have lost their all for his cause. Even this has not been denied.

It is singular, and indeed, a thing, under all its circumstances, inconceivable, that every thing should by the emperour be abandoned to the king of Prussia. That monarch was considered as principal. In the nature of things, as well as in his position with regard to the war, he was only an ally; and a new ally, with crossing interests in many particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. At best, and supposing him to act with the greatest fidelity, the emperour, and the empire, to him must be but secondary objects. Countries out of Germany, must affect him in a still more remote manner. France, other than from the fear of its doctrinal principles, can to him be no object at all. Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swiss, are left to their fate. The king of Prussia has no direct and immediate concern with France; consequentially, to be, sure, a great deal; but the emperour touches France directly in many parts: he is a near neighbour to Sardinia, by his Milanese territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, possessed by his uncle, is between Mentz, Treves, and the king of Prussia's territories on the lower Rhine. The emperour is the natural guardian of Italy and Germany; the natural balance against the ambition of France, whether republican or monarchical. His ministers and his generals, therefore, ought to have had their full share in every material consultation, which I suspect they had not. If he has no minister capable of plans of policy, which comprehend the superintendency of a war, or no general with the least of a political head, things have been as they must be. However, in all the parts of this strange proceeding, there must be a secret.

It is probably known to ministers. I do not mean to penetrate into it. My speculations on this head must only be conjectural. If the king of Prussia, under the pretext, or on the reality of some information relative to ill practice on the part of the court of Vienna, takes advantage of his being admitted into the heart of the emperour's dominions in the character of an ally, afterwards to join the common enemy, and to enable France to seize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble the empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, any thing more alarming for this country, separately, and as a part of the general system. After all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of politics, for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidental circumstances-But I never knew accidents to decide

the whole of any great business; and I never knew temper to act, but that some system of politics, agreeable to its peculiar spirit, was blended with it, strengthened it, and got strength from it. Therefore the politics can hardly be put out of the question.

Great mistakes have been committed; at least I hope so. If there have been none, the case in future is desperate. I have endeavoured to point out some of those which have occurred to me, and most of them very early.

Whatever may be the cause of the present state of things, on a full and mature view and comparison of the historical matter, of the transactions that have passed before our eyes, and of the future prospect, I think I am authorized to form an opinion without the least hesitation.

That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor ever can be, the least rational hope of making an impression on France by any continental powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the soul, of the whole confederacy against it.

This, so far as it is anticipation of future, is grounded on the whole tenour of former history-In speculation it is to be accounted for on two plain principles.

First, that Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other powers, as having less of crossing interest, or perplexed discussion with any of them.

Secondly, Because France cannot have to deal with any of these continental sovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime power, greatly superiour to them all put together; a force which is only to be kept in check by England.

England, except during the eccentric aberration of Charles the Second, has always considered it as her duty and interest, to take her place in such a confederacy. He chief disputes must ever be with France, and if England shews herself indifferent and unconcerned when these powers are combined against the enterprises of France, she is to look with certainty for the same indifference on the part of these powers, when she may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to disconnect this kingdom from the system of Europe, in which, if she ought not rashly to meddle she ought never wholly to withdraw herself from it.

If then England is put in motion, whether by a consideration of the general safety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new system on the

Netherlands, it must embrace in its project the whole as much as possible, and the part it takes ought to be as much as possible a leading and presiding part.

I therefore beg leave to suggest, First, That a minister should forthwith be sent to Spain, to encourage that court to persevere in the measures they have adopted against France; to make a close alliance and guarantee of possessions, as against France, with that power, and whilst the formality of the treaty is pending, to assure them of our protection, postponing any lesser disputes to another occasion.

Secondly, To assure the court of Vienna, of our desire to enter into our ancient connections with her, and to support her effectually in the war which France has declared against her.

Thirdly, To animate the Swiss, and the king of Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on the principles of the grand alliance. Fourthly, To put an end to our disputes with Russia, and mutually to forget the past. I believe if she is satisfied of this oblivion, she will return to her old sentiments, with regard to this court, and will take a more forward part in this business than any other power. Fifthly, If what has happened to the king of Prussia is only in consequence of a sort of panic or of levity, and an indisposition to persevere long in one design-the support and concurrence of Russia will tend to steady him, and to give him resolution. If he be ill disposed, with that power on his back, and without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will not be easily led to derange the plan.

Sixthly, To use the joint influence of our court, and of our then allied powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as she can by sea, and to make some addition by land.

Seventhly, To acknowledge the king of France's next brother, (assisted by such a council and such representatives of the kingdom of France, as shall be thought proper,) regent of France, and to send that prince a small supply of money, arms, clothing and artillery.

Eighthly, To give force to these negotiations, an instant naval armament ought to be adopted; one squadron for the Mediterranean; another for the Channel. The season is convenient, most of our trade being, as I take it, at home.

After speaking of a plan formed upon the ancient policy and practice of Great Britain and of Europe; to which this is exactly conformable in every respect, with no deviation whatsoever, and which is, I conceive, much

more strongly called for by the present circumstances than by any former, I must take notice of another which I fear, but cannot persuade myself to believe, is in agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very same view of things which is here stated, namely, the danger to all sovereigns, and old republics, from the prevalence of French power and influence.

It is to form a congress of all the European powers, for the purpose of a general defensive alliance, the objects of which should be,

First, The recognition of this new republic (which they well know is formed on the principles, and for the declared purpose of the destruction of all kings,) and whenever the heads of this new republic shall consent to release the royal captives, to make peace with them.

Secondly, To defend themselves with their joint forces against the open aggressions or the secret practices, intrigues and writings, which are used to propagate the French principles.

It is easy to discover from whose shop this commodity comes. It is so perfectly absurd, that if that, or any thing like it, meets with a serious entertainment in any cabinet, I should think it the effect of what is called a judicial blindness, the certain forerunner of the destruction of all crowns and kingdoms.

An offensive alliance, in which union is preserved, by common efforts of common danger, against a common active enemy, may preserve its consistency, and may produce, for a given time, some considerable effect; though this is not easy, and for any very long period, can hardly be expected. But a defensive alliance, formed of long discordant interests, with innumerable discussions existing, having no one pointed object to which it is directed, which is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war, is so evidently impossible, is such a chimera, is so contrary to human nature, and the course of human affairs, that I am persuaded no person in his senses, except those whose country, religion and sovereign, are deposited in the French funds, could dream of it. There is not the slightest petty boundary suit, no difference between a family arrangement, no sort of misunderstanding, or cross purpose between the pride and etiquette of courts, that would not entirely disjoint this sort of alliance, and render it as futile in its effects, as it is feeble in its principle. But when we consider that the main drift of that defensive alliance must be to prevent the operation of intrigue, mischievous doctrine and evil example, in the success of unprovoked rebellion, regicide, and

systematic assassination and massacre, the absurdity of such a scheme becomes quite amentable. Open the communication with France, and the rest follows of course.

How far the interiour circumstances of this country support what is said with regard to its foreign politics, must be left to better judgments. I am sure the French faction here is infinitely strengthened by the success of the assassins on the other side of the water. This evil in the heart of Europe must be extirpated from that centre, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it, and which will spread circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little defensive precautions which can be employed against it. I do not put my name to these hints submitted to the consideration of reflecting men. It is of too little importance to suppose the name of the writer could add any weight to the state of things contained in this paper.

That state of things presses irresistibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain, with a heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think that what is done in France, is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the English constitution ought no more to stand against it than the ancient constitution of the kingdom in which the new system prevails. I thought it the duty of a man, not unconcerned for the public, and who is a faithful subject of the king, respectfully to submit this state of facts at this new step in the progress of the French arms and politics, to his majesty, to his confidential servants, and to those persons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and their reputation for wisdom, seem to me to have a large stake in the stability of the ancient order of things. Bath, November 5, 1792.

As the proposed manifesto is, I understand, to promulgate to the world the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a more serious deliberation with regard to the time of making it, the circumstances of those to whom it is addressed, and the matter it is to contain.

As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion) I have some doubts whether it is not rather unfavourable to the issuing any manifesto, with regard to the intended government of France: and for this reason, that it is, (upon the principal point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifestos of this nature are commonly made when the army of some sovereign enters into the enemy's country in great force, and under the imposing authority of that force employs nenaces toward those whom he desires to awe; and makes promises to those whom he wishes to engage in his favour.

As to a party, what has been done at

Toulon leaves no doubt, that the party for which we declare must be that which substantially declares for royalty as the basis of the government.

As to menacesces-Nothing in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any sovereign in the public estimation, and to turn his defeats into disgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence. The second manifest of the duke of Brunswick appeared therefore to the world to be extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in that manifesto had been seasonable, they were not without an object. Great crimes then apprehended, and great evils then impending, were to be prevented. At this time, every act, which early menaces might possibly have prevented, is done. Punishment and vengeance alone remain, and God forbid that they should ever be forgotten. But the punishment of enormous offenders will not be less severe, or the less exemplary when it is not threatened at a moment when we have it not in our power to execute our threats. On the other side, to

the other (that which surrendered at Valenciennes) has actually crushed the people whom oppression and despair had driven to resistance at Lyons, has massacred several thousands of them in cold blood, pillaged the whole substance of the place, and pursued their rages to very houses, condemning that noble city to desolation, in the unheard-of manner we have seen it devoted.

It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a thousand declarations, that we take the royalists of France only as an instrument of some convenience in a temporary hostility with the jacobins, but that we regard those atheistic and murderous barbarians as the bonâ fide possessors of the soil of France. It appears at least, that we consider them as a fair government de facto, if not de jure; a resist ance to which in favour of the king of France, by any man who happened to be born within that country, might equitably be considered, by other nations, as the crime of treason.

For my part, I would sooner put my hand into the fire than sign an invitation to oppressed men to fight under my standard, and then on every sinister event of war, cruelly give them up to be punished as the basest of traitors, as long as I had one of the common enemy in my hands to be put to death in order to secure those under my protection, and to vindicate the common honour of sovereigns. We hear nothing of this kind of security in favour of those whom we invite to the support of our cause. Without it, I am not a little apprehensive that the proclamation of the combined powers might (contrary to their intention no doubt) be looked upon as frauds, and cruel traps laid for their lives.

So far as to the correspondence between our declarations and our conduct: let the declaration be worded as it will, the conduct is the practical comment by which, and which alone it can be understood. This conduct, acting on the declaration, leaves a monarchy without a monarch; and without any representative or trustee for the monarch, and the monarchy. It supposes a kingdom without states and orders; a territory without proprietors; and faithful subjects, who are to be left to the fate of rebels and traitors.

The affair of the establishment of a government is a very difficult undertaking for foreign powers to act in as principals; though as auriliaries and mediators, it has been not at all unusual, and may be a measure full of policy and humanity, and true dignity.

The first thing we ought to do, supposing us not giving the law as conquerors, but acting as

friendly powers applied to for counsel and as sistance in the settlement of a distracted country, is well to consider the composition, nature, and temper of its objects, and particu larly of those who actually do, or who ought to exercise power in that state. It is material to know who they are, and how constituted, whom we considered as the people of France?

The next consideration is, through whom our arrangements are to be made, and on what principles the government we propose is to be established.

The first question on the people is this, whether we are to consider the individuals now actually in France, numerically taken and arranged into Jacobin clubs, as the body politic, constituting the nation of France? or, whether we consider the original individual proprietors of lands, expelled since the revolu tion, and the states and the bodies politic, such as the colleges of justice called parliaments, the corporations noble and not noble of baillages, and towns and cities, the bishops and the clergy, as the true constituent parts of the nation, and forming the legally organized parts of the people of France?

In this serious concern it is very necessary that we should have the most distinct ideas annexed to the terms we employ; because it is evident, that an abuse of the term people, has been the original fundamental cause of those evils, the cure of which, by war, and policy, is the present object of all the states of Europe.

If we consider the acting power in France in any legal construction of public law, as the people, the question is decided in favour of the republic one and indivisible. But we have decided for monarchy. If so, we have a king and subjects; and that king and subjects have rights and privileges which ought to be supported at home; for I do not suppose that the government of that kingdom can, or ought to be regulated, by the arbitrary mandate of a foreign confederacy.

As to the faction exercising power, to suppose that monarchy can be supported by principled regicides, religion by professed atheists, order by clubs of jacobins, property by committees of proscription, and jurisprudence by revolutionary tribunals, is to be sanguine in a degree of which I am incapable. On them I decide, for myself, that these persons are not the legal corporation of France, and that it is not with them we can (if we would) settle the government of France.

Since, then, we have decided for monarchy in that kingdom, we ought also to settle who is