until this fatal Administration came in, did it fall below the sum mentioned. Then this colloquy ensued:

"Mr. Teller-That is a fact which every body understands We did not break into the reserve of $100,000,000 until after the present Ad ministration came into power. To be fair, I

doubt but that we should have broken into it if Mr. Harrison had been reëlected. It was not the Democratic party that came into power that made it; it was the condition of the country.

"Mr. Sherman-It was a Democratic law, "Mr. Teller-It was not a Democratic law. There was not any law and had not been any law. That was long after."

The law that Mr. Sherman referred to was the Wilson tariff, which was not passed until July, 1894, whereas the gold

reserve fell below $100,000,000 in April, 1893, or fifteen months earlier. Every day

we have fresh evidence that Mr. Sherman is losing his wits. Senator Aldrich, however, is not in his dotage. He knows perfectly well that President Harrison's Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Charles Foster, in his last annual report (December, 1892), predicted an early decline of the gold reserve below the $100,000,000 line, saying:

"One of the embarrassments to the Treasu ry, in the opinion of the Secretary, is the inability, with the limited amount of cash on hand above the $100,000,000 reserve, to keep up a sufficient gold supply. When the demand comes for the exportation of gold, the Treasury is called upon to furnish it. If this demand should prove to be as large the coming year as it has been for the past two years gold in the Treasury would be diminished to or below the reserve line."

But to return to the silverites, the condition of trade and industry which they bewail in their platform is mainly their own work. They caused the Sherman act to be passed. Its consequences were an alarm in the public mind and a withdrawal of capital from the country. When a scarcity of capital began to be noticed, they said that it was caused by the demonetization of silver which had taken place twenty years earlier. They overlooked the years of prosperity that had intervened. They ignored the fact that an era of great business activity began in 1879, when specie payments were resumed, and continued with slight interruptions until the Sherman act was passed, and until its operation had had a marked effect in the expulsion of gold from the country. Then they said the evil dated back to 1873, and many of them believe so

now.

It is perhaps hopeless to reason with people who go back to ancient history to find the cause of troubles that their own immediate misconduct has brought upon them; yet he must be a very ignorant man who cannot see that a withdrawal of capital from the country is an adequate cause of all the evils complained of. Every one of these evils is explainable by the single phrase "lack of capital." This will define and describe not only the general badness of trade, but the badness of every individual's trade, his want of profit, or

66

effect is the same. Bad trade, scarcity of money, higher rates of interest, curtailment of loans must follow, and when they come, some leatherhead who has done all in his power to drive capital away by threatening us with the silver standard or with a foreign war, declares that the money power" is producing all the misery by "cornering gold." First tell every man who has a dollar that you are going to fix things so that it will be worth only fifty cents, and when he takes it to a place where you cannot work this transformation, accuse him of maliciously causing a scarcity of money. O Liberty, how many sins are committed in thy

name!

THE ARMENIAN RESOLUTIONS. THERE has been more debating in the House and Senate over the Armenian resolutions than there was over the Venezuelan correspondence, but no more real taking of counsel. The discussion in the House on Monday had the aerial character which usually marks the fiery utterances of young men's debating clubs. Where else but in the proceedings of such a body would one find it solemnly resolved that "it was an imperative duty, in the interests of humanity, to express an earnest hope " that somebody else would behave properly? What other body would order the Secretary to send this resolution to six first-class Powers as an encouragement to execute one of their own treaties to which we are no more a party than the Y. M. C. A.? We may imagine the hilarity with which it will be received in the various European chancelleries, and the mock solemnity with which its receipt will be acknowledged. We doubt whether it is worth while to notice that the resolutions abandon that part of the Monroe Doctrine which denies our right "to take part in the wars of European Powers in matters relating to themselves" also Secretary Olney's recent interpretation of the Doctrine, which shuts us out from "wars or preparations of wars with whose causes or results we have no direct concern," and which closes with the remark:

"If all Europe were to suddenly fly to arms over the fate of Turkey, would it not be preposterous that any American state should find itself inextricably involved in the miseries and burdens of the contest? If it were, it would prove to be a partnership in the cost and losses of the struggle, but not in any ensuing bene fits."

In fact it would not be easy to make up, by inference, a more complete repudiation of our doctrine of non-interference in European matters, as the complement of the non-interference of Europe in ours.

The new revised Doctrine now is, that we may interfere in European affairs when we see the European Powers plainly neglecting their duty to each other, or when in any part of Europe "the hand of fanaticism and lawless violence" seems to us too strong, or when "men and Christians" in any part of Europe seem to us to be deprived of due legal protection. But surely we ought not to refuse this sympathy to "men and Jews," and yet we have never threatened Russia for expelling her Jewish population under circumstances of great cruelty. Lastly, how are we to assert this right to look after the manner in which European Powers discharge their domestic duties, without granting them the right to pass resolutions and address exhortations to us

about our negligences and failures-about our mob law, for instance, as expressed in the unpunished murder of the Italians in the jail in New Orleans a few years ago; in the massacre of the Chinamen in Wyoming; in the numerous, continued, and horrible lynchings all over the country? Are we prepared to accept meekly resolutions of reprobation on these topics from the British Parliament, and the Reichstag, and the Russian Chancellery, and the retort courteous from the Sultan? We doubt it greatly, and yet the probability that we shall have to put up with it, on principles of reciprocity, was never mentioned in the debate.

This vain talk was followed, as usual, by a stern resolve to "stand behind " the President in "the most vigorous action he may take for the protection and security of American citizens" in Turkey. What would or could "our most vigorous action" be? The whole of our fleet put together would not be more than sufficient to force its way up to Constantinople, if all the Powers agreed to stand aside and let it be done. Some of our ships would be sunk in the process. The others would arrive in a dilapidated condition. Both banks of the Bosphorus would be in possession of the enemy, and that enemy a hostile and fanatical population, which fights Christians with great fierceness. Without a land force, where would our coal and supplies come from, and how would the ships get back again after the Turks had time to prepare for their return? Suppose the Sultan, under threat of bombardment, were to agree to restore order in Armenia, how would this benefit the Armenians? They are hundreds of miles away from Constantinople, and they are being massacred by local Mussulmans who pay no attention to the Sultan's orders. The Sultan has already made to the Powers all the promises which we could possibly extract from him by any action, however vigorous, without helping the Armenians in the smallest degree. Moreover, there is no proof that we have received any injury from the Sultan, except the destruction of property, and for this, according to all accounts, he is willing to pay.

If we were talking to practical men of business, or serious diplomatists, and not mere Jingoes, we should point out that there are only two ways in which we can do anything for the Armenians. One is to threaten Russia with war if she, the only Power which can act promptly and effectively in the matter, does not occupy Armenia and restore order. The other is to offer to support Great Britain in any measures she may take to carry out the Treaty of Berlin. She has undoubtedly been checked in her recent attempt to coerce the Sultan by the fear that she might find herself acting alone or in the face of a powerful opposition, for she is not a general favorite, and France wants Egypt, and Russia Constantinople. But such support, to be really effective, would involve the despatch to the Mediterranean of a powerful naval squadron and say 50,000 men of a land force. We have little doubt, speaking under naval and military correction, that this, with the troops which England could assemble from England and India, would carry everything before it in Asia Minor, and that the spectacle of the two great Anglo-Saxon Powers acting together, not for aggrandizement but for order and civilization, would be one of the finest the modern world has seen. But, Jingo brethren, it would involve the abandonment of the sacred Doctrine of "the immortal Monroe," and it would commit you to the cares and responsibilities and dangers of European politics, and-harder than all-it would compel you to be civil to the odious "Britishers." If you are not ready for something of this sort, the less you vapor and threaten, the more the civilized world will respect you.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN.

TOKYO, December 28, 1895.

THE course of affairs in Japan since the treaty of peace with China has been on the whole different from what might have bɛen expected six months ago. The immediate effect of the peace upon the foreign relations of Japan has been comparatively slight. Not even the Corean troubles have proved to be so fruitful of immediate consequences as seemed likely at first. With Russia and other countries her relations, at least for the present, have assumed all the smoothness and cordiality of the period before the war. Nor is it likely that in the near future this status will be disturbed. So many terrific contingencies lie concealed in the present situation that no gov. ernment, however eager for success or expansion, will dare to rouse them.

The reflex action, however, of the war and its train of circumstances has given a most distinct impulse to the internal political development of Japan. It will be remembered that party politics in this country has always been in a state of confusion. At least three parties have existed between whom it is not easy to distinguish any essential political principle. All have been against the Government, all have been opposed to the Satcho combination, all have advocated a strong foreign policy, all have stood for the revision of treaties, for the reform of local government, for

the expansion of commerce, and for a large number of equally desirable objects. But while these parties have had so many objects in common, their attitude toward each other, except when a common enemy was to be attacked, has been anything but friendly. Each party has occupied its time either in attacking the Government or in denouncing the opposing parties.

A new step has lately been taken, however, which promises to put both the Government and the parties in a somewhat different position. It may be fairly said that no party in Japan can have much chance for success that is not opposed to the Satcho and strongly in favor of responsible party cabinets. The answer that the various statesmen in power, and especially Marquis (formerly Count) Ito have made to all demands for popular governments, is that the ministers are responsible not to the Parliament but to the Crown. The weakness of the argument, however, has been apparent probably even to the present premier. He must be aware that, under present circumstances, it is not the Emperor who summons a new cabinet when the old resigns, but a few statesmen who form an oligarchical faction in the state. Nevertheless, the means of fighting this system of government, powerful in its resources, ability, and past record, have not been within reach of the popular parties, and up to the present time all parliamentary warfare has attacked it in vain.

Early in November a rumor spread of a reconciliation between the Radical or Liberal

party (Jiyuto) and Marquis Ito. It was stated that the party leaders of the Jiyuto had approached the premier with a view to harmonizing the differences which had so long separated the representatives in Parliament and the Government. Among all the statesmen of national reputation who have in recent years held the reins of Government, the Liberals could not have approached a more tractable man than the present premier. Of a compromising disposition, by nature disinclined to continual bickerings between the Parliament and Government, he has doubtless come to the conclusion, especially since the close of the war, that the old measure of dissolving Parlia ment was no longer practicable. Japan is certain to have a serious time of it in the next few years, even under the most favorable circumstances; and with an irreconcilable political system the danger of successfully working the Government and guiding the country through its difficulties would be immensely increased. Whatever the motives actuating him may have been, it is known that Ito did not long hesitate to accept the proposals of the Jiyuto. The latter agreed to support the Government in the next parliamentary session, and thus, for the first time since the adoption of the Constitution, the Government is to have an avowed supporter among the representa tives of the people in the lower house.

The Kaishinto and other enemies of the Jiyuto interpret this political alliance in a most unfavorable sense. Their principal charge is that the Jiyuto, long deprived of the rewards of office, have at last fallen a victim to the wiles and bribes of the Government. In this and other ways the Opposition are trying to discredit the Liberals in the country. But it is doubtful whether these charges will have much effect. Most of the local political associations have cordially supported the action of the representatives of the party, and two or three members who have tried to play a double game by carrying on negotiations with the Opposition in case the alliance of their party

with the Government proved unpopular, have been promptly expelled from the ranks of the Liberal party. Whatever faults may be attributed to the Jiyuto, it can scarcely be said that they are double-faced, or ambitious for Government posts beyond the usual human measure. Their leader, Count Itagaki, has been called a political dreamer, a theorist; but no one has ever charged him with being other than a singularly honest and upright man. It is hard to say how far he controls the action of his party-in some cases his advice is certainly not accepted; but in the present instance it is almost certain that he wholly approves of the step taken by his party. His assurance on this point is almost a guarantee that the coalition between the Government and the Jiyuto is free from any political bargaining or personal gain to the leaders of the party.

Two motives are mentioned by the Liberals themselves for the coalition. The first of these is the obvious one that the Government work can be immensely expedited by the loyal sup. port of a strong popular party in the lower house. Hitherto the Jiyuto, though at times it has given the Government a grudging adherence, has for the most part joined in the cry against the Government. But for this refusal of the party several years ago to vote any bills introduced by the ministers, the position of the Government would have been im. mensely stronger than it was in the late war. More than once measures to increase the army and navy, especially the latter, failed to pass because of the implacable temper of the popu lar representatives towards any measure bearing the Government stamp. It is generally agreed, both by the Japanese themselves and by foreigners who are in a position to know, that had the Government succeeded in putting the navy in the state of efficiency it proposed four years ago-had the Japanese navy, for instance, had two first-class battle ships-the Japanese would have been at Pekin six months before the war actually ended. That the Government was so bitterly opposed by the various parties was one of the reasons why the Chinese were so eager for war, and why they were so confident of victory in the beginning of the struggle. Hereafter the Government is less likely to be placed in this predicament. As one of the spokesmen of the Jiyuto declared in a speech some days ago, "It does not require any uncommon intelligence to see that nothing could be more disastrous to the interests and dignity of the Empire than that the people should be engrossed in petty party disputes and contentions among themselves."

Another reason which the Jiyuto assign for their action is the influence their coalition with the Government will have in promoting true party government. Naturally their opponents, who are themselves aiming to introduce government by party, ridicule this assertion of the Liberals. It is declared to be absurd on its face that any party can give its support on this ground to what is not a national but a clan government. Yet, in spite of an apparent self-contradiction, there is no doubt that the Jiyuto have a strong case in this contention. Hitherto the Government has stood aloof from all parties. It has claimed to be the impartial arbiter between the conflicting demands of the popular representatives. To whatever extent in fact the Government may not have acted up to this assumption, yet it logically could present a strong front so long as it did not deviate grossly from this self-imposed rôle. But hereafter the cabinet minis. ters cannot fairly claim to be independent of party demands, for the simple reason that they

have openly admitted a definite party to support them. If they fail to get sufficient votes from their friends, it is difficult to see how they can continue in power. Marquis Ito must have understood this contingency from the moment he agreed to receive the Jiyuto as a Government party. Probably he even acted deliberately in this matter, believing that the time had come when the country would no longer brook the present Satcho administration. To quote another of the spokesmen of the Liberals in a recent speech:

"It is our conviction that, by taking this step (i. e., coalition with the Government), we shall effectually promote the introduction of a system of responsible cabinets-a consummation which has ever been the cherished hope of the Liberal party. For the attainment of that hope we have suffered much, but the sole result of our endeavor has hitherto been to strengthen the Government's resistance to the realization of our object. To continue the fruitless struggle at the present juncture would be not only to thwart the carrying out of various measures of paramount importance, but also to retard the attainment of our longcherished object. We are confident of victory in the coming session of the Diet. But, should we be defeated, we should be ready to hand over the government of the country to our opponents, if they faithfully represent the sentiments of the people."

censured. If this succeeds in passing the House, the cabinet must necessarily dissolve the present Parliament and make an appeal to the country. If a hostile majority is returned, no other escape seems possible but for the present ministers to hand in their resignations. Even if a friendly majority should be returned, the Government will stand committed, and thus in either case party government would be an accomplished fact in Japan. G. D.

TASMANIA.

HOBART, November 26, 1895, TASMANIA, Somewhat smaller than Ireland, is the least in size, though not the least interesting, of the Australasian colonies. Most of its surface is mountainous and rocky and is not likely ever to be brought under cultivation. There are twenty-one mountain peaks 3,000 to 4,000 feet high, eighteen 4,000 to 5,000, and two slightly over 5,000. Unless where cleared, and with exception of the mountains over 3,000 feet in altitude, it is covered with forests constituted principally of different species of eucalyptus. There are coal mines; and gold, silver, and tin are being discovered in considerable quantities in the northern districts. Fruit farming is becoming a considerable industry. After ninety-one years' settlement, the population is but 155,000; less than one-third of the surface has been alienated, and but four per cent. thereof has been brought under cultivation.

A last and most important point for consideration is how far the Jiyuto can give effectual support to the Government in the com. ing session. If the party had a clear majority over all other parties in the lower house, there would be little difficulty, either for the Government or for the Liberals. But the latter It is practically an independent State, havcannot claim more than 109 or 110 party repre- ing an ambassador, under the name of an sentatives out of a total number of 300. The agent-general, in London, and, under the Progressionists, who are the most active oppo-ægis of the British Empire, is relieved from nents of the Government, claim fifty-three, and the National Unionists thirty-two; while the Independents, together with other minor political organizations, make up the remainder. It is conceded that the Jiyuto can count upon at least twenty or twenty-five of the independent vote, while the Kaishinto claim as many as seventy or seventy-five. From these figures it follows that the National Unionists, with a following of only thirty-two, hold the balance of power between the two larger parties. The Progressionists have made strenuous efforts to get this party to join them in opposing the Government, but so far without success. The National Unionists have little sympathy with the statesmen now in power; on the contrary, they are hostile to both the compromising tem. per and the personnel of the present cabinet. But they are backed by the military classes of the empire, and cannot join with a party eager to antagonize the Government even in its military and naval policy. Hence the National Unionists are on the horns of a dilemma from which they cannot at present find any escape. Common rumor has it that they will vote with the Opposition on condition that the latter agree to the necessary military and naval bills.

Under the circumstances the present Government is not in a position of security. It will probably be authorized to carry out large designs for the country's welfare, but by the same authority it will be declared unfit for the pur. pose of carrying on the administration. Should the Jiyuto and their friends have the requisite number of votes to save the Government from the attacks of the Opposition, the present cabinet will be more certain of its position than it has been for a number of years. But the opposing parties are already gathering their strength for an address to the throne, in which the whole policy of the Government will be

the necessity of maintaining an army and navy. Its upper house consists of eighteen, its lower of thirty-seven members-the one elected by a somewhat restricted and partly educational, the other by a general, franchise. The public debt has, within the last few years, largely under labor and sectional influences, been run up from £3,200,000 to £7,600,000. It now stands at £50 per head of the population, nearly twice the national debt of the United Kingdom. But then it has large effects to show, mainly in railways-not merely prestige, honor, and glory, as with us at home. These state-owned and state-worked single-track railways cover 476 miles, and, beyond working expenses, return little over one per cent. on capital. The main roads are excellently maintained, also by the state. The fiscal policy of the country is, under the plea of revenue requirements, mildly protective. To a certain extent, but in a lesser degree than her sister colonies, Tasmania is passing through a wave of commercial depression, consequent upon in. flated dealings and engagement in unproduc. tive works upon borrowed capital. "She has," to use a nautical term, "been brought up with a round turn," and artisans recruited from country districts and drawn from other countries have had to look for work elsewhere. The severe lesson is being learned that if there are born more sons and daughters than the country can, by a natural process of expansion, support, it is wiser that they should follow naturally expanding industries abroad than that they should, at the cost of others, find occupations at home by building up unnatural trade barriers. Cheap ocean transit has worked radical changes. Wheat land has gone out of cultivation, and ruins are to be met both of water and of wind-mills.

It was a delightful change from the heat and bustle and wide extent of Melbourne and from

the low-lying shores of Port Phillip, to find ourselves, after a sea voyage of twelve hours, steaming up the beautiful, winding, thickly wooded shores of the Tamar. Launceston, with a population of 17,000, is pleasantly situated thirty miles up this river. A railway connects with the capital Hobart, of 25,000, on the Derwent, at the south of the island. Both these are regularly laid-out, quiet cities, with more of an Old World air about them than others we have seen in the southern hemisphere. The line connecting Launceston and Hobart may be said to roughly divide the country into two-thirds and one-third. The two-thirds portion, lying to the west, is for the most part mountain, lake, and waste; that to the east comprises most of the settled districts. The mountainous character of the country is expressed in the Tasmanian railway timetables, which give, in addition to the ordinary information, columns showing the height of the stopping-places above the sea. The main line between Launceston and Hobart attains an elevation of 1,400 feet. We never travelled on such a tortuous line apparently without sufficient cause. The explanation afforded is that it was constructed for a lump sum by a British firm which acted in the double capacity of engineers and contractors, and to which cheapness of construction, without regard to the future cost of working, was the main consideration.

On the more than one hundred miles of smooth waters of D'Entrecasteaux Channel, Derwent estuary and river, and Norfolk Bay, there is some really fine and much charming scenery. The eucalyptus forests at a distance appear somewhat sombre and uninviting; but, once in their leafy depths, a world of delight is opened up to the traveller. We spent many days lingering by the lakes and exploring the recesses of their ferny valleys. Now, in spring, the undergrowth of shrub and heath is bright with blossom; the air, redolent with scents, is fresh and pure; the coloring of the young trees is varied in different tints of green. To one subjected for long years to the storm and stress of public affairs there is a feeling of almost intoxicating delight in these leafy primeval shades. Fine strands are to be found on the shores of the Tasman peninsula and on the east coast-strands where the pellucid waters of the Pacific break on long reaches of sand, upon curiously formed terraces of basalt, against noble forest-crowned cliffs and pro montories. Upon Maria Island, which we reached by a four-hours' crossing in an open boat, from Spring Bay, we found magnificent scenery. Ten miles long by an average width of five miles, clothed in forest and thick scrub, it is the abode of countless numbers of a small species of kangaroo. There are only two families residing upon it, amid the ruins of a former penal settlement and of extensive works connected with abandoned speculations in the direction of vine-culture and cement manu. facture.

We have been most favorably impressed by the Tasmanians. There is, outside the towns, where there continue to be amusing gradations, much of that equality of class feeling and simplicity of dress and natural dignity of bearing to be met with in Switzerland combined with perhaps gentler manners bred of a milder climate. We found travelling cheap and dealings open and fair. Drink-shops are neither many in number nor intrusive in ap. pearance, and we have seen no drunkenness. Through several weeks of railway, coach, boat, steamer, and pedestrian travel, often glad to put up at simple inns where accommodation

was not always of the best, we have heard neither coarse nor even harsh language.

In the history of this interesting country there has been much of the tragic. Upon a small scale, but seldom elsewhere in a greater degree, have the horrors of the impact of civi lized with uncivilized man been here illustrated. Seven or eight thousand aborigines inhabited the islands when it was settled in the early years of the century. Sunk in a low condition of barbarism, they went unclothed. But all competent authorities agree in testifying that they were endowed with many good qualities, and were capable, if fairly treated, of living harmless upon the borders of civilization. The desires of successive early governments that this should be, were frustrated by the intolerable outrages inflicted upon the aborigines by escaped convicts and semi-barbarous whites. The aborigines, unable to discriminate, made reprisals alike upon the peaceful settler and the murderous bushranger. The Government felt itself driven into a war of capture or extermination. The few who survived, taken by force or decoyed by false promises, were de ported to the islands in Bass's Straits. Changes in modes of life, drink, disease, and neglect soon did their work. A miserable remnant were brought back to a settlement near Hobart. The last full-blooded native, a woman, passed away twenty years ago. Her skull, along with the bones of other extinct Tasmanian mammals, is preserved in the Hobart museum. A few half-castes live on the islands, where they make a living by curing fish and mutton-birds.

Tasmania was settled by the United Kingdom mainly as a penal colony. Here were deported alike hardened offenders as well as persons, of both sexes and often of tender years, who had committed offences for which now a few days', or at most a few weeks', imprisonment might be considered sufficient punishment. The wretched Irish peasantry, driven to outrage and violence under the iron heel of class and landlord rule, contributed in no small number to this latter class. Here settled down, after the Napoleonic wars, many British officers, who received grants of land upon easy terms. Among other advantages held out to these and other free settlers was the assignment to them of convict labor. The missionary labors of James Backhouse and George W. Walker have left the marks of Quakerism upon the society of the island. The convict system was here extended as it became apparent that it could not be maintained in the other colonies. Upon the Tasmanian Peninsula, at Macquarie Harbor, at Maria Island, and at Norfolk Island, a far-away dependency, the system was carried out in its concrete and severest form, unmitigated by the safeguards of a numerous surrounding free population. Escape was all but impossible: there was nothing available for the support of life in the forests. There are authentic instances of cannibalism among parties who did make the attempt. Chaingangs were subjected to the severest labor in swamp and forest, cutting and deporting tim. ber and mining coal. The lash was freely used. To the gallows were constantly consigned victims. Suicide, even among convict children, was not uncommon. A case caught our eyes in an old Hobart paper of a clergyman magistrate sitting alone on the bench, sentencing an unfortunate to thirty lashes and three years in a chain-gang for altering an order for sixpence into one for two shillings and sixpence. This system has long been swept away-all save the remembrance, and ruined walls and vacant barracks, and open

cells once impervious to light and sound, where men graduated for the madhouse or were done to death. The forest grows in upon them, and the lizards creep over them. "Such of us as were not bad were made bad," remarked to us an aged survivor of the system. At Port Arthur, a locality almost rivalling Killarney in beauty, we, the other day, rowed across to a lovely island where, in unmarked graves, lie 1,600 convicts. This system has found its 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' in Marcus Clarke's 'For the Term of his Natural Life,' a book the name of which is here in every one's mouth. Those who have lived through the scenes therein described, assure us that while they never could all have occurred in the experience of one connected set of characters, they are based

on truth and have occurred "one hundred times over." By the upper classes here, many of whom have sprung from "old hands," everything is done to erase the memory of those times. Records have been destroyed, the names of places altered, conversation upon the subject is discouraged. Among the people the system is with loathing freely spoken of, and the escapes and adventures of Martin Cash and other outlaws give interest to many a locality and form the subject of many a story. To Irishmen, Port Arthur, Maria Island, Lake Sorell, Bothwell, and other localities will ever be associated with the names of W. Smith

O'Brien, Mitchel, Martin, Meagher, and their compatriots, the exiles of 1848. There are sad and bitter memories connected with the history of Tasmania, but fortunately their continuity has been completely broken. In a certain sense Tasmania is the Ireland of the Australasian colonies, for the most enterprising and vigorous of her sons are likely, for a long time to come, to find wider scope for the exercise of their abilities abroad than at home. But this arises from natural and economic conditions. She is mistress of her own resources and of her own destiny, and has doubtless a happy future before her.

Correspondence.

D. B.

SECRETARY SEWARD AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

be left free to act in any crisis in such manner as their feelings of friendship towards those republics and as their own honor and policy at the time dictate."

In other words, the United States should not be fettered by any doctrine or programme (no true statesman ever acted on a doctrine or dogma), but were to be left free to act as occasion might require. Mr. Calhoun, one of the advisers of Mr. Monroe, who had taken most interest in the declaration, speaking of the Monroe Doctrine in the debate about the ac

quisition of Yucatan, asserted most emphatically that the United States was under no pledge to intervene against intervention, but was to act in each case as policy and justice required (see note 36, p. 97, Wheaton's 'International Law,' Dana's edition).

A resolution introduced by Mr. Clay, January, 1824, in the House of Representatives, "deprecating European combinations to resubjugate the independent American States of Spanish origin, and thus giving support and emphasis to the declaration in the message of December 2, 1823," seems never to have been acted upon, and was not referred to any committee.

Now what were the views of Mr. Seward when France had invaded Mexico in 1862 ? In a dispatch (October 9, 1863) to Mr. Motley, the American Minister at Vienna, who had expressed great alarm at the expedition of Maximilian, and sought instructions as to asking the Emperor of Austria for explana. tions in allowing recruiting for Maximilian's army to go on in his states, and had referred Mr. Seward to the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Seward instructed him not to interfere, using

these remarkable words:

"France has invaded Mexico, and war exists between the two countries. The United States hold in regard to those two states and their conflict the same principles as they hold in relation to all other nations and their mutual wars. They have neither a right nor any disposition to interfere by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish or maintain a republican or even a domestic Government there, or to overthrow an imperial or foreign one, if Mexico shall choose to establish or accept it."

Mr. Seward sent copies of this dispatch to our ministers at Paris, Madrid, and Brussels, undoubtedly for the purpose of advising the Governments to which they were accredited of his views. But, even before that dispatch to Mr. Motley, the writer of these lines was made

that

"in the negotiations for the only application of the Monroe Doctrine to Spanish American affairs which we have ever made-the expulsion of the French from Mexico-there was no mention of the Monroe Doctrine at all... Mr. Seward said he did not undertake to dictate to the Mexican people what kind of government they should have. They might have Maximilian if they pleased, but they must be free to choose; and therefore the French troops should be withdrawn."

Mr. Seward not only felt himself not bound by the Monroe Doctrine, but on several occasions expressly repudiated it, being justified by a resolution of the House of Representatives, passed in 1825 (when the matter was fresh), which was surely intended to be a correct interpretation of the Doctrine. It reads as follows:

"That the United States ought not to become a party with the Spanish-American republics, or either of them, to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing interference by any of the European Powers with their independence or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continents of America; but that the people of the United States should

the Monroe Doctrine, by a dispatch received by him in April, 1863. The French expedition was very unpopular in Spain, and just at that time the Madrid press was full of articles denouncing bitterly the policy of Louis Napoleon. In an entirely unofficial and friendly conversation with Marshal Serrano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, we spoke about the Mexican trouble, and in the course of our talk I mentioned that the present events were quite parallel with those happening in 1823, and that I thought that the Monroe Doctrine would be quite applicable. Serrano did not seem to know much about this doctrine, which I explained to him. In reporting my official conversation with the Foreign Minister to Mr. Seward, I also spoke of our unofficial one, mentioning that I had brought the Monroe Doctrine to the recollection of Marshal Serrano. It was not long before I received a dispatch from Mr. Seward, that the President had approved of what I had discussed with Marshal Serrano officially, but he regretted to have to say that the President had by no means approved of what I had to say in relation to the Monroe Doctrine, and that he desired me to at once call upon Marshal

Serrano and assure him that what I had said regarding the Doctrine was only my private view, and did not express that of my Gov. ernment. Before, however, I received this dispatch, the ministry of which Serrano had been a member was dismissed. I at once had con. cluded, on reading the dispatch, that it was not written for me, but for the French Govern ment, and so I dropped the matter; and, sure enough, I found in the diplomatic correspond. ence of 1863, published by the State Depart ment, in a dispatch from Mr. Washburn, our Minister to Paris, the following passage: "I read your dispatch, No. 51, to Mr. Koerner, our Minister at Madrid, to Mr. Drouyn de Lbuys (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and he expressed his extreme satisfaction with it."

Let me add that Mr. Calhoun has been reported to have said that when the draft of Mr. Monroe's message was laid before the Cabinet for consideration, it did not contain the colonization clause; that that passage was inserted by Mr. Adams, and had never been.considered and approved by the Cabinet. The fact that this clause occurs early in the message, and is followed by much other matter before the non-intervention passage is reached, lends great probability to Mr. Calhoun's remarks, as certainly those two subjects in the message logically would belong together.

In conclusion, I desire to make another point. Great stress has been laid of late on the fact that the English Government received the message of Mr. Monroe with very great satisfaction—that the Liberal press rejoiced at it; and we are favored with extracts to that effect from English journals of that time. This is all very true, for it conformed to the views of the English Government; but it is equally true that Mr. Canning remarked to Mr. Rush, our Minister at the Court of St. James's, that he was very much displeased with the colonization clauses as being built on false premises; that the southern part of the continent was not settled by Christian nations, so as to exclude all further European colonization, but was the abode of roaming savages. Such countries had always been considered as a field for civilized colonization. In some of his speeches he expressed his dissatisfaction with that part of the message, while he enthusiastically ap proved of the non-intervention clause. That the other great Powers of Europe which had just planned intervention do not accept the Monroe Doctrine as binding upon them needs no proof. GUSTAV KOERNER.

BELLEVILLE, ILL., January 20, 1896.

JINGO HISTORY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: In Mr. Cabot Lodge's late speech on the Venezuelan question are some statements that should not go unchallenged :

(1.) Speaking of the bill for the military occupation of Yucatan, to prevent its becoming a British colony, he says: "The war in Yucatan came to an end, and the bill never reached a vote."

Mr. Polk (1848) sent a message to Congress stating that Yucatan had declared its independence of Mexico, and had offered the sovereignty of the country either to the United States or to England; he further stated that the Indians there were conducting a destructive war against the whites, and be declared that the occupation of Yucatan by England would be an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine and that we should resist it. Our army was then in Mexico, and there was no

more necessity for an act of Congress to authorize it to protect the inhabitants from Indians than to storm Chapultepec. As the debate in the Senate shows, the real object of the message was to prevent England from occupying the country. When Mr. Hannegan saw the bill would be beaten, he let himself down easy by moving its postponement; alleging the very inadequate reason that the Indians had stopped killing the white people. Mr. Calhoun, John Davis (Senator from Massachusetts), and others denied that the Monroe Doctrine had any application to the case. Mr. Niles said there was no evidence that the designs of England had been abandoned, if they ever existed; the argument of humanity had been given up the argument of policy remained. The appeal to humanity was a mere makeshift, and was not made an issue in the debate.

(2.) Mr. Lodge says of the Monroe Doctrine that "Mr. Calhoun is the only American statesman of any standing who has tried to limit its scope."

If he will read Mr. Adams's messages explaining the object of the Panama mission, and the debates in Congress upon it, he will see that all of the statesmen of that day repudiate the construction now put upon Mr. Monroe's declaration by Mr. Lodge. In his 'Life of Web ster,' speaking of his speech on the Panama mission, Mr. Lodge says: "He made a full and final exposition of the intent of the Monroe Doctrine." True, he did make a full exposi tion of it, and he gave it the same limited scope and interpretation that Mr. Calhoun did in his Yucatan speech. It was not final, however, for Mr. Lodge has given an entirely dif ferent exposition of it. Both say that there is no general rule as to the circumstances that will justify armed intervention in the conflicts of other nations. Both Calhoun and Webster say that nothing but manifest, imminent dan ger can justify such interference. Mr. Webster thought that if a European armament were sent against Chili and took possession of the country, it would not be a casus belli with us because Chili is so distant, but that it would be different, by reason of its proximity, if it

landed in Cuba. Mr. Calhoun said the same thing. Mr. Lodge says if England takes a strip of land in Venezuela to which the United States thinks she is not entitled, it would justify war. It is all the same to him whether she is near or far away.

(3.) Mr. Lodge quotes the two declarations of Mr. Monroe's message and joins them together, as if they related to the same subjectmatter. He thereby perverts and distorts Mr. Monroe's meaning and creates a false impression. If read in connection with their context, it will be seen that they relate to entirely dif ferent subjects-one to the designs of the Holy Alliance in Spanish America, the other to the negotiation then pending with Russia about the Northwest (Oregon) Territory. It is sup. posed by many that Mr. Monroe said that the United States would not permit any European Power to colonize on either of these continents. He said nothing of the kind. He did say that there was no longer any territory subject to colonization by a European Power. Now, as Mr. Adams's correspondence with the American Minister to Russia, and his special messages to Congress explanatory of the objects of the Panama mission, and Mr. Clay's dispatch to Mr. Poinsett, show, the declaration simply meant that the whole eminent domain

covery and occupation. But this would not exclude the right of acquisition by treaty or conquest.

(4) Mr. Lodge says that slavery was the cause of the failure of the Panama Congress. It may have inspired some of the opposition to the mission; It had nothing to do with its fail. ure. Bolivar had put the same interpretation on the Monroe message that Mr. Lodge does, viz., that it implied a promise of a defensive alliance and protectorate over Spanish America. Hence the United States were invited to participate in the Congress. The disavowal of any such purpose by the friends of the mission in the United States destroyed the illusion. The South American deputies never attended it; the American ministers went and found nothing but yellow fever and mosquitoes. One of them died. The mission was an abortion. JNO. S. MOSBY.

SAN FRANCISCO, January 16, 1896.

AMERICAN HATRED OF ENGLAND. TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: Your editorial on American hatred of England omits two or three factors. One of these is the influence of the school histories in use a generation and more ago. Every one of these books that I read in my youth was pervaded with a distinct anti British animus. The conduct of Great Britain in the Revolu tionary war and the war of 1812 was placed in an odious light. It cannot be said that they were incorrect; but when the facts were presented without reference to the civilization of the times, the inevitable conviction produced in our minds was that every British soldier was a fiend of a peculiarly malignant type, and that every British officer was his abettor. When the antipathy thus engendered had somewhat subsided, the attitude of the English ruling class towards the North, and their outspoken sympathy with the South in the late rebellion, did much to kindle it afresh.

Again, Irish influence in this country is a perennial instigation to our batred of the English. Nobody need be told what a powerful factor the Irish-Americans are in our politics, and five-sixths of them are animated by the most intense animosity against the English | Government and the English people. How far this animosity is justifiable it does not here concern us to inquire-the fact is patent to the most superficial observer. There is, I imagine, hardly a community in any of the Northern States in which the Irish are not making an active propaganda of hatred against the English both by lectures and by newspapers. As our sympathies are always with the injured party, the effect of this crusade of words is easy to predict. As the defence is but feebly represented, or not at all, the resulting mental state of our public would be easy to imagine even if we did not see it. CHAS. W. SUPER. JANUARY 20, 1896.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: Might I suggest, as an additional reason for the hatred of England in the United States, the Englishman's habit of giving his critical faculties full sway wherever he goes? He comes to this country for the first time under the impression that he is visiting his nearest relations, and may therefore speak as freely as if he were dealing with things at home. Only

ers in America, while Americans in England are always Americans-the term "foreigner"