? If, in every instance in which there is opportunity for proof, the truth of the scriptures is indeed proved, may we not hence infer, that in those instances, with regard to which there is no opportunity for proof, the scriptures are written with the same exact regard to truth; and consequently, both from this circumstance and from the positive declarations of scripture, may we not conclude that the author is a being of strict veracity and perfect moral goodness?

From the historical part of scripture, and from its predictions as to this world and the world to come, we may, without taking the divine veracity for granted, argue the perfect moral character of their author, in this manner: Suppose the scripture a mere drama; this drama consists of a great variety of supposed facts, characters and scenes. But all these, taken together, most directly and powerfully tend to the encouragement of virtue and moral good, without anything, on the whole, of an opposite tendency. What is to be inferred from this concerning the author? Doubtless that he is a strong friend to virtue and moral good. In this manner we do, in fact, argue concerning all dramatic writers.

THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION.

It is commonly objected to this doctrine, that it implies partiality, inconsistence and insincerity in the Deity. Let us attend to these objections. First, Does the doctrine imply partiality in the Deity? This depends wholly on the meaning which we affix to the word partiality. If we mean by it, an inclina

tion to bestow, in the way of sovereign wisdom, favor on one, and not on another, doubtless God is partial, in dispensing not only spiritual and eternal favors, but those which relate to this life. God makes one rich and another poor; raises one to great honor and promotion, and leaves another in a low and obscure state; gives one every advantage for enjoyment arising from tranquillity, health, agreeable connections, etc. but not to another. If, therefore, this be partiality, there is no reason to make this objection peculiarly against the doctrine of election; it lies equally against the most common dealings of providence. And if this objection be of force to disprove the doctrine of election, it is of the same force to disprove the governing providence of God, in the common events of life. Yet all christians profess to believe this common governing providence of God. Therefore they cannot, with consistence, object partiality to the divine election of a certain number to eternal life. If, indeed, the Deity exercise his sovereignty in election, not wisely, nor so as to subserve the best purposes, there is just ground of objection; and so there is, if he do not in common providence subserve the best purposes. But this stating of the objection gives up the objection to election as such, or to the general doctrine, that God chooses some to eternal life, and leaves others to suffer eternal death; and it raises another objection against the ends or purposes which God has in view, and actually subserves by election. Therefore it is incumbent on the objector to show, that God does not, in election, design and subserve the best and most important ends or purposes.

2. Sometimes the word partiality is applied to a judge, in the exercise of his judicial capacity; and I grant that whenever a person is partial to the parties brought before him, he violates his integrity; as partiality in this case implies, that the judge is disposed to favor a person beyond what the law, which is the rule of judgment, admits. The law is the sole rule of proceeding to a judge acting in a judicial capacity; but this is not the sole rule of proceeding to a sovereign, acting as a sovereign. His chief rule of proceeding is the general good; and in promoting this, he often is not only justifiable in acting beside and above strict law, but is necessitated to do it; and whenever the general good requires, that he bestow favor on one and not on another equally deserving, or ill deserving; not only is his conduct vindicable, but it could not be vindicated, if he were to do otherwise. And election is not the act of a judge, but of a sovereign.

Secondly, It is objected, that if God choose that a certain number of mankind should repent, comply with the gospel, and be saved; and that the rest should not comply, but should go on in

sin and perish, and yet command and call on all to comply with the gospel; this is to act an inconsistent part. His will that they should go on in sin, is inconsistent with his commands, and calls to forsake it and repent of it.

Answer. Undoubtedly, God on the whole chooses, that all who do finally go on in sin, should thus go on, otherwise he would restrain them. So it is proved by manifest fact, that God does, on the whole, or all things considered, choose, that all those who finally remain impenitent, should remain in that state. Even if what some have pleaded be true, that God cannot restrain a man from sin consistently with his free agency, still this would not disprove what is now asserted, that all things considered God chooses, that those who are finally impenitent, should remain impenitent. If he did not choose this, he would restrain them, and lead them to repentance, though their free agency should be destroyed. At the same time, it is an undoubted fact, that God forbids all sin. Therefore, if it be an inconsistence, that God should forbid all sin, and yet choose, all things considered, that some men should go on in sin, it is not an inconsistence peculiar to the system of those who hold the doctrine of election; but it equally attends the system of those who deny that doctrine; and it equally concerns the latter as the former, to provide a proper solution of the difficulty. If this be an inconsistence, it is a very common one, extending not only to the case of the reprobate and finally impenitent, but to every sinner and every sin, whether of commission or omission. The sins of the elect, whether before or after their conversion, are as peremptorily forbidden in the divine law, as the sins of the non-elect; and the fact shows, that God as really chooses, all things considered, that the elect should fall into these sins, as that the non-elect should into those of which they are guilty. Therefore, whenever any sin takes place, or whenever any person falls short of perfect holiness, God acts the same inconsistent part complained of in the objection before us; and God is no more inconsistent in reprobating a sinner, or choosing, all things considered, that he should finally go on in sin, and yet absolutely enjoin upon him a compliance with the gospel, than he does in choosing that a saint should not be perfectly holy in this life, and yet absolutely requiring of him perfect holiness. This then seems to bring down the objection very considably, and represents it in a much less formidable light. I have never heard it objected, that the Deity acts inconsistently in requiring perfect holiness, and yet choosing, all things considered, that a particular saint should not be perfectly sanctified in this life.

After all, there is no real inconsistence in the case stated in the objection. The law and precepts of God inform us what our duty is; but they do not inform us of his intentions as to the future dispensations of his providence. They inform us, that it is our duty to be perfectly holy, but do not inform us, that it is God's intention to make us perfectly holy in this life; or that all things considered, he chooses we should attain to perfection in this life. Therefore, when in the precepts of the divine law, God declares our duty to us, and in other passages of scripture he informs us, that it is his intention and choice, all things considered, that we should not be perfectly holy in this life, there is no contradiction; nor is there any inconsistence between enjoining duty upon us, and choosing, that we should not, in every instance, perform our duty. A human legislator may consistently forbid all rebellion against the state, and yet being fully assured, that if a certain man should rebel against the state, it would give occasion to the more firm establishment of the most just and free government, and to the great increase of the good of the nation, inconceivably overbalancing the evils of the rebellion, he may wish that man would rebel. A parent may strictly forbid his children to intoxicate themselves, and if he be assured, that provided his son, who has naturally a strong appetite for strong drink, and therefore is exposed to great and confirmed intemperance be once intoxicated, he will have such a loathing of strong drink in future, that he will never fall into intemperance again; he may consistently wish, that he would once intoxicate himself. With the same consistence, God may forbid sin, and yet in the foreknowledge of wise and important ends to be subserved by it, may consent and choose, that it should take place.

Thirdly; it is objected, that if God choose that some men should not comply with the gospel, and dispose things so in providence, that it infallibly follows, that they will not comply, there is no sincerity in the calls and offers of the gospel. This objection consists of two parts; 1. If God choose that some should not comply with the gospel, there is no sincerity in the calls and offers of the gospel. This wholly depends on the meaning of the word sincerity. If it mean, that when God offers salvation to any man, he really chooses, all things considered, that the man should be saved; I grant, that in this sense, there is no sincerity in the offer. But sincerity does not necessarily imply this, and is not always used in this sense; e. g. If my son should be disposed to quit his present state of residence, and remove to another, if it be ever so contrary to my judgment and wishes; yet if I find him fixed in the purpose, I may seriously offer him, that if he remove, I

will provide him a house in the proposed place. If a man have a son at college; if the son be sick of college, and utterly averse to continuing there, the father, from various proper motives may of fer him, that if he be determined to quit college, he will set him up in trade or husbandry as the father shall judge to be best; yet he wishes that his son would not persist in his purposes. If in these cases the father intends to do as he says, provided the son fulfils the condition of the offer, the offer is sincere, though, at the same time, the father may wish, that the son should not fulfil the condition, i. e. in the instances above mentioned, the father may wish his son not to quit college, or to quit his present place of residence.

2. The other part of the objection is, that if God, in providence, set such motives before sinners, as to lead them to remain impenitent; or if he any how so dispose of events, that it certainly follows, that they will remain impenitent; there is no sincerity in the offers of the gospel. But if God may sincerely offer salvation to some men, and yet choose on the whole, that they should not accept the offer; why may he not, with the same sincerity, use any influence consistent with the free agency of those men, to dissuade them from a compliance with the condition of the offer? Why may not the parent in the case above stated, let the son know, that he does not think it best he should leave his present residence, and use all proper motives to persuade him to continue where he is; and yet, if he still be determined to remove, sincerely make him the offer before mentioned.

ON MORAL AGENCY.

A writer has raised this question: Is a capacity to know our duty necessary to moral agency? On this question I am willing to give my opinion, and the reasons.

The meaning of the question I conceive to be, whether a capacity to know our duty or obligation in any case, be necessary to the existence of moral obligation in that case; and whether duty or moral obligation bind us any further than our capacity to know our duty? In this sense of the question, I answer, that a capacity to know our duty is necessary to moral agency.

Capacity is power and opportunity. Power to know our duty is the power of rational understanding, and implies that the subject is a rational being; and if capacity to know our duty be not necessary to moral agency, neither is it necessary, that we be pos