General Cox states in his history, at page 83:

"Foreign officers visiting the army often expressed their amazement at seeing the troops of the line doing the incidental work, and without engineering assistance, what was earlier done by a corps of sappers under the direction of a scientific staff."

The ease, even at that time, of destroying railroad tracks is made evident by a despatch of General Sherman to General Rousseau of July 7, 1864:

"When you reach the road, do your work well. Burn the ties in piles; heat the iron in the middle, and, when red hot, let the men pull the ends so as to give a twist to the rails. If simply bent, the rails may be used, but if they are twisted or wrenched, they cannot be used again."

The speed with which the work of reconstruction was carried on in Sherman's army, where lines of railway had been destroyed, will appear by the following quotations from original documents. On the 10th of July, 1864, in his despatch from Roswell of that date, General G. M. Dodge advised Sherman as follows:

'My troops are arriving and crossing. I have been here three hours and in company with General Newton have thoroughly examined the country. I will occupy and fortify to-night a tete-de pont half a mile from the river and extending on and down one mile, covering the entire ford, bridge and roads leading to them; the ford is for a mile or two in extent very rough and impracticable except for troops. To bridge the stream I will have to build over 650 feet in length. I shall use the old piers and trestle. We have a strong picket out three miles covering the forks of road leading to McAfee's Bridge, 8 miles up the river and covering the forks of road that leads to Atlanta. It is too far out to take the command until the river is easily passed by the artillery and trains."

That despatch was sent by telegraph at 1.30 P. M. July 10th. At 8 P. M. General Dodge telegraphs as follows:

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Major General Sherman : Forces are all over river. Start at work fortifying. Have got batteries over also. Have built a floating bridge. Road bridge is a pretty big job but will work away on it. No forces in my front that we can hear of. G. M. Dodge, Major General."

General Sherman answers in part as follows:

"I have been out all day. Am just back. Have received General Garrard's and your despatches. I design that General McPherson's whole army shall go to that flank, and you are to prepare the way. General

Newton will stay with you till you feel all safe, when he will rejoin his corps, now in support of General Schofield eight miles below you. General Garrard will picket the roads, and I want you to fortify a tete-de-pont and bridge. * * * Keep me well advised by courier to Marietta and telegraph."

Some light is thrown upon the general nature of the situation by General Sherman's telegram to General Garrard of the same date, July 10:

"Signal officer reports railroad and wagon road bridges burning. If this be so, of course the enemy is on the other side. The truth will be ascertained at once; in the meantime be watchful."

Further light as to the nature of the construction work then on hand appears from General Dodge's despatch of July 11, to General McPherson, in which he says:

"I will work hard on the bridge here and finish it as soon as possible. It is a big job, as you will perceive from the length. Everything was burned up here that we could see-houses, mills, lumber and all.”

On the same date, July 11, General Sherman says in his despatch to General Dodge:

"I know that you have a big job, but that is nothing new for you. * * I know the bridge at Roswell is important, and you may destroy all Georgia to make it good and strong."

On the same date, July 11, General Dodge telegraphs to General Sherman :

"All quiet this morning. I had no fear about being able to build the bridge, but thought you might expect it finished sooner than possible. As it was twice as long as I expected to find it. and twice as long as the river is wide, down at Santown, I have over 1,000 men at work on it day and night. It is already well under way. I have planking for floors now on the ground, and not one minute shall be lost in pushing it forward. Every man that can work on it shall be kept at it."

General Sherman answers on the same day:

"I have no doubt you will have the bridge done in time."

On July 12, General Dodge telegraphs:

"I pushed my mounted infantry down five miles to-day to the crossing of Nancy's Creek, where we found the enemy's cavalry in force, and they followed us back one-half mile. The bridge at this place is a ferry, and will be a good place to put in a pontoon. We will if you should desire.

The river is about 300 feet wide. I will have the bridge at this place finished to-morrow. All the bents are up to-night, stringers on and planked one-third the distance across. When done it will take safely over any number of troops and their trains. All quiet here. River slowly rising."

The next day, July 13, at 9 P. M., General Dodge telegraphs: "Bridge is built; is double track."

No further notice was taken of the matter in despatches on either side. It was a mere everyday affair.

But has any other army than ours ever done such work? Yet that is the kind of work now before the British Army. Have they ever given any indication that they are equal to it?

rear.

Even laymen are well aware, that the matter of supply, in other words, of transportation, is the vital and essential one, in the conduct of active military operations by any large body of troops. Troops must be well fed, if they are to do good work. Ammunition, in all cases, must come from the In order to have military operations efficient, the supply of food, clothing, ammunition, and all other things needed by troops in the field, must have complete regularity, and great speed. It is obvious, then, that the matter of supplying the wants of a large army depends on having the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments very perfect, in their personnel and organization. In fact, the mere term "organization," if used with accuracy, implies the existence of a sufficient number of men, especially of officers, who have the requisite ability, and experience, for the discharge of their duties, together with such an arrangement and adjustment of those men and officers as will make them a harmonious working force. Assuming, then, that it is possible for a government to command the services of a sufficient number of experienced men and officers in the quartermaster's and commissary departments, even after that, in order to convert those men and officers into a smoothly working body, requires time. If, however, there is no such previous supply of men of training and experience, if the men for the quartermaster and commissary service must not only be found, but must be educated, it is quite plain that the time required for organizing those most essential departments of an effective army must be considerable.

THE EXTREME EASE OF DESTRUCTION OF RAILWAY COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN FIELD OF OPERATIONS.

Especially so,

The field of operations is most remarkable. when considered with reference to the military purposes of the South African Republic, and the most admirable choice of military positions which has been made by the commanding officers of their forces. This choice was, of course, to a great extent dictated by the positions and movements of the British troops. Taken in connection with those positions and movements, it is difficult to see how anything better could have been devised on the part of General Joubert.

The South African Republic itself has within its limits a large area of open country, fitted at some times of the year to the movements of cavalry and the easy handling of considerable bodies of troops. The movements of a modern army would, in some respects, be easier within the limits of the Republic itself than at almost any other point in South Africa which can be come the field of active operations.

It was, therefore, wise, for that reason, if for no other, that General Joubert decided to conduct his operations on the enemy's territory, that is, in Natal and the Cape Colony, rather than to allow the British troops to have the comparatively open country of the Republic itself, whereon to move and operate. Another reason for his course is doubtless to be found, that the British authorities had accumulated a considerable supply of military stores at Ladysmith, which it would be desirable for the Burghers to capture and apply to their own use. Another point to be noticed is, that, for the sake of protecting Mr. Rhodes' diamond mines, a considerable British force had been posted at Kimberley, and another at Mafeking. It was, of course, desirable that these two bodies of troops should be

isolated, and that their capture at no distant date should be made as certain as possible. Moreover, the nature of the country south of the Transvaal frontier, its mountains, its streams, its lack of available wagon roads, furnished other conclusi reasons, why the Republics should make their first line of d fense south of their own frontiers. For these reasons, taken i combination, General Joubert evidently decided to make h objective points in the first instance the three bodies of Britis troops at Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking. The move ments of Lord Methuen and General French also made i DIAGR necessary for him to concentrate forces of Burghers to th mileage and alt on Main Line south of Kimberley; between Kimberley and Orange River, tURBAN AND CH meet Lord Methuen; and in and around Naauwport, Steyns Horizontal 8 mile burg, and Molteno, to meet the advance of General French.

Bearing these facts in mind, we have next to note that the country around Ladysmith, and along the line of the railroad to the north as far as Charlestown, is very mountainous, and that the road, for all practical purposes, runs through one continuous defile. Such a position is the strongest known for the purposes of the defense. At the same time, the roads available for the passage of any considerable number of troops are very few, and almost follow the line of the railway itself. From Ladysmith to Dundee, a station on the railroad forty-seven miles northeast of Ladysmith, there is a road which follows substantially the line of the railroad, crossing it at one point or another, and having a length not very different from that of the railroad line itself. From Dundee to Newcastle the wagon road continues to follow the line of the railroad, crossing it at different points. Between Ladysmith and Newcastle a wagon road goes with comparative directness, forming roughly the diameter of a semicircle, the semicircle itself being the railway track. On the other hand, to the east and right of the railway is another road making a considerable circuit from Ladysmith to Dundee. A very few small and inferior wagon roads go between these main roads just mentioned at a few points; but they hardly deserve consideration from the military standpoint. From Newcastle to Charlestown there is for all practical purposes only one wagon road, which follows irregularly the line of the railroad for a distance, and then strikes off to the northeast to Wakkerstroom.

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