REMARKS

ON THE

A

POLICY OF THE ALLIES.

S.the propofed manifefto is, I understand, to promulgate to the world the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a more ferious deliberation with regard to the time of making it, the circumftances of those to whom it is addreffed, and the matter it is to contain.

As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion) I have fome doubts whether it is not rather unfavourable to the iffuing any manifefto, with regard to theintended government of France; and for this reafon, that it is, (upon the principal point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifeftoes of this nature are commonly made when the army of fome fovereign enters into the enemy's country in great force, and under the im pofing authority of that force employs menaces towards those whom he defires to awe; and makes' promises

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promises to those whom he wishes to engage in his favour.

As to a party, what has been done at Toulon leaves no doubt, that the party for which we declare must be that which fubftantially declares for royalty as the basis of the government.

As to menaces-Nothing in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any fovereign in the publick estimation, and to turn his defeats into disgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence. The fecond manifefto of the duke of Brunswick appeared therefore to the world to be extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in that manifefto had been seasonable, they were not without an object. Great crimes then apprehended, and great evils then impending, were to be prevented. At this time, every act, which early menaces might poffibly have prevented, is done. Punishment and vengeance alone remain, and God forbid that they, fhould ever be forgotten. But the punishment of enormous offenders will not be the lefs fevere, or the lefs exemplary when it is not threatened at a moment when we have it not in our power to execute our threats. On the other fide, to pass by proceedings of fuch a nefarious nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on in France, without any fignification of refentment, would be. in effect to ratify them; and thus to become ac-. ceffaries after the fact, in all thofe enormities which

it is impoffible to repeat, or think of without horAn abfolute filence appears to me to be at this time the only fafe course.

rour.

The fecond ufual matter of manifeftoes is compofed of promises to those who co-operate with our defigns. These promises depend in a great mea-. fure, if not wholly, on the apparent power of the perfon who makes them to fulfil his engagements. A time of difafter on the part of the promiser, feems not to add much to the dignity of his perfon, or to the effect of his offers. One would hardly wish to seduce any unhappy persons to give the last provocation to a mercilefs tyranny, without very effectual means of protecting them.

The time therefore feems (as I faid) not favourable to a general manifefto, on account of the unpleasant situation of our affairs. However, I write in a changing scene, when a measure very imprudent to-day, may be very proper to-morrow. Some great victory may alter the whole ftate of the quef tion, fo far as it regards our power of fulfilling any engagement we may think fit to make.

But there is another confideration of far greater importance for all the purposes of this manifefto. The publick, and the parties concerned, will look somewhat to the difpofition of the promiser indicated by his conduct, as well as to his power of fulfilling his engagements.

Speaking of this nation as part of a general combination