recommendation was carefully pigeonholed and not permitted to reach the public.

Mr. Daniels in this criticism apparently ignores the statement of the General Board of the Navy (which he himself quotes in his letter to Representative Butler) that in this very year 1907 the navy of the United States advanced from third to second place, judged by number of ships actually built, and in quoting from Mr. Roosevelt's Message of 1907 he neglects to add any quotation from the special Message which Mr. Roosevelt sent to Congress on April 14, 1908, a Message which casts no little light upon the conditions confronting the country at that time in comparison with the situation to-day. Presi

dent Roosevelt then said :

Prior to the recent Hague Conference it had been my hope that an agreement could be reached between the different nations to limit the increase of naval armaments, and especially to limit the size of war-ships. Under these circumstances I felt that the construction of one battle-ship a year would keep our navy up to its then positive and relative strength. But actual experience showed not merely that it was impossible to obtain such an agreement for the limitation of armaments among the various leading Powers, but that there was no likelihood whatever of obtaining it in the future within any reasonable time. Coincidentally with this discovery occurred a radical change in the building of battle-ships among the great military nations-a change in accordance with which most modern battle-ships have been or are being constructed of a size and armament which doubles, or more properly trebles, their effectiveness. Every other great naval nation has, or is building, a number of ships of this kind; we have provided for but two, and therefore the balance of power is now inclining against us. Under these conditions, to provide for but one or two battle-ships a year is to provide that this Nation, instead of advancing, shall go backward in naval rank and relative power among the great nations. . . . I earnestly advise that the Congress now provide four battle-ships of the most advanced type. I cannot too emphatically say that this is a measure of peace and not of war.

In 1916 President Wilson in his efforts to build up the navy of the United States has had the stupendous advantage of an aroused public opinion made vocal chiefly through private initiative and endeavor. In 1908 no such condition existed. Mr. Roosevelt's recommendations, as one man who was then a Member of Congress has recently testified, "excited only languid interest among the

people of the country-excepting where they aroused sharp condemnation."

WHEN IS A BOS'N

NOT A BOS'N?

From this consideration of naval history it may be a relief to turn to an incident in a much lighter vein which has recently served to enliven naval circles.

During the progress of the Naval Bill through the Senate Senator Tillman introduced an amendment of very innocent appearance which fortunately does not appear in the measure which President Wilson has just signed because it did not survive the journey through the legislative mill. In brief, this amendment provided by deft circumlocution" that no officer shall be addressed in orders or official communications by any other title than that of his actual rank."

To the civilian this sounds fair enough, but the civilian is generally unfamiliar with the distinction between the words rank and grade. An officer may have the grade of commander, of assistant civil engineer, of chaplain or naval constructor. The ques tion of rank is entirely a different thing. Rank means that officers in one grade have the same "official standing" as officers in another grade. Some of the titles of the various grades belong to the line and some to the staff of the navy. It is quite as absurd to call a man "captain " or " commander" merely because he "ranks " as captain or commander, as it would be to insist that a railway president be called "senator" because he might have the same social standing in a community as a member of the upper house.

That the absurdities of this proposal would have been extended to warrant and petty officers of the navy is made evident in a letter which a naval pharmacist recently addressed to the editor of the "Navy." He writes in expectation of the passage of the amendment :

In the last "Navy Register" I appear as a "Pharmacist." In the next I will be known to the world as a "Boatswain." . . .

I have already begun to address my Hospital Apprentice as Coxswain, which is the title of his rank. Instead of telling him to get the bandages and lint ready for an operation by the Surgeon, I sing out:

or

"Ay! Ay! Boatswain! Ready! O ready!" The old-fashioned Boatswain in our mess tells me that we haven't got the terms just right; that seamen never heard of a "Boatswain a "Coxswain," but that the proper pronunciation is "Bos'n " and " Coxs'n;" but it all sounds Lautical to us of the Medical Corps, and, any. way, we address each other by the titles of our ranks. . . .

There has been considerable discussion in our mess as to the way the new law will work. Personally, I have always desired the title of "Boatswain," and now that, practically, it is legally mine, I have proposed that all of us Fharmacists, Machinists, and Carpenters-now staff Boatswains-should perform some of the more public functions of the line Boatswains. I don't mean that we should do any of the work with the anchors and chains and such, but we might "pipe the side" when the Secretary of the Navy or the Chairman of the Senate Naval Committee comes aboard. Instead of the piping of one lone line Boatswain there might be ten or a dozen of us staff Boatswains all piping the side together. It would make an appropriate reception for the civil functionaries, who always require the limit in military honors, and for Staff Admirals, even if the line Admirals would not stand for it. . . .

Some of my messmates do not take kindly to the changes required by the new legislation. The old and philosophic Chief Machinist said: "Well, I s'pose I'll have to stand for it, to be called 'Ensign;' though I ain't one an' don't look like one an' don't want to be one." . .

The Gunner and the Carpenter growled because they did not wish to be addressed as "Boatswain.”

The one line Boatswain in our mess, who is a taciturn and muscular person and an overbearing line officer besides, said: "As all you guys are going to be called what you ain't, I'm goin' to be called 'Judge' in this mess, an' don't you fergit it."

According to the "Navy," the blame for this proposal cannot be put upon any legislator from the interior country. It was the work of a very small group of men in the navy itself who have coveted the military titles which belong to the officers of the line.

This tempest in a teapot is a good illustration of the pettiness which sometimes creeps into the discussion of even large public issues.

JAPAN AND RUSSIA

It is not remarkable that on a subject of which so little is known as the form and intended effect of the recent movement towards a Russian-Japanese Entente there should be a great deal of variety of opinion. This variety of opinion seems to follow no hard

and fast racial or national lines. Distinguished publicists of Japan, Russia, England, and the United States can be found who will aver in confidence that the RussianJapanese Treaty is aimed directly at England. And just as distinguished men from all these countries can be found who loudly protest against this view of the convention.

This disagreement among experts is the less remarkable when one considers that the final text of the treaty has not yet been made public. But the text of the tentative agreement as published in the semi-official Japanese newspapers on July 8 is as follows:

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Imperial Government of Russia, having resolved by united efforts to maintain permanent peace in the Far East, have agreed to the following:

ARTICLE I

Japan will not be a party to any agreement or political combination directed against Russia. Russia will not be a party to any agreement or political combination directed against Japan.

ARTICLE II

In case the territorial rights or special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties recognized by the other contracting party are menaced, Japan and Russia will confer on the measures to be taken in view of the support or co-operation necessary for the protection and the defense of these rights and interests.

In faith thereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Convention and thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Petrograd, the third day of the seventh month of the fifth year of Taisho, corresponding to the 3d of July (20th June), 1916.

MOTONO. SAZONOFF.

We are informed by responsible Japanese in this country that the following arrangement has been tentatively agreed upon, the final details to be adjusted within a few weeks, when the Japanese delegates, Prince Kanin and Dr. Adachi, arrive at Petrograd:

First, a grant to Japan of the control of the Eastern Chinese Railway between Changchun and the Sungari River. Japan had asked for the railway concession from Changchun to Harbin. The Sungari River is just about half-way between those two points. The tentative price which Japan is to pay for this concession is $7,000,000. Second, Japan is to have a share with Russia in the navigation rights of the Sungari River. Third, freedom of trade, residence, and travel in

Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria to be enjoyed equally by Japanese and Russians. Fourth, Japan to furnish munitions to Russia when to do so does not interfere with her own plans for defense.

All these concessions and the considerations to be paid for each are to be threshed out in Petrograd when the Japanese delegates arrive there.

MOTIVES FOR THE TREATY

So much for the little that we know of the actual arrangement between the two great Powers who were at war with each other only eleven years ago. When it comes to considering the conditions which have made such a treaty desirable for both Russia and Japan, we are on more solid ground. The desire of both Japan and Russia to keep the influence of any third Power at a minimum in China has been a principal factor in the arrangement of the treaty. Russia's desire to be protected by a strong ally in her rear while she is facing embattled Germany has been matched by Japan's desire to have the support of Russia for Japanese policies toward China. But, while military motives have been strong in bringing the two nations together, the entente has been mainly brought about by commercial factors. Japan's trade with Russia has increased enormously since the beginning of the war. As Mr. Alexander Znamiecki, Russian expert of the National City Bank of New York, has recently said to a representative of The Outlook, "Two very important factors in the RussianJapanese rapprochement are Russia's need of foreign markets for her foodstuffs, raw materials, and half-manufactures, and again the value for the growing Japanese industries of the enormous neighboring Russian market." In this connection an article in the influential Russian newspaper "Novoe Vremya" recently said: "Japanese merchants, adapting their merchandise to the demands of the Russian traders, are studying the Russian household in every detail. A few days ago, for instance, some boots appeared on sale, of Russian shape, for the use of the populace, accompanied by a bottle of shoe polish."

As to the prediction that the RussoJapanese alliance means the end of the AngloJapanese alliance it can only be said that there is no proof that Russia and Japan are at present aiming at such a consummation.

On the other hand, ample reason for the agreement between Russia and Japan is found in the desire of both to be secure from the Far Eastern ambitions of any third Power and in the manifest political and economic advantage which the alliance offers to both Powers in present world conditions.

THE CHURCH IN MEXICO

Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which was the scene of the conferences which ended the Russo-Japanese War, has been assured of additional historical fame through its selection as the meeting-place for the members of the joint American-Mexican Commission appointed to discuss the difficulties between the two countries. By the time this issue of The Outlook reaches our readers the date of the first formal conference will probably have been decided at a preliminary meeting in New York City. Portraits of the six commissioners appear elsewhere in this issue.

The greatest interest in the conferences lies in the possibility that they will be marked by a discussion of more fundamental questions than the withdrawal of our soldiers from Mexico and the patrolling of the border. Certainly it is to be hoped that the deeper questions of the economic and agrarian reconstruction of Mexico will be discussed, as well as the future status of the schools and churches in that country.

The religious question in Mexico has been a source of friction throughout the history of that country, and a careful and sane discussion of it by the Commission is to be desired. That this will be accomplished is the more probable in view of the fact that the leading Mexican member of the Commission, Señor Luis Cabrera, has had a powerful hand in the formation of Carranza's policy towards the Church. Señor Cabrera has recently published a pamphlet on this subject which is a highly interesting contribution. In defending the Constitutionalists from charges of injustice towards the Church Señor Cabrera says: "We Constitutionalists are Catholics, the Villistas are Catholics, the Zapatistas are Catholics. Ninety-nine per cent of the Mexi can population is Catholic, and therefore the Constitutionalist party could not in the present struggle attempt to deprive the Catholics, who form the totality of the Mexican people, of their right to profess their religion or of their right to take part in political questions." He goes on to say that the aim of the Con