were forwarded for 390 miles by rail to Naghamadi. There an English officer was in charge of a gang of men who took them off the railway and put them into boats, which sailed 145 miles to Assouan. There another English officer was in charge, who had the stores loaded on to a train, which took them four miles around the cataract to Shellal, where they were again put into boats. This work was entirely done by convicts. At Shellal some of the boats were lashed alongside the stern-wheel steamers thus loaded, and towed 240 miles to Halfa, while the remaining boats sailed. From Halfa the railway carried them 68 miles to Ambigol Wells, where they were loaded on camels and carried about 35 miles to Ferket."

From this statement it is seen that the maintenance of communications had difficulties, even under the comparatively easy conditions which actually existed. Those difficulties, however, once surmounted, ceased to be serious, unless there was active interference with the communications by an active enemy. Throughout the whole of Kitchener's advance, and this is the fundamental fact underlying the nature and difficulty of his entire operations, there was virtually no interference with the work of construction on the part of any hostile force. From the statements already quoted it is quite apparent that the entire situation would have been essentially changed, if the work of construction had been interrupted by any active alert force of men supplied with modern explosives, and at the same time possessing knowledge as to their use.

No doubt Sir Herbert Kitchener showed remarkable capacity and energy, and fertility of resource in surmounting the difficulties of transportation and supply which were the preliminaries to his final engagement with the Dervishes. He evidently has the capacity for organization, untiring energy, combined with great skill in the selection and handling of men. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the work which he prosecuted to its successful termination was not seriously interfered with at any point of time. No one knows better than he, how essentially different would be the conditions in case of opposition on the part of an alert and skillful foe.

Taking the conditions as they existed, however, with the river at his command, which made the problem of construction and supply comparatively simple and easy, Kitchener required from March, 1896, to June, 1898, for the construction of 550 miles

of railway to Atbara. At that point a flotilla of steamers and sailing boats was collected; the Nile was nearly high, and nothing more was wanted to complete the preparation for the advance on Khartum. The line of communications from Cairo

at this point was as follows: From Cairo by rail to Assouan, 535 miles (36 hours); from Assouan to Halfa, 220 miles, in barges towed by steamers, (4 days); from Halfa to Adbara, by rail, 385 miles (36 hours); that is to say, from Cairo to Adbara, seven days, sometimes eight or even nine.

At the end of the British advance came the battle of Omdurman, in which the Dervishes were so obliging as to attempt a direct front attack on a well-drilled and well-disciplined force of men supplied with all the modern weapons of precision. The description of the situation on the front, given by the officer from whom quotations have already been made, is as follows:

"The fire discipline of the British throughout the action was a treat to watch; exactly as on parade they changed from volley firing to independent, and back to volley firing, as might be ordered, coolly and without any hurry. Their shooting, too, was admirable; they handily knocked them over at 900 yards, and within 300 nothing could live. The Egyptian troops were as steady, but they cannot shoot so well. Although the Dervishes were falling in hundreds, their advance seemed at first to be unchecked; numbers dropped, but others were rushing on and coming nearer and nearer, till it almost seemed as if they would reach us; but within 300 yards of the British, and within 200 of the Egyptian Brigade, scarcely a Dervish could live, and few camels escaped till within 50 yards or so, and then one or two daring horsemen calmly stood within 100 yards imploring their men to come on. * * * Now and again the enemy would try to rush forward from their cover, always with the same result."

The officer continues:

"So rapid was our fire that above the sound of the explosions could be heard the swish of our bullets going through the air, just like the swish of water; it literally swept away the line of charging Dervishes. One or two horsemen got within 100 yards, and it really looked as if they would reach us."

The real nature of the battle of Omdurman is easily seen from the statements already quoted, and from the following figures of the losses on either side. The entire casualties of the British side were:

"About 500, of which about 150 were killed."

"Of the Dervishes quite 15,000 were killed. Officers sent out next day counted 11,800 dead on the battle field; to these must be added those killed by the bombardment in Omdurman and in the Desert during pursuit. Several thousand more were wounded and taken prisoners." * "The smallness of our loss was due to the facts that the Dervish fire was extraordinarily inaccurate, and that the openness of the ground enabled us to keep the greater part of the enemy at a distance. Had the Dervish stayed in entrenchment and fought there as pluckily as they fought in the open, or had they made a night attack, the casualty list would have been very different."

In the operations in South Africa thus far, it will be noted the conditions have been reversed. The selection of position has been assigned to the Burghers. The making of a front attack on a force admirably posted, fully equipped with modern arms and ammunition, has been allotted to the British. The result has been what might have been expected-heavy loss to the attacking forces, with comparatively slight loss on the part of the defense.

But the point of principal interest in the story of the Soudan expedition is to be found in the fundamental problem already so many times mentioned that of transportation and supply. That is the problem which the British forces in South Africa have now to encounter. But the conditions will be essentially different from any that they have heretofore encountered. The reason is the difference in the character of the country, and the character of the enemy.

THE REASON FOR THIS ABSENCE OF PREPARATION ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

The reason for this most astounding absence of preparation on the part of the British Army is to be found in the ignorance, and the incompetence, of the British War Office.

But that statement only takes us back one step.

What is the reason for the ignorance, and the incompetence, of the British War Office?

It is to It is an

The answer to that question is somewhat complex. be found in a number of facts, taken in combination. old story. At its foundation lies the principal fact of the incapacity of hereditary kings, and hereditary classes, to do the severe steady hard work, which is absolutely essential to the proper handling of affairs of state in general, and of army affairs in particular. To that fact is to be added the further one, that efficient army administration is an absolute impossibility, when it rests in the hands of an ever-shifting group of ignorant laymen, selected at uncertain times, for uncertain periods, from a legislature, whose time and labor must always be given in the main to the manipulation of a majority in the House of ComThese last are the conditions which exist under what is termed "parliamentary government."

mons.

Let us consider some of the historical facts, as to the conduct of the British War Office, under the royal and parliamentary regimes. For it will be found that they have both been characterized by the same essential features.

From that most interesting book "England at War," by W. H. Davenport Adams, the following quotation is made:

"The military history of the reign of Charles I begins as that of James I closed, with a record of a failure.

"Charles and his confederate, the Duke of Buckingham, had committed themselves to a war with Spain; but Parliament showed little inclination to support it, and refused to grant the necessary subsidies until at all events the just grievances of the people had been redressed. After much wrangling it was induced to grant a subsidy, and Charles in a burst of sudden anger dissolved it, declaring that he knew how to govern without its assistance. He proceeded to make good his words. Orders were issued to the Lord Lieutenants of the country to raise by way of loan the money of which he stood in need. They were to apply to the wealthy for contributions and to transmit to the Court the names of those who refused or delayed compliance. The response, nevertheless, was reluctant and limited; but Charles and Buckingham pushed forward their military preparations, and a fleet of 90 sailed earrying 5,000 seamen and 10,000 soldiers, which under Sir Edward Cecil (created Viscount Wimbledon) as General and Admiral, and the Earl of Essex as Vice-Admiral-neither of whom had had any experience of naval warfare,—was despatched to intercept the Spanish treasure ships and to attack Cadiz.

Ill-officered, ill-manned, ill-provisioned, the expedition brought disgrace upon the English flag. The men raised by press,' half starved,

badly paid and without training, had no stomach for fighting, and disregarded the orders of their officers; while the officers, though not wanting in bravery, were absolutely devoid of military knowledge."

The conditions do not at present seem to have been essentially changed.

Mr. Adams continues:

"On the 22d of October the fleet arrived in Cadiz Bay. A counsel of war was held at which some gallant spirits proposed an immediate attack on the great Spanish seaport; but the majority were frightened at so daring a venture, and resolved to take the fort of Putnal, which guarded the entrance to the main Harbor where lay the Spanish merchantmen, twelve tall ships and fifteen or sixteen galleys. The fort quickly surrendered, but meanwhile the garrison of Cadiz had been largely reinforced. Wimbledon, however, landed his troops and began his march upon Cadiz; but in his haste no thought had been given to the army's supplies, and his men tramping forward under a hot sun began to grow faint with thirst and hunger. Wimbledon good naturedly ordered a cask of wine to be brought out of a neighboring house for their refreshment. Even a little drop would have been too much for their empty stomachs, but the houses about were stored with sweet wines for the use of the West India fleets. In a few minutes casks were broached in every direction, and well nigh the whole army was reduced to a state of raving drunkenness.' Next morning as the men could not be kept longer without food, Wimbledon marched them back to Ponto, and on the 27th re-embarked."

Mr. Adams gives a short narration of the next adventure of the King and his Minister. It is as follows:

"Untaught by this deplorable failure, King and Minister next turned their inglorious arms against France. They found a pretext in the persecution which the Hugenots were undergoing." (The close resemblance between that feature of the situation and the pretense now put forward for a wholly unprovoked active aggression on the Burghers will appear more clearly from the facts hereafter given.) Whose last stronghold Rochelle, was besieged by the Royal Army, and its downfall would consummate the ruin of the French. It was hoped that a religious war would be popular with the Nation, and a general loan was therefore ordered. But the anticipated enthusiasm did not show itself; in every county Charles' Commissioners met with refusals. The refusants were harshly dealt with; but the refusals continued. * * At length a fleet and an army were got together, and Buckingham took the chief command. His instructions were to maintain the English dominion of the seas and relieve Rochelle. With 100 ships, carrying 6,000 foot and 100 horse he sailed from Stokes Bay on the 27th of June. No enemy appeared, and Buckingham could not ful