quiring any concession on the part of that power in return. The concessions we allude to are the direct trade with our colonies, and the unprecedented clause which makes the Hanseatic and Dutch harbours the harbours of Prussia and of the states forming the Prussian League, without including the Hanse towns and Holland as parties to the treaty.

It was worse than uncalled for by the effect which it was calculated to produce on the minds of allied powers, who looked upon themselves as gratuitously abandoned on the only side to which they could resort for help against the encroachments of a dreaded rival.

It was in every respect improper on the part of a British minister, who pretended at home to rest his claim to confidence upon the opposition which his cabinet offered to monopoly, thus to throw the whole weight of British influence into the scale of Prussia against old allies of this country, on a question which solely arose upon the pretensions of Prussia to extend and perpetuate a commercial monopoly of the most dangerous kind.

But it will be said, the Hanse towns and the Dutch have not protested; that they have not publicly even remonstrated against this treaty. They have not done so publicly, because the time when a remonstrance would have been effectual was carefully allowed to slip by under the influence of a delusion too alluring to those towns not to have been grasped at by them.

The second treaty, which did not appear until a sufficient interval had elapsed after the publication of the first, was with the Hanse towns, and conceded the direct trade to our colonies; but not the article which was expected to be introduced, to correspond with the concession to Prussia contained in the other treaty to trade to and from the Hanseatic ports with England. It was confidently reported that a clause would admit of the carriage by Hanseatic vessels of all productions of all the Baltic ports or elsewhere to Great Britain and her colonies, from all ports as well as from Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, under whatever circumstances they might have been imported into those ports. The restriction in the treaty to goods which can legally be conveyed in foreign vessels from the Hanse towns, and the omission of a

permission to Hanseatic vessels to import to Great Britain from the Baltic ports direct, prove that we were bound to show a greater respect to Prussia than to the smaller states on the German Ocean. In other words, it is evident that there was a desire to sacrifice the rights of the Hanseatic towns and of Holland to Prussia when it was required, but no disposition to allow the smaller powers any advantage at which Prussia might take umbrage.

We are aware that these, with other proceedings of the late foreign minister, have been judged harshly at home, and that this sudden desire to please our Prussian allies has been ascribed to inducements of a very different kind from a desire to extend our commercial relations. It is, as our readers see, not easy to perceive how such an extension was to result from these treaties; but the serious accusation which has been founded upon their tendency is not one on which we are called upon to decide. For such charges the nation is the only fit jury, and the evidence that ought to support them has not yet been laid before it. Under these circumstances, that no protest was entered by the Hanse towns where protestations would have been useless, will excite but little surprise, and alters in no degree the responsibility of concluding one treaty which was little less than treasonable, and another which was worse than useless.

Then too, had the Hanse towns protested against the Prussian treaty, the risk must be taken into account of offending the irritable feelings of a nation like ours, with whom a moderate dose of dictation is not to be omitted in the ministerial receipt for procuring popular assent to any foreign transaction. The "lords of human kind" are fond enough of lording it over their fellows, but they have their good sides, and one of the best is their love of fair play. The plan followed by the aggrieved powers on this occasion was one likely to result from a much more intimate knowledge of the English character than we fear that their statesmen can claim. They saw that their rights were about to be sacrificed to please a minister without the knowledge of the nation, and, as if by accord, Holland on the Rhine and Hanover on the Elbe determined to make their rights known. The Stade negotiation, which might have easily been arranged in a manner satisfac

tory to both parties, became on a sudden mixed up with extraneous matter, involving to the last degree the dignity of the crown and the independence of the kingdom of Hanover. We had, without asking the consent, or even soliciting the co-operation of the King of Hanover, coolly declared his ports to be ports of Prussia and of the other German states, and accorded particular privileges to strangers who should trade from his harbours, while his vessels are excluded from the Prussian ports by differential duties. Can we wonder that the negotiation did not proceed?

Holland in the same manner was alarmed at the appearance of this clause; for such clauses are usually what the strongest party chooses to call them. One application of the clause was pointed out in the treaty itself, and in order to guard against any undue interpretation of it, the Dutch government quietly published a decree of the king in council, declaring that the steam navigation on all Dutch rivers and inland waters lay under the control of the minister of the finances, to whom application was to be made for permission, and for an approval of the hours and distances which it was intended to observe.

Thus two restrictions, one in the shape of the continuance of an old grievance and one in the imposition of a new one, resulted from this masterpiece of diplomatic policy on the part of a minister who professed to be the arch-enemy of all restrictions.

But the worst consequence of this affair was the partial breaking up of the North-western League. This league, formed between Hanover, Oldenburg and Brunswick for the purpose of securing freedom of communication to the states within it, accompanied by a moderate scale of duties on foreign merchandise, had prospered since its foundation in a manner proportioned to the resources of the lands composing it. The unceasing efforts of Prussian diplomacy were directed towards seducing or frightening one or other of the members to secede. The negotiation of the treaties before mentioned turned the scale when the chances appeared equal; and, balancing between Prussian and English commercial policy, Brunswick first listened to the voice of the former, when the English minister thus recommended her to side with a power

which, even with a hostile mien, was able to command respect.

The defection of Brunswick, which has from the commencement of the present year joined the Prussian League, gave a fatal blow to the North-western League, of which, on account of the importance of the Brunswick fair, this state has been a more influential member than its diminutive territorial extent would lead a stranger to suppose.

What the reasons may have been which prevailed with the Brunswick government so far as to cause it to renounce the liberal commercial policy to which it so long adhered, we know not. Whatever they were, it is evident that they were greatly strengthened by the concessions which were thus unnecessarily made to Prussia at a moment when no word of concessions to the North-western League, which had such strong claims on our acknowledgements, was breathed. The comparative statement of the two tariffs, given in our Number XXII., shows that the duties levied by the North-western League, in some objects of great demand in trade, are from one-third to one-fifth less than the Prussian duty. Yet to the former league we were disposed to grant nothing, while to the latter we were willing to sacrifice even our alliance with the former league.

We pointed out on a former occasion the reasons why the people of an agricultural state have nothing to gain by acceding to the Prussian union. The government, it is true, gains by the immense increase of the duties on colonial produce caused by the introduction of the Prussian tariff. This is of itself a serious addition to the burthens of the people and a sad incumbrance to the trader. But the increase of taxation thus caused is as nothing when compared with that arising from the increase in price of all articles of clothing, of all tools, machinery and objects of luxury or comfort, occasioned by the protection of the Prussian tariff. There is not an implement of industry, from the knitting-needle to the steam-engine, which is not rendered less accessible to the people. Where is then the advantage to be derived from such a step for Brunswick?-we confess we cannot see it. Still less can it be to the interest of a seaport to join. The increased price of labour, the control of custom-officers, would of

themselves materially detract from the present gains of merchants, who are so happy as to be exempted from such inflictions. But when Prussia comes to Hanover, Mecklenburg and the Hanse towns with the declaration that she only wishes for their accession that she may set up the long decried, and now almost abandoned, system of differential navigation dues, can it be wondered that mercantile states hesitate to adopt a proposal so fraught with ruin to their trade? The shipping of all these countries has steadily increased within the period when the shipping of Prussia, fostered by differential duties, has been decreasing. Since the commencement of our late large importation of grain from the Baltic, the Prussian shipping has somewhat recovered; but even now, if the extent and population of the two lands be compared, the shipping of Prussia bears no comparison to that of the little Duchy of Mecklenburg. According to recent statistical accounts, Prussia possesses 619 sea-ships: Mecklenburg counts 248 sea-ships, which carry 20,510 lasts. Recent statements of the trade of Bremen show likewise that the shipping of that port is in a healthy and rising condition.

Bremen will illustrate happily the arguments for and against the adhesion of the maritime states to the Zollverein. The arguments advanced on the Prussian side in favour of the union are, that Bremen, having a large trade in wines, in tobacco and in sugar-refining, the greater part of which articles are destined for the markets of the union, would find it an advantage to have no customs' line between its gates and the markets in question. This is true if the customs' line were to disappear altogether; but it appears evident that if the line be preserved, it is better for Bremen it should be there than between Bremen and the sea. Wine is an article which requires constant attention if long kept in stock. The casks must be filled and coopered from time to time; the merchant may wish to bottle in large or small quantities, and it is eviIdent that he can do all this in his own cellar better and cheaper than in a bonded warehouse. On tobacco the duty must be paid before it can be manufactured for smoking or for snuff, and the same must take place with sugar before it can be refined. All these processes are now performed without an advance of duty by the Bremen merchant. What