attempt to over-awe the legiflature, and influence by clamour, or by the appearance of numbers, their decifions,-what is it, but an attempt, an impotent attempt I hope it will prove, to deftroy their authority, and put the actual exercife of fovereignty in the hands of the populace?

From the time that the Jacobine Club at Paris, in concert with other affociations of the fame fort in other parts of the kingdom, and in conjunction with the mob of Paris, took upon them to decide upon the general business of the nation, and to prescribe measures to what was called the legislative affembly,-every thing has rushed into confusion in France. The prefent convention, ever fince it met, has been no more than a tool in the hands of the Jacobin Club and the Paris rabble: and the world has been witnefs to the dreadful confequences. Similar caufes will always produce fimflar effects. If ever our clubs and conventions shall become fo powerful as to be able to dictate to parliament, or if parliament fhall become fo weak, in point of intellects, as to fuffer them to attempt it with impunity, that day will put an end to all regular government and Tubordination among us. Our happy constitution, the work of ages, and the admiration of mankind, will go to wreck in one hour: and the fame scene will be acted here, that has been in rehearsal, for eighteen months paft, on the other fide of the channel.

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3. This reform could have no tendency to reduce our taxes, nor to prevent our entering into new wars, by which our burdens may be increafed. With regard to prefent taxes, I fhall fpeak more fully hereafter. With regard to war; if the nation were threatened by a foreign enemy, if any neighbouring nation fhould cramp our trade, or otherwife injure or infult us, I am perfuaded the people of Britain have more fpirit than to fuffer it without defending themfelves. Suppofing the body of the people averfe to war, it is plain from what has been faid, that this reform gives no additional fecurity, that Parliament will be of the fame mind. But es very one who knows any thing of our history must have perceived, that the people have always been as much inclined to war as either Court or Parliament. The wars, in the days of King William and Queen Anne, were undoubtedly popular. Nor was there ever any measure of administration, fince the revolution, more unpopular than the peace in the latter end of Queen Anne's reign, Yet, by thefe wars the foundation of the fyftem of national debt was laid. The war which terminated in the year 1763, was undoubtedly the war of the people and, though the peace of that year was the most honourable and advantageous to Britain, of any that ever the enter ed into, it may well be remembered how much it was blamed by the people. Indeed, if all the people in Bri tain could be made, inftead of electors, members of Parliament, there is much reafon to think that we would be engaged in more wars than ever.

4. Experience fhews that we who have no vote in choofing members of Parliament, fuffer no inconvenience on that account: and we may be well affured, that if we could obtain a vote, it would be of no folid advantage to us. The town of Jedburgh has a vote, and the

town

town of Hawick has none. Are the people of Hawick fubject to any oppreffive laws, from which they of Jedburgh are free? Are trade, manufactures, or any useful improvement in a more flourishing state there than here ? Or what have we to complain of, that does not ly equally heavy upon them? On the contrary, is it not manifeft, through all Britain, that thofe towns that have no concern in elections, have risen to opulence, and are rifing apace, while many of our Parliament burroughs are lolling in indolence, frutting in pride, and finking into infignificance? Sheffield, Birmingham, Manches ter, Paisley, permit me to add, Hawick, and Galashiels are inftances of the former: inftances of the latter are too common to require fpecification. Perhaps other caufes may concur, in producing this effect; but I am perfuaded it is not a little furthered by the exemption of thofe towns from the hurry and bustle, the riot and diffipation, the corruption, perjury, and chicanery, that too frequently attend elections. Should we in this town, for inftance, ever obtain a vote in elections, it could not better our condition. We might indeed have

an

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opportunity of fpending a week or two, once in feven years, in drunkennefs and debauchery, without much expence to ourselves. We might have canvaffing and cajoling, and fwearing and bribing among us, as our neighbours have, on every fuch occafion. Perhaps we might, now and then, have the pleasure of feeing our magiftrates degraded, our privileges fufpend ed, and commiffioners appointed by a court of justice, to manage our public funds for feven years; as a punifhment for our corruption. Our people, who now quietly mind their own bufinefs, and, by honeft induftry make a decent provifion for their families, would acquire habits of idlenefs and vice. Our trade and manufactures

nufactures would decline apace; and we would foon be * remarkable for nothing, but poverty and pride. Unless we really wish for fuch a change, we had much better content ourselves as we are.

5.

"Befides all this, we in Scotland fhould confider, that if any advantage is to be derived from a reform in parliament, we could not enjoy an equal frare of it. We are limited by the Union, to forty-five members in the House of Commons. Suppofing, as has been propofed, that one hundred more members were added to that house, our proportion of thefe would be no more than eight. And what advantage would we gain, by having eight more nofes to fhew? Perhaps we may be for breaking the Union, in hope of fending more representatives to Parliament; as, now a days, little regard is paid to treaties entered into by our forefathers; but how do we know that our English brethren will be equally willing to break it in this article? Perhaps we only want an increase of the number of electors, not of representatives; but what would that do for us? Is there any reafon to think, that they who should be chofen by the many, would be more worthy of the trust, or would difcharge it better, than they who have heretofore been chofen by the few? In Scotland, a much smaller proportion of the people are electors than in England: but has there been, fince the Union, a fmaller proportion of honeft men, and friends to their country, among the Scots, than among the English members?

Upon the whole, the principal thing to be attended to, in the matter of reprefentation is, that the members of the House of Commons, being chofen from among the people, fhould never have an intereft oppofite to theirs; nor have it in their power to aggrandize or enrich themselves at their expence. While they can make no laws, that fall not affect themselves, as much as

their fellow fubjects, it is comparatively of very small importance, who their electors be. They will always be attentive to the interefts of the people, and will op pofe every oppreflive law, for their own fakes.

6. Supposing the propofed reform to be both proper and neceffary, this is furely no time for driving fuch a measure. The nation is engaged in war; the legislature, as well as adminiftration must have their attention engaged to that, and other matters of prefent neceffity. And they cannot have fuch leifure to deliberate upon the bufinefs of reform, as the importance of the affair would require. Things may appear eafy in theory, which are found very difficult, when we come to reduce them to practice. And, as no plan of reform has yet been propofed, by our Friends of the People, it is impoffible for them to foresee what difficulties may occur, either in the formation of the plan, or in the execution of it more efpecially as few of them have ever had an opportunity to know much about affairs of state. How many, for inftance, are to be added, to the number of our reprefentatives? Who are to have a right to be electors? What number of people are to fend a member to Parliament; or how fhall the numbers, at each election be afcertained; as they are always fluctuating? What proportion of, the reprefentation fhall be attached to the foil; what to property, and what to population? And how are thefe differences to be afcertained? How fhall the proportion between England and Scotland be fixed to mutual fatisfaction? What compensation shall' be given to our rotten burroughs, for the lofs of their privileges, or to our freeholders in Scotland, for divid ing their rights with the multitude? Above all, how fhall the balance of our conftitution be preferved; and what fecurity fhall we have, that by loofing a few pins, we shall not bring down the whole fabric about our

ears?