LECTURE II.

Of the Nature and Ufe of TOPICS.

A

LL the kinds of composition may be reduced to two, viz. NARRATION and ARGUMENTATION. For either we propofe fimply to relate facts, with a view to communicate information, as in Hiftory, natural or civil, Travels, &c. or we lay down fome propofition, and endeavour to prove or explain it.

With respect to Narration of any kind, it is fuperfluous to fay much about it under the firft head of Recollection, or Invention, except fo far as facts are wanted for the purpose of argumentative difcourfes. The chief affistance that those who compose only in the narrative ftyle can expect from the art of oratory, is in digefting and adorning their compositions; and these articles will be confidered in the second and third parts of these lectures.

The whole business, therefore, of artificial recollection must, in a manner, be confined to the use of those who compose argumentative difcourfes, whofe minds are previously furnished with every argument and obfervation proper to be introduced into them; but who may not be able to find them fo readily as they could wish. To such persons the following directions and obfervations may not be unuseful.

RECOL

RECOLLECTION comprehends whatever is proper to be faid upon any subject; that is, all the thoughts or fentiments that make up the body of a difcourfe.. Thefe, which may be called the nerves and finews of a compofition, may all be confidered as arguments in proof of what is advanced. Now every argument that can with propriety be brought as a proof of a propofition, should bear fome kind of relation to both the terms of it. For, according to logicians, every propofition afferts the agreement or difagreement of two ideas, or things, which are called the fubject and predicate, or attribute of the propofition. If the agreement or difagreement of thefe do not appear at firft view, we make use of another idea, called a middle term, which, being severally applied to them both, will, by informing us of the relation they both bear to it, enable us to judge of the relation they both bear to one another. bear fome relation to both the others, it will be impoffible to compare them together by the help of it..

But unless this third idea.

I fhall illuftrate these obfervations by the example of the following propofition: Every good man is a wife man. It may not be apparent, at first view, that the fubject and attribute of this propofition do really coincide, as is afferted in it. In order to show that, notwithstanding this, they really do agree, I introduce another idea, viz. the making ufe of the means of happiness; and by confidering that a good man is one who lives and acts in fuch a manner as will fecure his greatest happiness, which is also the object of the trueft wifdom; I fee that the defcription of a good man intirely agrees with that of a wife man, and that they are the fame perfon, which the propofition afferts. But I could not have made use of this intermediate idea, in order to fhew the relation of the terms to one another, unless it had borne fome relation

I.

lation to them both, and had thereby been capable of being compared with them.

In this cafe, the relation that means of happiness bears to goodnefs is that of effect; goodness being the fource of those actions which tend to produce true happiness; as the relation that the idea of the means of happiness bears to wisdom is that of means, or inftrument, which wisdom employs to effect her purpose. And it is not improbable but that if a person had considered the natural effects of virtue and goodness, and what cause of actions a wife man would be led to adopt, he would have hit upon this idea, which furnishes fo clear an argument in proof of the propofition in question. Or again, the fame idea might have occurred to a person who had carefully confidered the definitions of the terms of his propofitions; fince he would have found that property of goodness connected with those ideas which form the characteristic of wisdom. So that either the relation of cause and effect, that of means and end, or the definition of terms might have led the mind of the composer to the idea he wanted. These are called COMMON PLACES, TOPICS, or GENERAL HEADS, under which arguments of all kinds may be claffed, and an attention to them may suggest the arguments that fall under them.

It belongs to the art of oratory to point out these topics, common places, or general heads to which all arguments may be reduced; that, whenever we undertake to prove any thing, by running over the titles of them in our minds, our thoughts may be directed to what fuits our purpose. To make the use of these topics still more intelligible and easy, I fhall illustrate each of them by an example or two.

All

All propofitions, or things to be proved, metaphyfically confidered, may be reduced to the fame form; as being a declaration of the coincidence of the subject and attribute of them. Thus if I fay, that man is mortal, I mean that my idea of man coincides with my idea of a mortal being, or a being fubject to death; or if I fay, Alexander conquered Darius, I mean that my idea of Alexander, and of the person who conquered Darius, are the fame. We fhall, however, find it most convenient, in the business of popular oratory, to quit this general idea, and confider all propofitions, or subjects of discourse, as fubdivided into two kinds, viz. univerfal, and particular propofitions.

Universal propofitions are those which have no relation to particular persons, times, or places, but are at all times, in all places, and with regard to all perfons, true or false; as these, man is mortal; virtue makes the happiness of man; the three angles of every right-lined triangle are equal to two rectangles. This head includes all metaphyfical and mathematical subjects.

Particular propofitions are those which have relation to, and are limited by, particular persons, times, or places; as Alexander conquered Darius; France is larger than England; Carthage was founded before Rome, &c. This head comprehends all historical debates, geographical, and chronological knowledge, confultations about the intereft of particular ftates at particular times, judicial inquiries into the actions of particular persons, and all perfonal panegyric, or invective.

I divide all fubjects of difcourfe into these two kinds, because the topics of argument fuited to each are very confiderably diftinct; though things which relate to particular persons, times, or places, may often, with propriety, be introduced into a discourse upon a propofition that is univerfally true, or univerfally false,

without respect to any particular perfon, time, or place; and, fince every thing that is particular is comprehended in that which is univerfal, arguments relating to particular persons, places, and times, may be fetched from those topics, which are peculiarly adapted to univerfal propofitions.

Convenient topics for univerfal propofitions are the following: Definition, Adjuncts, Antecedents, Confequents, Means, Analogy, Contrariety, Example and Authority.

Before I explain these topics, I would obferve, that it is not very material, with respect to the real use of them, whether the diftribution be metaphyfically exact; particularly, whether fome of them, ftrictly speaking, be not fuperfluous, as being comprised under others; as, for example, whether it might not have been fufficient to have comprised example under the head of confequents. It is fufficient if, by attending to them, The table may be too

the mind be led to proper arguments.

The table

fcanty, but can hardly be too full. Notwithstanding this, a great deal of the redundancy of other tables is retrenched in this.

LECTURE