poses a clear and adequate notion of the two ideas, that are joined together in a proposition, and, of course, a clear and adequate notion of the opposition or incompatibility that exists between them. Now, can the Unitarian, can any man, boast of possessing a distinct and comprehensive knowledge of what relates to mysteries? Do you, for instance, sufficiently know the intrinsic nature of the divine essence, so as to be able to pronounce with certainty, that it cannot comport with three persons? Or, have you an idea sufficiently clear of person, as far as it relates to the Divine Being, to affirm without fear of mistake, that three persons are repugnant to the same divine Being? Let the same be applied to all other mysteries: you assert, for instance, that original sin, and two natures in one and the same person of Jesus Christ involve contradiction. And whence do you know this? Did you ever penetrate the adorable essence of the divine nature? Do you clearly know, how far the rights of the infinite justice of God, and of his sovereign dominion, extend, in regard to man, his creature? Have you a clear idea of original sin, as far as it is propagated in the descendants of Adam, and as far as it affects them? Are you sufficiently acquainted with the divine nature, and the properties of a divine person, with their intrinsic relations and bearings, to decide with full assurance, that the two natures cannot be united in one and the same Christ? No, sir, you have not, you cannot have, in what relates to divine mysteries, a clear, distinct, and adequate idea, for the very reason, that they are above the sphere of reason. It is, of course, utterly out of your power to discover any contradiction in them.

Thus, mysteries are incomprehensible; to deny them on no other ground, but because they are incomprehensible, would be to suppose, that God cannot reveal to man what exceeds the sphere of his understanding, which is downright impiety but when it is demonstrated, by indubitable evidence, that God has revealed them, it is both folly and irreligion to reject them. Such are the principles of Christians, principles sanctioned by reason. We Christians follow the

example of a man born blind, whom we all resemble so much, especially in things that relate to God. This blind man sees neither the skies, nor the majestic luminary which the Lord has placed therein all, therefore, that he can say of himself, is, that he sees neither the sky nor the sun; he would be rash, were he to say any thing more, and were he to pronounce, absolutely, that there is neither sky nor sun; but when those around unite in telling him that there is a sky and a sun ; that they see both, and are ravished with the spectacle presented to their view, he believes them on their word, though he has no idea of what they tell him, and he would act like a fool, were he not to believe them. Yes, were the blind man obstinately to maintain, that there is neither sky nor sun, because he does not see them himself; nor colours, because he cannot form an idea of them; you would consider him as blind in his mind as in his body. And is not this exactly the procedure of Unitarians? "Mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur."

SECTION IV.

XVI. What is above reason is not always against reason. After all, is it not a maxim generally admitted amongst philosophers, that, "what is above reason, is against reason?""

To this anti-christian principle, I answer: If, what is above reason, is always against reason, then the existence of this universe, our own existence, and, finally, the very existence of God, are against reason; for they are certainly above reason, as has been demonstrated.

This maxim is borrowed, not from wise men, but from frantic sophisters, who, finding nothing wherewith to attack religion with success in those ancient principles, which were admitted at all times, and by all nations, and which are the common light of rational beings, and the very foundations of reason, formed the scheme of contriving arbitrary principles: from these principles they draw such inferences as they wish to draw; as it is for the very purpose of drawing No. I.

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such consequences, they invented them whence it happens, that the principle originates in the consequence, whereas the consequence ought to follow from the principle. Those sophisters proceed exactly like one that would define man to be, an animal with two legs, and without feathers," in order to be able to conclude, that a goose, devested of its feathers, is a man. Can there be any thing more extravagant? This, their pretended axiom is, in the main, but empty wit, which signifies nothing; for when they say that all that is above reason is against reason, they mean to speak either of the reason of man, or of the sovereign, uncreated, and infinite reason of God. If they mean the reason of man, this proposition is disgustingly absurd, as it is self-evident that the world presents to men an infinity of mysteries which are above reason, and which this same reason is nevertheless forced to admit : and if they mean to speak of the reason of God, this proposition is equally absurd; because they then must suppose, that there are things which are above the sovereign reason of God; a supposition the most revolting to the very first notions we have of the Supreme Being, and I must add, the most impious, as it necessarily implies, that nothing is true but what is demonstrated as such to man, that is to say, but what he can comprehend; and, of course, that what man cannot comprehend, God himself cannot comprehend.

XVII. Our Unitarian friend is not yet done: reason, says he, is one, and, of course, the reason of God and the reason of man, are not two reasons, but the same reason, and, by a necessary consequence, what is according to the reason of man, is according to the reason of God, and what is against the reason of man, is against the reason of God. This is marvellous reasoning indeed it is exactly as if you were to say: the water of a fountain is the same as that of the ocean; the light of ray is the same as that of the sun; therefore, with the water of a fountain, I can water and fertilize as large a tract of land, as with all the waters of the ocean; and with one ray of the sun, I can see as many objects, and as distinctly, as I can with all the light of the sun. The comparison, however, is far

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from being exact; for there is some proportion between one drop of water, and all the waters of the seas; between the light of a ray of the sun, and that of the sun itself: both these objects being essentially of a limited nature-but between the reason of man, which is essentially finite, and the reason of God, which is infinite, there can be no proportion at all.

Reason is one; that is to say, that, what has been demonstrated to be true by an evident principle, cannot be demonstrated to be false by another evident principle; because principles do not contradict each other: whence it results, that faith is not contrary to reason; because for the very reason that a doctrine is evidently revealed by the God of infinite veracity, it is self-evident that it cannot be false or contrary to reason. In any other point of view, there exists an infinite difference between the reason of man and the reason of God. God knows all things; man knows almost nothing. God knows all the relations which things have to one another; man perceives but few of those relations, and scarce ever otherwise than in a confused manner. God judges infallibly of the nature of those relations in which things stand with each other: man may be mistaken, and is, indeed, often mistaken, in his judgment about the relations of the things which he knows. Thus man rushes into a thousand errors, suffers himself to be deluded by a thousand prejudices, draws at every turn false and rash inferences; in a word, man, that rational animal, is every moment at variance with reason and good sense. What then must we think, when, to use the language of the Apostle, we behold that pitiful animal insolently rising up against the infinite knowledge of God? When we see man argue with his God, and maintain that, what he has revealed, is not, or cannot be? when we see him demand of God his proofs, and solemnly protest to God, that he will not believe him, unless he see and comprehend what he reveals? Is it possible to unite so much rashness with so much weakness ?*

* Let the insolent creature, who pretends to have a right to dispute with his God, and to call him to an account at the bar of his haughty reason, turn over to the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st chapters of the book of Job: "Then the Lord

Why, then, (so goes on our Unitarian friend,) do Christians say, that in order to believe the mysteries of religion, man must renounce his reason? If they be not against reason, why, in order to believe them, should he be obliged to give up his reason?

This objection obviously rests upon nothing but a pitiful equivocation. Christians say, that in order to believe the mysteries of religion, man must renounce, not reason, but his reason; that is to say, not the light of reason, but the curiosity of his reason, which claims a right to know and to fathom every thing; the pride of his reason, which affects a ridiculous independence; the rashness of his reason, which persuades him, that, what he does not comprehend and clearly conceive, cannot be true. Thus, in renouncing, not reason, but my reason, it is reason itself that guides me. How so? Because my reason dictates to me, that, as God on the one hand comprehends infinitely more things than a created being can understand; and as on the other he has a right to be believed on his sacred word in what he is pleased to reveal to men, how incomprehensible soever it be to them, the best and most noble use I can make of my reason, is that of submitting it to God's infallible oracles: the submission, therefore, with which I believe the most impenetrable mysteries, is, to use the words of the Apostle, a rational submission, rationabile obsequium, that is to say, a submission, for which reason itself furnishes me the motives, and motives not only probable and plausible, but altogether evident. What I believe, is ob

answered Job out of a whirlwind, and said: Who is this that wrappeth up sentences in unskilful words? Gird up thy loins like a man: I will ask thee, and answer thou me. Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me, if thou hast understanding, who has laid the measure thereof, if thou knowest? or who has stretched the line upon it? Upon what are its bases grounded? or who laid the corner stone thereof? When the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody? Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth, as issuing out of the womb? When I made a cloud a garment thereof, and wrapped it in a mist as in swaddling bands? I set my bounds around it, and made it bars and doors; and I said: hitherto shalt thou come, and shalt go no further; and here thou shalt break thy swelling waves. Didst thou know then that thou shouldst be born, and didst thou know the number of thy days? &c. &c."