Even under the conditions existing to-day, as to the contest between the British Empire on the one hand, and that apparently feeble power, the South African Republic, on the other, it is a fact that the sympathies of the civilized world will be largely influenced by their opinion of the probable outcome. It is a sad condition of affairs, but it is nevertheless the truth, that a large portion of mankind is inclined in almost any contest to take the side of the strongest, or of the party which they deem to be the strongest, without very much reference to the justice or injustice of the position of either side. In view, however, of this fact of human nature, it becomes desirable to consider, with as much accuracy as conditions permit, the prominent features of the present military situation in the war between the Transvaal and Great Britain, and to figure, as far as is now possible, the probabilities as to the result of this present most unfortunate contest.

Especially will this inquiry be found interesting, if the result should be a conclusion that Great Britain is in this present contest somewhat overmatched, and that it behooves her, with a view simply to the preservation of the Empire within its present limits, to put an end to this most unnatural and unjustifiable struggle at the earliest possible moment.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

It has for a long time been agreed by competent military authorities, that, under ordinary circumstances, the stronger position, in case of invasion, is that of the defense. It need not be said, that, under ordinary circumstances, the strongest defense is some form of attack. Bearing that in mind, however, it is quite well conceded among military authorities, that in case of an invasion the stronger position, generally, is that of the defense.

In this respect there has been no essential change in the principles or rules of military science during the last one hundred years. Yet the advantages on the side of the defense have been steadily increasing. They were sufficiently strong at the time

of the battle of Bunker Hill, when a handful of minute men, without drill or discipline, posted behind earthworks which had been hastily thrown up in a few hours, were able to defeat, for the time being, and so long as their ammunition lasted, the flower of the British Army. Even in the days of the oldfashioned smooth-bore musket, under ordinary conditions, the defense was much stronger than the attack. Starting only from that point of time, the chief improvement has been in the range and accuracy of weapons. The change has been one of degree, and not of kind. The principles applicable to prob lems of that nature have not been changed in their essence. No conditions have been introduced which are new in kind.

To come down a little later, to the days of our own Civil War, and comparing the conditions existing at that point of time with those existing at the present day, the changes between the relative positions of the attack and the defense are hardly worth mentioning. In the days of the Civil War the Springfield rifle was a weapon of fairly long range and accuracy. The increase in range and accuracy since that time is one which need have very slight consideration in any study of the principles of military science applicable to the questions of attack and defense. There has been, as said before, merely an increase in range and accuracy. The increase in rapidity of discharge is one to which military critics are inclined to attach great weight. But even this is less important than is commonly supposed. The fire of the old Springfield rifle was fast enough-for practical purposes in most cases. Under very exceptional circumstances, it was, no doubt, desirable that the firing should have greater rapidity. But the fire was rapid enough, to serve fairly well the needs of the men who used it. With it they accomplished very satisfactory results, that is, from a professional standpoint. From one point of view, the increased rapidity of fire is almost a disadvantage, in that it tends to cause an enormous waste of ammunition, with no adequate corresponding benefit. Smokeless powder is, no doubt, a thing of the greatest importance. But many of the advantages resulting from smokeless powder can often be had from the mere withholding of fire, until an enemy gets within easy range, as the Boers always do, as is always done by steady and skillful troops. So that these points of

rapidity of fire, and the use of smokeless powder, are of less importance than is some times supposed. They introduce no substantial change in the principles of the military art.

The fundamental features which enter into the consideration of any military problem are to-day what they always have been. They are as follows:

1. SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION.

Strictly speaking, these should come under one heading, that of supply. They concern ordnance, ammunition, clothing, medical and surgical appliances, commissary stores; together with what may be called the furniture of transportation, that is, wagons, animals and railways.

2. THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS.

Under this head come, of course, all questions relating to the actual area of the war, the mere surface distances, all matters of topography, such as streams and mountains; and all features bearing on transportation, such as railways, wagonroads, paths, and places where railways, wagon-roads, and paths are possible of construction.

3. THE CONTENDING FORCES.

Under this head are comprised, of course, all facts as to the quality of the individual units of an army; its organization; its discipline; its drill; but above all things, the quality of its commanders.

From this short statement, it is apparent that, for the solution of any military problem, the facts required are somewhat complex, and need very careful study. The omission of any one of them may cause a fatal defect in the conclusion to be deduced. The opinion of the most competent expert, therefore, on any existing military situation, may, in the event, be set at naught by the disclosure of essential features, which were at the time unknown to him, and which it was impossible for him to foresee.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM

OF TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLY, FOR ANY
LARGE ARMY IN SOUTH AFRICA, EXCEPT BY
LINES OF RAILWAY.

This Transvaal situation is one of the most interesting that has ever fallen under the observation of any military critic. Its controlling features are strongly marked; and although it is, of course, an impossibility for any man to have a thorough knowledge of them all, yet many points in the situation are so clearly beyond dispute, and have such a large military value, that a careful conjecture, at least, can be made as to the probabilities of the situation, and as to the possible result. It need hardly be said, that the entire complexion of a battle, or a war, is liable at any moment to be changed by the events of the hour, or the minute. A thunder storm, or the untimely illness of a commanding general, witness Waterloo, may easily turn possible victory into a crushing defeat. Contingencies of that sort must always be implied, in any endeavor to discuss any military problem. Bearing carefully in mind, however, the existence at all times of such contingencies, it will be interesting to note some of the features of the military situation in the present war.

In the first place let us consider the question of supply and transportation.

Here it is evident, that on one side, that of the Burghers, the question of supply has received the most careful attention, and the provision made therefor has been remarkably complete. We now know, that for several years past the Transvaal authorities have been importing large quantities of the munitions of war, of all kinds, comprising everything that could be needed in the prosecution of an aggressive or defensive campaign.

On the other hand, it is equally evident that the absence of