tricably mingled together.--Now take a child, and place him suddenly on the shores of the ocean, or in full sight of darkly wooded mountains of great altitude, or before the clouds, and fires, and thunders of volcanoes; and, in most cases, he will be filled with sublime emotions; his mind will swell at the perception; it will heave to and fro like the ocean itself in a tempest. His eye, his countenance, his gestures, will indicate a power of internal feeling, which the limited language he can command is unable to express. This may well be stated as a fact, because it has been frequently noticed by those who are competent to observe. Again, if a person can succeed in conveying to a child, by means of words, sublime ideas of whatever kind, similar emotions will be found to exist, although generally in a less degree than when objects are directly presented to the senses. There is an incident in the life of Sir William Jones which will serve to illustrate this statement. "In his fifth year, as he was one morning turning over the leaves of a Bible in his mother's closet, his attention was forcibly arrested by the sublime description of the angel in the tenth chapter of the Apocalypse; and the impression which his imagination received from it was never effaced. At a period of mature judgment, he considered the passage as equal in sublimity to any in the inspired writers, and far superior to any that could be produced from mere human compositions; and he was fond of retracing and mentioning the rapture which he felt when he first read it." The passage referred to is as follows. "And I saw another mighty angel come down from heaven, clothed with a cloud; and a rainbow was upon his head, and his face was as it were the sun, and his feet as pillars of fire."* 287. Influence of association on emotions of sublimity. Granting, therefore, that sublime emotions are in part original, still it is unquestionably true that a considerable share of them is to be attributed to association. As an illustration, we may refer to the effects of sounds. When * Teignmouth's Life of Sir William Jones, Am. ed., page 14. a sound suggests ideas of danger, as the report of artillery and the howling of a storm; when it calls up recollections of mighty power, as the fall of a cataract and the rumbling of an earthquake, the emotion of sublimity which we feel is greatly increased by such suggestions. Few simple sounds are thought to have more of sublimity than the report of a cannon; but how different, how much greater the strength of feeling than on other occasions, whenever we hear it coming to us from the fields of actual conflict! Many sounds, which are in themselves inconsiderable, and are not much different from many others to which we do not attach the character of sublimity, become highly sublime by association. There is frequent ly a low, feeble sound preceding the coming of a storm, which has this character. 66 Along the woods, along the moorish fens, It is sometimes the case, that people, whose sensibilities are much alive to thunder, mistake for it some common sounds, such as the noise of a carriage or the rumbling of a cart. While they are under this mistake they feel these sounds as sublime; because they associate with them all those ideas of danger and of mighty power which they customarily associate with thunder. The hoot of the owl at midnight is sublime chiefly by association; also the scream of the eagle, heard amid rocks and deserts. The latter is particularly expressive of fierce and lonely independence; and both are connected in our remembrance with some striking poetical passages. CHAPTER V. EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS. § 288. General nature of emotions of the ludicrous. In prosecuting the general subject of emotions, we are next to consider another well-known class, which are of a character somewhat peculiar, viz., emotions of the ludv crous It is difficult to give a precise definition of this feeling, although the same may be said of it as in respect to emotions of beauty, that it is a pleasant or delightful one. But the pleasure which we experience receives a peculiar modification, and one which cannot be fully conveyed in words, in consequence of our perception of some incongruity in the person or thing which is the cause of it.In this case, as in many other inquiries in mental philosophy, we are obliged to rely chiefly on our own consciousness and our knowledge of what takes place in ourselves. 289. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous. It may, however, assist us in the better understanding of them, if we say something of the occasions on which the emotions of the ludicrous are generally found to arise. And, among other things, it is exceedingly clear, that this feeling is never experienced, except when we notice something, either in thoughts, or in outward objects and actions, which is unexpected and uncommon. That is to say, whenever this emotion is felt, there is always an unexpected discovery by us of some new relations.-But then it must be observed, that the feeling in question does not necessarily exist in consequence of the discovery of such new relations merely. Something more is necessary, as may be very readily seen. Thus we are sometimes, in the physical sciences, presented with unexpected and novel combinations of the properties and qualities of bodies. But whenever we discover in those sciences relations in objects, which were not only unknown, but unsuspected, we find no emotion of ludicrousness, although we are very pleasantly surprised. Again, similes, metaphors, and other like figures of speech imply in general some new and unexpected relations of ideas. It is this trait in them which gives them their chief force. But when employed in serious compositions, they are of a character far from being ludi crous. Hence we infer, that emotions of ludicrousness do not exist on the discovery of new and unexpected relations unless there is at the same time a perception, or supposed perception, of some incongruity or unsuitableness. Such perception of unsuitableness may be expected to give to the whole emotion a new and specific character, which every one is acquainted with from his own experience, but which, as before intimated, it is difficult to express in words. § 290. Of what is understood by wit. The subject of emotions of the ludicrous is closely-connected with what is termed Wit. This last-named subject, therefore, which it is of some importance to understand, naturally proposes itself for consideration in this place. In regard to WIT, as the term is generally understood at the present time, there is ground to apprehend, that an emotion of the ludicrous is always, in a greater or less degree, experienced in every instance of it. This being the case, we are led to give this definition, viz.: WIT consists in suddenly presenting to the mind an assemblage of related ideas of such a kind as to occasion feelings of the ludicrous.-This is done in a variety of ways; and, among others, in the two following. § 291. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing objects The first method which wit employs in exciting the feelings of the ludicrous, is by debasing those things which are grand and imposing; especially those which have an appearance of greater weight, and gravity, and splendour than they are truly entitled to. Descriptions of this sort are termed burlesque. An attempt to lessen what is truly and confessedly serious and important, has, in general, an unpleasant effect, very different from that which is caused by true wit. And yet it is the case, that objects and actions truly great and sublime may sometimes be so coupled with other objects, or be represented in such new circumstances, as to excite very different feelings from what they would otherwise. In the practice of burlesque, as on all other occasions of wit, there is a sudden and uncommon assemblage of related ideas. Sometimes this assemblage is made by means of a formal comparison. Take, as an instance, the following comparison from Hudibras: "And now had Phoebus in the lap And, like a lobster boiled, the morn From black to red began to turn." We find illustrations of burlesque also in those instances where objects of real dignity and importance arr coupled with things mean and contemptible, although there is no direct and formal comparison made. As in this instance from the above-mentioned book: "For when the restless Greeks sat down So many years before Troy-town, In these instances we have related ideas. In the first, there is undoubtedly an analogy between a lobster and the morning, in the particular of its turning from dark to red. But however real it may be, it strikes every one as a singular and unexpected resemblance. In the other passage, it is not clear that Butler has done anything more than Homer, in associating the renown of the Greeks with their boots as well as their valour. But to us of the present day the connexion of ideas is hardly less uncommon and singular, not to say incongruous, than in the former. § 292. Of wit when employed in aggrandizing objects. The second method which wit employs in exciting emotions of the ludicrous, is by aggrandizing objects which are in themselves inconsiderable. This species of wit may be suitably termed mock-majestic or mock-heroic. While the former kind delights in low expressions, this is the reverse, and chooses learned words and sonorous combinations. In the following spirited passage of Pope, the writer compares dunces to gods, and Grub-street to heaven: "As Berecynthia, while her offspring vie Not with less glory mighty Dulness crowned, Shall take through Grub-street her triumphant round; Dehold a hundred sons, and each a dunce." |