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the nature of counsel, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth: so may also the differences between "apt" and "inept counsellors be derived from the same. experience, being but memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and counsel but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the virtues and defects of counsel are the same with the virtues and defects intellectual: and to the person of a commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in the place of memory and mental discourse. But with this resemblance of the commonwealth to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined of great importance; which is, that a natural man receiveth his experience from the natural objects of sense, which work upon him without passion or interest of their own; whereas they that give counsel to the representative person of a commonwealth may have, and have often their particular ends and passions, that render their counsels always suspected, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good counsellor, "that his ends and interests be not inconsistent with the ends and interests of him he counselleth."

Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to pro pound his advice in such form of speech as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly as the evidence will permit. And therefore "rash and unevident inferences," such as are fetched only from examples or authority of books, and are not arguments of what is good or evil, but witnesses of fact or of opinion; "obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical speeches, tending to the stirring up of passions," (because such reasoning and such expressions are useful only to deceive, or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own,) repugnant to the office of a counsellor."

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Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great commonwealth are necessary to be known, "no man is presumed to be a good counsellor, but in such business as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also mucb meditated on, and considered." For seeing the business of a commonwealth is this, to preserve the people in peace at home, and defend them against foreign invasion, we shall find it requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the nature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without study; and of the strength, commodities, places, both of their own country, and their neighbours; as also of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to without much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel, as I have said before (chap. viii.), is judgment. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study or business, and of others to another. When for the doing of anything there be infallible rules, as in engines and edifices, the rules of geometry, all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel that has learnt or found out the rule. And when there is no such rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of business has therein the best judgment, and is the best counsellor.

Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, in a business that hath reference to another commonwealth, "it is necessary to be

acquainted with the intelligences, and letters" that come from thence, "and with all the records of treaties, and other transactions of state between them; which none can do, but such as the representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to counsel, can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better counselled by hearing them apart than in an assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart you have the advice of every man; but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with "aye," or "no," or with their hands or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of anotber, or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in an assembly are like many brands, that inflame one another, especially when they blow one another with orations, to the setting of the commonwealth on fire, under pretence of counselling it, Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine, when there is need, the truth or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent interruptions and objections; which cannot be done in an assembly, where in every difficult question a man is rather astonied and dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many called together for advice, wherein there be not some that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the politics; and give not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the applause of their motley orations, made of the divers coloured threads or shreds of authors; which is an impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret, whereof there be many occasions in public business, the counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are dangerous; and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel from a great assembly of counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able seconds at tennis-play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best that useth his own judgment only, as he that has no second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execu tion whereof is commonly, out of envy or interest, retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a wheelbarrow or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgments and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or mcre amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true that many eyes see more than one; yet it is not to be understood of many counsellors, but then

only when the final resolution is in one man.

Otherwise, because many

eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never aim but with one; and therefore no great popular commonwealth was ever kept up but either by a foreign enemy that united them, or by the reputation of some eminent man amongst them, or by the secret counsel of a few, or by the mutual fear of equal factions, and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as for very little commonwealths, be they popular or monarchical, there is no human wisdom can uphol them longer than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours.

CHAPTER XXVI.
Of Civil Laws.

By "civil laws," I understand the laws that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are members, not of this or that commonwealth in particular, but of a commonwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws belongeth to them that profess the study of the laws of their several countries; but the knowledge of civil law in general to any man. The ancient law of Rome was called their "civil law," from the word civitas, which signifies a commonwealth: and those countries which having been under the Roman empire, and governed by that law, retain still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my design being not to show what is law here and there; but what is law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the law.

And first it is manifest, that the law in general is not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for civil law, it addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is persona civitatis, the person of the commonwealth.

Which considered, I define civil law in this manner. "Civil law,' is to every subject, those rules, which the commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of, for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule."

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For every man seeth, that some laws are addressed to all the subjects in general; some to particular provinces; some to particular vocations; and some to particular men; and are therefore laws to every of those to whom the command is directed, and to none else. As also, that laws are the rules of just and unjust; nothing being reputed unjust that is not contrary to some law. Likewise, that none can make laws but the commonwealth; because our subjection is to the commonwealth only and that commands are to be signified by sufficient signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

1. The legislator in all commonwealths, is only the sovereign, be he one man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of men, as in a democracy, or aristocracy. For the legislator is he that maketh the law. And the commonwealth only prescribes and commandeth the observation of those

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rules, which we call law: therefore the commonwealth is the legislator. But the commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything, but by the representative, that is, the sovereign; and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a law made, but the sovereign; because a law is not abrogated, but by another law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

2. The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it in assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth free himself from that subjection, by repealing those laws that trouble him and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself; because he that can bind, can release; and thererore he that is bound to himself only, js not bound.

3. When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that maketh the authority, but the will of the sovereign signified by his silence, for silence is sometimes an argument of consent; and it is no longer law, than the sovereign shall be sent therein. And therefore if the sovereign shall have a question of right grounded, not upon his present will, but upon the laws formerly made; the length of time shall bring_no prejudice to his right; but the question shall be judged by equity. For many unjust actions and unjust sentence go uncontrolled a longer time than any man can remember. And our lawyers account no customs law but such as are reasonable, and that evil customs are to be abolished. But the judgment of what is reasonable and of what is to be abolished belongeth to him that maketh the law, which is the sovereign assembly or monarch.

4. The law of Nature and the civil law, contain each other, and are of equal extent. For the laws of Nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature, as I have said before in the end of the fifteenth chapter, are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to

ut obey them. For in the differences of private men, to declare what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral virtue, and to make them bindwing, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of Nature therefore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of Nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of Nature. But every subject in a commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law; either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative itself one by one, when subdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life; and therefore obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of Nature. Civil and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law; whereof one part being written, is called civil, the other unwritten, natural. But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged and restrained: nay, the end of making laws is no other but such restraint; without the which there cannot possihly be any peace. And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men, in such manner as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy.

5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth subdue a people that have lived

under other written laws, and afterwards govern them by the same laws by which they were governed before; yet those laws are the civil laws of the victor, and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be laws. And therefore where there be divers provinces within the dominion of a commonwealth, and in those provinces diversity of laws, which commonly are called the customs of each several province, we are not to understand that such customs have their force only from length of time; but that they were anciently laws written, or otherwise made known, for the constitutions and statutes of their sovereigns; and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an unwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no other but a law of Nature, equally obliging all mankind.

6. Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth, that is to say, from the will of the representative, which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other commonwealths the sovereign assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in several commonwealths, directly or by consequence making the legislative power depend on private men, or subordinate judges. As for example, "that the common law hath no controller but the parliament;" which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power, and cannot be assembled nor dissolved but by their own discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to control them, and consequently to control their controllings. And if there be no such right, then the controller of laws is not parliamentum, but rex in parliamento. And where a parliament is sovereign, if it should assemble never so many or so wise men from the countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a legislative power. "Item" that the two arms of a commonwealth, are "force and justice; the first whereof is in the king, the other deposited in the hands of the parliament." As if a commonwealth could consist, where the force were in any hand, which justice had not the authority to command and govern.

7. That law can never be against reason our lawyers are agreed; and that not the letter that is every construction of it, but that which is according to the intention of the legislator, is the law. And it is true, but the doubt is of whose reason it is that shall be received for law. It is not meant of any private reason, for then there would be as much contradiction in the laws as there is in the schools; nor yet, as Sir Edward Coke makes it, an "artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience," as his was. For it possible long study may increase and confirm erroneous sentences, and where men build on false grounds, the more they build the greater is the ruin: and of those that study and observe with equal time and diligence, the reason and resolutions are, and must remain, discordant, and therefore it is not that juris prudentia or wisdom of subordinate judges; but the reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his command that maketh law and the commonwealth being in their representative but one person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the laws; and when there doth, the same reason is able, by interpretation or alteration, to take it away. In all courts of justice, the sovereign, which is the person of the commonwealth, is he that judgeth; the subordinate judge ought to have regard to the reason which moved his sovereign to make such law that his sentence may be according