XIII. Before we proceed further, it is proper to take notice of an apparently plausible objection, that may be made against what has been said in this paragraph, but which, if properly examined, will turn greatly to our advantage, and throw new light on the matter before us. The Unitarian might say you have done your best to convince the public, by a variety of instances, that reason itself obliges us to be lieve what we cannot comprehend, and that, of course, the incomprehensibility of mysteries, is, of itself alone, not a sufficient reason for rejecting them; but you will permit me to observe, that there appears to be a vast difference between the cases adduced above, and mysteries.

To this I reply, that, if there be any, let it be pointed out. Here it is, says the Unitarian: It is true, sir, that I cannot conceive, how this world could or should rush into existence, by the simple act of the will of God, but after all, I behold this world, I dwell in it, I enjoy it, and its existence incessantly strikes all my senses. I must agree, likewise, that I do not know the very essence and intrinsic nature of any of the beings that compose the world: but I am constantly environed by them: they are before my eyes, and under my hands: they are subservient to all my wants and conveniences. I am, too, I must confess, in deep darkness as to the nature of my own being, as well as to what passes within myself, but I am con

one Supreme God, with the sword as a scourge on those idolizing Christians ; Men, who seem so much concerned for Mahomet's glory; men of that character, who so openly court the friendship and fellowship in faith with the sworn enemies of the Christian name, leave, assuredly, serious doubts on the public mind, whether they value themselves much for the title of a Christian.

The authority of the above correspondence is set beyond the possibility of a doubt, in the very interesting pamphlet published by the Rev. Henry J. Feltus, Rector of St. Stephen's Church. N. Y. under the following title: Historical Documents and Critical Remarks on Unitarianism and Mahometanism, printed by W. A Mercein, 1820. The same Rev. Author makes it appear, from unquestionable authority, that "Mahometanism, in many respects, has much stronger laims to orthodox Christianity, than Unitarianism; and that the Mahometans have much more exalted sentiments of Jesus Christ, than the Unitarians have, See the Tract just quoted.

scious of my own being and of its modifications. In a word, I have no intimate or adequate knowledge of any of these things, but, to supply this want of adequate and intuitive knowledge, I have proofs of fact, proofs of sentiment, proofs of experience, and these more than suffice me. Let any one produce me such or like proofs in support of the mystery of the Trinity, or of any other mystery, and I am ready to believe. them.

This reflection does honour to the understanding of our opponent; it is that of a man of good sense; and, in consequence of it, I to assure him, that if he be sincere, before long we shall perfectly agree in our belief. He will believe the mystery of the Trinity, and all other mysteries as firmly as I do, and though he smiles, I shall proceed to my demonstration, and reason thus:

You grant, and you cannot but grant, that the mystery of the Trinity, is simply incomprehensible. You agree, likewise, that there is a variety of things, which are unintelligible to us, and which, nevertheless, we are forced to believe, because, if, on the one hand we cannot conceive the possibility of them, we have, on the other, certain proofs of their existence: it is on these two grounds you promise to believe in the mystery of the Trinity, for instance, how incomprehensible soever it may be, if I am able to afford you certain proofs of the said mystery. Well, sir, I am going to give you a certain and infallible proof of the existence of the mystery of the Trinity; a proof which is equivalent to a direct demonstration.-Here is my proof: Are you not convinced, that God is to be believed by men upon the unerring authority of his own testimony, respecting his own nature, his own Being, his manner of existing, and in fine, his own works? Assuredly, you are convinced of this principle; for, in order to deny it, you must needs suppose, either that God does not know himself or his own works, which would be a horrible blasphemy; or, that God may give a false evidence to men respecting his own nature, or that of his works, which would be a blasphemy still more horrid; or, in fine, that men, although convinced of the infinite veracity of God, have, notwithstanding, a right, not to ad

mit the evidence, which God gives concerning his own nature, or his own works, unless he give them clear and intuitive ideas of the objects revealed, and unless he make them clearly understand them—which would be, at once, the height of impiety, and the last degree of folly.

But now, God has declared to men, in the most authentic form, that he exists in three persons, perfectly distinct, in a perfect unity of essence, nature, or substance; therefore, you ought to believe this mystery, how incomprehensible soever it may be, after the same manner as you believe your own existence, or that of the world, because, although you have no intrinsic or intuitive evidence of either, still you have other extrinsic irresistible proofs of the said truths. The irrefragable arguments, in support of this mystery, will form the matter for a distinct number.

SECTION 111.

XV. The assertion, that the mysteries of Religion involve contradiction, is itself a contradiction in the very terms.

Is there not a manifest contradiction, says the Unitarian, in the mystery of the Trinity? How can one, for instance, be three, and three be one?

To this sophism, borrowed from the school of incredulity, we answer thus:

One can be three and three can be one, after the same manner nearly, (without pretending, however, to exact comparison, which is not to be found in created things,) as our soul, considered in its nature as a spiritual substance, is essentially one, and, at the same time, essentially three, when considered as to its powers, memory, understanding, and free will. These three powers subsist in one and the same individual soul, and partake of its nature, and yet, when viewed in their formal capacity, and their peculiar operations, they are distinct from each other; for he, that simply remembers, cannot be truly said to reason or to will, any more than he, that simply wills, can be said either to remember or to reason. Or, to

use a more familiar comparison, our Congressmen are at once, many and one; many, when considered in their individual capacity-one, when considered as a legislative body: as such, they constitute one indivisible government, and possess one common and indivisible power. Thus, you see, sir, that the same thing may, at once, be one and many-one, in one respect, and many, in another: and this is exactly the case with regard to the Trinity, in which there is Unity and Trinity-Unity in nature or substance, and Trinity in persons. There is, therefore, no contradiction.

What then, sir, will be absurd, continues the Unitarian, if this mystery be not so?

My answer is: It will be your mode of reasoning; for you suppose a contradiction where it is impossible to discover any, for the very reason, that this mystery is above your comprehension.

How is it impossible, (you will ask,) to discover a contradiction in the Trinity, or any other mystery?

To make my answer as plain as possible, we must diștinguish three kinds of propositions: evident propositions, absurd and contradictory propositions, and incomprehensible proposi tions. A proposition is evident, when the mind clearly perwith ceives, that the two ideas, of which it is composed, agree each other, and are, to use the very terms of the school, identified. Such are these propositions: God is good: God is just: the whole is greater than any of its parts, severally taken. A proposition is absurd and contradictory, when the mind clearly perceives, that the two ideas, of which it is composed, are jarring with one another, and mutually exclude each other. Such are these propositions: God is unjust: the part is greater than, or equal to, the whole. A proposition is incomprehensible, when it is impossible for the mind to discover the accord, or identity, of the two ideas that compose it. Such are these propositions: A being that has never existed, may receive existence. A being that is in existence, may return to nought. Such would likewise certainly be for you and for me, this proposition, if we had always been out of this world

and out of our bodies: A being composed of a soul and a body, is possible.

Now, it is no more in our power to give our assent to an absurd and contradictory proposition, than to refuse it to an evident one. As to propositions which are simply incomprehensible, two things are certain: the first is, that we are not obliged to admit such propositions as true, unless we have proofs elsewhere of the truth of them, equivalent to intrinsic evidence, which is wanting. The second is, that we have no right to deny them, absolutely, unless, in want of intrinsic evidence of their falsity, we derive elsewhere certain proofs of their falsehood. The reason of this is obvious for who does not see, that, because we do not perceive how two ideas agree, and are identified with each other, it does not follow, that they are contradictory to each other, or that they destroy each other? And, likewise, because we do not perceive that two ideas oppose and exclude each other, it does not follow, that they are compatible and identified with each other. Now, I maintain, that this proposition: there exists one God in three distinct persons, or any other proposition relating to mysteries of faith, are propositions of the third kind, that is to say, propositions simply incomprehensible, which, of course, you cannot absolutely deny, unless you have proofs elsewhere that they are false; nor can you help admitting them, when, in defect of intrinsic evidence, you have, from some other source, undoubted arguments that they are true. Were you told that "three Gods make but one God," or that "three persons make but one person," these two propositions would be contradictory and absurd, because either of them would join together two ideas, which manifestly exclude each other. Three Gods and one only God: these propositions would be of the same kind as this: "the whole is not greater than its part:" but what you are told by Christians, viz. that, "three persons make but one God," is vastly different from the above propositions; and I defy any man in the world to point out a contradiction in this, or any other like propositions, that express mysteries of faith; for contradiction sup