"Qu. 14,591. You were not informed that the failure on the part of the commissariat to feed the troops was occasioned by the failure of other departments in their duties? A. Not officially.

'Qu. 14,592. When did you first receive information of the breakup of the road from Balaklava to the camp? A. I do not remember the exact date; it was one of those facts that unfortunately grow upon one as events follow one another; and it was seen by its consequences that things were not carried to the front.

'Qu. 14,593. Can you tell whether any information was given you of the probable failure of the road before the failure took place? A. Certainly not.

.

Qu. 14,594. So that you remained altogether in the dark as to the chance of the non-supply of the troops arising from the failure of the road? A. Yes.

Qu. 14,595. So soon as you heard of the failure of the road you took steps, did you not, to have a road made of some sort or another? A. No, I cannot say that I did; because it was impossible for me to be able to judge whether the thing was practicable then. There are things which it is absolutely necessary to leave to officers on the spot.”

Lord Roberts also gives us in his autobiographical "FortyOne Years in India," an account of the difficulties which have always surrounded this problem of transportation in India. The first incident, which he narrates, concerns the expedition under Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, to Abyssinia. The expeditionary force numbered a little less than 14,000 men.*

Profiting by the experience of the Crimean War the Government was determined that the mobility of the force should not be hampered by want of food and clothing. Stores of all descriptions were dispatched in unstinted quantities from England, and three of the steamers in which they were conveyed were fitted up as hospital ships. But food, clothing and stores however liberally supplied would not take the army to Magdala without transport.

"The question as to the most suitable organization for the Land Transport Corps occupied a good deal of Sir Robert Napier's attention while the expedition was being fitted out, and caused a considerable amount of correspondence between him and the Bombay Government. The Commissary-General wished to keep the corps under his own orders, and objected to its being given an entirely military organization. Sir Robert Napier preferred to establish the corps on an independent basis but was at

* The numbers actually despatched from India were 13,548, of whom 3,786 were Europeans. In addition a company of Royal Engineers was sent from England.

first overruled by the Bombay Government. While acting in accordance with their orders, the Commander-in-Chief wrote: 'I believe that the success of systems depends more on the men who work them than on the systems themselves; but I cannot accept without protest a decision to throw such a body of men as the drivers of our transport animals will be (if we get them) on an expedition in a foreign country without a very complete organization to secure order and discipline.' Eventually Sir Robert got his own way, but much valuable time had been lost, and the corps was organized on too small a scale; * the officers and non-commissioned officers were not sent to Zula in sufficient time to take charge of the transport animals as they arrived.

'A compact, properly supervised train of 2,600 mules, with serviceable, well-fitting pack-saddles, was sent from the Punjab, and from Bombay came 1,400 mules and ponies, and 5,600 bullocks, but, these numbers proving altogether inadequate to the needs of the expedition, they were supplemented by animals purchased in Persia, Egypt, and on the shores of the Mediterranean. The men to look after them were supplied from the same sources, but their number, even if they had been efficient, was insufficient, and they were a most unruly and unmanageable lot. They demanded double the pay for which they had enlisted, and struck work in a body because their demand was not at once complied with. They refused to take charge of the five mules each man was hired to look after, and when that number was reduced to three, they insisted that one should be used as a mount for the driver. But the worst part of the whole organization, or, rather, want of organization, was that there had been no attempt to fit the animals with pack-saddles, some of which were sent from England, some from India, and had to be adjusted to the mules after they had been landed in Abyssinia, where there was not an establishment to make the necessary alterations. The consequence was that the wretched animals became cruelly galled, and in a few weeks a large percentage were unfit for work, and had to be sent to the sick depot.

"Other results of having no properly arranged transport train and no supervision or discipline, were that mules were lost or stolen, starved for want of food, or famished from want of water. The condition of the unfortunate animals was such that, though they had been but a few weeks in the country, when they were required to proceed to Senafe, only sixtyseven miles, a very small proportion were able to accomplish the march ; hundreds died on the way, and their carcases, quickly decomposing in the hot sun, became a fruitful source of dangerous disease to the force."

It was the same old story-the thing which almost invariably happens, the inevitable breakdown in transportation, that regu

* At first it was thought that 10,000 mules with a Coolie corps 3,000 strong would suffice, but before the expedition was over it was found necessary to purchase 18,000 mules, 1,500 ponies, 1,800 donkeys, 12,000 camels and 8,400 bullocks.

larly takes place with a British foreign expeditionary force. It arises always from the same cause the ignorance and the incompetence of the British War Office.

We come next to Lord Roberts' account of the conditions when he took command of the Kuram field force:

"It was a proud, albeit a most anxious, moment for me when I assumed command of the Kuram Field Force; though a local Major-General, I was only a Major in my regiment, and, save for a short experience on one occasion in Lushai, I had never had an opportunity of commanding troops in the field. Earnestly longing for success, I was intensely interested in ascertaining the qualities of those who were to aid me in achieving it. To this end, I lost no time in taking stock of the several officers and corps who were to be associated with me, some of whom were personally known to me, while others I had never met before; and in endeavoring to satisfy myself as to their qualifications and fitness for their several posts, I could not help feeling that they must be equally anxious as to my capability for command, and that the inspection must be of nearly as great moment to them as to me.

"The results of a very close investigation were tolerably satisfactory, but there were weak points in my armour which gave me grave cause for anxiety.

"I came to the conclusion that the force was not numerically strong for the heavy difficult task before it—in the first instance, the occupation of the Kuram valley and the expulsion of all Afghan garrisons south of the Shutargardan Pass, and in the second, as opportunity might offer, the pushing my reconnaissances into the Khost valley, and, if military considerations wouldadmit, the dislodging the Amir's administration from that tract of country, so as to prevent the Kobul government drawing supplies from it. Finally, I was directed to explore the roads leading to the unknown region beyond Khost.

"The Shutargarden was not less than 180 miles from Khost, the garrison of which station would, on my departure, be reduced to a minimum, and Rawal Pindi, the nearest place from which aid could be procured, was 130 miles still further off, separated from Khost by an execrable road and the swiftly flowing river Indus, crossed by a precarious bridge of boats. It had to be taken into account also that the various Afridi tribes were watching their opportunity, and at the first favourable moment, in common with the tribesmen nearer Kuram, they might be expected to take advantage of our weakness and attack our convoys and the small posts which had necessarily to be established along our line of communication.

"The attitude of the Mahometan sepoys, of whom there were large numbers in four out of my six Native Infantry regiments, was also a cause of considerable anxiety, for I was aware that they were not altogether happy at the prospect of taking part in a war against their co

religionist, the Ruler of Afghanistan, and that the mullas were already urging them to desert our cause.

Furthermore, I discovered that my only British Infantry regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Foot, was sickly to a degree, and therefore in an unserviceable condition. It was largely composed of quite young, unacclimatized soldiers. peculiarly susceptible to fever, that terrible scourge which fills the hospitals of our Punjab stations in the autumn of each year. I rode out to meet the battalion on its way into Kohat, and was horrified to see the long line of doolies and ambulance-carts by which it was accompanied.

"The inefficient state of the transport added to my anxieties. Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in former campaigns from the same cause, the Government had neglected to take any steps for the organization of a proper transport service while we were at peace; consequently, when everything should have been ready for a start, confusion reigned supreme in this all-important department. Large numbers of camels, mules and bullocks arrived daily, picked up at exorbitant prices from anyone who would supply them; but most of these animals were quite unfit to enter upon the hard work of a campaign, and with a totally inexperienced and quite insufficient staff of officers to supervise them, it was evident that the majority must succumb at an early date.”

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION BY THE BRITISH ARMY, UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS.

Here, of course, all that can be done is to state conditions. Results, especially the results of a serious and bitterly contested war, are beyond the knowledge of finite human beings. The conditions, however, that we have thus far ascertained to exist in South Africa to-day are these:

I. The impossibility of handling the problem of transportation and supply, for any large army in South Africa, by any means other than by railway.

II. The extreme ease of the processes of destruction, with the extreme difficulty of the processes of construction, of railway communications, in the present South African field of operations.

III. The absence of preparation, on the part of the British Army, for the handling of the present problem of transportation and supply.

IV. The fact, that the reason for that absence of preparation is to be found in the immense and dense ignorance, and incompetence, of the British War Office.

In the face of these existing conditions, we come to a further question: What are the probabilities, as nearly as we can forecast them, that the British War Office will be able to solve the transportation and supply problem, within any reasonable period of time? In case of a prolonged war, they will have many other problems to solve. But what are the probabilities, as to their being able to solve this one, that is, to solve it within any reasonable time? For it is hardly to be deemed within the reasonable probabilities, that the entire civilised world, especially these United States, will quietly sit by and wait for the British Government to pursue to the end a war of extermination, even on the assumption, that the British people would be willing to carry the cost of such a war, in men and money. The British people, be it noted, have not as yet uttered their judgment on the existing situation. Assuming, however, that they are willing to pay the cost, in men and money, of a war of extermination against the South African Republics, what are the probabilities, even then, of success to the British Government?

Bearing in mind, at all times, the almost infinite margin, that must be allowed for the contingencies of war, let us look at some of the remaining features of the situation which have not as yet been fully considered.

The first of these features is to be found in the extreme mobility of the forces of the Burghers, in contrast with the extreme immobility of the British. The contrast is overwhelming. On the one hand, the Burghers, most of them mounted men, operating in a friendly population, accustomed to long journeys on short rations, having a thorough knowledge of the country, can move in small bodies, in all directions, almost at will. Especially, they can move with the greatest ease in the small detachments, which will be needed for a war on railway communications.