FOREIGN MINISTERS. BOOK IV. CHAP. 5. § 66. The obligation does not go fo far as to suffer at all times, perpetual minifters, who are defirous of refiding with a fovereign, though they have. nothing to negociate. It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to the fentiments which nations qwe to each other, that thefe refident minifters, when there is nothing to be feared from their stay, fhould be friendly received: but if there be any folich reafon against this, what is for the good of the state ought unquestionably to be preferred; and the foreign fovereign cannot take it amifs if his minifter, who has concluded the affairs of his commiffion, and has no other affairs to negotiate, be defired to depart.* The cuftom of keeping every where minifters continually refident, is now fo ftrongly established, that the refufal of a conformity to it would, without very good reasons, give offence. Thefe reafons may arife from particular conjunctures; but there are also common reafons always fubfifting, and fuch as relate to the conftitution of a government, and the state of a nation. The republicks have often very good reafons of the latter kind, to excufe themfelves from continually fuffering foreign minifters, who Difmiffion of Mr. Chauvelin,EDIT. corrupt corrupt the citizens, in order to gain them over to their mafters, to the great prejudice of the republick, and fomenting of the parties, &c. And fhould they only diffuse among a nation, formerly plain, frugal, and virtuous, a tafte for luxury, avidity for money, and the manners of courts, these would be more than sufficient for wife and provident rulers to difmifs them. |