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THE TRANSVAAL OUTLOOK.

I.

THE MILITARY SITUATION.

The thing of most absorbing public interest now before the civilized world is the war between Great Britain and the two South African Republics.

Its especial importance to the American people is to be found in the value to the British nation of American sympathy. That sympathy, down to the present time, has been largely on the side of our kinsmen beyond the sea. It has been assumed, with or without reason, that we had, during what has been termed the Spanish War, a manifestation of sympathy on their part, which went virtually to the extent of active intervention and support. It has also been generally assumed, that, although in the present contest the purely technical right of the situation on legal grounds is with the Boers, yet nevertheless, upon the whole situation, the British nation is entitled to the sympathies of the civilized world; that the present contest is really one between progress and stagnation; is a question of the spread of the realm of liberty and order; is, in fact, a struggle between democracy and oligarchic class rule. It has been assumed, in effect, that the Boers are resisting the march of civilization.

Public opinion seems, however, on these questions, to be gradually verging towards a condition of, at least, doubt. It is not now so generally assumed, as it was a short time ago, that the Boers are an obstacle to progress. It is evident, that we are beginning to examine the facts. The indications are, that the tide of sympathy is turning away from our nearest kinsmen.

However this may be, large numbers of persons are of the belief that, whichever of the contending parties may hold the meritorious side of the contest, yet there can be no question as to its outcome. It is generally assumed, that victory is sure finally to rest with the British, and after no very long period

of time. Consequently, it is also assumed, that it is more in the interests of mankind that the result should be reached quickly; and that the war should come to a speedy termination, by a great British triumph, which is generally believed to be a practical certainty.

It is, therefore, of prime importance to give careful attention to the military situation. If the facts of that situation should warrant the conclusion, either that the British will not succeed at all in the conquest of the South African Republics, or that success will be attained only at the end of a long and costly war, the situation would be essentially changed. If the war must in any event entail upon the British people an enormous expenditure of money and life, it will behoove them seriously to consider, whether they can, with safety to themselves, and with safety to their empire, afford to prolong the existing contest; whether it is not imperatively demanded, by their own interests, and the interests of the whole civilized world, that the war with the South African Republics should be brought to an immediate termination, even if that termination should result in the abandonment of the contest by the British Government.

The military situation, from this point of view, becomes one of principal interest. At all times the operations of war have an absorbing interest. At this particular time, however, the interest which they excite is exceptional; and arises from the fact, that the prospect either of a British failure, or of a British success which would come only at the end of a very long period of hostilities, will have the deepest significance.

In the Army and Navy Gazette, in the issue of October 14, 1899, there appeared an editorial entitled "War at Last." That paper is edited by the Honorable William Howard Russell, correspondent of the London Times during the Crimean War, and during the earlier portion of our own Civil War. The editorial in question amounted to a warm and hearty congratulation, to Mr. Chamberlain, on the fact, that his foreign policy had at last attained the object for which he had so strenuously labored, a war with the Transvaal Republic. It would seem natural, and even probable, that any person who had had, even to a slight extent, a personal observation of actual military operations would never have had the hardihood to emit a publica

tion of the nature of the one just mentioned. However, Dr. Russell was guilty of that indiscretion. Its nature and extent will appear more fully upon the reading of his language.

"WAR AT LAST.

“Mr. Reitz, as Secretary of State of the Transvaal Government, has signed the declaration of war, which is to be effective if the Queen's forces are not withdrawn from the frontier and if the reinforcements now on their way are allowed to land, but he is only the instrument of Mr. Kruger's will. It is not in our line to interfere in the process, but it seems to us that the severance of the knot ought not to have been effected at this moment, yet it cannot be regarded by us with dissatisfaction as an untoward event from the political point of view. In fact, if we could read the 'inwards' of Mr. Chamberlain we think there would be found in characters of flame inscribed under his orchid, Heaven be praised! Kruger has declared War? From the Pretoria point of view the declaration may have been necessary. From the standpoint of the soldier, the politician, or the statesman, it must be regarded as a grievous blunder. It was too late. If the forces of the two Republics could have been set in motion six weeks or a month ago, there could have been an infinity of mischief to Natal and to the Cape Colony for them to inflict and revel in— an immense encouragement to the Boer Afrikanders—a great blow to the loyal colonists--and much possible obstruction to the concentration of the troops destined in case of war to invade the Republics. We were not ready and we were not strong. If there was no threatening movement or concentration of ours on the frontiers to justify the demands of the Republics there was ample evidence that the British Government was preparing a great army to operate if necessary against them.

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It is not too much to say, that the declaration of war by the Republics must have caused the utmost satisfaction to the millions of people who have supported the Colonial Secretary in the energetic policy he has pursued in dealing with the Transvaal Government, and we hope sincerely that the results of the success of our arms in the field will be productive of the benefits which are expected from the overthrow of the Boer Republics, confer honor on our leaders in the council and the field and give peace and prosperity to South Africa.”

To us, with our later acquired knowledge from actual events, it seems almost impossible to realize anything more humorous than the preceding utterances, of one who presumably has kept in touch for the last forty years with military operations and current military literature. It is well, however, that we bear in mind the existence of the frank avowal contained in the foregoing paper, which may be deemed almost official, to the

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effect that the British troops at the time of the publication of that editorial were near the boundaries of the Transvaal, "destined in case of war to invade the Republics." It is also interesting to observe the implied affirmation, that, although the British people six weeks or a month prior to the time of the Transvaal declaration "were not ready, and were not strong," nevertheless at the time of the publication, to wit, on the 14th day of October, 1899, the British people were ready," and were strong." It is equally interesting to note the point made in the next succeeding sentence: "From the standpoint of the soldier, the politician or the statesman, it must be regarded as a grievous blunder. It was too late." Dr. Russell's meaning is that it was the action of the Transvaal which was "too late." The implication is, that, for the purposes of the British Government, the declaration of war by the Transvaal Republic came in the very nick of time. Let us note also the further implication, when Dr. Russell says: "If the forces of the two Republics could have been set in motion six weeks or a month ago, there could have been an infinity of mischief to Natal and to the Cape Colony for them to inflict and revel in—an immense encouragement to the Boer Afrikanders-a great blow to the loyal colonists, and much possible obstruction to the concentration of the troops destined in case of war to invade the Republics.

In view of the fact, now apparent, that the South African Republic was in the highest state of preparation for the breaking out of hostilities, that this preparation had extended over a period of more than four years, and so far as now appears, had provided for almost every possible contingency, it becomes really ludicrous, to consider the state of absolute absence of counter preparation, at every material point, on the part of the British Government, which, as we now know, was forcing a war, virtually at the point of the bayonet, upon a people whom they thought to be much weaker than themselves, whom they thought to coerce by a mere demonstration of superior force, and who, as Mr. Chamberlain fondly imagined, would submit to any extortionate demands that might be conceived, rather than enter upon the prosecution of actual hostilities.

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