to come to pass, as well as the adorable Being who made him. Not in an equal degree indeed, but still in some degree. And this fact also goes to confirm the position which we are now examining in regard to the Will.

§ 468. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own situation and conduct.

In the first place, man can foretell (we do not say with perfect certainty, nor is that at all essential to our argument) his own situation, actions, and success at some future time.

Take a very simple illustration. A man proposes to go to Boston or New-York, or to some place of common resort, no matter where it is, for the purpose of transacting business there. The execution of a design of this nature, although it is difficult to mention one more common and simple, implies the putting forth of hundreds and thousands of volitions. And it is undoubtedly the fact, that the object in view cannot be effected without this great number of volitions. And yet we perceive that this person goes forward with confidence, and that he makes his calculations without fear, and with a feeling of certainty that he will be able to execute them. He evidently proceeds upon the supposition (although he may not be fully conscious of it at the time, and may never have made it a matter of distinct reflection) that the operations of the Will exist in reference to some fixed principles; and particularly in connexion with motives in their various kinds and degrees. And looking at his proposed undertaking with care, and understanding well the claims, both of interest and duty, which are involved in it, he determines or wills in reference to the general plan before him, whatever it may be, without even doubting that all the future acts of the voluntary power will be accordant with its requisite details; and that, in due season, it will be brought to a fulfilment in all its parts. But we may assert with confidence, that this could never be done if volitions were entirely contingent; in other words, if they were

without laws. For if this last were the case, he would be just as likely to go to Providence as Boston, to Albany as New-York, or to any other place whatever, as to that where he first determined to go; and would be just as likely to do the direct opposite as that particular business which he designed to accomplish at his first setting out.—And the views, applicable in this particular case, will apply to the multiplied occurrences and duties of every week and day. And they furnish of themselves, and independently of every other argument which may be brought up, but little short of a demonstration of what we are attempting to establish.

§ 469. Foresight of men in respect to the conduct of others.

In the second place, men are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of certainty, the situation, actions, and success of others at some future time. This is so notorious as not unfrequently to have elicited the remark, that there is a certain regular order in the conduct of men, in some degree analogous to the regular course of things, which we never fail to observe in the physical world. Men may everywhere be found who would no more hesitate to predict the precise conduct of their neighbours in certain assignable circumstances, than they would to predict that trees of a certain kind would grow in a given situa

tion.

Some instances will illustrate what we mean.—A poor man goes to a rich man in the same neighbourhood, who is a confirmed and inexorable miser, for the purpose of borrowing a sum of money, but without being willing to give the customary interest of twenty per cent., and unable at the same time to furnish adequate security for the principal. Everybody knows that the miser will refuse his money at once. They expect and predict it with hardly less confidence than they predict, that a stone thrown into the air will immediately fall to the earth's surface. "A prisoner," says Mr. Hume, "who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of escape, as well

when he considers the obstinacy of his guards as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and in all his attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other." This remark of Mr. Hume is an important one, and, without question, is essentially correct. Undoubtedly it is sometimes the case, that prisoners endeavour to effect their escape by working upon the passions and will of their guards; but in a vast majority of cases they consider their chance of escape much better by means of attempts made upon the stone and iron that enclose them. They understand so well the connexion between motive and volition, between interest and duty on the one hand and the resolves of the will on the other, that, with the knowledge they possess of the characters and situation of those who are appointed to act as their guards, they consider their escape by means of any collusion with them, or any assistance from that source, as an utter impossibility.

§ 470. Other familiar instances of this foresight.

But we will now proceed to give some instances which are less remote from common observation. The reader may perhaps recollect some remarks of Dr. Paley, relative to our constant dependence on our fellow-men. "Every hour of our lives we trust and depend upon others; and it is impossible to stir a step, or, what is worse, to sit still a moment, without such trust and dependence. I am now writing at my ease, not doubting (or, rather, never distrusting, and, therefore, never thinking about it) but that the butcher will send in the joint of meat which I ordered; that his servant will bring it; that my cook will dress it; that my footman will serve it up; and that I shall find it on the table at one o'clock."*—And this is a state of things which is constantly occurring, not only in the matter of the daily food necessary for the support of our lives, but in a thousand other instances. The merchant depends upon his clerks; the manu*Moral Philosophy, book iii., chap. v.

facturer upon his numerous operatives of all classes and conditions; the farmer, who works upon a large scale, depends upon the hands of others as much as he does upon the labour of his own hands; the commander of a vessel constantly reckons upon the efficient co-operation of his sailors; the leader of armies relies upon the movements of vast bodies of men made with the utmost precision in the most trying circumstances. And it is the same in all situations, and among all classes of men, as any one, who will in the least trouble himself to exercise his recollection, will be abundantly satisfied. But if all these persons operated by mere accident, and without regard to any fixed principles; if it were a matter of entire contingency whether they should perform their engagements or not, it is easy to see that all the sources of enjoyment and even of existence would be destroyed, and the foundations of society speedily broken up.

§ 471. Argument from the regularity of voluntary contributions. In connexion with the topic now before us, viz., that we are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of certainty, the situation and actions of others at some future time, we request the attention of the reader to a class of facts which are somewhat peculiar. It cannot have escaped the notice of any one as in some degree a characteristic of modern times, that there are a multitude of benevolent associations, whose receipts depend wholly upon voluntary contributions. But, notwithstanding the fact of their income being wholly voluntary, which, if experience had not shown to the contrary, would be exceedingly discouraging, they proceed in their affairs with nearly or quite the same confidence as if they had a fixed capital to operate with. They send out missionaries, establish schools, translate the Scriptures, explore unknown and barbarous countries, plant colonies, erect churches, and engage in other important and expensive undertakings, without a cent of money except what comes from voluntary gifts. They make their calculations beforehand as to what they can accomplish in a given

time; and not unfrequently incur heavy expenses in anticipation of their receipts. Their true capital is a knowledge of the operations of the human mind under certain assignable circumstances. These circum stances they are in a good degree acquainted with; and hence are enabled to anticipate the amount of their receipts for a given time with almost as much accuracy as the merchant or farmer, who has an actual capital already in his possession to operate with. Does not this circumstance go, with others, to show that the Will has its laws?

§ 472. Of sagacity in the estimate of individual character.

We now proceed to introduce to the consideration of the reader another view of the subject of this chapter, which is exceedingly interesting in itself, besides furnishing an argument deserving of some attention. It is not uncommon to find men who exhibit a sort of quickness or sagacity in the estimate of individual character, which is sometimes described by the phrase, a knowledge of the world, or of human nature. This knowledge is undoubtedly possessed by all persons to some extent; but not unfrequently individuals are found who possess it in a remarkably high degree. In some men it may be said not only to assume the appearance, but even to approximate the nature of a prophetic anticipation or foresight; and when this is the case, it is an acquisition, as no one can be igno rant, of great power and value. The late Mr. Dumont, of Geneva, in his Recollections of Mirabeau, has noticed this ability in one of its more striking forms.-Speaking of the political life of that celebrated man, especially in its connexion with his knowledge of men and his political foresight, he goes on to say, "It was by the same instinctive penetration that Mirabeau so easily detected the feelings of the Assembly, and so often embarrassed his opponents by revealing their secret motives, and laying open that which they were most anxious to conceal. There seemed to exist no political enigma which he could not solve. He came at once to the most intimate