looked in all psychological speculations. In fact, some idea of the infinite mind, on which it depends in an absolute dependence, must first come to it and impress its passive or receptive nature, or its activity, its life, is at best but a potential, not a real, existence. This activity begins as real, only on the introduction into its receptivity of such idea as necessary object and as indispensable condition. For certainly there can be no intelligence, no free energy exerted until an object is brought to it; and this object can reach it only through the receptive nature. So there can be no sense, no feeling, without a consciousness, an intelligence, of such feeling as the impression of some object, and as having certain characteristics or attributes which make the feeling to be such as it is. Nor, again, can there be feeling without engaging the energy of the soul, which is not except as such energy. It is only as an intelligent energy that it can be impressed or can feel at all. And certainly there can be no determination of the free-will except in relation to an object introduced to it through the receptive nature, and apprehended in the intelligence as being such or such. An intelligent impression of such object is indispensable condition of any exertion of the free activity.

3. Once more, the intelligence, the sensibility, and the freewill, are coördinate functions of the human mind. In some aspects one may seem to hold a higher rank; but in other aspects, each of the others asserts a similar preeminence. The free-will, as constituting the very personality, seems thus in one view to be the higher function; it should be held perhaps to be the fundamental attribute of the human spirit. But the human mind, as finite, is dependent, and can act, can live, only as object is brought to it upon which its energy can be executed. The sensibility as that department of the mind which receives the objects of all its energy, is necessarily conditional for any activity. This is true not only in reference to the first mental act, but also in reference to all subsequent acts, whether the objects of such acts be presented through the external or the internal sense. As indispensable condition, thus, feeling seems to claim a certain supremacy in mind. But yet farther, the intelligence in still another view presents an unquestionable claim to similar precedency. Somehow or other, the intelligence, perhaps under the more ambitious designations of the reason, consciousness,

wisdom, has been very generally recognized as the preeminent endowment of the human spirit, as its essential attribute. It is, according to the grand sentiment of Pascal, because man knows that he dies, that he is more noble than the universe that crushes him.

We are forced thus to recognize the three functions of the mind as true coördinates, as we have found them to be the sole complementary and coëssential functions. The mind, the spirit, simple and indivisible in itself, possesses this three-fold endowment; and while in the ceaseless revolutions of its experience, it brings before our view sometimes one and sometimes another of the three, no one of them ever drops entirely out of its active nature, but each enters as indispensable requisite into every form of its experience, every phase of its life, every determination of its activity.

ART. II.-CRIMES OF PASSION AND CRIMES OF

REFLECTION.

By J. B. BITTINGER, Sewickley, Pa.

Sin is the primal cause of lawlessness, but in its covert state is not amenable to society. When it becomes overt, it passes into crime, and is thenceforth responsible to human laws. The essence of sin is selfishness, in its various forms of self-indulgence, self-gratification, self-seeking and self-aggrandizement. Hence every crime takes one or other of these abnormal forms of self. The moral character of the crime is always determinable from the animus of the perpetrator. This animus is measured by the two factors,-passion and reflection. These factors moreover are variable. Reflection varies in degree; passion both in kind and degree. Under the impulse and direction of these factors originates every species of crime, from the slightest misdemeanor to the gravest felony. As to their number, crimes are countless; as to their variety, infinite. Every application of the common law which repairs an old barrier, and every statute which erects a new one, provokes the spirit of lawlessness to a fresh attempt at assault or evasion. The more justice explicates itself in legislation, the more selfishness re

fines itself in cunning. Proteus did not more cleverly assume a new guise, or more deftly slip a manacle, than does the "tricksy spirit" of evil. The history of criminal jurisprudence is the history of competition between crime evading justice, and justice forestalling crime.

Crime is punishable because it includes in itself injury to society. The law of self-preservation is put on the defensive, and proceeds against the criminal, because he is noxious. The degrees of this hurtfulness must determine the character of the criminal legislation; and the ultimate safety of the state, the nature of the penal treatment. In order that the subject of crime may be treated with more exactness, and lead to some practical results, it will be necessary to make such a division of the field of misdemeanor, as shall throw light on the path of the law-maker and the penologist. Blackstone, in his admirable Commentaries on the laws of England, has distributed the whole domain of law into four parts. The rights of persons, and the rights of things; private wrongs, and public wrongs. The fourth division treats of crimes, and is the only one that concerns us. The several classes of crimes which he enumerates, and under which he treats the whole subject of " public wrongs," are: (1.) Crimes against God and Religion. (2.) Crimes against the Law of Nations. (3.) Crimes against the King and Government. (4.) The Commonwealth. (5.) Private individuals. There is no one word, or single term, that covers the whole scale of offences, from the lowest punishable misdemeanor, to the highest felony. Count Sollohub very earnestly questions whether, instead of the two classes-Misdemeanor and Felony, we should not have three classes, Misdemeanor, Crime, Felony; while of the last term, J. Stuart Mill affirms, that "there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony is, otherwise than by enumerating the various kinds of offenses which are so called." Blackstone says, that "crimes and misdemeanors, properly speaking, are merely synonymous terms." These differing divisions of the domain of crime may be passed by, as unimportant in this discussion. For my present purpose, I have chosen to divide all crimes into two classes only,-Crimes of Passion, and Crimes of Reflection.

This division is effective, because it brings clearly before us the criminal as the efficient agent of the wrong done, and there

fore the proper subject of the penalty to be inflicted, of the restitution to be made, and of the reformation sought. It has the further advantage of accurately distinguishing passion, as the motive power to crime, from reflection, which is only its directing and guiding force. If the line here indicated shall be found clearly to divide the class of wrong-doers, the legislator, no less than the penologist, will be put in possession of a very important principle. For no one would for a moment contend that the criminal, who is the victim of sudden passion, should be dealt with in the same manner as the criminal of patient reflection; or that crimes of malign and of non-malign passion are on a par. All will admit, as an axiom, that knowledge is the first element of responsibility, and as such the chief factor in crime. Intelligence is the inventing and contriving faculty. It may be stimulated by the passions, but it is in directing them that it is criminal. Mere passion is as blind as the weapon which it uses, but when reflection points the way, the poniard becomes as sharp-sighted as the lynx, and killing grows to murder. It may seem like uttering a barren truism, to speak of knowledge as the chief element of responsibility in crime; but I shall use it rather for the purpose of classifying criminals, and for suggesting appropriate penal legislation and treatment, than with reference to a basis of moral responsibility. But, further, when intelligence is spoken of as a factor in crime, it is not the absolute amount of knowledge which the man possesses that determines his criminality, but the amount of deliberate intention directed towards committing the offense. How much of his knowledge did he turn to account? A murderer may have much less intelligence than one guilty of manslaughter, but he turns more of his knowledge to a criminal account. He "nurses his wrath to keep it warm," and but for such thoughtful tending the baleful fire would have gone out. The sentiment of the community towards these two classes of criminals is very different. Feeling is most active towards crimes of passion, whereas towards crimes of reflection principle is most operative. In these two kinds of antagonism we see reflected the leading features of the two classes of criminals:

The following schedule, if not rigidly scientific, will place the two great classes of crimes clearly before the eye:

CRIMES.

In which are considered;

I. CRIMES OF PASSION.

1. Crimes of malign passion.

1. Crimes of malign passion against persons.
1. Murder (manslaughter).

2. Mayhem.

3. Slander (libel).

2. Crimes of malign passion against property.

1. Malicious mischief (arson, poisoning cattle, &c.) 2. Crimes of non-malign passion (passing over into). II. CRIMES OF REFLECTION.

1. Crimes against religion. (?)

1. Blasphemy.

2. Profanity.

2. Crimes against nature.

1. Bestiality.

2. Sodomy.

3. Crimes against chastity.

1. Rape.

2. Adultery.

3. Fornication.

4. Seduction.

5. Obscenity.

4. Crimes against property.

1. Robbery.

2. Burglary.

3. Larceny.

4. Counterfeiting.

5. Forgery.

6. Defaulting.

7. Embezzling.

8. Adulterating food (shoddy, &c.)

9. Short weight, measure.

5. Crimes against liberty.

1. Perjury.

2. Bribery.
3. Ballot-stuffing.

4. Treason.