SECTION III. Objections to the received interpretation of the clause of exception in the law of Divorce, and attempt to recover the original and primitive signification. Objection, 1. from the ambiguity of the word ogveia: 2. from the omission of the clause of exception by Saint Mark and Saint Luke: 3. from the violence of the in- ference under the received exposition: 4. from the con- text: 5. from Saint Paul's doctrine, 1 Cor. vii. 2 Cor. vi. 16. Opinions of Tertullian and Cyprian; of Miegius and History of the Christian Doctrine of Divorce. Variations of the doctrine in the several ages before Constantine: between Constantine and Justinian: from the time of Justinian to the decay of the Eastern Empire Indissolubility of marriage the constant doctrine of the English law. merely technical terms. Divorce a mensa limited to cases of cruelty and adultery. Practice of courts in suits of divorce a mensá on the ground of adultery. Objections from the Reformatio Legum, and the case of the Marquis of Northampton not conclusive of the dissolubility of mar- riage, and opposed by Tables of Archbishop Parker, and Canons of 1603. Precedent of the Bill for dissolving the marriage of Lord Rous slowly adopted, and eventually abused. Attempts to restrain the abuse. Debates on Private separations subversive of the end of marriage : not sanctioned by the precedent of Jewish divorce: con- demned by the law of Christ: violate the particular vow of marriage: liable to be superseded by suits for the restitu- tion of conjugal rights: impede actions for criminal conver- sation and petitions for Bills of divorce: not approved by the judges: resting not on principles of law, but the pre- Doctrines of Milton. Laws of France: the Batavian republic: Connecticut. Difficulty of proving the marriage in Scotland, and facilities of divorce on the ground of non- THE LAW OF RAPE, SEDUCTION, AND BASTARDY. The Jewish law of rape and seduction. The English law of rape. Aggravated guilt of seduction, and inade- 1. Μοιχεια means adultery: 2. μοιχεια distinguished from πορνεία: in which the words seem to be confounded are not conclusive. 5. Togva in the use of the Hellenistic writers signifies chiefly the apostacy of idolatry. Citation of texts in which the words πορνεύω, εκπορνεύω, πόρνη, and πορνεία, occur in the sense of apostacy: of texts in which the same words denote idolatrous initiation: and in which they denote incestuous marriage of the faithful with the unbelieving. Application of the argument in exposition of Acts xv. 20, 29. Matt. v. 32. xix. 9. The argument confirmed by the use of the words in the writings of Philo Judæus, Josephus, and other Hellenistic writers before the time of Christ, and by the use of the Christian writers of the three first centuries. No. II. Page 396. DOCUMENTS EXPLANATORY OF THE OBJECTIONS OF UNITARIANS AND FREE-THINKING CHRISTIANS TO THE OFFICE FOR THE SOLEMNIZATION OF MATRIMONY, AND OF THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH THEY SEEK THE PRIVILEGE OF MARRYING IN THEIR PRIVATE CONVENTICLES. Petition to the Houses of Parliament. Resolutions of the Unitarian Association. Forms of Protest. Defence of Protest. Page 551. No. III. COLLECTION OF OFFICES FOR THE SOLEMNIZATION OF MATRIMONY. Offices of the Greek Church-of the ancient Latin Church-from the Salisbury Missal-King Edward's first Book-the American Liturgy-the Liturgy of Geneva. Page 570. CHAPTER VI. THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH EMBARRASS THE PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF DIVORCE. SECTION I. The Right of Divorce assumed arbitrarily and without authority. THE divine institution of marriage is not only a speculative opinion, but it is a powerful principle, affecting the whole law and doctrine of marriage, elevating its dignity, requiring its religious ratification, restricting its impediments, enforcing its duties, and aggravating the guilt of its violation. It is also a principle of the highest authority, in settling the term and period of marriage. If marriage be but a civil contract and nothing more, no reason can be alleged why the contract should not be limited to a certain period, or why it should not contain a covenant for the dissolution of the contract at the mutual pleasure and discretion of the parties. It is certain, that wherever the divine institution and the religious ratification, conformable with that institution, have been depreciated or neglected, the facilities of separation have been indefinitely increased: and this is the natural result which might be expected, that parties to a contract merely civil should fix the terms upon which they shall enter into a conventional agreement, into a voluntary association of persons and of interests. There is nothing in marriage, considered merely as a civil contract, which essentially distinguishes it from other contracts, or which proves that it contains, what many have ascribed to it, a natural incapacity of being dissolved by the consent of the parties, at the option of both or either of them. Expedience is the only ground of the permanence of marriage, considered merely as a civil contract. "It is evidently most essential, according to every view of public expediency, as well as of justice between private parties, that of all contracts, that of marriage should have a fixed and indelible character, which it shall not be in the power of the husband to alter at pleasure. But the municipal laws as to divorce in almost every state, ancient and modern, are peculiar and local. These too are sometimes quite opposite even in neighbouring provinces of the same state. No example can be more striking than that of the three kingdoms of the British empire; in two of which marriage is indissoluble by judicial sentence; while in the other it may be dissolved either for adultery or continued non-adherence after legal requisition. By the law of the French revolutionary governments, and by the law of Russia, as to certain classes, incompatibility of temper has been made a ground of divorce. In the Netherlands opposite rules prevail. Those of the several states of Germany are altogether different from each other, and at variance. The municipal systems of the a Paley's Mor. Philos. b. iii. pt. 3. c. 3. Selden de Jure Nat. et Gent. 1. v. c. 7. |