to any colour; for the application of the name supposes not only a capacity of receiving the sensation, but a power of comparing it with one formerly felt. At the same time, I would not be understood by these observations to deny that there are cases, in which there is a natural defect of the organ in the perception of colour. In some cases, perhaps, the sensation is not felt at all, and in others, the faintness of the sensation may be one cause of those habits of inattention from which the incapacity of conception has arisen.

A talent for lively description, at least in the case of sensible objects, depends chiefly on the degree in which the describer possesses the power of conception. We may remark, even in common conversation, a striking difference among individuals in this respect. One man, in attempting to convey a notion of any object he has seen, seems to place it before him, and to paint from actual perception; another, although not deficient in a ready elocution, finds himself in such a situation confused and embarrassed among a number of particulars imperfectly apprehended, which crowd into his mind without any just order and connexion. Nor is it merely to the accuracy of our descriptions that this power is subservient; it contributes more than anything else to render them striking and expressive to others, by guiding us to a selection of such circumstances as are most prominent and characteristical, insomuch that I think it may reasonably be doubted if a person would not write a happier description of an object from the conception than from the actual perception of it. It has been often remarked, that the perfection of description does not consist in a minute specification of circumstances, but in a judicious selection of them, and that the best rule for making the selection, is to attend to the particulars that make the deepest impression on our own minds. When the object is actually before us, it is extremely difficult to compare the impressions which different circumstances produce, and the very thought of writing a description would prevent the impressions which would otherwise take place. When wo afterwards conceive the object, the representation of it we form to ourselves, however lively, is merely an

outline, and is made up of those circumstances which really struck us most at the moment, while others of less importance are obliterated. The impression, indeed; which a circumstance makes on the mind, will vary considerably with the degree of a person's taste, but I am inclined to think that a man of lively conceptions who paints from these, while his mind is yet warm. from the original scene, can hardly fail to succeed in descriptive composition.

The facts and observations which I have now mentioned, are applicable to conception as distinguished from imagination. The two powers, however, are very nearly allied, and are frequently so blended, that it is difficult to say to which of the two some particular operations of the mind are to be referred. There are also many general facts which hold equally with respect to both. The observations which follow, if they are well founded, are of this number, and might have been introduced with equal propriety under either article. I mention them here, as I shall have occasion to refer to them in the course of the following work, in treating of some subjects which will naturally occur to our examination before we have another opportunity of considering this part of our constitution.

It is a common, I believe I may say a universal doctrine among logicians, that conception (or imagination, which is often used as synonymous with it) is attended with no belief of the existence of its object. "Perception," says Dr. Reid, "is attended with a belief of the present existence of its object, memory with a belief of its past existence, but imagination is attended with no belief at all, and was therefore called by the schoolmen, apprehensio simplex."

It is with great diffidence that I presume to call in question a principle which has been so generally received, yet there are several circumstances which lead me to doubt of it. If it were a specifical distinction between perception and imagination, that the former is always attended with belief, and the latter with none; then the more lively our imagination were of any object, and the more completely that object occupied the attention, the less would we be apt to believe its existence; for it is reasonable

to think, that when any of our powers is employed separately from the rest, and there is nothing to withdraw the attention from it, the laws which regulate its operation will be most obvious to our observation, and will be most completely discriminated from those which are characteristical of the other powers of the mind. So very different, however, is the fact, that it is matter of common remark, that when imagination is very lively, we are apt to ascribe to its objects a real existence, as in the case of dreaming or of madness; and we may add, in the case of those who, in spite of their own general belief of the absurdity of the vulgar stories of apparitions, dare not trust themselves alone with their own imaginations in the dark. That imagination is in these instances attended with belief, we have all the evidence that the nature of the thing admits of; for we feel and act in the same manner as we should do if we believed that the objects of our attention were real; which is the only proof that metaphysicians produce, or can produce, of the belief which accompanies perception.

In these cases, the fact that I wish to establish is so striking, that it has never been called in question; but in most cases, the impression which the objects of imagination make on the mind is so momentary, and is so immediately corrected by the surrounding objects of perception, that it has not time to influence our conduct. Hence we are apt to conclude, on a superficial view, that imagination is attended with no belief; and the conclusion is surely just in most cases, if by belief we mean a permanent conviction which influences our conduct. But if the word be used in the strict logical sense, I am inclined to think, after the most careful attention to what I experience in myself, that the exercise both of conception and imagination is always accompanied with a belief that their objects exist.1

1 As the foregoing reasoning, though satisfactory to myself, has not appeared equally so to some of my friends, I should wish the reader to consider the remarks which I now offer, as amounting rather to a query than to a decided opinion.

May I take the liberty of adding, that one of the arguments which I have stated in opposition to the common dectrine concerning imagination, appears to me to be authorized, in some measure, by the following reasoning of Dr. Reid on a different subject? In con

When a painter conceives the face and figure of an absent friend, in order to draw his picture, he believes for the moment that his friend is before him. The belief, indeed, is only momentary; for it is extremely difficult, in our waking hours, to keep up a steady and undivided attention to any object we conceive or imagine; and as soon as the conception or the imagination is over, the belief which attended it is at an end. We find that we can recall and dismiss the objects of these powers at pleasure; and therefore we learn to consider them as creations of the mind, which have no separate and independent existence.1

sidering those sudden bursts of passion which lead us to wreak our vengeance upon inanimate objects, he endeavours to shew that we have, in such cases, a momentary belief that the object is alive. "I confess," says he, "it seems to be impossible that there should be resentment against a thing which, at that very moment, is considered as inanimate, and consequently incapable either of intending hurt or of being punished. There must therefore, I conceive, be some momentary notion or conception that the object of our resentment is capable of punishment."

In another passage the same author remarks, that " men may be governed, in their practice, by a belief which, in speculation, they reject.”

"I knew a man (says he) who was as much convinced as any man of the folly of the popular belief of apparitions in the dark; yet he could not sleep in a room alone, nor go alone into a room in the dark. Can it be said, that his fear did not imply a belief of danger? This is impossible. Yet his philosophy convinced him, that he was in no more danger in the dark when alone than with company. Here an unreasonable belief, which was merely a prejudice of the nursery, stuck so fast as to govern his conduct, in opposition to his speculative belief as a philosopher and a man of sense. There are few persons who can look

down from the battlement of a very high tower without fear, while their reason convinces them that they are in no more danger than when standing upon the ground."

These facts are easily explicable on the supposition, that whenever the objects of imagination engross the attention wholly, (which they may do in opposition to any speculative opinion with respect to their non-existence,) they produce a temporary belief of their reality. Indeed, in the last passage Dr. Reid seems to admit this to be the case; for to say that a man who has a dread of apparitions, believes himself to be in danger when left alone in the dark, is to say, in other words, that he believes (for the time) that the objects of his imagination are real.

1 [It was with some satisfaction I observed, twenty years after the first publication of this volume, the following sentences in one of the numbers of an excellent literary journal, not commonly over-partial to my opinions. Strong conception is, perhaps, in every case attended with a temporary belief of the reality of its objects. . . . The feeling, we believe, is often very momentary ; and it is this which has misled those who have doubted of its existence."— See the Edinburgh Review of Baron Grimm's Literary Correspondence, in the Number for July, 1813.]

The compatibility of such a speculative disbelief, as I have here supposed, of the existence of an object, with a contrary momentary belief, may perhaps be more readily admitted, if the following experiment be considered with attention.

Suppose a lighted candle to be so placed before a concave mirror, that the image of the flame may be seen between the mirror and the eye of the observer. In this case, a person who is acquainted with the principles of optics, or who has seen the experiment made before, has so strong a speculative conviction of the non-existence of the object in that place where he sees its image, that he would not hesitate to put his finger to the apparent flame, without any apprehension of injury.

Suppose, however, that in such a case it were possible for the observer to banish completely from his thoughts all the circumstances of the experiment, and to confine his attention wholly to his perception, would he not believe the image to be a reality; and would he not expect the same consequences from touching it, as from touching a real body in a state of inflammation? If these questions be answered in the affirmative, it will follow, that the effect of the perception, while it engages the attention completely to itself, is to produce belief; and that the speculative disbelief, according to which our conduct in ordinary cases is regulated, is the result of a recollection of the various circumstances with which the experiment is accompanied.

If, in such a case as I have now supposed, the appearance exhibited to us is of such a nature as to threaten us with any immediate danger, the effect is the same as if we were to banish from our thoughts the circumstances of the experiment, and to limit our attention solely to what we perceive; for here the belief, which is the first effect of the perception, alarms our fears and influences our conduct before reflection has time to operate. In a very ingenious optical deception which was lately exhibited in this city, the image of a flower was presented to the spectator; and when he was about to lay hold of it with his hand, a stroke was aimed at him by the image of a dagger. If a person who has seen this experiment is asked, in